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Transnational Thursday for April 2, 2026

Transnational Thursday is a thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or international relations history. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.

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On a quick Google, DoD estimated last year that China has around 1,300 MRBMs and 300 launchers and only about 550 IRBMs and 300 IRBM launchers, adding 50 of each since 2024.

You do realize these numbers are comparable or even smaller than the estimate for Iranian stockpiles by IDF, don't you? It's almost funny. I surely hope Americans are not running their war plans with these estimates.

I'll just go back to a source I used in an earlier discussion that cited IDF estimates at 2,500 ballistic missiles (so considerably higher than 1850 ballistic missiles), with other estimates being as high as 6,000. But I should note that the numbers I cited don't include SRBMs.

JINSA estimates about 1840 ballistic missiles launched by Iran since Epic Fury kicked off, which I think suggests that 2,500 is low, but that's because I suspect IDF and USAF tagged a quite a few launchers with missiles. It seems quite compatible with 6,000 to me.

Obviously it's quite possible actual PLA numbers are much higher, but at a certain point you have to go by public estimates, otherwise the entire discussion devolves into a "well but maybe the real numbers are much higher" for both sides. If you have a better source for any of these numbers I will happily take a look at it.

I think in cases like this, it might be worthwhile to put asterisks next to those numbers. I agree that you shouldn't just go by pure vibes, but at some point you should also avoid citing authoritative sources that are obviously implausible or highly unlikely to be true, which I think applies here. I don't think anyone should just hallucinate "China has 5k IRBMs" without citing sources, but I also don't think an estimate that puts the PLARF's stockpile below the IRGC's, which itself might be an underestimate, is worth repeating without nuance just because it has the DoD's stamp on it. I also think there are good reasons to believe the IDF's estimate on Iranian missile stockpiles is likely more trustworthy than the DoD's on China, given how thoroughly infiltrated the Iranians seem to be.

Do I have better numbers? I wish I do, but here, DoD again:

In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training. This was more than the rest of the world combined, excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones.

Missile launches are harder to hide than missiles and launchers, and that might provide a better estimate maybe, no idea how.

it might be worthwhile to put asterisks next to those numbers.

I definitely agree with this.

but I also don't think an estimate that puts the PLARF's stockpile below the IRGC

Well keep in mind I wasn't counting Chinese SRBMs, of which they have quite a lot, or ICBMs, (since those will, at least partially, be used for nuclear deterrence). I imagine most of the 135 ballistic missiles launched for training were SRBMs. I also think it's worth noting that Iran has, from what I understand, really pursued ballistic missiles - they haven't been able to produce a capable, modern navy or air force. Whereas China has been walking while chewing gum - ballistic missiles are just one item in their toolkit.

The PLARF is its own branch for good reasons, reflecting the PLA doctrine to some degree annd also as a signal of how eagerly pursued ballistic missiles are. There’s a long history where China was “unable to produce a capable, modern navy or air force”, as recently as two or one decade ago, not too dissimilar to Iran, and the PLARF is part of why the Politburo could sleep well. Mostly because of the ICBMs of course, which you didn’t count here, but still.

I also think the PLA can chew a lot of gum without straining the economy or industrial base at all, unlike a heavily sanctioned economy that can barely provide freshwater to its capital.

In any case, I think it’s intriguing why the DoD estimate is so small. Israelis hype up Iranian stockpiles while DoD downplays Chinese capabilities. What gives? Few are serious about the risk of a real conflict, I’m afraid.

It's interesting too because the DoD traditionally hypes up threat capabilities.

However I am not sure if the culture in the post-GWOT DoD is the same as during the Cold War.