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Culture War Roundup for the week of December 5, 2022

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here's one of the Smart Like Us crew who is dumber than an ordinary person when it came to "I can make yuuuuge money out of trading magic beans"

No he's not; the "ordinary people" are the ones getting rooked into buying at the top of the crypto bubble, or latching onto one of the innumerable scams out there. Running one of those scams, especially one as big as FTX, is harder. Plus, SBF did legitimately stumble into profitable bitcoin arbitrage opportunities; if he had just stopped there, and not gotten out over his skis, he would have still made a lot of money - completely legitimately! - on those "magic beans".

He did make legit fast bucks on the arbitrage, but that was something that was not sustainable and he should have known it. He took advantage of a loophole, and that loophole got stopped up. He probably did realise it, couldn't or wouldn't give up the lure of fast easy millions, and decided to go into exchange business instead.

And the ordinary people weren't the ones who gave him $1 billion in funding, it was the (presumably) smart investors at Sequoia Capital and elsewhere:

The B round raised a billion dollars. Soon afterward came the “meme round”: $420.69 million from 69 investors.

$420 million divided by 69 comes to around $6 million each, so do you count someone who can drop $6 million into an investment as "ordinary people" and if you do, then you and I have very different definitions of "ordinary people".

My understanding was that the reason the FTX scandal went from "niche finance scandal" to "world-shaking cataclysm" was that SBF wasn't just losing institutional/high net worth individual money, but instead was raiding ordinary joe-schmo funds nominally being used to buy and sell coins on FTX to transfer to Alameda. Is that incorrect?

Plus, SBF did legitimately stumble into profitable bitcoin arbitrage opportunities;

I made the point below, but how do we even know this is true? Given what we know about SBF, isn't it more likely that he was simply stealing user funds from the start?

Think about it logically. Which makes more sense?

  1. Obvious billion dollar arbitrage opportunity is discovered by SBF and no one else OR

  2. Known fraudster steals user deposits for his own purposes

He very probably did make legitimate profit off the "kimchi premium", and while it wasn't his own money and he did need to hit up investors for it, he wasn't stealing their dough, at least not at the start, because they lucked into making money faster than they could lose it. Interesting and indicative parts bolded by me in the below:

Curious, SBF had started looking into crypto—and almost immediately noticed something strange. Bitcoin was trading at a higher price in Japan and Korea than it was in the U.S. In theory, this should never happen because it represents a riskless profit opportunity—in other words, a free lunch. One simply buys Bitcoin at the lower price, sells it at the higher price, and pockets the difference. Jane Street built an empire on high-frequency trades that took advantage of fraction-of-a-cent price differences. But here was Bitcoin, trading at around $15,000 in South Korea: an unheard-of 50 percent price premium.

…Another day of work dealing with the red-tape problem netted SBF a single round-trip trade—to Asia and back—for a $20 profit. That was it: the proof of concept. There was an opportunity to be had. SBF immediately put $50,000 of his own money to work. The first job was just getting the money into the system. The operational challenges were huge. Not just anyone can walk into a foreign bank and start wiring money out of the country every day. There are know-your-customer rules, caps on withdrawals, citizenship requirements. Even worse, to any normal bank, the constant zeroing out, then maxing out, of a cash account—with the money coming and going overseas, to and from fly-by-night Bitcoin exchanges—raised every red flag in the book. It looked like laundering. It looked like drug money. There were even monetary policy concerns: The liquidity of the South Korean won is sharply limited by the country’s central bank.

