vorpa-glavo
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User ID: 674
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
Calling an adoptive child "my son", or my wife's mother "mother-in-law" isn't intuitive either. It is a social convention concerning common ways we stretch and skew language.
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
Er, but "man" and "woman" really do have an objective scientific meaning, unlike "relative", which is a social convention.
I'm not sure that I've heard the objective, scientific meaning of "man" and "woman" that doesn't fall prey to the Diogenes-style "behold Plato's man" objection.
I think a gamete-based definition is a strong option (and Trump seems to agree, based on his EO) or a cluster-of-traits definition. But even those have their flaws.
And even aside from core definitions, I think this ignores the way words often operate at many levels. A "bear" is centrally an animal, but if I call a bear-shaped toy or a fictional bear character a "bear", I'm stretching and skewing the word in a way that is immediately intuitively understandable to an English speaker, even though in a real, literal sense I'm not actually talking about any kind of bear at all.
A "woman" could centrally be an "adult human of the sex that produces large gametes", and we could still allow for stretched usages like calling a particular type of game piece in a board game a "woman", or granting trans women the status of honorary "women."
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
There already are laws passed in various European countries that literally allow this, the only limit that I'm aware of being frequency.
Could you point me in the direction of these laws? Do they allow you to self-ID without letting anyone know until you're called on it, or do they require you to file paperwork with the government still? Because filing paperwork is still a form of social proof in my book.
vorpa-glavo
1yr ago
Personally when something is that frequently out of whack it goes beyond “natural” to something else.
I feel like you're exhibiting the same "representation fallacy" that a lot of left-wing idpol people do. Imagine we're in a spherical cow world where the main cast of every piece of media (be it a commercial or a movie) is 10 people and Hollywood produces 100 high profile movies/commercials in a year, and you're evaluating all of the media produced in the past year for its representativeness of the general population, across a variety of identity categories.
It is going to be trivially true that the media is not going to reflect the general population, either on a case by case basis or taken as a whole. It's just a huge coordination problem. If LGB people are around 5-10% of the population, then to get "accurate" representation, every other movie would need to have a gay person in it. But if their gayness is going to be a relevant trait, then two of our 10 cast members probably need to be gay (so they can be in a gay relationship together), and that is already going to create a wonky balancing problem when it comes to movies that aim to portray gay people.
And the problem only deepens if you consider movies like Moana, which would have 10 polynesian characters in it (thus accounting for 1% of the total characters in spherical cow world's yearly evaluation), when polynesians are around 0.5% of the total population.
I think the "rounding error" problem is always going to be present when it comes to representation in films. I also see it being an issue for panel discussions. I have a female friend who was indignant that professional conferences don't try to have a 50/50 split of males and females on panel discussions, but even ignoring the demographics of certain professions like STEM fields being majority male to begin with, you're always going to have the problem that when putting together a panel discussion, you're presumably prioritizing goals other than equality (such as, "Wouldn't it be nice to have someone who wrote a book about this topic recently?" or "We want to balance the panel with opposing viewpoints, so lets try to find the most prominent person who believes ~X, and see if they're willing to fly out and participate on our dime"), and large professional conferences are also operating under constraints of who will actual attend and who actual wants to be on a panel in the first place. Add in the fact that an odd-numbered panel number will always result in an imbalance of some kind, and I think it's completely unreasonable to want more women (or more anyone) on a panel discussion.
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
Many people find this to be their main sticking point with the pronoun stuff. Not only is somebody lying, they want everyone else to lie too.
I don't think this is truly people's objection, whatever else they may say.
I think there are a ton of cases where a fuzzy boundary, usually corresponding to some biological reality, gets bridged with an honorary status. Whether it is adoption of children creating honorary blood relations, or conversion to ethnoreligions like the ex-Muslim Vaishnavite convert Haridasa Thakur or the Biblical Ruth's adoption of Jewish customs and ways.
