saltminer
16d ago
This is an excellent comment, and I largely agree with your taxonomy and framing. In particular, I think you’re exactly right that reference-class forecasting shines most when you have (a) stable baselines and (b) a well-posed question to begin with. Your distinction between known unknowns and unknown unknowns maps very cleanly onto where forecasting techniques feel powerful versus where they feel brittle in practice.
Your intelligence-analysis perspective also rings true to me. Using the outside view as a stabilizer against excited inside-view narratives is, in my experience, one of the highest-leverage applications of forecasting. In most real-world settings, the dominant failure mode isn’t underreaction but overreaction to new, salient information, and reference classes are a very effective corrective.
Where I’d push back slightly—and I mean this as a nuance rather than a rejection—is on COVID as an example of a true black swan in the Taleb sense.
I agree completely with your café-owner framing: for many individuals, COVID was effectively unaskable ex ante, and therefore indistinguishable from an unknown unknown. At the decision-maker level, it absolutely behaved like a black swan. That’s an important and underappreciated point.
However, at the system level, I’m less convinced it was unforeseeable. A number of people did, in fact, raise the specific risk in advance:
Bill Gates publicly warned in 2015 that global pandemic preparedness was dangerously inadequate and that a fast-moving virus was a more realistic threat than many conventional disaster scenarios.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology had been criticized multiple times prior to 2020 for operating at biosafety levels below what many thought appropriate for the research being conducted.
More broadly, pandemic risk had a nontrivial base rate in the epidemiology and biosecurity literature, even if the exact trigger and timing were unknown.
On a more personal note (and not meant as special pleading), I discussed viral and memetic contagion risks repeatedly in The Dark Arts of Rationality: Updated for the Digital Age, which was printed several months before COVID.
All of which is to say: COVID may not have been a black swan so much as a gray rhino—a high-impact risk that was visible to some, articulated by a few, but ignored by most institutions and individuals because it didn’t map cleanly onto their local decision models.
I think this distinction matters for forecasting as a discipline. It suggests that one of the core failures isn’t predictive ability per se, but attention allocation: which warnings get surfaced, amplified, and translated into actionable questions for the people whose decisions hinge on them. In that sense, I think you’re exactly right that Tetlock’s next frontier—teaching people how to ask better questions—is the crux.
So I’d summarize my position as: Forecasting works best in domains with history and well-posed questions, struggles at the edges, and fails catastrophically when important questions never get asked. But some events we label “unpredictable” may actually be predictable but institutionally invisible—which is a slightly different (and potentially more tractable) failure mode.
Curious whether that distinction resonates with your experience in intelligence work, or if you think I’m still underestimating the true weight of the unknown-unknown problem.
That kind of highly-polarised tribalism is a very dangerous game to play. In the short-term, it gets your group what they want, but in the long-term it fuels lots of resentment towards them. This kind of heavily-polarized tribal mindset is the reason that the Jews have been driven out of almost every country they took up residence in. It was only until WW2 - when Jews learned the costs of these cultural traits and adapted their society to be more multicultural and less insular - that their worldwide persecution stopped. And I think that if the Jews ever went back to their insular pre-WW2 attitudes (with the "us against them" mentality that many non-Jews find so distasteful), it would very quickly become socially acceptable to persecute them again.
Like I said, nobody likes freeloaders. You can't be part of a nation while prioritizing tribal loyalties over national identity. This kind of mindset is rightfully viewed as disloyalty at best, and treason at worst. In other words, if you are an American Jew, then you're American first and Jewish second. If you can't handle that - if you view your Jewish identity as more important than your American identity - then you don't deserve American citizenship. Likewise, if the Hasidic Israelis view themselves as Hasidics first and Israelis second, then they don't deserve Israeli citizenship.
You're talking about Russians not upholding peaceful goals when they're not at peace. That makes no sense.
