Masterclass in giving a man so little to lose he might say ‘fuck it’ and nuke you even with guaranteed MAD, genius. They’ve got to be kicking themselves if he really is alive.
Because American interceptors at bases in Iran are ones that can’t be donated to Ukraine, and are worth far more than a few cheap drones?
I suspect Israel’s logic is more out of desperation. The know Iran’s going to get nukes and they know a core mission of the Islamic Revolution is the elimination of the ‘Zionist Entity’ by any means necessary - why wouldn’t that include nukes? Iran after all destroyed its relationships with countless others in the region, got sanctioned by half the world and spent billions of dollars just to fund pretty much every major hostile force on Israel’s border (none of whom are ethnically Persian, many of whom aren’t even Shia). They did it solely to attack Israel, for purely ideological reasons. An Iranian nuclear first strike was always a possibility.
In that scenario, maybe the Israelis calculated that even a war with Iran with a 20% chance of destroying the government or sparking a collapse or uprising was worth it.
Shaheds are tiny and there’s a huge border where they can be resupplied, not least through Iraq which is majority Shia and sympathetic. Maybe you can get Putin to promise pretty please that he’s not going to supply them, but come on. So again you’re in an insurgent situation that maybe looks a little less like Afghanistan and more like a cross between what happened in Iraq, the Troubles, and the second intifada, except far larger, more entrenched and on larger territory, and with enemies happy to die.
Immigration is like boiling a frog. It really is too late by the time you notice it getting a little warm. Occasionally, you start thinking “man, it’s getting hot in here”, but then you’re distracted by geopolitics, or by the economy, or another financial crisis, or a pandemic, and the water temperature goes to the back of your mind.
I think this probably ought to be the greatest cause of pessimism for the Western right - you can have a few great years where immigration is the number one issue, but then there’s another recession and suddenly all anyone cares about is stimulus and unemployment and bank bailouts and it’s another decade before people remember what’s happening.
What makes you think that it failing in Iran isn’t due to specific characteristics of Iran rather than some universal strategic truth?
Let me give you an example: if Trump bombs Belgium heavily tomorrow demanding some political arrangement, they would surrender by midnight; the political leadership don’t want to fight and won’t, they would rather be ruled by America than die. Maduro’s party preferred making a deal with America to dying. The Iranians don’t.
Taiwan is neither Venezuela nor Belgium nor Iran, but its political leadership is closer - when it comes to ideological position on this - to the former than the latter. If the Islamic Revolution is overthrown then the IRGC are penniless and prosecuted at best and hunted and slaughtered at worst, probably the latter. If the Taiwanese elite accept Chinese rule relatively quickly…they get to go back to being rich in Taipei, or at worst exile themselves to America if they love democracy.
If Iran was ruled by people with the character and belief system of EU bureaucrats they would have surrendered on the day, shaking their heads.
Their most obvious path (diplomatic / ‘peaceful’ / semi-peaceful unification aside) is a blitz campaign (with or without attacks on US bases in the region) followed by a quick deal with whoever survives in the leadership. The options for them at that point are “make a deal with Xi” or “call in the yankees and turn my country into a wasteland and die along with hundreds of thousands of civilians and my family and friends”, and they will pick the former.
China has extensive overland routes, are the world leaders in renewable energy, have a year of oil reserves, have the state capacity to make unpopular decisions about limiting energy usage, can be resupplied through Russia, Central Asia etc, and has large food reserves. Terrible for an export-led economy but not something impossible to survive for a year or two.
I sympathize with exiled Iranians but they don’t know more about regime change than anyone else, many are just clinging onto whatever hope they might be able to go home in their lifetime, if this is it it’s it.
I didn’t say it would happen this time. I said ‘when’ it happens. Trump can still easily save himself here.
