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Small-Scale Question Sunday for July 5, 2026

Do you have a dumb question that you're kind of embarrassed to ask in the main thread? Is there something you're just not sure about?

This is your opportunity to ask questions. No question too simple or too silly.

Culture war topics are accepted, and proposals for a better intro post are appreciated.

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Does anyone else ever watch/listen to Glenn Diesen's "The Greater Eurasia Podcast"? The tone of the show is rather dry and boring but many of his guests seem to talk about Europe getting nuked like it is as inevitable as the weather forecast.

I am no geopolitical expert by any means so my first reaction was that this was just a tactic to kick Europe/NATO into action to better defend itself against Russia, but one of the main guests proposing the nukes is Stanislav Krapivnik, (who sometimes seems slightly drunk in my opinion,) and apparently is on Russia's side in the Ukraine conflict. Since that's the case I suppose he might be exaggerating Russia's power boastfully or trying to instill fear into the West but he is not the only guest who seems to treat nuclear action as an inevitability. And it is not that Russia would nuke Ukraine, but rather they mention targets like Germany or Finland or other NATO nations.

Can I get a sanity check on this? Does anyone on this board share the view that Russia is going to use nuclear weapons on Europe in the next year or two?

  1. Never listened to this podcast.
  2. Don't have a strong opinion as to what will happen in the next year or two. Widening the conflict they haven't been able to win yet would certainly be a move for Russia, and so there are strong reasons to think it is doubtful, but I'm not sure it's impossible.
  3. I assume the nuclear weapons being discussed are tactical, as part of an "escalate to deescalate" doctrine, with the idea being that Russia would use "small" nuclear weapons, probably after an initial military action, to say "back off" - with the idea being that NATO would be unwilling to retaliate with nuclear weapons of their own, lest the conflict crawl up the escalation cycle to "real" nuclear weapons.

IF Russia finds itself in a shooting war with NATO (regardless of who initiates it), I consider an "escalate to deescalate" scenario plausible. Russia has (by some estimates) a 10:1 advantage over NATO in substrategic nuclear weapons in the European theater. Many of these weapons are very small, deployed from artillery pieces or even air-to-air missiles.

I would stress that tactical nuclear weapons are very, very different from strategic nuclear weapons, and during the Cold War both sides would likely have used nuclear weapons "routinely" as substrategic weapons (for instance nuclear depth charges were intended to destroy an enemy submarine, not necessarily the entire Russian Baltic Fleet, or what have you). Generally speaking, the effects of these weapons would be along the lines of "destroy an airbase" not "obliterate Berlin." However, the current gap in NATO/Russian tactical nuclear capabilities is important because it limits the ability to play tit-for-tat if Russia uses tactical nuclear weapons, either as part of an escalate-to-deescalate gambit or simply because they are effective. If you've got 10 tactical nuclear weapons for every 1 of theirs, they are going to run out of tactical nuclear weapons long before you do. So once you've both nuked each other a few times and they run out, they have two options: accept you nuking them routinely (which greatly enhances the effectiveness of your weapons systems) or escalate to strategic nuclear weapons, with the larger stakes and (literal) fallout that entails.

Now, modern nuclear weapons are smaller and often have "dial a yield" capabilities that makes the lines a bit blurrier than that, but hopefully that gives you a good idea of why people might believe Russia would resort to nuclear weapons: militarily, nuclear weapons are very effective, even if they are "small." Politically, if you have the upper hand and the deeper stockpiles, you have good reason to believe that you can extract concessions from a foe who will be unwilling to race you up the escalation ladder to tossing ICBMs at each other.