None of the explanations makes a lot of sense to me. Either there was a very weird and unlucky combination of things that created an accident or accidents or someone took an action that doesn't make a lot of sense IMO, or someone stepped up and managed to pull something off that would seem beyond their capabilities.
Ships and aircraft of various countries were near the area at times before the explosion but that's pretty meaningless. The Baltic has a lot of civilian and military traffic it isn't some obscure patch of distant Ocean that no one really cares about.
Theories -
1 . Russia did it -
They certainly had the capability. Wouldn't even need to put a ship or sub or aircraft anywhere near where the explosion happened, they could transport explosives through the pipeline. They could of course just turn it off (and in fact had done so for Nord Stream 1 (2 was shutdown on the Germany side). They were not getting any revenue from the pipelines anyway. OTOH that was partially their choice (they shut down #1) and while there prospect fro revenue in the future was dim, it wasn't zero so you would think they would hold up some hope. A 10 percent chance of many billions is worth a lot of money. Why would they do it? Well they might avoid liability for not meeting contractual obligations. Could be a "burn your ships" or "burn your bridges" type of action showing contempt for the west and internally making an internal political signal that there can be no backing down. Could be a threat that other important pipelines and at sea infrastructure are vulnerable. Could be an attempt to make people think the US did it to try to sew division within NATO. Could be an attempt to block the Germans fro musing the part of the pipeline in German waters for an offshore LNG terminal.
2 - Anti-war Russian saboteurs did it -
From a perspective of motivation this perhaps makes the most sense. Perhaps an anarchist anti-war and anti-government group, trying to harm Russia. But they are the least likely to have the capability. I doubt they could pull off getting to the site of the damage with a large explosive. Maybe they had people working in Gazprom and sent explosives through the pipeline? That's possible but it seems unlikely they would have that access.
3 - Germany did it -
All the theories seem unlikely to me (although it did off course happen, so something unlikely happened) but this perhaps the least likely. Like Russia they could destroy it through the pipeline without needing to get close to the area of the explosion. But Germany while they decertified Nord Stream 2, actually wanted to continue to get gas from Nord Stream 1 for a time. Also they might use the parts of Nord Stream 2 in German for an offshore terminal (not sure if the plan was to use 1 or 2, but eventually both could have been used). Why would they do it? The government could have thought that they may face pressure to open up Nord Stream 2 this winter, and didn't want to go back on their decision to close it so they closed off that possibility. But than why also blow up Nord Stream 1. Some faction in the intel services or some saboteurs who worked for Nord Stream AG? Not impossible but it also seems one of the least likely answers.
4 - US did it -
Why would they do it? Well there could have been a thought that Germany would cave on allowing Nord Stream 2 operations and this closes that option. Maybe 1 was hit as well because the Russians could always decide to send gas that way and the Americans didn't want the Germans buying Russian gas? Also the US supplies LNG, while currently the exports are at capacity since the Freeport terminal explosion, there may be the thought that NG prices generally and specifically LNG would go up with an exploded major pipeline, and/or that Germany would be more locked in to buying US LNG in the long run. But it would require an extraordinary amount of willingness to take serious diplomatic risks, for a pretty modest gain.
5 - Ukraine did it -
It would lock out the possibility of Russia receiving funds from selling gas through the pipelines. Also maybe they could hope Russia would be blamed. Still this seems one of the least likely possibilities. Russia wasn't getting any revenue through those pipelines at the moment and it seems unlikely they would ever get revenue through #2. Ukraine would seem to have less ability to pull it off than the other countries listed, they aren't near the pipeline, and their countries resources are going in to the war effort. And the risk would be enormous. There is a good chance it eventually would get out and some chance it would get out quickly, which could devastate support for Ukraine within Germany and harm support elsewhere, and that support is very important to them. The gains would be very small compared to the potential harm.
6 - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland did it -
They have easy access to the area and a strong dislike for Russia. But while their downside isn't as large as Ukraine's it still seems too reckless. I can see them taking the risk for an action that would at one stroke mean Russia's defeat (if any such action existed) but not for such modest potential Russian down side. It doesn't really impact Russia's war.
7 - China did it -
Maybe they wanted to make things even crazier for Europe and hoped the US would be blamed? This is another one of the least likely possibilities IMO.
8 - Some other country did it - Who? Why? Can't think of any scenarios that seem to make much sense.
9 - It was an explosion caused by underwater live munitions from previous wars. Apparently there were such munitions near the Nord Stream 2 breach. But what would cause them to shift to where the pipeline is and blow up now? Also it seems a Nord Stream 1 breach was not near any known location of underwater munitions.
10 - Methane Hydrate plugs - See https://thelawdogfiles.com/2022/09/nordstream.html
Such plugs are apparently more likely to form when the gas is sitting in place, like it was in Nord Stream. And they could cause pipeline ruptures. But both pipelines at pretty much the same time? Also unless there was more than the normally very low level of oxygen in the pipelines (which is monitored to avoid corrosion and at higher levels combustion risk) that would allow for combustion I don't see how you would get explosions as large as those that were detected.
11 - Other - Different causes for each pipeline (different countries sabotaged each one, or one was an accident and one was sabotage), eco-terrorism (would they have the ability and would they want to release that much methane), aliens, etc. No real reason to seriously consider any of these without some specific evidence. They are all a bunch of wacky theories, that I'm not taking seriously. Something I haven't even considered? Well of course that's possible but what?
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Notes -
I think the issue with these theories is missing information. I will just list a few categories questions that seem pertinent here.
