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Transnational Thursday for February 1, 2024

Transnational Thursday is a thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or international relations history. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.

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Israel

I’ve been waiting for something meaty as an update. There’s been a lot of progress/change since my last post so I think it’s worth writing a longer follow up.

TL;DR

  • A tenuous but promising "humanitarian ceasefire" (emphasis mine, I'm not sure if ceasefire is the right word here) - is actively being negotiated this week; ball is currently in Hamas' court and so far they're holding out for a full stop to the war, which Israel says is off the table
  • IDF is running out of (surface) targets to destroy. Estimates are at 50-61% of the surface of Gaza is destroyed as of Tuesday this week. IDF is suggesting their last major step will take combat into Rafah, a last ditch safe area, currently cramped with 1m+ refugees/civilians
  • A hospital based assassination of 3 militants by Israeli operatives in the West bank this week is seen as an escalation and significant change in the rules of combat
  • Aid into Gaza is stopped temporarily; the UNRWA scandal/funding cut signals future aid will go in through other or new organizations
  • There is intense, aggressive, worldwide pressure on Netanyahu to sign a ceasefire

I'm not sure how to interpret this when it comes to IDF objectives and the length of the war. FWIW, Israeli polls still estimate the war as lasting 2+ more months (67.9%), 4+ months (45.9%)


Ceasefire/Humanitarian relief negotiation

Seemed to be making rapid progress going into this week, and now appears slowed (though ongoing). Hamas was expected to respond earlier today, but has not yet responded officially. They've given positive signs, but so far they seem to be holding out on or rejecting some of the key provisions, in ways which would make Israel unlikely to agree. Israel seems to have agreed to everything except for a longterm/permanent/literal ceasefire or end to the war - which Hamas is pushing for. Indirect negotiations are ongoing (diplomats and spy agencies formed and maintain an indirect connection via Cairo earlier this week). These are the same spy agencies (Mossad, Egypt, Quatar) and international leaders who put together the proposal last weekend in Paris. Many details aren't public - so far, it seems the proposal follows previous proposals and suggests a 3 stage return to peace (with each stage lasting 4-6 weeks?):

  • First stage would have Israel allowing up to 300 supply trucks in per day via the Egyptian side of the border, and Hamas releasing injured, minor and senior prisoners, with release of TBD captives held by Israel
  • Second stage would see Hamas releasing IDF members (including remaining women captives), release of TBD captives held by Israel, reconnections with Israeli infrastructure for power and communication into the region and some aid being allowed to also come in via the Israeli side of the border
  • Third stage would see exchange of corpses held by both sides, release of TBD captives by Israel, and other provisions not yet made public

Known details that are up in the air:

  • Order, type of, and number of prisoners to be released by each side. Hamas is still holding at most 100-136 live captives and at least 5 corpses, Israel is holding

As of Februar[y] 2024 Israel holds 2,084 sentenced prisoners, 2,752 remand detainees and 3,484 administrative detainees held without trial. Israel also holds 606 people as "unlawful combatants". https://hamoked.org/prisoners-charts.php

  • Amount, source and kind of aid to be allowed in and at which stage. Crucially, basic infrastructure is only meant to be reconnected/rebuilt in stage 2 (which I assume means indirect means of communication will be re-established between Israel/Hamas without a need for Egyptian intermediaries)
  • Length of the process (estimates are in the 6-18 weeks range)
  • When/whether/how Hamas leadership will be allowed to (or required to) leave Gaza
  • How much of a cessation of hostilities will actually take place. Israel strongly signals this is a humanitarian deal, not a literal or longterm ceasefire, a statement backed by the US and others.
  • What guarantees will be provided by the US, France, Egypt, and Qatar to ensure that both sides adhere to the agreement

The Israeli war cabinet met on Monday/Tuesday to discuss, but officially the ball is in Hamas' court:

Versions of the phased ceasefire framework have been under discussion since late December, but Israel did not sign onto the concept until David Barnea, the Mossad chief, met his U.S. and Egyptian counterparts and Sheikh Mohammed [ruler of Dubai] in Paris on Sunday.

Egyptian sources said Qatar, Egypt and Jordan would guarantee that Hamas adheres to any agreement, while the U.S. and France would do the same on the Israeli side. Reuters was unable to establish what assurances the guarantors would be able to offer. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-ceasefire-plan-hostage-release-awaits-hamas-response-2024-01-30/

Some war status/stats

  • 50-61% of all surface buildings in Gaza have been demolished / destroyed. See BBC Verify
  • Rafah is holding around 1m refugees, and has been declared to be as the next (last) target for a major offensive by Israel. The potential cost(s) in human life and otherwise, if armed combat or bombing spreads into the area, are staggering. The area has seen heavy flooding, and will see more, as heavy winter rains come in this month
  • The IDF admitted to flooding some Hamas underground rooms and tunnels with seawater. This has been an open secret for a while now. As a consequence, it's likely that clean water and electricity will remain in critical short supply in the region for the foreseeable future (water pipes/power lines have been rerouted or connected through the same tunnels)
  • Conservative/trustworthy estimattes for total casualties in Gaza are around 30000, on the low end. Approximately 9000 of those are Palestinian combatants or militants, and around 400 or so are Israeli combatants (IDF, ShinBet, police). Around 1000 are Israeli civilians, and the majority of the rest of the 20000 or so Palestinian civilian casualties are under 18. Many Palestinians are marked as missing, so final numbers may turn out to be significantly higher.