The unique setup of the IRGC is unlike that of other Gulf countries. It’s an armed ideological and economic core operation designed specifically to rule over a hostile middle and upper class by design, it’s unlike other “militarized countries” where the army controls large amounts of the economy but is also very corrupt and ideologically disunited (Pakistan, Egypt) and it’s also unlike security states ruled by comparatively small intelligence communities like East Germany or arguably even modern Russia. The IRGC doesn’t need ordinary Iranians to rally to the cause, it just needs to avoid open revolution and to keep the public scared enough that nobody stands against them.
It’s just not true that people haven’t called Trump’s bluff. Plenty of people have, including over tariffs, when China did.
if the Straits are mined, destroying some oil infrastructure doesn't add much additional pain
Surely it prevents export from Saudi Arabia’s western ports?
It’s kind of up to Iran. While there’s a lot of online rumor-mongering that the ‘Samson doctrine’ means that Israel will nuke third countries if Iran nukes it, the more commonly accepted version of it is just that it’s a second-strike trigger. So Iran nukes Israel, Israel nukes Iran, then what? For WW3, either Israel nukes another Arab country (increasingly unlikely as time goes on, at least for now, and even then the path of escalation is unclear), or Iran nukes Saudi Arabia (drawing Pakistan into the conflict, drawing India into the conflict, which is a more plausible route to a world war), which again, is far from a given and doesn’t make a lot of sense.
Will Iran strike first? I’m not sure. They might announce they have nukes and see what happens. At that point, the Israeli reasoning changes.
My opinion is that the previous efforts (targeted assassinations and then the bombing campaign) were as effective as possible given the circumstances (limits of conventional weaponry, contributions of individual scientists), but that a society of 80 million capable of procuring and enriching to 60%+ with an intelligent and well-developed academy and domestic population of scientists is going to get there sooner rather than later. There is no big technical hurdle they cannot quickly overcome. Israel will keep trying, but interventions can set a program back by weeks or months at the most, not more.
True, but he can try desperately to bring it down, and even his advisors will tell him that unilaterally ending hostilities with Iran is the fastest route to that.
As for mining, if Iran mines the straits while their oil production is still active, they've cut themselves off from oil sales. Mines have no IFF, and the Iranians have only one filling terminal outside the straits, which the US could easily destroy from the air.
What’s the logic here? They can (and are) still shipping oil from the port not in the Strait (Jask I think). The US can bomb it, sure, but then the shaheds start bombing Saudi, Emirati, Kuwaiti etc oilfields without inhibition, which is far worse for America and its allies than it is for Iran (which is already fighting an existential war if you’re a senior regime figure) - and which the GCC specifically doesn’t want to happen. Even worse, they might go all in and start bombing gulf desalination plants, at which point you guarantee a humanitarian crisis.
Iran can mine the straits, keep shipping oil from the Gulf of Oman, and dare the US to do something. If America attacks, they go for the jugular and attack Gulf oilfields directly and devastatingly. If they don’t, they get away with it. No good options absent a deal, which they don’t seem to want to do.
Right now, not much has happened and foreign policy simply isn’t a very emotive issue for most Americans.
So far every knife out for Trump has failed. When the first real hit lands (when he gets unpopular enough and someone - probably not one of the central players - is willing to gamble on going all in) everyone will reposition themselves. I don’t think this means it’s over for Rubio or Vance necessarily. The Democratic base was antiwar since 2005 and they chose Obama, Hillary, Biden. Immigration, law and order and the economy are the top three policy issues for Republicans.
My feeling is that:
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Casualties (which may well remain moderately low) don’t typically blow back in the face of wartime presidents. If anything, deaths make people mad and angry and bloodthirsty. Vietnam wasn’t even an exception until it had been a very long time indeed. If Iran sinks a big ship and kills 200 US navy sailors a lot of ambivalent Republican commentators will say “well now we do have to punish them”.
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Trump’s tariff performance suggests he isn’t willing to allow oil to be much above $100 for long at all. A comparatively ‘principled’ or ideological neocon might try to make a case to the public, Trump won’t. That might not save his polling (which has been in decline for a while) but it might be enough for Vance and Rubio.
Does disaster in Iran make war with China less likely?