How does this work contractually? That is, how long a contract did Germany sign for NS 1? What are the consequences for Germany for breaking their contractual agreements with Russia aside from not getting gas? Are the payments more like my utility bill, or is there a sum agreed on at the signing of a contract for [X period of time] where Germany pays a fixed amount on some schedule provided Russia isn't found in violation of the contract? What penalties would a force majeure spare Russia, how long can such penalties be stalled/contested, how can they be collected and how do they stack up to the amount of frozen Russian assets or war damages that may be demanded at the conclusion of this conflict?
How badly does Germany need Russian gas? One of the pipelines is undamaged, but it's part of the unapproved NS 2. What parts of its agreement with the U.S. and/or U.S. sanctions would Germany be violating by certifying it? What would doing that mean for U.S. Germany relations? How badly does Russia need the money from these pipelines vs the leverage against Germany?
What was the immediate cause of the explosions? Planted explosives, drones, accident? Which of these options can be excluded from being available to a country like Poland or Estonia? What are the actual surveillance and investigative capabilities of the countries watching the Baltic Sea? What is the outlook on repairing the pipelines - how possible is it, how much can it cost, how quickly can it be done? How possible is it for a party interested in the continued operation of these pipelines to prevent this problem in the future?
Spinning theories through the possible answers to these questions is making my head dizzy. For example, if execution is hard and chance of being found responsible is very low, that narrows it down to Russia or some of the NATO countries. If, furthermore, the certification of NS 2 would be a large cost to Germany-U.S. relations and Russia needs the money far more than they need any leverage over Germany while the latter really needs the gas, and if, furthermore, any contract for gas supply would have to be made for multiple years, and if Germany cannot be expected to force the breaking of such a contract, then it could be a way for Germany to get full gas supply from Russia by making NS 2 politically possible and then also getting gas through NS 1 if it's repaired and making it look like their hands are tied by contracts. On the other hand, there are a lot of variables here that would single-handedly break this theory if the answer is something else.
So some fact gathering that I did...
Last year, Nordstream 1 supplied 59 billion cubic meters of gas. A little over its stated capacity.
In 2015, a disabled explosive remote controlled vehicle was found near the pipeline off the coast of the island of Öland.
Nordstream 2 and Turkstream are viewed by some as strategic projects rather than strictly economic. That is, it is not so much that these pipelines had to be built as much as Russia wished to avoid routing its gas through Ukraine.
At least 2 of the leaks occurred in the Swedish economic zone, and Sweden does have and did exercise the right to exclude Russia from investigating the leaks. Sweden stated that they have made seizures on the site which they consider sufficient to make the case for sabotage and are looking into determining whether suspect can be identified based on what was found.
Gazprom, in which the Russian government has a 50.002% share also has a 51% share in the distinctly non-slavic sounding Nord Stream project. The remaining 4 shareholders make no mention of any degree of state ownership.
The war is expensive for Russia, exports have declined, and estimates are that it's costing Russia $1 billion daily. Forbes estimated the cost at $400 million daily.
Germany paid in roubles and earlier this year estimated they would need until at least 2024 to become energy independent of Russia.
Gas supply contracts can be signed for a period such as 10 years and even countries at odds such as Russia and Ukraine respect such contracts. So, right now, Gazprom is getting gas through Ukraine even though the two countries are at war and the former is a state-owned enterprise.
The remaining Russian pipeline through Ukraine is currently pumping 42 million cubic meters of gas daily, which would come out to something like 14 billion annual capacity - about a quarter of what either of the Nord Streams could pump. Currently, Naftogaz is taking it to arbitration for alleged nonpayment of transit fees while Gazprom categorically denies such charges and is threatening to shut down the last pipeline to Europe aside from Turk Stream if Naftogaz proceeds with the complaint, which supplies southeast Europe at capacity of up to 31.5 billion cubic meters.
It seems Gazprom really might not have paid transit fees. This article is quoting Gazprom complaining that Naftogaz had no basis for suspending the Sokhranivka pipeline, which carried 1/3 of Russia gas transit to Ukraine so working backward from the stated capacity it seems Russia was moving around 100 million cubic meters of gas through Ukraine, for about 1 Turk Stream's equivalent of annual transit. Ukraine suspended that pipeline in May by declaring force majeure on account of interference from separatist and Russian force, but pledged to re-route the gas through other pipelines.
There seem to have been a suspicious number of suicides among people linked to Gazprom since the start of the conflict.
It would seem that long term gas contracts are made well in advance of their start date and be renewed up to at least a decade in advance. Here in a 2008 paper it can be seen that Russia already had multiple gas supply contracts for billions or 10s of billions of cubic meters of gas to several European countries, most of them to last until around 2030.
Link in previous point was before either Nord Stream was operational, and at the time it estimated that Russia exported 120 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Europe with 70% of that going through Ukraine. According to the BBC Nord Stream was said to supply 35% of the gas Europe imported from Russia. So given that it pumped nearly 60 billion cubic meters last year, that would make for around 170 bcm.
Earlier this year Russia halted shipments to Poland and Bulgaria along the Yamal-Europe pipeline because these countries did not comply with Russia's demand that all payments past April 1 be made in rubles.
So far I can't find a written source for this, but it appears that Gazprom refuses arbitration with Naftogaz regarding the Ukrainian pipelines because of "unfriendly jurisdiction" concerns.
I guess after the basic facts I might ask more interesting questions to find more information. Posting it for now as my laptop's running out of memory.
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