I think the "adoption" model (which I've sometimes called the "socio-legal sex" model) of trans people is the closest to being an accurate statement of the reality of trans people, and it has the advantage of not requiring any dubious metaphysics. A transwoman is a woman in the same way and to the same degree that an adopted child is their adoptive parent's child. Obviously, neither adoption nor transness are objective facts about reality - they are intersubjective facts about human social relationships and (potentially) associated legal structures
There is no lie in saying, "Augustus was Julius Ceasar's son" any more than there is a lie in saying "The United States has 50 states" or any number of other intersubjective human-created "truths." Of course, with these kinds of truths, there will always be room for rivalrous claims. If I say, "There is no King of England", then depending on what I mean by that, I could be saying a perfectly "true" fact. (For example, if I was an anarchist, and didn't regard any monarchical claim as valid.)
vorpa-glavo
11mo ago
If woke cancellation tactics were already forms of disproportionate retribution against random unknown people, how is adopting the same tactic on the right going to result in a better equilibrium?
First of all, it doesn't end up hurting that many people directly, since only a small minority are going to get cancelled in the first place, and that makes it hard for people to take it seriously enough to do something about it. But second of all, I'm not actually sure there is much that can be done about it, short of passing laws that protect the jobs of randos, and making those laws have teeth. Like, plenty of my progressive friends IRL hate cancel culture and wokescolds as much as any right winger, but they don't have any power to stop the decentralized mobs calling for firings.
How does tit-for-tat even work with a large, decentralized collective anyways?
vorpa-glavo
1yr ago
Except we won't get them, and you know why as well as I do.
As big Hollywood movies, maybe not. But even I am sometimes surprised at what people are able to come up with.
Miku Binder Thomas Jefferson might have been super cringe, but I also think it was 100% sincere and "organic", even by your own standards. Some Gen Z artist saw Hamilton, and liked that depiction of Thomas Jefferson by a black actor in a play enough to take it one level further. That's just how people interact with media in this day and age.
Look at this list of Undertale AU's. All of that seems completely organic to me. Some people just like imagining their favorite video game characters in a cozy coffee shop, or as vampires, or whatever. This is only even scratching the surface - there are Undertale AU's that have their own Undertale AU's that have their own Undertale AU's with videos on Youtube that have thousands of views. It's a wild rabbit hole.
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
I'm not sure that I've observed this inconsistency.
What are some instances where you think the definitions are strong, and on trans people's sides that they tend to bring up?
In many ways, the core of my adoptive sex model is one that sidesteps definitions all together. Sure, call trans women "men" if you want - that has absolutely no bearing on whether they're an honorary woman, because honorary statuses exist in the social realm not the empirical realm.
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
I don't think I've ever endorsed the view that trans people can choose their gender at any given moment, any more than I've endorsed the view that you can just adopt an orphaned child at any given moment. I think in most cases and with most social groups, honorary statuses will require some kind of "social proof" for a group to accept them. In the case of adoption, it might look like filling out a bunch of forms with the government. In the case of trans people, it might look like paying $50 at your DMV to get your sex indicators changed on your driver's license.
The "social proof" doesn't have to involve the government, though that is usually the "easiest" path since it means that the people with the ability to enforce contracts through their monopoly on force recognize your claim as legitimate. However, if a national disaster created a 10 year state of anarchy, I think people in a community that already believed in the basic legitimacy of child adoption could have informal adoption with enough social proof that most of the people in a community recognized the validity of the claim.
vorpa-glavo
10mo ago
Do you believe there are ever any circumstances where it is okay to attack the US congress? Do you believe that there are any actions that the US congress could commit that would ever make violence against them acceptable?
I think the difficulty I have is that we in the United States aren't a nation. The United States isn't and has never been defined by being a single ethnic group sharing a common birth. We are a civic state, defined by our ideals and institutions. (This is the reason American conservatives are so different than "blood and soil" European conservatives. By and large, even the conservatives are classical liberals in the United States.) Because we got our start in a bloody revolution justifying itself based on a conception of natural rights, it must be the case that there are circumstances where it is alright to attack a government and its representatives. But despite this being a core part of the ideology under-girding the United States, I'm dissatisfied that the vast majority of people seem to think that it is never okay to rebel or engage in violence against the state and its actors.
