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I don't think this even qualifies as an argument that needs refuting. This loss of energy was understood to be a consequence of military engagement and so because it was a known consequence it doesn't matter? The economic problems and energy supply issues caused by provoking hostilities with your main supplier of fossil fuels are in fact caused by provoking hostilities by your main supplier of fossil fuels!
This isn't happening and Europe is currently undergoing serious economic problems as a result of the lack of fossil fuels. This could indeed be qualified as shift to an import network infrastructure, but the idea that this makes the continent more resilient is farcical. The huge costs associated with importing LNG from the US rather than a pipeline from Russia have no compensating factors, and will continue to act as a drag/tax on the economy as a whole due to the massively important role played by fossil fuels in modern economies. There is going to be less energy, it will be less reliably sourced and it will cost more - this will have a ripple effect through the rest of the economy, and again, I do not think that this is a cost worth paying for the goal of making sure that Kiev can continue to shower the breakaway regions with artillery fire.
That said, the flagrant violation of the sanctions has also contributed - Europe is still using Russian fossil fuels, they're just paying India a premium to do so, and the US doesn't have the stones/capability to sanction India and China. Actually going through with the economic threats and sanctions in a real and serious way, as opposed to paying them lip-service and paying someone else so you can ignore them, would impose such a disastrous political cost that the leaders who did so would be removed from power in short order.
Recent events and sanctions have given that process rocket-skates and supercharged it. De-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before the war, and the sanctions regime that was imposed upon Russia has contributed to that. You're right when you talk about the problems associated with not using the current global reserve currency, but the problems associated with staying on the dollar are starting to match or even exceed them.
I agree that European militaries were largely jokes, but the supply chain and logistical issues that this affair has exposed are not minor and will take considerable time and investment to fix. Ammunition factories can't be built overnight. Of course, if you're an advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe you'd have to advocate for getting them out from under the thumb of the USA so this entire affair is meaningless anyway.
I'm taking the Rand corporation's word for it - they're as fanatically pro US empire as it is possible to be, and even they are saying that the engagement in Ukraine is tying up resources which could be used in the conflict with China, which is far more important (source: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html ). Most serious pieces I have seen discussing this topic claim that the conflict is drawing away resources which could be used in China.
Moreover, the idea that this materiel is irrelevant because Taiwan will get blockaded is also meaningless, given that hostilities haven't actually started yet and that equipment could be sent there before they do anyway. Anti-air defences and artillery are absolutely the sort of military equipment that could be useful, and those have definitely been showing up in Ukraine.
I think you're wrong but I don't think that there can be an actual resolution of this with words - so instead I'm going to offer a bet. My position is that Russia is absolutely capable as an ally, that western nations are not willing to shoulder the burdens required to prevent the rise of a multipolar world and the US is in fact incapable of achieving their goals. The US failed in Iraq, is failing in Syria, failed in Afghanistan and failed in Vietnam. The recent history of the US empire's military adventurism has been a long litany of defeats, and I see no reason for that to change. If you disagree, I'll give you a chance to put some money on the table - I'm willing to throw 200 USD in monero into escrow for a bet that Ukraine will not retake Crimea and the breakaway republics by the time hostilities cease.
Incorrect. The point is not that it doesn't matter- the point is that the causal mechanism is different. Being a result of energy blackmail as opposed to war is a meaningful distinction because the energy cutoffs could occur in non-war contexts as well- as the eastern Europeans had previously experienced in the 2010s, but which Germany dismissed on arguments that Russia had been a consistent supplier to them so the warnings of the Americans were baseless.
The Europeans did not provoke hostilities, unless you consider the pre-Maidan support by European and especially German economic interests in supporting pro-European Ukrainian groups a form of provocoation.
You can't have it both ways: either the Europeans lack fossile fuels, or the Europeans are still using Russian fossile fuels. Choose one argument and stick to it.
Further disagreements on framing include-
-The US isn't the primary supplier of LNG on the markets, it was the Arabs (who the Europeans bought much of the gas that normally went to Asia, especially China)
-The ability for sea-based LNG imports is what makes the energy import more reliable, as it avoids critical dependencies on any particular provider due to maritime LNG's fungible nature
-The fact that the LNG import terminals are actually importing LNG, while the Russians actually did shut down the gas pipelines on pretext, belies the reliability difference
-The German economic difficulties were a market distortion result of the Russians functionally subsidizing the pre-war German energy market for the purpose of the blackmail setup, which was raised
-The Europeans are paying a premium in a technical sense, not a global market sense, where their price for the Russian products benefits from the price caps
-You continue to misunderstand the design purpose of the sanctions, and chest-thumping bravado is not a superior alternative
This is repeating the same claim, not a counter-argument with any falsifiable new claims. The use of non-dollars for transactions is not a new thing. The reasons it is not an at-scale thing over time is due to the dynamics of reserve currency, and the functions which drive reserve currency usage have not changed. Until they do, 'de-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before' is synonymous with 'the Russians are sanctioned from the dollar, and are trying to make a virtue of a weakness they've been lobbying to have reversed.'
