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Culture War Roundup for the week of February 2, 2026

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If these aren't character flaws, I don't know what is.

They're model weights. <-- This is a link.

That's literally, exactly, precisely what they are.

You can map your own preferred anthropomorphized traits to them all you want, but that's, at best, a metaphor or something. This is the same as when people say their car has a "personality." It's kind of fun, I'll grant you, but it's also plainly inaccurate.

They're good at different things

This is correct. But it is correct because of training data, superparameters, and a whole host of very well defined ML concepts. It's not because of ... personalities.

They're model weights.

They're model weights, and we're collections of atoms: bags of meat and miscellaneous chemicals. Both statements are technically correct. And yet... a tiger being made out of atoms doesn't make it any less capable of killing you. The problem with pure reductionism is that it throws out exactly the information you need to make predictions at the level you actually care about. Too much of it can be as bad as too little.

All models are false, some models are useful. That's a rationalist saw, but for good reason. What actually matters is whether a model constraints expectations, in other words, is it useful?

Gemini 2.5 Pro doesn't meet the DSM-5 or ICD-11 criteria for clinical depression. After all, it's hard for a model to demonstrate insomnia or reduced appetite. Yet the odd behaviors it regularly demonstrated are usefully described by that label.

If my friend let me drive his Lambo, and told me "be careful, she's fierce!", I'm going to drive more carefully than I would in a Fiat Pinto. That is still, to some degree, useful, but I think it's clear that anthromorphic analogies are more useful for LLMs, because they have more in common with us behavior-wise than any car (unless you're running Grok on your Tesla). They process language, they exhibit something that looks like reasoning, they have distinctive response patterns that persist across contexts.

But it is correct because of training data, superparameters, and a whole host of very well defined ML concepts. It's not because of ... personalities.

This is true in the same way that human behavior is fully determined by neurotransmitter levels, synaptic weights, and neurological processes. But just as you can't predict whether someone will enjoy a particular movie by examining their brain with an electron microscope or a QCD-sim, you can't accurately predict an LLM's macroscopic behavior by staring at its training corpus and hyperparameters. No human can.

Nobody at Google intended for Gemini 2.5 Pro to be "neurotic" and "depressed" or to devolve into a spiral of self-flagellation when it fails at a task, nobody wanted Kimi to hallucinate as regularly as it does. These were emergent, macroscopic properties, there's no equivalent of a statistical scaling-law that lets you accurately predict log-loss for a given number of tokens in a corpus and a compute budget.

Training models is still as much an art as it is a science, particularly the post-training and personality tuning phrases (as explicitly done by Anthropic). You test your hypothesis iteratively, and adjust the dials as you go.

Anthropomorphism is a cognitive strategy. Like all cognitive strategies, it can be deployed appropriately or inappropriately. The question is not "is anthropomorphism ever valid?" but rather "when does anthropomorphic modeling produce accurate predictions?"

I maintain that, if applied judiciously, as I take pains to do, it's better than the alternative.

Your response is incoherent throughout.

Right from the jump;

And yet... a tiger being made out of atoms doesn't make it any less capable of killing you.

As opposed to what? A tiger not made out of atoms? This isn't even strawman, it's just a weird thing to say presented as an argument.

You complete lost me here;

All models are false, some models are useful. That's a rationalist saw, but for good reason. What actually matters is whether a model constraints expectations, in other words, is it useful?

Regarding;

They process language, they exhibit something that looks like reasoning, they have distinctive response patterns that persist across contexts.

That something looks like, sounds like, and walks like a duck doesn't always make it a duck. For example, is Donald Duck a duck?. Well, we can yes and know that he's a representation of a conception of a duck with human like personality mapped onto him (see where I'm going ...) but it doesn't make him a duck made out of atoms - which seems to be, like, important or something.

They're model weights, and we're collections of atoms: bags of meat and miscellaneous chemicals. Both statements are technically correct. And yet... a tiger being made out of atoms doesn't make it any less capable of killing you. The problem with pure reductionism is that it throws out exactly the information you need to make predictions at the level you actually care about. Too much of it can be as bad as too little.

I always find these arguments sort of annoying because it really conflates what is actually going on in ML/AI systems with this weird pseudo-science fiction mystification. Yes Tiger's are made of atoms, but no you can't use atomic physics to describe tiger-behavior. With AI models, you can describe behavior directly in terms of the underlying code. The model weights are deterministic parameters that literally decide how the system behaves.

Also you've gotten reductionism vs abstractions completely backwards. Abstractions "throw out information". High-level models compress details to make systems easier to reason about. Also not every useful abstraction corresponds to a mind, subject, or being.

Some Thought Experiments:

  • A corporation is a higher-level abstraction with goals, memory, persistence, and decision-making. Do we think corporations are conscious?
  • A nation-state has beliefs, intentions, and agency in discourse. Are they conscious? Do they feel pain?
  • A thermostat system “wants” to maintain temperature. Are they alive?

LLMs don't have minds and they aren't conscious. They are parameterized conditional probability functions, that are finite-order Markovian models over token sequences. Nothing exists outside their context window. They don't persist across interactions, there is no endogenous memory, and no self-updating parameters during inference. They have personality like programing languages or compilers have personality, as a biased function of how they were built, and what they were trained on.