As the fog of war begins to clear after the last ten days, a few things have become evident.
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There is no revolution in Iran. The IRGC’s grip on power has strengthened, or at least not weakened. In Khamenei’s son it has its preferred candidate in power, at least nominally (it may be the institution rather than the man who is in power, but it doesn’t really matter). The IRGC has more than 150,000 men, heavily armed, extremely well trained, in control of more than 40% of the economy. True Shia believers, deeply committed to the Islamic revolution, they know they have no future in a secular Iran and will do anything to prevent it. The secular middle class can flee, as they have for decades, and have low casualty tolerance. Even worse, the risk-takers in that demographic were already killed or jailed in the previous wave of repression. According to various sources, more than 80-90% of Iranian mine laying speedboats and other platforms are still operational. These are very hard to target from the air, they’re small, easily hidden, widely dispersed along the coast. Minutes ago, Fars announced that Iran will not allow a single ship affiliated with America or its allies through the Strait. According to CNN, US intelligence believes mine laying has already commenced.
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The US has only two escalations left open. The first, which is low-casualty (comparatively), is to bomb Kharg and/or Iranian oilfields, pipelines and refineries, and/or Iranian tankers using the Hormuz or Iran’s Eastern ports where they’re scaling up shipping. In that event, Iran’s low cost drones will attack Gulf oil production. The Strait will remain heavily mined and inaccessible for months for cargo traffic. Oil surges to $150, perhaps beyond; the Gulf nations will be forced to sue for peace with Iran, expelling US bases. The regime holds, even still; the people are not armed, resistance is limited. The second option is that the US goes all-in, attempting a ground invasion, arming the Kurds (destroying further relations with Turkey); thousands of American soldiers die but Tehran can likely be occupied, the IRGC retreats to hardened mountains it knows well, quagmire with far higher casualty rates than Afghanistan, and far less US support. Both routes end with the GOP finally turning on Trump and a wipeout in the midterms.
The consequences are clear, and for all his faults, the president has very good immediate political instincts if poor military ones: the US will declare mission accomplished, the president may well personally blame the Iranian people for failing to rise up (“you know, I really thought they’d do it, it’s a shame, you know, but they had their chance”), Witkoff will force Israel’s hand to stop further action like he did with the Gaza deal. Through back channels with Turkey or Russia, the Iranians will agree to slowly stop their action, so that they can rebuild. Iran will quickly complete its bomb. A period of rebuilding and greater domestic repression will follow. The Gulf states will be angry with Iran, but will ultimately draw closer with it out of necessity.
Most importantly, and this is true in pretty much every scenario, the US will have experienced a major geopolitical and military humiliation that makes conflict with China much less likely. Missile defenses shredded by cheap drones that can be mass produced by the million by China will rightly create visions of entire hundred billion dollar carrier fleets destroyed by a hundred million dollars of Chinese drones in a massed attack. Unlike in the Gulf, in a Taiwan conflict in which the US actually fought, bases in Guam, Korea, Japan and elsewhere could definitionally not be evacuated abroad (those forces would be needed to fight).
And while some Americans, Jewish and Evangelical, place eschatological and otherwise deep religious important on the geopolitics of the conflict with Iran (or rather, on its hated adversary), even these people are less motivated for a war with China over Taiwan, especially as chip production diversifies geographically. Who actually wants war with Taiwan? Some AI labs who don’t want Chinese competition? Seems unlikely, open source models will get out regardless. The influential Taiwanese diaspora like Lisa and Jensen? Seems unlikely that they want their country destroyed; most smart Taiwanese I know have made peace with their country’s destiny a long time ago. Neocons? Even many of them seem to be going on record to say this war is a bad idea, and many don’t care much about China for the reasons above.
Broadly I agree with that kind of two state solution but it’s also very explicitly against the absolute antizionism embedded in the foundation of the Islamic revolution, in which any Israeli state ie ‘Zionist entity’ is illegitimate; this was the Iranian position even when in the late 1980s and early 1990s a two state solution that involved the removal of most Jewish settlements was on the table.