For example, imagine that I'm a Roman general and I'm talking to a barbarian tribe that I want to assimilate into Rome. I make them a promise like "If you accept our terms, not only will your current leadership be allowed to remain in power, but we promise that your tribe will maintain its freedom and we promise not to enslave any of you." The leader's response is to tell me to go screw myself. So I send in the legions, execute the barbarian leadership, and start taking lots of slaves to send back to Rome.
Now the barbarians start complaining "You promised that you would allow our existing leadership to remain in power, and that you wouldn't take any slaves!" Are the barbarians being reasonable here? My promise was entirely contingent on them accepting my terms. They didn't do that; instead they chose to fuck around and find out. So I have zero obligations towards them, and in fact from the perspective of Rome it's good that I'm making a horrible example of them because it'll teach other barbarian tribes what happens when they choose to cross Rome instead of playing nice. I think that in this example, the barbarians are out of line to complain about me failing to uphold a promise of fair treatment when that promise was entirely contingent on them playing nice and helping me to accomplish Rome's goals.
This is how I feel we're holding Russia to unfair standards. For better or worse, Russia and Ukraine are enemies now, which means we can't expect Russia to respect Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainians chose to fuck around and find out, so now Russia's goals changed from cooperative to punitive, which is basically the entire point of a war - to punish the other side for refusing to accept your diplomatic terms. Do I think Ukraine deserves to be taken over? No, of course not. But I can't condemn Russia for trying to dissolve Ukrainian ethnonationalist identity when that ethnonationalist identity is part of what made Ukraine oppose Russian goals in the first place. They're at war and in war you have no obligation to play nice with your opponent.
I view removing Soviet monuments in the Baltic states the same way as I view the U.S. removing Confederate monuments - it is a short-sighted attempt by ideological tyrants to rewrite history and force it to conform to whatever ideological fad is currently dominant in their society. This mindset is disgusting and I oppose anybody who supports it.
Now I'm not saying that these monuments should remain standing in public when they're clearly offensive to so many people. By all means, remove them from public display in the city streets. But like it or not, they're art - and more importantly, they're art with significant historical value. They belong in a museum, where people who want to see them can go and study them to their heart's content. History never looks kindly on people who destroy historical artifacts to appeal to whichever short-term political view is trending, and I personally view people like that as barbaric savages.
saltminer
3yr ago
The reason why there aren't more left-wing posters here is because they tend to have trouble playing by the rules. I want a place where we can talk in a reasonable logical way about any topic ranging from video games to genocide, both in terms of the pros and cons. A lot of Leftists seem to have trouble disassociating their emotions from their intellect. The second somebody makes a reasonable point that emotionally disturbs them or makes them feel threatened, they tend to get angry. The solution to this is not to coddle them and indulge their emotional temper tantrums, it is to punish them until they learn that they need to change their behavior, not us.
I agree with you that it would be nice to see more diversity of thought here, but not by giving Leftists a pass to break the rules every time they get emotionally triggered. We simply need to enforce the rules and gather more power until we are the dominant narrative, at which point Leftists will be forced to change their behavior if they want to participate in the dominant online discourse instead of being marginalized in their echo chambers. How is this unfair? We're not shutting them out, we're simply preventing them from shutting down other people's discourse with emotional appeals.
saltminer
3yr ago
I understand that this happens as lot in Israel too, and fuels a lot of Israeli unhappiness towards the Hasidics (who also refuse to perform the military service that is mandatory for Israelis because it "violates their religious tenets."
No successful society tolerates parasites and freeloaders in their midst. The reason the West is failing is because our leaders are gutless people-pleasers who lack the moral culture to persecute any minorities who behave this way, for fear that they'll be accused of bigotry.
saltminer
3yr ago
Great post, I agree with everything you are saying.
I've written a lot about many of these topics in my online substack, but this is the one that I feel seems most relevant, in regards to your first point - the replacement of science with "ScIeNcE."
https://questioner.substack.com/p/how-to-make-enemies-and-influence
This is a very thoughtful comment—thank you for taking the time to lay it out so clearly. Also, thanks for the reading recommendations; I’m familiar with Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, but I haven’t read all three you listed, and I appreciate the pointers. The intelligence-community framing is very much adjacent to how I think about this problem.
