site banner
Jump in the discussion.

No email address required.

There's something interesting going on in this discussion here, and in previous discussions on Alexandros's writing on this topic.

There's a lot of people pointing at how Alexandros is pretty critical of Scott/Scott's epistemics (and curiously missing his similar criticisms of the community's epistemics), rather than just focusing on whether or not Scott's conclusions are true and/or justified. Alexandros does seem pretty critical, so fair enough there. And there's a conversation to be had about how critical is appropriate, and how to figure out how critical is appropriate.

But that conversation isn't happening.

Instead, we're getting accusations that Alexandros is "attacking"/"grinding his axe against"/"picking on" Scott rather than sticking to the object level and minimizing "unnecessary heat"... in a way that sure looks a bit like "attacking"/"grinding axes against"/"picking on" Alexandros. You know, with insults including but not limited to "absolutely autistic", "creepy", and "fucking stalker". People showing up just to let everyone know that they don't care to talk to him because he's bad. And, of course, not one object level rebuttal yet as of when I'm writing this.

Is Alexandros acting like an obsessed stalker who once got attention from a girl, and letting his emotions pull him away from truth and honesty? Is Scott letting the fear of his "expert status" being challenged interfere with his neutral truth seeking? Are these questions both completely fair and valid, both out of line by virtue of attempting to address the person instead of the argument, or is there some principle saying that one can be asserted without argument while the other is unacceptable to question even with many pages of argument? And if so, what is that principle?

So far no one is addressing Alexandros's arguments about whether ivermectin works.

Or whether Scott's arguments against ivermectin are valid.

Or whether Alexandros's criticisms of Scott's (and the communty's!) epistemics are valid.

It's all focused on a rather uncharitable mind reading of Alexandros motivations. This isn't entirely a bad thing in itself since there's actually a lot to be gained by tracking the least-flattering-consistent-explanation of people's behaviors/beliefs, but it sure is interesting what happens when you apply this metric uniformly and judge those criticizing Alexandros on this metric.