Cogitism is my personal moral framework, developed and refined in my free time. I believe that this specific combination of ideas is novel and useful. I know it's pretty arrogant to claim a novel moral framework, especially considering that before today I was the only person who has been reading my own work, so I'm making this post to get adversarial eyeballs on it. While I'm aware of similarities with other rational moral frameworks, I believe that Cogitism is distinct in grounding value in the nature of consciousness itself rather than in preferences, utility, or consequences. Have fun tearing it apart!
(Edited to include the full essay text)
A Brief Clarification on AI Involvement
People often care very deeply that the involvement of AI in the production of a work is stated upfront, myself included, because the extent of AI involvement in a project and what shape that involvement takes provides useful context for its legitimacy. As a result I feel it is important to disclose and contextualize the involvement of such tools in this work as early as possible.
Over the period where I developed these ideas, much of that development took place in chats with LLMs (Claude, most often), which I used as a sounding board for my ideas. In these chats I gave these models explicit instructions to check my work and reel me in whenever it thought it saw a flaw in my reasoning. A lot of the time it's wrong in the analysis, and a lot of the time that's because it doesn't understand what I mean, but explaining why to the machine and getting it to understand tends to help me think through the problem more clearly than I could otherwise.
The ideas, words, and phrasing in these essays are my own; I am writing this after having solidified and used these ideas privately for half a year. AI models did not write any of this for me. In short, LLMs only had a hand in the development of these concepts as a really complicated, talking rubber duck.
Cogito Ergo Sum
There is only one fact that any individual can know for certain, beyond even the tiniest echo of a doubt: I Exist. Without first acknowledging one's own existence it is impossible to make any logical conclusions or form any stable beliefs about anything in the universe. If you did not exist, you could not think, and so it follows that thinking is itself proof of your own existence.
Of course, this is not a particularly original concept; the phrase "Cogito Ergo Sum" was first coined in the 1600s by the French philosopher René Descartes. However, despite the concept seeming self-evident and being relatively well-known in the modern day, I believe the reasoning is worth laying out here explicitly to ensure the foundations are solid.
Cogito takes care of base reality, but a moral framework cannot be constructed only from raw truth: to decide what one "should" do, a person needs to make value judgements, and for value judgements to be possible one needs to value something. As a result, Cogitism makes one additional presupposition: that the self, the only verifiable truth, has value.
These two fundamentals, the truth that "the self Is", and the belief that "the self Matters", make up the bedrock of Cogitism. From here we can begin to build a fully functional moral framework.
The Quality of Existence
We've established that the self exists and that it has value, but without the tendency for the self to change it's impossible for one to derive any direction from these principles; if nothing you do helps or harms the thing that holds value, then nothing you do holds any moral weight.
Luckily we know that the self has a tendency to change; simply by thinking and observing the self, a person can establish the knowledge that the self is plastic, and that one can sharpen or dull the fidelity of thought by taking different actions within oneself.
If thought is the quality that proves the self, and thinking can get more or less difficult moment to moment, one must presume that thinking could degrade to a point where the self could dissolve, or otherwise cease to exist.
Because the self is our basis for value judgements, and it is possible for the self to end, it stands to reason that any action which brings us closer to that end (incoherence) is negative, and any action that takes us further away from that end (coherence) is positive.
The Reality of the Environment
So far we have only operated within the limited scope of the self, but moral frameworks must account for interactions with reality outside the self. So, how do we prove that the environment exists in a way that matters?
Invoking "Cogito Ergo Sum" only proves the existence of the self, as an observer of one's own thoughts, so it stands to reason that any stimulus that cannot be directly proven by Cogito must be outside it. If external stimuli can be shown to affect the quality or coherence of the self, they must be real, as things that do not exist cannot have an effect on things that do.
By reflecting on oneself while interacting with perceived reality, a person can observe that the self does indeed change due to external stimuli. Thus, there must be a reality outside the self that is relevant to moral discussions.
Note that under this model, the specific ontological nature of reality does not matter. Whether the universe is a simulation, the hallucinations of a Boltzmann Brain, or truly the lowest and most fundamental "reality" that can exist, the fact that the environment can change the self means that it is real in the ways that count to us.
Consciousness and Value Outside the Self
Now that we have established the existence of a world outside the self, a person can observe that they exist within, or at least linked to, a mind and body. One's mind can be seen to have emotions, desires, and impulses, and the body can be seen outwardly expressing these things.
Going further outside the self, a person can see that they exist in a world with other bodies, built similarly, presenting similar emotions and expressing similar desires. Because we know our observations are caused by real phenomena, and because these other bodies are so similar to our own, one must presume that there are other selves present within those foreign bodies and minds.
One cannot deny that these other selves have value under the same principles by which we derive our own value, because confirmation of their existence and moral relevance was reached through the same observation and logic that confirmed our own existence. To do so would call into question the methods by which we assigned our own value, and in doing so, we would degrade our own coherence.
Because of this, all other selves determined to have moral relevance through these or similar methods must hold the same or similar value as the self under our moral framework. This means that despite Cogitism being rooted in the value of the self, self-sacrifice, selflessness, and altruism are coherent under this system.
Keeping all of our principles and observations in mind, and generalizing to allow for beings dissimilar to ourselves, we can derive a singular aim to act as an ethical north star and guide moral discussion:
To Preserve And Enhance The Stability And Coherence of Sapient Consciousness.
