My argument is a Bayesian one. What I said is: there is plenty of long-standing precedent for American whites killing American blacks for specifically racist reasons, but not much for American blacks killing American whites for the same; therefore, when dealing with any individual murder, it is prima facie more likely to be racism-based if it's white-on-black than if it's black-on-white.
To the extent that this Bayesian argument makes sense, it is pretty much useless for any analysis of this incident or incidents similar to this one, because in no actual incident we're talking about, are we dealing with a prima facie situation where literally the only thing we know about the murder is the races involved. Notably, the races involved, by themselves, provide so little information about any given incident in comparison to readily available information about the incident just from observing it that to call it rational to consider this specific almost-as-crude-as-possible Bayesian analysis to be meaningful would be rather absurd.
As such, your judgment below is suspect:
I would rather the press not ascribe racial motives to anybody without ironclad evidence, but it doesn't seem odd or irrational to me that white-on-black killings should be more readily assumed to be racist.
It is irrational to rely on such a crude method of Bayesian analysis to land at a conclusion when there are many far more precise, far more specific pieces of information that offer far more information on motive than looking only at the races. Now, it's possible that there's a silent "prima facie" in that sentence, which is perfectly cromulent and makes it more defensible. However, if such a hidden term were in there, it would also render it entirely irrelevant to the topic at hand, as the discussion is about a situation (and generally, multiple situations) where prima facie doesn't apply due to just mountains of information surrounding the incident and the individuals involved.
People aren't talking about what the Platonic form of a journalist would do in a spherical vacuum, they're talking about how real-world journalists are really behaving when given lots of information that has irreversibly destroyed their ability to be in a prima facie state and, as such, using extremely crude Bayesian reasoning of this sort is irrational.
However, it's not odd, given what we know about the biases and behaviors of most mainstream journalists in most mainstream outlets. I suppose that's one form of Bayesian thinking that's justified in this case.
I see the logic, but it also still doesn't make sense to me. "Republicans pounce" is a well-trodden meme at this point, and using such phrasing signals partisanship that discredits themselves and whatever article is under the headline. Anyone who's been paying attention to US politics and journalism - which should include literally every American journalist writing about Republicans - should be fully aware of this. As such, if I were a cynical partisan Democrat journalist editing a headline, I would make sure to avoid any phrase that has any similarities with this meme, knowing that any such similarities would make my mission of manipulating people into buying into my framing and narrative less likely to succeed.
Now, some might say that these journalists are in echo chambers that prevent them from recognizing how they discredit themselves. Seems reasonable, but this also doesn't escape the same problem as above: everyone knows that everyone is susceptible to echo chambers that are invisible to them. And, again, US journalists who cover US politics should be more aware of this than the typical person. As such, a US journalist should at the very least be highly suspicious that they live in an echo chamber, which means that they're less capable of analyzing and reporting the news credibly to the populace in general, which means they're less capable of manipulating them. Or informing them properly, if you're an honest, good-faith operator. As such, a selfish, cynical, partisan journalist would (and certainly a non-cynical, non-partisan one would) try to gain perspectives from outside their echo chambers, thus allowing them to understand how damning anything similar to "Republicans pounce" is to their credibility.
And yet we see the line - sometimes verbatim - trotted out regularly. It appears as the mirror image of the "Democrats are the real racists" (DRRR) meme, which the left has already developed antibodies for, and as such, just serves to discredit the speaker for playing into their hand.
I'm reminded of the fable of the Scorpion and the Frog far too often these days.
That's a different dimension than what's at play here, I think. Just from what I saw on the video, there's no way that that behavior counts as manslaughter, not murder. Manslaughter tends to be about unreasonable recklessness causing an unintended killing, not intent to kill causing an intended killing. The reason journalists don't call this "murder" is probably because, sans an actual conviction, they're opening themselves up to libel accusations. Sure, this video makes things pretty clear cut, but it's still a judgment call of whether this is truly clear-cut enough to declare as murder given that the justice system hasn't is probably something journalists and editors don't want to make. They could call it "alleged murder," which I think would be fine even if the guy hasn't been charged with murder.
We're not journalists publishing in news outlets, though, so we can call it murder all we want, and I'm pretty comfortable calling it first degree murder, based on the evidence I've seen.
