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Culture War Roundup for the week of July 17, 2023

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Ok, at this point I don't feel like you're arguing in good faith. You don't specifically say that you think I don't hate nazis enough, but if I read you correctly you are implying it. You're saying that the way I find abhorrent people abhorrent is incorrect?

You're expressing pretty strong judgements and I don't feel like you are backing the up in a helpful way. If you have such a strong judgement, please say it straightforwardly, and back it up. I've tried to engage with you honestly. You are shaming instead of trying to convince me at all.

You clearly think the position I've put forward is despicable, but despite your questions I don't feel like you've actually argued with what I've said in good faith.

I don't see why what I've said is offensive to you. I don't see why saying that "who I am is what makes nazis abhorrent to me" is not enough. That seems like a strong moral judgement. Why do you think that is not enough.

I suppose you can be forgiven for using language too casually in a way that would normally seem to imply that there is something about Nazis that actually is bad, so long as you're able to clear it up. Would recommend you avoid using that language in the future, though.

I do think that nazis actually are bad. I do not think that morality is a material attribute. If you find that position so gross can you please attack the reasoning I have given. You have not even tried to argue that subjective things aren't real and only objective things are real, while I have repeatedly made it clear that I do not agree with that. I believe subjective things are truly real.

I didn't say that I don't think you hate nazis enough, make strong judgments, say that your position is despicable or offensive. I just tried to understand and describe your position accurately.

I believe subjective things are truly real.

In what sense? Probably not in the traditional sense of the word.

In what sense? Probably not in the traditional sense of the word.

Lol fair enough. I am not a moral realist. I mean real as in subjective things actually exist, but I am fine taking the moral realist definition in this case. There are plenty of philosophers who have have argued that subjective things are "real". I agree with those philosophers, but I'm not interested in defending the definition of real as it's not really needed for my position right now.

Instead, how about I say that subjective things can be overwhelmingly profound and important. They are in no way of less importance than physical material facts. They are not secondary.

I didn't say that I don't think you hate nazis enough, make strong judgments, say that your position is despicable or offensive. I just tried to understand and describe your position accurately.

I think that's dishonest. What is your honest moral judgement of my moral judgement of bad/evil people? You are saying that when I say that people are bad, I don't mean that they are actually bad. How is that not the same as saying that my moral judgement is not the right kind of moral judgement?

You have continually implied that moral relativism as a position is insubstantial or just incorrect. I am not offended, that's the default position. I just want you to argue with what I have said.

Instead, how about I say that subjective things can be overwhelmingly profound and important. They are in no way of less importance than physical material facts. They are not secondary.

I mean, your subjective things are pretty secondary to me. The same reason why the nazi's subjective things are secondary to you.

What is your honest moral judgement of my moral judgement of bad/evil people?

I think it's incorrect/incomplete.

I mean, your subjective things are pretty secondary to me. The same reason why the nazi's subjective things are secondary to you.

Well only assuming we don’t share the same moral axioms right? What if we share most moral axioms besides the axiom that morals are relative?

Then the axioms that define my perspective wouldn’t be secondary to you, by virtue of being the same as your axioms which are primary to you.

I think it's incorrect/incomplete.

Ok well that’s not very informative or fun but it’s honest. Thank you.

That two people happen to share some set of subjective things does not somehow elevate them to being any more primary. You and a buddy may both happen to share the taste axiom that you like cilantro. You may happen to share that with twenty buddies. Your experience is still secondary to them, even though they can find some familiarity with it. And it is utterly secondary to the twenty-second guy who dislikes cilantro. Looking at those twenty-two people, can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"? I think that even trying would be an error in language.

That wasn't what I meant. Your axioms are already primary to you. So if we share an axiom that axiom is primary to you. I didn't say anything about my experience. There is just an overlap of a preexisting condition of primary-ness. I am not saying my axioms have any effect on what is primary to you.

Your axioms are primary to you. Let's say there is an axiom called axiom A. If axiom A is an axiom that you hold, then it is primary to you. If I hold axiom A, then axiom A is primary to me, because it is one of the axioms I hold. Therefore if you and I both hold axiom A, then it is primary for both of us and acts as primary, substantial moral common ground. You don't have to care about my experience or my moral axioms whatsoever. But if we do share them, then those axioms are primary for both of us. That's all I was saying. And with that common ground then we can communicate about morality. That is the basis of a shared morality. Even if you don't agree with me that moral axioms are subjective, the ones we share are still primary to both of us.

That two people happen to share some set of subjective things does not somehow elevate them to being any more primary.

No elevation is needed. Each person already believes the thing, therefore the thing is primary to them. I am not saying that there is magical effect creating new primacy from their shared moral axioms. I am saying that all of their moral axioms are primary to them, therefore if they share them, they have common ground and will agree that those axioms are primary.

Looking at those twenty-two people, can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"? I think that even trying would be an error in language.

I am saying that if all of those people share the axiom that cilantro is good, then they can all agree that cilantro is good. That's all.

can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"

If you are one of these people with the axiom that cilantro is good, then you will say that cilantro is good. If you hold an axiom that it is bad you will say it is bad.

If you are a third party with no opinion about cilantro, then I think the moral status of cilantro will be undefined for you, or perhaps it will seem like a weird and alien thing to attach moral status to. As it does for me in real life.

I think that even trying would be an error in language.

maybe it would be an error in language for you as a third party with no opinion on cilantro to say that cilantro is good or bad. But it would certainly not be an error of language for you to say that those people over there believe that cilantro is good. That would be a simple description of the reality that those people believe cilantro is morally good.

and for that strange group of people who believe cilantro is morally good, it would not be a error of language for them to say "cilantro is morally good" - because that is what they believe. You would say that they are incorrect, but there have been lots of humans with moral axioms you would say are incorrect or bizarre, and I doubt you would normally say that their expressions of their weird beliefs are an error of language.

But it would certainly not be an error of language for you to say that those people over there believe that cilantro is good.

There's twenty-one people over there that like cilantro and one person who doesn't. I can't actually say that "they" believe that cilantro is good. In any event, you changed what it is that I said would be an error in language. I asked, "Looking at those twenty-two people, can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"? I think that even trying would be an error in language."

There's twenty-one people over there that like cilantro and one person who doesn't. I can't actually say that "they" believe that cilantro is good.

Ok, Sorry if I miswrote that or wasn't clear enough. You can say that they, the 21 people who believe cilantro is good - believe that cilantro is good. That seems essentially definitionally true and not an error of language.

In any event, you changed what it is that I said would be an error in language. I asked, "Looking at those twenty-two people, can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"? I think that even trying would be an error in language."

I don't think I changed what you said. I made it clear what I thought. If there are groups of people who think cilantro is good or bad, that does not provide you any ability to extract from the fact that they believe those things the position that cilantro is good or bad. Their moral conclusions are largely irrelevant to whether you can say cilantro is good or bad, that would have to be based on your own axioms. most likely you wouldn't think that cilantro has a moral weight, but I have no problem imagining a culture that does, like this theoretical group.

If your axioms are that cilantro is morally good, then it is not an error of language to say that cilantro is morally good.

However, as I said earlier, it is logically incoherent to say that is it objectively true that cilantro is morally good. And definitely logically incoherent to say that it is morally truer that cilantro is good than that cilantro is bad. What is objectively true is that some of these theoretical people believe that cilantro is good, and some of them believe it is bad. That is objectively true. Determining the truth of the statement "cilantro is morally good" is where logical coherence breaks down.

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