If one of the justifications of the 2nd Amendment is that capacity of violence against the state needs to be preserved to lessen oppression and tyranny, why is it that in practice the set of "tyrannical acts that would justify violence against the state" seem to always be an empty set? Is it because America truly is the freest country ever conceived with no hints of tyranny and oppression anywhere in its 200+ year history? When is violence against the state ever justified?
vorpa-glavo
10mo ago
I suppose I didn't make myself clear. I am somewhat sympathetic to motives of the Puerto Rican nationalists of 1954, and I don't have a great argument for why they should have seen political violence as beyond the pale given their island's relationship to the United States. The ordinary means of political redress were denied to the Puerto Ricans, and violence seems reasonable enough under those circumstances, even if I prefer if Congress would not be attacked by people for the sake of stability.
While I don't think January 6 posed all that great a risk to the country given how badly executed it was, I tend to be less sympathetic to the January 6 rioters. A big part of this is because I don't think the thing they were angry about - stolen elections - were a "legitimate" complaint, if we don't engage in a motte and bailley about what we mean by a "stolen election."
However, what makes one "acceptable" and one "unacceptable"? I would prefer if there were easy and widely accepted principles for when political violence was considered acceptable, but the mainstream answer seems to "never, except in retrospect."
vorpa-glavo
10mo ago
The point of criminal laws is not to ensure that a thing never happens. We outlaw murder, but there will always be murders. The point of laws is threefold: 1) to discourage other criminals from committing the crime in question, 2) to reform the criminal so they never commit the crime again, and 3) if 2 is impossible, to safely contain a criminal away from the rest of society so that everyone else is safe.
My guess is that the number of gun-related assassination attempts in Japan over the last 50 years is probably going to be less than the equivalent number per capita in the United States. Now, if all-cause assassinations per capita were the same between the two countries (all else being equal), that would be evidence that gun control is unlikely to play much of a role in preventing assassination attempts.
vorpa-glavo
1yr ago
I actually think the Wikipedia page on women walks a fair line on the topic. The very first sentence uses "adult female human" as its core definition, and the second paragraph starts:
Typically, women are of the female sex and inherit a pair of X chromosomes, one from each parent, and fertile women are capable of pregnancy and giving birth from puberty until menopause.
I don't view the use of the word "typically" here the way you do. I think it is an appropriate amount of nuance for a reference work, since it makes room for discussion of intersex women. Now, I acknowledge that there's various decisions about how and when to include references to atypical examples in an encyclopedia, but I maintain that including mention of intersex women somewhere in the article about women is appropriate. Given the article's sections:
- Etymology
- Terminology
- Biology
- Sexuality and gender
- Health
- Femininity
- History
- Culture and gender roles
- Clothing, fashion and dress codes
- Fertility and family life
- Education
- Government and politics
- Science, literature and art
- Gender symbol
I could see the argument for keeping discussion of intersex women to the biology section, and creating a subsection for trans women under Culture and gender roles or something. But I don't really think that the Wikipedia article on the whole screams "captured by trans activists" to me.
vorpa-glavo
2yr ago
The strongest form of the gamete definition is not gamete-focused around a cluster of traits. The strongest form only concerns gamete contribution to sexual reproduction, which is binary in mammals. Sexual reproduction is a well defined process at the core of sexual selection, which has been known since at least the publication of On the Origin of Species. Examples of a species in class 1 are male. Examples of a species in class 2 are female. Examples of a species that are in class 3 are sterile. Examples of of a species in class 4 are hermaphrodites.
I think the issue is that this biological definition is rarely relevant in a human context.
First, humans in the anglosphere (at least) tend to think sex is salient even for prepubescent children who are unable to reproduce. We presumptively use "he" and "she" for kids even though we know that 9% of men and 11% of women experience reproductive issues. Even after a person has become physically mature, we don't generally say they're "not a man/woman" just because we discover that they don't produce gametes properly, or can't reproduce for any number of other reasons.