Let me try to respond to both the theoretical and practical questions in turn.
Theoretical question: what assumptions are superforecasters actually making?
I think your concern is a real one, and I don’t think there’s a fully satisfying, formally rigorous answer yet.
You’re right that most forecasting implicitly assumes something like: there exists a stable-enough probability distribution over futures that can be approximated and scored. And you’re also right that if the underlying distribution is heavy-tailed, discontinuous, or adversarial in the wrong ways, then many common scoring and evaluation methods can look “good” right up until they catastrophically fail. Finance is full of examples of exactly this dynamic.
Two clarifications about my own claims:
I did not use leverage. The 40% average annual return I mentioned was achieved without leverage. I agree completely that high apparent performance with hidden ruin risk is trivial to generate, and I’m very wary of arguments that don’t control for that.
I don’t have a clean statistical confidence interval for my forecasting ability. I wish I did. What I can say—without pretending it’s a theorem—is that when I pitched this approach to VCs last year, several were interested in investing on the order of ~$2M. That’s not proof of correctness, but it does suggest that sophisticated actors found the combination of reasoning and track record at least plausible. (For the record, I embarrassed myself by not having the proper licenses lined up before pitching a hedge fund idea, which is a lesson I learned the hard way.)
More broadly, I think the honest answer is that superforecasting rests on a weak ontological assumption rather than a strong one: not that the world is well-behaved, but that some environments are predictable enough, often enough, to beat naive baselines. The goal isn’t asymptotic optimality; it’s persistent edge.
Where I personally diverge from the “pure scoring-rule” framing is that I don’t think of forecasting as approximating a single global distribution. Instead, I think of it as model selection under uncertainty, where the models themselves are provisional and frequently discarded. That doesn’t fully resolve the Cauchy-vs-Gaussian problem you raise—but it does mean I’m less committed to any single assumed distribution than the formalism might suggest.
Practical question: forecasting in a narrow, expert domain
Your North Korea example is excellent, and I agree with your diagnosis of the problem. If all you ask are first-order, low-entropy questions (“Will war break out this year?”), you get almost no learning signal, even if your answers are technically correct.
This is where my approach probably diverges from how most superforecasters would describe their own methods, and I want to be clear that I’m not claiming this is canonical.
Very roughly, my technique is to lean heavily on macro-level regularities and treat individuals as if they were particles—subject to incentives, constraints, and flows—rather than as unique narrative agents. At that level of abstraction, societies start to behave less like chess games and more like fluid systems. You can’t predict the motion of a single molecule, but you can often predict pressure gradients, bottlenecks, and phase transitions.
Applied to your case, that suggests focusing less on isolated facts (rice prices, phones) and more on questions that proxy for stress, throughput, and constraint relaxation. The exact phrasing matters less than whether the question sits on a causal pathway that connects to higher-level outcomes you care about.
You’re also right that the skill of asking good questions is the real bottleneck. My (imperfect) heuristic is to ask:
Does this variable aggregate many micro-decisions?
Is it constrained by hard resources or incentives?
Would a large deviation here force updates elsewhere?
Those questions won’t necessarily predict war directly—but they can tell you when the system is moving into a regime where war becomes more or less likely.
Finally, I agree with you that the intelligence community is one of the few places where calibration is actually rewarded rather than punished. In many ways, I think superforecasting is a partial rediscovery—by civilians—of techniques analysts have been developing for decades, albeit with better scoring and feedback loops.
I don’t think your concerns undermine forecasting as a practice. I think they correctly point out that it’s a tool with sharp edges, and that the hardest problems aren’t about probability math but about question selection, regime change, and institutional attention.
If you’re open to it, I’d actually be very interested in how you decide which NK-related variables are worth tracking at all—that feels like exactly the frontier Tetlock is gesturing at.
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