Transnational Thursday is a thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or international relations history. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.
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An Iranian news service has published a clear photograph (Twitter link, possibly slower Iranian link) of a US gravity bomb hitting the B1 bridge in Karaj.
Twitter ID's the bomb as a GBU-31. It's definitely looks to be some sort of JDAM, and it does not appear to have a wing kit (such as in a JDAM-ER) which means it was dropped at a very short range, likely inside of 15 miles, and in broad daylight. Karaj is just outside Tehran, which means that either US forces flew several hundred miles over Iranian territory to drop gravity bombs, or, intriguingly, the US approached over the Caspian Sea, indicating an overflight route over, probably, Azerbaijan.
Either way, I am going to take a lil victory lap after my assessment a couple days ago that the US was, in fact, using gravity bombs inside of Iranian territory. This was very close to Tehran, suggesting that the US has a high degree of access even to areas one would expect to be highly defended.
Still here? Good, because I actually wanted to talk about China. Well, China and Iran. Or Iran, China, and the US.
Earlier this year, I read Strategy of Denial by Elbridge Colby. Colby makes a very concise argument for why the US should focus on countering China. Basically, Colby argues that Asia is the most significant part of the world, with the largest chunk of the global economy, and that it was essentially the area where the United States could be critically harmed by having someone else hegemonize the region. Colby dismisses the idea that the US' paramount security concerns are in Europe or the Middle East, and argues that it is important to prevent China from dominating Asia to avoid damaging US interests and the quality of life of American citizens. I highly recommend it, just as a read, specifically because Colby's writing style is extremely straightforward - I expected a much denser book.
Colby is now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Needless to say, some things have changed since Strategy of Denial was written in 2021. The security situation in Europe has arguably deteriorated significantly, and the war to defend those American interests in the Middle East that Colby said were not all that important is going strong. But the reason I want to revisit the book isn't to dunk on the fact that we're very clearly expending a lot of munitions that would be very relevant to a fight with China fighting Iran. It's because of the specific threat that Colby identifies from China. Colby's argument, hearkening back to the domino theory from the Cold War, is that Taiwan is specifically where the US and its regional Pacific partners should draw the line. If China starts taking territory it will be better positioned to add subsequent countries into its regional hegemony, either by force or coercive diplomacy. Colby identifies China starting from where it has the best relative strength (against Taiwan) and moving from there against other nations in the region, a tactic 4X players everywhere understand intuitively.
Is it just me, or does that seem familiar?
How about snatching Maduro (possibly the weakest American adversary), toppling the government of Cuba, and then moving to take out Iran? (a much stronger and more capable foe). Wait, that's not quite what happened - Cuba is still alive and kicking (for now). But if you squint, it almost looks like the Trump administration read Strategy of Denial and then...decided to ignore all of its recommendations for the US in lieu of pursuing its recommendations for China.
I don't know - I just thought it was an intriguing thought, but it's not clear to me that is what is going on. What is clear to me is that the US is probably now at the nadir of its strength relative to China in the Pacific. Over the next five years, US munitions production levels are slated to ramp up to extremely high numbers, but this will take time. If China wants to invade Taiwan (and I think that they would prefer not to, to be fair) the best time is probably while the US is stuck in the Middle East bombing stuff, the second-best time is as soon as you can afterwards.
How about it, China? How's it going?
Well...maybe not so great. The PLA has been gutted pretty badly by purges, which are also hitting high-level weapons engineers. I'm pretty skeptical of the theory that this is because recent US successes demonstrated that Chinese weapons were vaporware - it seems too neat, too America-centric.
But I do wonder if the US had some reason to believe that China was not going to move in 2027. Some reason to think they could mop up a few holdouts before beginning the real pivot to the Pacific?
Or maybe Hesgeth really was taken aback by Iran chimping out in retaliation for the decapitation strike, and maybe Xi is keeping all of his "purged" generals in a backroom somewhere waiting to spring them out as soon as he pushes the big button.
I too read and enjoyed Colby's book.
How much do purges hurt the PLA? The strength of the Chinese military is not in their professionalism or training or experience but in their numbers and the scale of the munitions and technology that Chinese industry can supply them with. They can learn how to fight as they go, adapt and improve in wartime. They can promote new, younger and more talented generals. They cannot make a new industrial base in wartime.
When we think about military purges, we all think back to the Soviet Union pre-WW2. Military purges reduced their combat effectiveness by some degree, sure. But the strength of the Red Army was not in fighting well. They improved over the war but never fought as well as Germany did. They didn't need to be especially competent to prevail. They had mass!
The US seems to be purging generals right now, during a major conflict. The Army Chief of Staff is a fairly high profile role. Furthermore, it's significant in that the US doesn't have a China-tier industrial base, totalitarian-state casualty tolerance or that gigantic recruiting pool. The US needs to be fundamentally more capable and competent to prevail against a much bigger country.
Extremely high... by US standards. Annual production of 400 THAAD interceptors in 7 years? The Chinese will burn through that in a week, probably on day 1. If the THAAD batteries are even there, they might be sent off to the Middle East by then.
There is currently no TNT production in the US. That's part of the 'munitions buildup' - restarting TNT production from zero.
Does anyone know how much TNT China produces? Probably a lot more than 0 tonnes a year, maybe 30,000 to 60,000 tonnes. 2000 tonnes a year, all things considered, won't make much difference. If the US is aiming to match Russia in munitions production, there's no chance of beating China.
How is the US supposed to outrace China in scaling munitions production? The Chinese industrial base has cheaper components, cheaper energy, an ocean of engineers and machine tools frothing about.