I agree that your four classes are a categorization scheme that should exist somewhere in the English language. It's very useful to biologists, and an important idea for people to understand.
It also seems to have only a weak correlation to how we colloquially use language.
vorpa-glavo
6d ago
I mean, I think we've already created a society where humans aren't "from top to bottom" racist.
Humans will always be tribal, but I think that different circumstances can turn the dial of how much that tribalism affects their behavior in practice. Having a food-rich, water-rich society is a great starting point for interracial harmony. Adding men with guns forcing people not to act racist, and a set of societal institutions that are designed to brainwash people to be even less racist, and I think you've got the "best" possible form of sanding that bit of human nature off.
You can't change human tribalism, but you can make it less salient depending on how you constitute society.
People who don't produce any are, in every case, a defective version of one or the other (yes this includes all types of intersex people).
I've actually always felt that this is kind of an odd abstraction from a philosophical stand point, wherever we do it - not just in the trans domain.
If we're talking about the "facts" about a person's biology, then shouldn't we actually talk about the empirical facts?
Like, if we want the central definition of dog to be something like, "Four-legged animal descended from wolves", then it seems a bit odd to me to say that a congenitally three-legged dog is "actually" a defective four-legged animal. It seems to me that it actually is a three legged animal, and while the central definition of dog might have four legs, it is actually fuzzier in the way almost all biological definitions are.
Don't get me wrong, I'm not stupid. I get the idea of human category making involving a central exemplar, and then making accomodations for difference. If I saw a purple horse, I would not lose all sense and go, "What kind of strange creature is this?", but I'd also be prepared to widen my effective definition of horses to include the possibility of non-central horses like a congenitally purple horse, the same way I do for albino or melanistic animals.
It kind of strikes me as a strange sort of epicycle to justify having any definitions at all in the biological space.
Like, by what metric is a person with Turner's syndrome (X0-karyotype) actually a "defective" woman? Sure, she'll have feminine anatomy, but she doesn't naturally undergo puberty and can't produce large gametes. If we're talking about congenital biology, that seems like a natal null to me, and our medical science is currently capable of pushing her body in a more womanly direction. But that was an intervention - it is not natural. How can we say she is a "biological woman", or a "defective biological woman" if we're using the gamete definition of sex? Surely, there would then be some ground to claim that a trans woman is just an extremely defective biological woman by the same token?
If we can admit comparisons and contrasts to the larger class as a non-central example, then it seems to me the limits of inclusion are social willingness and not any "objective" facts about the reference class.
Edit: Typo, flow.
vorpa-glavo
4mo ago
That still means you're in favor of sending men to women's prison because they've had a sentencing-day realization that they're trans (or even a post-sentencing-day one, and transferring them), of letting men pommel women in sports like boxing during the Olympics, or of telling the women complaining about a bloke with a raging erection in their women-only naked spa, that they're the one in the wrong. Correct?
Incorrect.
Adoption laws don't force us to pretend that adoptive parents will likely be possible bone marrow donors, and honorary sex laws have no necessary legal connection to a package of particular treatment norms.
We could have the institution of honorary sex, and decide to still segregate some or all of the spaces you listed. The only one I'm actually inclined to push for is bathroom honorary sex integration, because I think that the requirement most societies will have to show social proof will usually prevent same day declarations by malefactors, and my assessment of risks versus rewards just doesn't agree with the integration pessimists. (Especially because I think a pseudo-trans malefactor who would want to lie could always be smart and say something like, "Hey, I don't want to be here either, but I'm a trans man - a biological woman - and the stupid laws require me to be here. I'll try to be quick and do my business in private without getting in your way" - before assaulting a victim when they let their guard down. I don't think any enforcement mechanism can fix the problem of a motivated invader without getting overly draconian.)
If you live in a civilized country, you should have little trouble trusting your neighbors with weapons.