JENIN, West Bank, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Israeli commandos disguised as medical workers and Muslim women burst into a hospital in the occupied West Bank on Tuesday and killed three Palestinian militants, one of them lying paralysed in bed, witnesses and authorities said. https://www.reuters.com/world/this-is-moment-israeli-commandos-disguised-palestinians-walked-into-jenin-2024-01-30/

This kind of operation is unheard of on Israel/WestBank soil, and seen as an escalation and changing of the rules of combat by Palestinians. Up until now targeted attacks / assassinations have used drones or other explosives. Direct action by specialists, especially inside a hospital, is seen as an escalation

UNRWA

UNRWA - the organization providing aid into Gaza - has lost all funding and support from the west on IDF allegations it hired terrorists. Supporting countries (including Germany, France, US and Canada) are looking at alternative methods for providing aid into the territory. Canada has committed an additional 40m in support funding as of January 30th, to be transferred into Gaza + the west bank through non-UNRWA organizations like WHO and WFP. This may not be that big of a change or escalation in the grand scheme of things - western governments have been regularly sending aid without the support of local orgs over the last decade (instead preferring to regularly send money directly to trusted or proven Fatah aligned individuals or other known non-militants on the ground).

For reference, UNRWA employs as many as 30000 people, almost all (99%+) of them local Palestinians, and around 13000 or those based in Gaza. It and has always, and also recently, gone to great lengths to cooperate with IDF in making sure it has no involvement with militants. They've fired everyone mentioned in the scandal, and promised to cooperate and/or prosecute them to the maximum allowable by law. Also, IMHO 190 suspected participants in the October 7 attack is a much lower than expected number given the size of the organization. Based on the background incidence of extremist militants in Gaza, I would have expected the number to be 10x higher than that, at the lower end. So the shut down seems politically or extraneously motivated, more so than driven by practical concerns. Likely there is pressure to replace UNRWA with a foreign controlled body (maybe even going as far as putting a peacekeeping force in place?) for channeling foreign aid into Gaza, since (I'm speculating here) future aid into the region will be tied to enforcement systems or guarantees backing the ongoing humanitarian deal negotiations. The optimist in me wants this to be an opportunity for a return or recreation of something like the NORDBAT peacekeeper batalion in Bosnia

Netanyahu pressure

There is intense international pressure on Netanyahu to stop the civilian casualties and humanitarian disaster in Gaza. The (symbolic/toothless) ICJ preliminary injunction against Israel asking the country to actively prevent genocidal acts as well as prosecute incitement to genocide will be followed up with an Israeli report on progress on these dimensions by end of February.

Equally symbolic but stinging sanctions from US , UK, EU and Canada against Israeli settlers involved in recent violence in the west bank are likely not immediately materially effective, but written in a way which makes them easy to escalate.

Some other international pressure is maybe more relevant and practical - lots is on the table in the larger region; US pressure on Israel includes material steps towards Syrian recognition of the Israeli state and Russian pressure mulls a withdrawal of Iranian troops from Syria. Many smaller symbolic acts constantly happening all over the world - eg. Israel's ambassador to Belgium taken to task once a Belgian building in Gaza was bombed.

The involvement of Mossad in the Hamas negotiations is a mixed signal. Obviously, a deal would go through or involve them, since no direct means of communication exist between Israel and Hamas. At the same time, there were rumblings that Netanyahu lost Mossad support last year, and a deal which defangs the case for the IDF invasion completely (Hamas leaders moved out of Gaza + all Israeli captives returned) is seen by some as another step in the same direction.

ACX mentions support as high as 32% for Netanyahu, in a more recent poll than the 15% one from my last post, when he given as an alternative between existing folk who are known choices for the PM role. Gantz (48%) and Eisenkot (45%) both poll as preferred options over Netanyahu (32%) as PM. They form the bulk of his current ruling coalition, as members of the National Unity party. So there could be several options for forming a more centrist coalition if an election were to run now, if National Unity were to give in to the temptation and defect from Netanyahu's coalition ("Israeli Likud lawmaker appears to call on party to replace Netanyahu").

Netanyahu's consideration of the deal with Hamas is alienating some of his more extremist supporters, who are threatening to leave his coalition if he makes a deal without their consent:

Ben-Gvir and another ultranationalist coalition partner, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich of the Religious Zionism party, have chafed at their exclusion from the war cabinet.

In response or protest over the deal, some of the more extreme ministers staged a conference promoting resettlement of Gaza with Israeli citizens. This step was extremely unpopular with everyone, and might be another sign the extremists are being dropped from the ruling coalition (and consequently an election being held):

Benny Gantz, a centrist member of the war cabinet, said on Monday the attendance by government and coalition members hurt Israel's standing abroad and would compromise efforts to bring about a hostage release. Opposition chair and former Israeli prime minister Yair Lapid called the convention delusional and dangerous in a televised statement in the Knesset.

Corruption Trial

As of January 20th, the pace of hearings in Netanyahu's corruption trial is up to 3 days a week. They were cut down to 2 per week last year, on account of the Hamas war (and Netanyahu was excused from attending), and were meant to go back to full speed by February 1st. So 3 days per week are a compromise.

The departure of star attorneys Ben Zur + daughter from the case is being downplayed (https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-netanyahus-defense-attorney-in-case-4000-to-step-down-1001468883) by everyone and makes sense on paper. The timing seems weird, and some speculate is related to potential defence witnesses that will be called up (Ben Zur is an attorney to many folk in Netanyahu’s camp, and has many potential conflicts of interest with future defense witnesses; he will leave once the prosecution finishes calling up witnesses).

Estimates put the trial as concluding around June of this year. Predictions are for a likely conviction

I can't find information on what the potential is for penalties to Netanyahu if convicted (anyone know or have a good source?). I assume a prison term of something like 2-10 years is on the table, given similar cases in the past. I don't know how to evaluate the chances for one or more guilty verdicts or the range of potential penalties