If the generals being purged are incompetent, the purges will help the PLA, at least over the medium-long term. If the generals being purged are competent, presumably it will hurt them. It is unclear to me which of the purged generals fall into which category. In the short term, because it does not appear that Xi has yet filled all of the purged positions, it will likely hurt simply because it is hard to execute in a major war without a clear chain of command. (China already has enough of a problem with the "clear chain of command" because they have a dual-track military authority.)
One area where I expect the US purges to be different than the Chinese ones is that I expect the Americans will have another ACOS quickly. The Chinese Central Military Commission still has not been re-staffed after Xi's purges – although perhaps Xi discovered that too many cooks were in the kitchen. There can be a certain virtue to keeping staffing lean.
THAAD, Patriot PAC-3 MSE (supposed to increase to 2000/year), SM-3 (set to increase to 100/year) SM-6 (set to increase to 500/year) and probably the AIM-174 are all anti-ballistic missile interceptors. The Taiwanese also have domestic production of the TK-3 ABM, and (if it becomes relevant) South Korea has their own domestic analogues to the Patriot and THAAD.
On a quick Google, DoD estimated last year that China has around 1,300 MRBMs and 300 launchers and only about 550 IRBMs and 300 IRBM launchers, adding 50 of each since 2024. China's more numerous SRBMs won't range Guam and most of Japan, and the MRBMs will only range Japan. So the US pre-ramp-up produces more ballistic missile interceptors with THAAD systems alone (nearly 100/year) than China produces ballistic missiles that could range Guam (if DoD estimates are even ballpark accurate). Maybe the question we should be asking is "How is China supposed to outrace the US in scaling munitions production?" And indeed, the Chinese are reportedly asking this themselves.
And ballistic missiles will be spread pretty thin in a war – for instance, there are probably around 80 airports in Japan along with airstrips relevant for tactical aviation that aircraft could in theory disperse to in an emergency. Even if the US and Japan had zero interceptors, China could easily spend 400 missiles just to crater each runway for...as little as 4 hours.
I don't think TNT is used for most of the high-end weapons systems – I think that would RDX (of which we have a domestic supply). I believe the Army wants TNT for arty shells, which will not be the most relevant in a Pacific conflict.
As I've discussed in here before, for a Taiwan contingency the US needs to stop an amphibious invasion and/or a blockade, which is very different from fighting a set-piece battle on the open sea, or something.
You do realize these numbers are comparable or even smaller than the estimate for Iranian stockpiles by IDF, don't you? It's almost funny. I surely hope Americans are not running their war plans with these estimates.
I'll just go back to a source I used in an earlier discussion that cited IDF estimates at 2,500 ballistic missiles (so considerably higher than 1850 ballistic missiles), with other estimates being as high as 6,000. But I should note that the numbers I cited don't include SRBMs.
JINSA estimates about 1840 ballistic missiles launched by Iran since Epic Fury kicked off, which I think suggests that 2,500 is low, but that's because I suspect IDF and USAF tagged a quite a few launchers with missiles. It seems quite compatible with 6,000 to me.
Obviously it's quite possible actual PLA numbers are much higher, but at a certain point you have to go by public estimates, otherwise the entire discussion devolves into a "well but maybe the real numbers are much higher" for both sides. If you have a better source for any of these numbers I will happily take a look at it.
I think in cases like this, it might be worthwhile to put asterisks next to those numbers. I agree that you shouldn't just go by pure vibes, but at some point you should also avoid citing authoritative sources that are obviously implausible or highly unlikely to be true, which I think applies here. I don't think anyone should just hallucinate "China has 5k IRBMs" without citing sources, but I also don't think an estimate that puts the PLARF's stockpile below the IRGC's, which itself might be an underestimate, is worth repeating without nuance just because it has the DoD's stamp on it. I also think there are good reasons to believe the IDF's estimate on Iranian missile stockpiles is likely more trustworthy than the DoD's on China, given how thoroughly infiltrated the Iranians seem to be.
Do I have better numbers? I wish I do, but here, DoD again:
Missile launches are harder to hide than missiles and launchers, and that might provide a better estimate maybe, no idea how.
I definitely agree with this.
Well keep in mind I wasn't counting Chinese SRBMs, of which they have quite a lot, or ICBMs, (since those will, at least partially, be used for nuclear deterrence). I imagine most of the 135 ballistic missiles launched for training were SRBMs. I also think it's worth noting that Iran has, from what I understand, really pursued ballistic missiles - they haven't been able to produce a capable, modern navy or air force. Whereas China has been walking while chewing gum - ballistic missiles are just one item in their toolkit.
The PLARF is its own branch for good reasons, reflecting the PLA doctrine to some degree annd also as a signal of how eagerly pursued ballistic missiles are. There’s a long history where China was “unable to produce a capable, modern navy or air force”, as recently as two or one decade ago, not too dissimilar to Iran, and the PLARF is part of why the Politburo could sleep well. Mostly because of the ICBMs of course, which you didn’t count here, but still.
I also think the PLA can chew a lot of gum without straining the economy or industrial base at all, unlike a heavily sanctioned economy that can barely provide freshwater to its capital.
In any case, I think it’s intriguing why the DoD estimate is so small. Israelis hype up Iranian stockpiles while DoD downplays Chinese capabilities. What gives? Few are serious about the risk of a real conflict, I’m afraid.
It's interesting too because the DoD traditionally hypes up threat capabilities.
However I am not sure if the culture in the post-GWOT DoD is the same as during the Cold War.
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