Cogitism In Short
In short, Cogitism derives its conclusions along the following lines:
By Observation, The Self Exists ▶ The Self Has Value ▶ By Observation, The Self Can Change ▶ Stability And Coherence Are Positive, Degradation Is Negative ▶ By Observation, An Environment Exists Outside The Self ▶ By Observation, Other Selves Exist Outside The Self ▶ These Other Selves Have Value ▶ To Generalize, All Sapient Consciousness Has Value ▶ One Must Preserve The Coherence Of Sapient Consciousness
It is my belief that in this way, Cogitism presents an ethical and moral framework built entirely from the nature of consciousness, through observations that any person can make, and it does this with no appeal to any tradition or authority except one's own awareness of the self.
While not made explicit in this essay, Cogitism can apply to beings outside the scope of humanity. Animals, which can be determined by the same methods to have internal experience, qualify (just not as strongly). In the same vein, extraterrestrial life and artificial intelligence can also qualify given that certain criteria are met.
It is my intention to expand on these concepts and to dive deeper into the various implications of Cogitism. These explorations will take the form of additional essays published to my site, and crossposted here if and when they're relevant to TheMotte.
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Notes -
I'll make sure to try and get my hands on a translation of The Crisis at some point, sounds like it would be helpful to read that at some point. For now I'll just have to go off a few Google searches.
From what I can tell, Husserl's goal was phenomenology, as you pointed out, and epistemology. It points out that science stripped value out of its worldview, and gestures at ethics being a problem in this landscape, but doesn't attempt to actually build an ethical framework. I know "self" can have a dozen different definitions, and I'll make this more clear in future essays and revisions, but I'm approaching the self as "that which can prove its own existence to itself through the tautology 'Cogito Ergo Sum', and which can make intentional actions within itself". Anything that happens that isn't intentional is, as far as my definition goes, outside the self.
As for value being assumed, yes it is. Ethics cannot work without value being assigned to something, so I'm establishing that the framework restricts itself to one assumption: that the only seed we derive value from should be the one thing we can prove exists in the absence of other context, that being the self.
Finally, whether or not the others have selves like the ego, denying the similarities would undermine the same logic and observation we used to prove our own existence, which degrades the self. You don't have to be sure that they're really actually real, you just have to know that denying their reality undermines your own coherence.
While Husserl doesn't provide an ethics in Crisis, he did hope to develop one, and some of his students, Edith Stein, for instance, did try to develop ethical insights out of his position. But his project in the crisis is actually very close to what you describe as your own in the second paragraph. Husserl wants to build philosophy (ethics included) out of something that is apodictic, for him that is the Cogito. But while Husserl accepts, with some criticism, Descartes Cogito, he says that he does not go far enough, and that there is actually a further Cogito, which is more holistic. Even when the Cartesian, Husserl writes, is in the throes of his most intense doubting, wherein all he can seem to affirm is the bare cogito, he is still at that moment subjected to phenomenal experience: and the existence of that experience is just as undoubtable as the bare cogito. So, in this moment of radical doubt, one has not just the simple statement: I think therefore I am, but also has, at the same moment, the world. You only have the self, the cogito, but this cogito can be taken to be a "transcendental ego" which is constituting the world. (At this stage of Husserl's thinking he is drawn to a transcendental idealism). At this moment, Husserl writes, we can put aside concerns about the existence of the noumenal world, and deal only with the apodictic phenomenological one revealed to us through our Cartesian method of doubting: and, happily, this phenomenal world has among its basic structures many of things we hoped to find "really out there." Crucially, for an ethics, we have a primordial phenomenological experience of "being with" other people, which is ineradicable from our phenomenological experience, and upon which, we consequently are motivated to act. The question of the "real" existence of other people, the problem of solipsism, is thus sidestepped: what surely is is only that which cannot be doubted, which includes our phenomenological experience of others as others, hence we can treat them as other subjects.
To your final paragraph, it seems to me that the whole problem of other minds stems from the fact that it is in fact not the same logic whereby we become sure of our own existence that we become sure of the existence of other minds. I have first-hand, undeniable experiential proof of my own mind's existence, whereas, I only observe other people behaving "as if" they are minded: if all I have to prove my own existence is the so-called "bare cogito" then that certainly does not allow me to become sure of the existence of other minds. It's perfectly coherent to imagine myself as a solipsistic god mind: the bare cogito gives me no evidence this is not my situation. The expanded Cogito of husserl, however, may provide a way out, allowing you to sidestep this "coherence" talk altogether, which to me seems like an epicycle.
And a point on Ethics: it still seems to me you're putting the cart before the horse, here. I want an Ethics, you say, and I want it to be systematic: that means I'm going to have to make an unwarranted assumption to get this thing off the ground. It may be true that your system couldn't exist without accepting as brute this one fact "selves have value," but that's an extremely hard pill to swallow when the premise of your system is to be as reductive as possible and to ground ethics only in the most undeniable things. You have gone to all the effort to provide an extemely minimalist world picture--just the bare cogito--but then brought in this assumption, whose hugeness is made flagrant by the modesty of the rest of the system's assumptions. It's like trying to rake a zen garden with a bulldozer.
It also seems like normal ethics doesn't fall out of this view: my intuition would be if something did not decrease myself's coherence but did harm to other people, it would still be wrong. So not only are the grounds of ethics assumed by this system, they seem to open space for repugnant conclusions about what is ethical to be drawn.
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