The way models are influenced by the prompts are very model-specific, and so the easiest way to formulate your prompts to be effective would be to start by copying an existing example and going from there. I personally use anime-based models, which are almost all (all?) trained on Danbooru data sets with underscores removed from the Danbooru tags, which means that Danbooru-specific tags (e.g. 1girl, looking at viewer, 3d, cowboy shot) or Danbooru-common artist names or organizations (e.g. takeuchi takashi, cle masahiro, a1 pictures, kyoto animation - you can mix & match and put different weights, so e.g. "(takeuchi takashi:0.3), (kyoto animation:0.6) will produce a style that looks roughly 2x as inspired by Kyoto Animation's house style as it was inspired by the VN illustrator Takeuchi Takashi) give very predictable and reliable outputs, at least by standards of diffusion models. I've heard that this feature of anime-based models is such a strength that some people opt to use them to make the initial generation, followed by using IMG2IMG with different models and/or ControlNet to turn it into a photorealistic-ish or other style image. Dunno how common that is, though. But also, if you want specific poses or framing or whatever, using ControlNet with a separate input image that you manually create or pick out from somewhere is much more effective.
Parameters can be a real crapshoot and luck of the draw IME, or maybe I'm just poorly informed and lazy. Most anime-based models use Clip Skip = 2 (has to do with skipping the final layer of the neural net or something, which is how the very first useful anime-based models were trained), and you also have to choose the sampler, the CFG, and the number of steps.
As a rule of thumb, 20 steps is a good starting point; steps scale run time linearly, and usually above 20 you get returns that diminished to almost nothing (though usually not totally nothing - it can be good to inpaint over parts with 30+ steps sometimes).
CFG has something to do with how much denoising happens at each step, and lower values tend to make images look blobby and ill-formed, while higher values tend to make them look embossed, harsh, with a look that people have described as "deep fried" or "overcooked." I find values from 4-20 tend to be good, but it's also highly model-dependent and also dependent on what you want to get.
I don't think the sampler matters much, but this, too, is model-dependent. Samplers with "A" at the end of the name are "ancestral," which means they add noise with each step, such that the pictures will never converge on a single image no matter how many steps you take. There are also some samplers that require half as many steps as the others (but each step takes 2x as long), but I forget their naming scheme.
For image generation, I recommend starting with KritaAI, an open source add-on to the open-source image editing software Krita, available on Github. It adds a panel to Krita where you can enter prompts, and a further settings menu where you can create saved settings for generation inputs. It has automated ways to download default models to use, and it installs an instance of ComfyUI that is used on the back-end for generations. Adding on new models manually is easy and intuitive, just copy-pasting to the proper folders and then selecting them in Krita's settings after a refresh. Krita's interface also makes inpainting extremely easy and intuitive.
For a more powerful/capable but less intuitive tool that takes longer to set up, you can install ComfyUI directly. I never got too much into it, since I enjoy working on and polishing up individual images, which Krita is set up very well for, but the subreddit for ComfyUI had good resources. It's much better than Krita if you want to generate a large batch of images, a batch of images with random variables or systematic changes in the prompts, a batch of images that each have to follow some sequence of steps requiring multiple generations, or any combination of these.
Blood type is horoscopes for Korean (and Japanese) people. And so is Chinese horoscopes. I see MBTI as horoscopes for educated fans of science who look down on horoscopes as superstition but who haven't done enough research into science to learn about the veracity of MBTI as well as the existence of OCEAN/CANOE. Then again, that's probably more reflective of the population of people I encounter rather than population of people who buy into MBTI.
In my couple decades of going to the gym regularly, I've yet to see any evidence of this happening. I'm sure it does, because the idea that people who go to the gym are uniquely virtuous and kind doesn't seem likely to be true. But my perception of the culture around people who tend to go to the gym is that they are overwhelmingly positive and supportive, especially to people who look unfit and appear to be inexperienced/incompetent in their exercises. That's been my experience as someone on both sides of that relationship at different points in my life. It's impossible to know for sure, but if someone put a gun to my head, I'd easily guess that less than 50% of people at any given gym would laugh at a typical out-of-shape fat slob who clearly hasn't been to the gym in years but who's genuinely trying his best. Well, except January maybe, when gym rats do get annoyed by the extra crowding that often happens due to new year's resolutions. But that's usually condescension for being less disciplined, rather than mocking for lacking skills/strength.
If they don't, then how am I able to identify colors of entirely new things sans context?
I don't think that's a thing you're able to do sans context. Infants, lacking context, aren't able to identify the colors of anything.
I suspect we're using the word "context" differently - what exactly do you mean by "sans context"? Are your memories a part of the context? Are the innate saccade patterns that all humans use to look at things (e.g. gaze snaps to contrast, edges) part of the context? How about the learned saccade patterns (e.g. scanning in reading order)?