Setting aside that Europe is not under the US's thumb, it remains better to identify and start fixing logistical issues before they are needed in another crisis. Either the European logistical issue is not an issue for whatever role they might have in a Taiwan crisis- in which case earlier forced awareness is only going to improve the position- or the European logistical issue were insufficient for a Taiwan crisis- in which avoiding the issue (by avoiding the Ukraine crisis) would have been worse, as any Chinese effort willing to take the risk on an assumption of European strength would have been more likely to succeed as the Taiwanese and Americans might have been assuming a level of support not there.
This may be a retreat to a bailey, but it's still a bailey to the original claim of which types of resources matter between conflicts. Your RAND article does not claim the weapon kits and systems being sent to Ukraine are the resources that matter in a China conflict, nor does it address the point on how the cost-value of these resources that were already paid for implies costs in the current era.
Setting aside RAND's own contested history and accuracies, the article's claims regarding China (which is mentioned all of 8 times) center around whether Russia is 'completely' subordinated to it by the end. It makes no claim that the Russian level of support to China in a Taiwan conflict has or would change, not least because it doesn't actually identify the sort of resources / support that would be provided, let alone what would change.
The point remains: the types of resources matter. The types that the Europeans are investing into Ukraine are not the type that would matter in a near-term Taiwan scenario. Unless you believe that the resources / economic costs would have been directly substituted into a maritime naval buildup, these are not costs with a Taiwan-relevant opportunity cost, because the Europeans were never a credible military factor in a Taiwan conflict.
But they wouldn't send significant amounts in advance, for the same reason they didn't go to Ukraine in advance despite Ukraine actually being at far more direct and recent threat: a mix of limitations, their economic interests, and the strategic interests of key European leaders uninterested in being involved in the situation and trying to minimize exposure.
This is an argument that assumes a generosity of the Europeans that didn't exist in their own neighborhood. More to the point, this assumes that they would have been more generous in the face of an uncontested Russian invasion on their borders, rather than finding the advance of Russians in their neighborhood a compelling reason to keep their air defense systems defending themselves, and thus tying down potential resources to Taiwan in a functional strategic fixing action.
I'll disagree, without betting. Setting aside that it's a poorly structured list in measurable and general claims, I don't bet in general.
What?
I legitimately do not understand your position here. If I go to a restaurant that I've been a regular at and decide to chuck a huge tantrum and break some plates and then get banned from returning or doing business with said restaurant, the fact that they could have banned me from entering at any point prior to that does not mean that being banned as a result of my actions is no longer a result of my actions. What, precisely, is the distinction you're making here? How is it relevant to a given incident, at all, that a business could choose to stop selling to me for breaking their rules beforehand? All I can see is playing games with words to disguise the fact that disruptions in energy supplies are a direct result of sponsoring the war.
The Europeans lack the ready access to fossil fuels they had previously - but they are still using Russian fossil fuels anyway by paying middlemen like India, and this is having a noticeable impact on their economies.
The purpose of the sanctions was to reduce Russia's ability to wage war by targeting their economy, and to put pressure on the population in order to achieve a political goal (leadership change/stopping the war). These efforts have failed - the war is still happening and the Russian economy has not been destroyed.
Incorrect - China has been aggressively pursuing de-dollarisation and so has India. They're experiencing difficulties doing so, of course, because financial systems and currencies have a lot of inertia and moving parts. The Global Times, which is essentially a mouthpiece for the Chinese government, has explicitly stated that the weaponisation of the dollar is driving other countries away from it (though they also correctly note that this process takes time and a lot of nations have complicated linkages to the USD which will take time to unwind) - https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1289549.shtml
Ok, whatever - a distinction without a difference. I freely admit that a substantial portion of the resources spent on the Ukraine conflict could not be used in any prospective Taiwan conflict. This does not damage my point in any real way - the military equipment is one factor, and the drain on attention, time and decision-making are all relevant as well. Though that said, I will admit that I may have been unclear earlier when I said "at least among EU militaries". I did not exclusively mean EU militaries when talking about the reduction in western capability, and was including the US in that category.
Huh? They did send significant amounts of aid to Ukraine in advance. I'd argue that "the defence minister mentions the event to the press" to meet the threshold of significant - (and no, I am not talking about the exercise that is the main thrust of the article, but the following quote) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29204505
And inserting some text here just to clearly mark the difference between a BBC quote and your post...
The actual bet is very straightforward and specific - will the Ukraine regain control over Crimea and the breakaway republics when hostilities end? Though that said, given that you're not willing, I'm leaving the bet open for any takers, mainly because I don't think even the people arguing that the Ukraine will win this conflict take that belief seriously enough to put money on it (and I'd love to get some free, easy money from anyone who does).
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