I mean, in my civilized country, a rando tried to assassinate the candidate of one of the two major political parties, so my trust is being strained.
My basic problem is that I can't say whether a rando trying to assasinate a political candidate is the 2nd Amendment working as intended (since it puts the power to decide when to overthrow tyrants in the hands of individuals), or if there is some principled way to criticize some acts of political violence as outside of the intended scope of gun rights?
I mean, you can own a car and it can't be taken from you by the government without due process and such (literally the fifth amendment), whereas operating one on private property is explicitly a 'privilege.' So no, there is no explicit right, but there's still an inherent protection in there.
The relevant comparison is whether it would be constitutionally possible for a Federal or State ban on cars to be enacted. I very much doubt if such a thing would ever happen, but I don't think it would be unconstitutional.
vorpa-glavo
11mo ago
Donald J. Trump is a celebrity and a politician. While I think it is ugly behavior to celebrate anyone's death or near death, I would expect anyone above a certain level of fame to have to deal with a whole spectrum of ugly behavior and have thick skin about it at this point. I don't know why people feel the need to deputize themselves to avenge Trump for this slight against him.
I also cannot emphasize enough that I haven't seen this woman's actual tweets. I don't rule out that she didn't post a bit of dark humor, which I think would be more defensible than literally and sincerely saying she wished Trump was dead.
Injustices happen every second, and the alleged injustice she suffered, is lesser than the one she wished upon a man much greater than herself.
Whatever she supposedly wished upon him, she had no power to enact it, and there is almost 0 chance that Trump saw what she wrote, or thought about it for more than a second.
vorpa-glavo
1yr ago
Exactly! And that's why it's way past time that John Henry be depicted as a trans pan differently abled bi-racial Latinx!
Oh, but John Henry is different? Why?
You seem to assume something I don't agree with. Sure, bring on every variant of John Henry under the sun! Give me a white Black Panther, or an Asian Othello - nothing is forbidden in storytelling. I have experienced multiple versions of Cyrano de Bergerac, and I would imagine if you asked a person 100 years ago about a version where he's a little person, they would have thought it strange, and yet I loved Peter Dinklage's portrayal of the character in the musical.
John Henry is not an exception to what I say. Even sacred figures like Buddha can sometimes wander across cultures and become a Catholic saint.
Changes need to be organic, not "how many boxes off the DEI bingo card can we tick?".
I'm curious what you think the process is for a change to be "organic".
Do you also think Kirill Eskov's The Last Ringbearer, which recasts the orcs as the good guys, is inorganic?
Do you think the decision of Marvel's writers to take the originally red-haired Thor and turn him into a blonde character is "organic"?
Do you think that the manuscript traditions of the Mahabharata where the lower caste character of Karna is made more powerful is "organic"?
To me, there is no "organic" or "inorganic" retelling of a tale. There is only the storyteller's art, and what you make of the material you are given. If I was retelling the Greek myths, there are parts I would embellish and polish and things I would omit and they all feel perfectly natural situated in the particular time and place I am in. Saying any of the changes I would make are "inorganic" is to assume there's some way I "should" be telling the story, which I reject.
vorpa-glavo
2yr ago
Sure, I'd be okay with treating something like Bitcoin as money in some cases, since it bears enough of a resemblance to money.
Should morphology be the tie-breaker for sexual categorization?
A common tact one sees in trans skeptical circles is to put forward gametes as the tie-breaker for sexual categorization. In some ways, I like the simplicity of this solution, even as someone who is fairly pro trans. I'm not, in principle, opposed to a categorization scheme that would occasionally split transwomen and ciswomen, since I feel there's always a basic lumpers vs. splitters problem in all categorization problems, and I'm comfortable with either tiny base categories with supercategories above them, or larger categories and smaller subcategories. It's all the same, and the choice between various models of reality seems largely to be a matter of what is useful and what traits we find salient in a given context where we seek to categorize.