We probably are. Memories wouldn't be a part of the context, but it would be a tool that allows you to interpret the context (what does context even mean if you lack memories by which to understand it, anyway?). When I say "sans context," I mean that there's no context around the object that would allow you to identify its color even if you couldn't see its color. I.e. if it's so dark that my vision has become black & white - even then, I could guess that a stop sign is red, based on where it is, its shape, the words on it, etc. My contention is that, if I were interrupted during my walk by God bringing into existence some piece of paper on the ground in front of me that was painted a solid color of some color I'd never observed painted on a piece of paper before, I would still be able to identify that color, and the qualia that I experience from viewing that object will be reflective of the photons that bounced off of the paper and onto my retina, such that if similar-wavelength photons bounced off different things and landed on my retina, I would experience similar qualia.
You don't experience unmediated sensory inputs. The map is not the territory, and you can only experience the map, never the territory directly.
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True, but since we don't directly experience the raw sensory inputs, I don't know how much it matters how similar the raw sensory inputs are. We could quantify the similarity of those raw sensory inputs (e.g. by doing the same dimensionality reduction trick on optic nerve spike frequencies), but I don't think doing so would buy us anything beyond pretty pictures to look at and maybe some cures for diseases.
OK, fair enough. You seem to be saying that the qualia you experience only comes up after your sensory inputs have been mediated by your memories, concepts, etc., and all the stuff that exists before that is inaccessible to your conscious mind and hence not really qualia. Seems likely to be correct.
But this doesn't address the question of how similar that qualia between different people actually are. The experiments you designed seem to be very capable of telling if the relationship between qualia that people have are similar to each other (which seems obviously true - people consistently place "orange" between "red" and "yellow" or "purple" between "blue" and "red," for instance). But having similar (or "very similar" or whatever) qualia doesn't refer to similarities in how one individual's various qualia relate to each other, it refers to similarities in the qualia themselves of observing the same thing between multiple different people. Which, as of yet, can't be measured directly. And one might say that the fact that relationships are pretty consistent between humans should push us towards believing that the qualia themselves are consistent, but we also know that, mathematically, it's pretty easy to have different coloring systems that are homeomorphic to each other.
If you can figure out the full chain of causality from sensation to perception to meaning making to conversion to language to speech, I don't think there's anything left to explain.
That's a heck of a big "if," though, to figure out a chain of causality like that. If we could figure out in full just the link between sensation to perception, that in itself would be enough to make qualia "objective." But we don't have much of an idea on even beginning that. I'd say that figuring out that link is in the same category as mind-uploading or revival after cryogenic freezing in terms of being sufficiently advanced science as to be magic. I don't support the notion that science can never advance sufficiently, but also, it certainly hasn't, and so we lack the existence proof that this is possible.
Do those sensory inputs exist as an experience that I have outside of my memories, emotions, etc. though? If they don't, then how am I able to identify colors of entirely new things sans context? I'm not sure how that would make sense, so I conclude that I do experience sensory inputs, i.e. those sensory inputs are a form of qualia. Which then raises the question of if the qualia of me experiencing the sensory input from observing a stop sign is similar to that of someone else doing the same thing. We can empirically observe that the meaning that we ascribe to these sensory inputs are very similar, but that wouldn't actually get us to the similarity of the sensory inputs themselves.
It's also possible that, since qualia is intrinsically and, as-of-yet, inescapably subjective, the very concept of comparing qualia between two people is incoherent, and the best we can do is to figure out if the qualia of the meaning that we ascribe to sensory inputs are similar, as a proxy that we can never get better than.
It is physiologically dangerous for a woman to run a marathon, because it is for anyone, and, more importantly, it's more physiologically dangerous for a woman than for a man, for whatever it means when we make sweeping general statements comparing women and men, due to how the physical act of running a marathon is influenced by and influences one's physiology. I have no information by which to determine if this "uterus might fall out" characterization is weakmanning or just accurate, but certainly there's a large gap between "women ought to be banned because their uteri might fall out" and "women ought to be banned because the threshold we have for acceptable risk is crossed by females trying to run a marathon, even though it isn't crossed by males." Even if the latter is also pretty ridiculous by most standards that modern people find reasonable.
I don't think there is "something it is like" to see the color crimson, aside from the associations with your memories, emotions, concepts, behavioral associations, etc. And if you ask whether other people have the same associations, the question becomes an empirical one, and one we know how to tackle.