He can think about the consequences of his technological innovation on society. This is something we ask of many creators; it is fair to ask Mark Zuckerberg if he thinks social media is harmful or what should be done about its negative impact on children or whoever (and indeed this is something Meta at least pretends to care about)
Stop being vague and start thinking about specifics. If there’s going to be UBI, how is it going to be paid for, how is it going to be distributed, how do the economics of the whole thing work?
AGI euphoria promoters have been much more vague about the post revolution economy than even Marx was in the mid-19th century. “Yeah man everyone will get their $2k a month in welfare bux, you will live in a nice pod and crochet all day or something, this will all happen with minimal social upheaval and the economics will work themselves out”.
Oh, and you’re 80 years old and easily impressionable. This is the capability of Mossad, plus infinitely more.
Why does responsibility not lie with Trump / Hegseth etc here, or even Americans who voted for someone allegedly so easily manipulated? It’s very much “the Tsar’s advisors are the real problem”.
Imagine the best salesmen in the world working for years to figure out how to sell you something.
The best salesmen in the world are working right now to sell you Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Fanduel, Kalshi, day trading, laundry detergent, whatever. That doesn’t mean one can’t criticize the lifestyle decisions of gluttons, gamblers and spendthrifts.
It increases it hugely during a conflict. Afterwards the incentives change, especially after a very shameful US withdrawal / unilateral cessation of hostilities, in which case the smart move for them is to complete the bomb, display it publicly, make clear there are many spares distributed across hardened underground facilities, and so a state of nuclear MAD has been reached with Israel.
Twelver Shias really do have a millenarian eschatology but I don’t think that says much about how likely they would be to use that nuclear weapon. In addition, there would be a price to pay for breaking the 80 year nuclear taboo diplomatically, including with Russia and China (since a successful wartime use of a nuclear weapon would almost certainly lead to Poland, Japan and others getting the bomb, which is contrary to the political desires of those states).
Lastly, it’s unclear that a nuclear attack on Israel, depending on scale, would 100% be the end of Israel or (viable) Zionism. It might well be, and presumably this theory involves the subsequent storming (after the deaths of 800k+ Israelis) of the country from multiple sides by an army of angry Muslims, both ‘axis of resistance’ and otherwise Sunnis from Egypt, Syria etc just caught up in the nature of things. But it also might not, Israel would retaliate with nuclear attacks, the population is well armed, it’s possible the US could intervene, there could be a period of anarchy before a Jewish state of a kind is restored, there a number of scenarios.
So certainly it increases the chance, yes. But I don’t think that a regime that survives intact under, say, Khamenei’s son will necessarily do it. That an Iran that survives will get nuclear weapons though is inevitable, surely.
If the war is called off now, the IRGC will press to finish developing nuclear weapons, engage in an extraordinary program of domestic repression and ultimately emerge as the much firmer, more cemented, and even more indisputable ruling elite of Iran. Will they nuke Israel after a cessation of hostilities? I doubt it. If there is a nuclear attack it will happen during a long war of at least several months, probably a rough or dirty bomb using the current 60% enriched material, put together quickly over a month, smuggled into Israel, Dubai, or somewhere else by an IRGC remnant unit operating under limited central authority. Someone like Pezeshkian wouldn’t even know about it until it happened.
The problem is, all of that might happen anyway, underscoring what a poor decision this war has been so far. As I said, there was only one chance to do this and it would have been while 2m+ Iranians were protesting, take out the leadership, police stations, basij, IRGC hubs, then hope that the institutions get overwhelmed with the sheer mass of human movement before anyone regroups, and then bring in US forces to ‘defend’ the (counter)revolution either overtly or quietly. Doing it after all the most aggressive / low inhibition protestors have been killed is pointless, a bunch of scared middle class people in Tehran are now supposed to, what, message each other on Telegram and try to storm parliament, when there are 800,000 soldiers, some who care and some who don’t, and 150,000 deeply ideologically committed IRGC fighters out to avenge their spiritual leader?
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