But I've always had a slight discomfort with the gamete-focused definition of sex. Even if we allow that sexual categorization is based on a cluster of traits, like chromosomes, genitalia, bone density, face and body shape, etc., where we're just using gametes as the tie breaker, I think we run into some problems. First, a gamete-focused definition is not naturally a binary. There are only two types of gametes, but there are technically four possible ways those two gametes could manifest:
-
Produces only sperm
-
Produces only eggs
-
Produces neither sperm nor eggs.
-
Produces sperm and eggs.
The last situation has never been observed in humans, though it is theoretically possible for a human chimera formed from a male and female zygote to fuse into a single embryo and result in a human with functional gonadal tissue of both types. We do observe ovotesticular syndome in humanity, but 50% of such cases ovulate, and only two such people have been found to produce sperm. Maybe the reason sperm and egg producing intersex conditions haven't happened is for some complex set of issues that result from such a chimera, and so it is effectively impossible.
But even ignoring that, it leaves us with three categories, not two. Now, there isn't actually an a priori reason to expect there to be exactly two sexes in humans, especially when we observe fungi like Coprinellus disseminatus, which has 143 different mating types that can each mate with any of the other mating types besides its own, but most people's intuition before they do any fancy book learning is that there are two sexes, so it seems unsatisfying to have a tie breaker that seems to naturally produce three categories.
Now, it's possible someone will object here that I have framed the problem wrong. Maybe the true proposal for sex categorization is not to use gametes as a tie breaker at all. Given that there seems to be an impulse in some trans skeptics to say that, for example, a trans women who has had her testes removed is still a man, one might conclude that, while gametes are (one of) the most important factor(s) in sex categorization, it is not actually the tie breaker. Maybe they will say that it is a much more fuzzy, amorphous categorization scheme based on a a wide variety of traits, and even lacking the ability to produce gametes altogether doesn't result in a sexless/third-sex categorization if a person has enough other traits common to either of the two (only two) sexes.
Or, they might put forward that it is actually some abstraction like "natural tendency to produce gametes" that is the true tie breaker, and not a person's current ability to produce gametes at all. A eunuch is not sexless, or some third sex - they are always a man, albeit a maimed man. This might still leave us with some problems in classifying people who are naturally infertile and don't produce gametes as mature adults (especially in the case of intersex conditions like ovotesticular syndrome where infertility is common and sex characteristics are mixed), but if that abstraction is truly a tie breaker and not the entirety of sex it would still rescue the idea of there being two sexes in humans.
I grant that either of these approaches could, in theory, rescue a truly two sex humanity.
But there is another misgiving that I have with such a framing, and it applies to all three of these models.
If gametes or some abstraction of them are an important component in sex categorization, then we get an entire class of epistemological problems surrounding sex categorization. I do not have the time or means to sequence the DNA, collect the gametes or see the genitals of every human being I interact with. And yet, my intuition is that I'm reasonably certain about the sex of most of the people I interact with in everyday situations. Here one might be able to make some arguments from evolutionary psychology, or the likelihood that there is some sort of sex categorizing module innate to humans that needed to be fairly accurate in order for humans to successfully mate with compatible mates. Maybe the bias towards thinking there are only two sexes goes fairly deep into human biology and psychology.
But such a "sex categorizing module" doesn't really solve the epistemological issue. Evolution is "lazy" and frequently does a hack job with its solutions. I find women attractive, I love boobs and cute feminine faces and the like. But I still find f1nnst5r, a male crossdresser, attractive in many of his photos. It turns out, it's much harder to code a computationally light sex categorizer when your only lever is whether the genes for your sex categorizer get passed on to the next generation. As long as guys who are attracted to femboys tend to also have sex with fertile women, the mesaoptimzer within you doesn't need to be perfect - just good enough.