I don't follow this. What is being associated with your memories, emotions, concepts, behavioral associations, etc.? When you see a random drop of fresh blood on the ground during your walk, you might identify it as "red" because it appears similar to fire trucks and stop signs and strawberries which you were taught at a young age were "red," but what is it that you're comparing in order to associate these things in the first place? I would characterize it as comparing the qualia of observing a stop sign with observing fresh blood on the ground, which would be another way of describing "what it is like" to see the color red. If there's no there there, and there's no actual experience of seeing the color red when you observe fresh blood or a stop sign, then how is it that you're associating the color of the blood to the color of a stop sign?
I don't think I have any particular insights into this, but I do think other commenters have gotten at the truth of the matter, along the likes of Trump violating Blue Tribe sanctity and getting away with it or signalling OUTGROUP or whatever. Now, if you think about this for a few minutes, this isn't a dissatisfying answer. But, on first blush, I used to find this answer dissatisfying, because it just moves the question back a step: why did the Blue Tribe/Dems/liberal leftists/etc. decide that there were certain things that they held sacred, such that if they were violated without censure, they would lose their shit?
Because, in the decades leading up to Trumps POTUS run in 2015, much of Blue Tribe rhetoric was based around categorical rejection of one's emotional reaction as having moral authority. This had been happening for decades with narratives around stereotypes or implicit bias, and more recently with the victorious fight for gay marriage, which was quite explicit in stating that one's disgust reaction to something has no relationship to that thing's ethical or moral considerations.
One mistake that I personally think is reasonable to make - because I made it - is believing that the fact that much of Blue Tribe rhetoric supported this implied that much of Blue Tribe thinking supported this. Which would imply that, when members of the Blue Tribe noticed that they had an emotional reaction to Trump due to doing things that offended their sensibilities, they would understand that such an emotional reaction provides precisely the same amount of moral information as their born again Christian uncle Jim reaction to seeing 2 leather daddies kissing at the local pride parade and treat it similarly to how they treat Jim's homophobic rants. But evidently, a very significant portion of Blue Tribers do not do this and, instead, take this emotional reaction of theirs as seriously as if it were shot into their brains as a command by God.
I think what we observed 10 years ago now is a shift from the Blue Tribe being rarely challenged in its commitment to this idea, because the landscape was almost entirely filled with things that barely offended their sensibilities (i.e. "norms," which is really just another way of describing "tradition") - at best, they offended them just enough to create a credible-looking example of how, unlike those Red Tribe ignoramuses, they're virtuous enough to tolerate being offended! - to them constantly being challenged, and that commitment being proven to be just cudgels with which to beat their ideological opponents rather than actual principles they hold.
It's arguable if "no one is principled" is a satisfying answer, but I at least see it as the solution to the puzzle that I had first started noticing a year or two before Trump's 1st POTUS run.
I got about halfway thru S1 before getting bored. There's some girl power/male cuck wokeness in there, but from what I saw, there was nothing too egregious. What really got me, which is wokeness-adjacent or -like but not quite on the bullseye, was a scene showing a couple of apparent-stoners whose apparent job is to hold zombies in cages, who had the protagonist captured IIRC, but then through a set of boneheaded decisions, lets everyone loose in a way that causes the freed zombies to come at them and murder them. They were depicted as having been doing this sort of guard duty for some time, yet they had the attitude and competence of a couple of potheads that were hired on as line cooks because no one else was available that day, so either they should've gotten got a long time before the protagonist encountered them, or they should've been competent enough not to make those obvious errors. The whole thing just reeked of "the universe bends around the (female, headstrong, whose primary flaw is being too stubborn in her ambition and sense of justice) protagonist" to me, which, hey, this is a video game adaptation after all, but it's a video game adaptation.
I didn't finish Hogwarts Legacy because it turned out not to be my type of game, but I also recall that the student body seemed rather more diverse than what one would expect there in the early 20th century, with one student who was a major supporting character coming from some wizarding school in Africa.
I think all the rhetoric about how Trump's goons could break down every trans person's door any day now, nation-wide, would be enough to unbalance even someone living in the queerest neighborhood in Portland.
Heck, I'd say it's more likely to unbalance someone living in such a neighborhood, because it's disproportionately in those neighborhoods that such memes about Trump's goons tend both to get spread and to get taken seriously. I'd guess that the proportion of trans people who take such things seriously enough to meaningfully affect their mental health would be small in either case, and that it'd almost certainly be much bigger in progressive spaces.