Fortunately, SBF had a secret weapon: the EA community. There’s a loose worldwide network of like-minded people who do each other favors and sleep on each other’s couches simply because they all belong to the same tribe. Perhaps the most important of them was a Japanese grad student, who volunteered to do the legwork in Japan. As a Japanese citizen, he was able to open an account with the one (obscure, rural) Japanese bank that was willing, for a fee, to process the transactions that SBF—newly incorporated as Alameda Research—wanted to make. The spread between Bitcoin in Japan and Bitcoin in the U.S. was “only” 10 percent—but it was a trade Alameda found it could make every day. With SBF’s initial $50,000 compounding at 10 percent each day, the next step was to increase the amount of capital. At the time, the total daily volume of crypto trading was on the order of a billion dollars. Figuring he wanted to capture 5 percent of that, SBF went looking for a $50 million loan. Again, he reached out to the EA community. Jaan Tallinn, the cofounder of Skype, put up a good chunk of that initial $50 million.

With a goosed-up capital account, the money started piling up so fast that SBF placed what he refers to as “a market order for employees” to tend to the Rube Goldberg operation that kept the capital spinning. There were constant blowups with banks, which are wary of anything crypto. Crypto was so new that regulators in South Korea and elsewhere were constantly changing their mind about regulations—then making those changes retroactive. It was a swirling mess. …The first 15 people SBF hired, all from the EA pool, were packed together in a shabby, 600-square-foot walk-up, working around the clock. The kitchen was given over to stand-up desks, the closet was reserved for sleeping, and the entire space overrun with half-eaten take-out containers. It was a royal mess. But it was also the good old days, when Alameda was just kids on a high-stakes, big-money, earn-to-give commando operation. Fifty percent of Alameda’s profits were going to EA-approved charities.

The Bitcoin arbitrage didn’t—and couldn’t—last forever. The Japanese appetite for overpriced Bitcoin withered (or, more likely, another shadowy arbitrage outfit also found its way to the trade and collapsed it). Either way, the spread narrowed to almost nothing. But there were other trades to be had. The simple fact that crypto was new, and that the tools traders needed to handle it were still under construction, meant that there were market inefficiencies all over the place. And behind every market inefficiency is an arbitrage opportunity.

…At this point, mid-2019, SBF decided to double down again—and scratch his own itch. He would bet Alameda’s multimillion-dollar trading profits on a new venture: a trading exchange called FTX. It would combine Coinbase’s stolid, regulation-loving approach with the kinds of derivatives being offered by Binance and others.

…And, with that, he moved the nascent company to Hong Kong, a jurisdiction with a crypto-friendly regulatory regime. Hong Kong also happens to be conveniently located next door to the country that, at the time, had the largest and most enthusiastic crypto user base in the world: China.

…The problem, as Bailhe saw it, was that FTX didn’t appear to need any money. She was correct, but what she didn’t know was that SBF was starting to think about raising money anyway. Alameda had some unexpected losses due to so-called counterparty risk. Arbitrage is, in theory, riskless. But not when the rickety exchange you’re using to place your trades suddenly locks up and refuses to disburse your money. Or, worse yet, when two crypto exchanges can’t even agree on what a crypto transfer looks like, and so the act of sending crypto from one exchange to another results in tokens just disappearing into the ether. And don’t even ask about futures contracts that see their terms unilaterally changed mid-agreement: the dreaded “clawbacks.” Alameda was not immune to the exchange-level shenanigans that gave crypto as a whole its sleazy reputation. But FTX had an ambition to change that. It was built to be the exchange traders could count on. SBF needed to get the word out. He wanted FTX to be known as the respectable face of crypto. This required ad campaigns, sponsorship deals, a charitable wing—and a war chest to pay for it all.

So Alameda starting running into the problem of no more easy money and worse, losing money. Bankman-Fried decided that setting up his own exchange would be the new easy money, and getting more funding from investors was the solution to Alameda's losses. That seems to have worked for a while, too, but the losses continued and so he started dipping into the funds FTX was supposedly holding separate from Alameda.

I mean, it seems pretty easy to check. Go back and look at the buy/sell records for Korea and Japan at various points during which the "kimchi premium" was allegedly there for the taking.

The Japan-US arbitrage was known in early 2018. Even now there are still ways to make $ trading crypto. I imagine someone with enough data analytics and his intelligence could find patterns.