All this to say, we can do better than the sex categorizing module in our brain. But if we try this route, we are forced to conclude that we don't know the sexes of most of the people we interact with. Sure, we can go the Bayesian route, and say based on base rates of the sex categorization module in our brain, checked against population-wide data, we can be 98% sure of a person's sex, regardless of definition being used. It might even be an isolated demand for rigor to expect more than 98% certainty. After all, humans also have a "face recognition module" that sometimes sees faces in tree bark and clouds, and yet we trust it to see human faces all of the time.
But I think if we do go the Bayesian route of trying to justify using the "sex categorization module" in the brain, we have actually conceded that the most important thing is actually how a person looks, their sexual morphology. Now obviously, a person could want biological children, and so, for reasons separate from their sex categorization module, care about about whether a particular person they are with is able to carry children, or produce sperm, but that would be something that only matters for potential romantic partners. For ordinary shop keepers and people you pass on the street, the only thing that really matters is the "sex categorization module."
Now, I'll concede that if this is accepted, non-passing trans people would have to be classed as their assigned sex at birth. That's almost exactly what it means to be non-passing in the first place - most people's sex categorization modules see you as the sex you were assigned at birth. But in the case of passing trans people, it would tend to mean that we can lean in to our wonky evolution-addled brains, and accept what we see at first glance. Of course, when we're going to interact with people frequently in our social circle, we could accept nicknames and nickpronouns, and allow these to override our brain's sex categorization modules, but that is a separate discussion.
vorpa-glavo
2yr ago
I don't think Gays Against Groomers should be banned, but I suspect they're roughly equivalent to the Log Cabin Republicans or many other "we're tribe X, but we hold unconventional views for members of tribe X" groups. Usually, you can model them as being run by leaders who are secretly tribe Y, and who wish to undermine the efforts of tribe X.
Gays Against Groomers should get a fair hearing in society if they're arguing in good faith, and individuals should punish them with inattention and apathy if they're not arguing in good faith.
vorpa-glavo
6d ago
Because, I don't think most traditional libertarians support the "men with guns forcing people not to act racist" part of the equation, and I think that is a central part of how the idealized form of modern American politics actually works in practice.
I still call myself a "state capacity libertarian" or "liberaltarian" because I want the lightest touch version of this in practice. I'm fuzzy on it, but I think I'd limit it to, say, public schools, employment, banking, and housing. Men with guns can force people to not discriminate in those domains, and then we can leave the people free to discriminate everywhere else in society.
I'm pretty sure that the forced integration of hospitals, hotels, gas stations and public schools that happened at gunpoint in the United States is the only realistic way that could have happened. I'm open to being proven wrong on this point. I would love to be pointed to real world historical examples of oppressed, othered minorities being successfully integrated into wider society without the state forcing the issue.
Also, I think the problem of petty tyrants is not limited to racism. It is just one of the easiest to describe examples. I think even something as simple as, "I'm the black sheep of my family, and the pariah of this small town" can be a case where petty tyranny makes living a happy, fulfilling life difficult. The anonymity of a corporation like McDonald's or Walmart makes us "exile-proof." Even if I reach my lowest point, if I become the most socially hated and cancelled person, the wonderful thing about Capitalist Liberalism is that it shapes us into interchangeable cogs, and I can still get a job at McDonald's or Walmart, and become a part of the background radiation of other people's lives.
I mean, in some places all it takes to get married is to sign a piece of paper with a witness. I would still consider that a form of social proof - even if "throwing a party with all of our friends and family where we state our commitment to one another" is probably a more central example of social proof.
I don't support the punitive aspects of such laws. I'm a big believer in pluralism and free speech culture, and I would rather the government didn't force people to say or do things that go against deeply help beliefs of theirs.
I'm okay with fairly lax laws for letting the government know you want to adopt an honorary sex role though. That's up to every society and subculture to decide for themselves, including the decision to reject it entirely.
EDIT:
I think I already said that I accept transracialism up thread, and even think that it is far more common than usually thought (cf. Hispanics becoming "white" in the US.)
I tend to think that more costly social proof is more likely to be widely accepted, but I have nothing against a culture or subculture making the gatekeeping for honorary statuses as low as they collectively decide.
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