I mean, it's hard to gradually groom someone who's attacking you with an axe, isn't it?
More to the point, pre-/low-teen girls (or boys, for that matter) aren't known for great epistemics or rationality. It's possible for a 12 year old girl to incorrectly but reasonably, by 12-year-old definitions of reasonable, to believe that an axe would provide her with some significant amount of extra protection against grooming gangs.
After all, even fully grown adult women with brains that have had time to develop often take inconvenient steps to protect themselves against the stranger-jumping-you type of rape, despite the fact that those are quite rare. I think it's the viscerality/salience and availability bias, like how people often get more paranoid about flying than about driving, because plane crashes are severe and usually fatal to most people involved, and the news tends to report on them more than any particular banal car crash.
Now, these specific girls? Not having seen the video, I cast no vote, but my default presumption is that, outside of what's directly seen on video, there's no meaningful wider conclusion that can be made just from a brief out-of-context video that takes place as part of a longer interaction. Too many unknown unknowns.
That is certainly one dimension along which that particular type of person will benefit according to her own desires, as intended. I suspect that this, even moreso than other typical decisions which are already filled with them, is the kind of decision that has a lot of unintended consequences with significant impact in one's quality of life.
From my perspective, it seems pretty obvious that a lot of FtM types in particular are far less interested in becoming men than they are afraid of becoming women, and so their "dysphoria" is driven more by a desire to prevent adulthood. It's less about what they transition to ("boys"), than what they don't transition to (adults).
Given the memes separating "women and children" from "men," there's something deeply ironic and perverse and even darkly hilarious about this. Of course, an FTM doesn't transition to becoming a man, but rather a transman, and I have to wonder, once we remove all the ideologically-based praise and support from being trans, if a typical FTM's experience as an adult in society is closer to that of a masculine/low status woman or that of a median man.
Could transgenderism — for the ones not seeking sexual gratification — be caused by the mind being “stuck” in the age where one learns about their body, due to some obscure early life trauma or a lack of social affirmation, and their mind tries to rekindle the feelings of that age through the artificial rediscovery of their body via “coming out” and hormones? This is something to dwell on, because there does seem to be a sub-expression of transgenderism which is obsessed with nostalgic things but which is not sexualized, and this is a distinct from the other subexpression which craves its own sexual humiliation (eg that Canadian teacher with the enormous boobs who sent her one sextape to her HR lady; the Matrix-dominatrix brothers…)
I see a lot of potential insight in this. One pattern I noticed is that the way that some transgender people's understanding of being the opposite sex appear almost nostalgic, certainly childish, and naive. Namely, MTF appear to see being a woman as akin to being a nubile, young, attractive woman, while FTM appear to see being a man as akin to being a high status man. Which are pretty likely and reasonable misconceptions for someone to form at adolescence.
Now, these are common enough misconceptions among non-trans people that it's possible that there's nothing particularly going on there. It's also possible that these misconceptions being so powerful play into making identifying as trans appear much more attractive. It's unfortunate that we lack a credible social science institution with resources to research something like this, since it's had such huge, transformative effects in our society just in the past decade.
Pronouns being, much like many/most things to do with trans/gender ideology, sacrosanct, is pretty mainstream in my experience in progressive/"woke" culture in America. I didn't pay much attention to it, but the few times I ran into it on Twitter and such, it was common to see people being berated for not using Chris Chan's preferred pronouns, and in general it tends to pop up whenever there's some news of some trans person doing something most people agree is wrong. I also recall seeing a scene from some CW Batman show where a cop berates another cop for misgendering the suspect they're interrogating and kicks him out of the interrogation room, followed by him telling the suspect something like how they might be on different sides, but that doesn't mean he has to be an asshole to him, or something.
Of course, opinions tend to vary, as always, but one of the core tenets of this ideology is the relationship between someone's position on the progressive stack (i.e. oppression Olympics or the oppression totem pole) and the truth of their words or justice of their actions. As a result, in practice, the most extreme views espoused by some individual at the highest point on the totem pole with the least scruples about exercising social and physical acts for enforcement set the agenda. Straight men/lesbian women not discriminating against transwomen in dating/sex or including transwomen as full, undifferentiated members of women's sports teams and their lockers are other fairly extreme positions that seem not that commonly held when talking to individuals in private, but in practice, there's rarely more than some non-committal mumbling and foot-dragging when the extreme true believers demand all of society submit to these things, resulting in everyone having to behave in public as if they agree with those things.
No it it isn't. The causation is completely reversed. There's nothing in the comment to which you're replying that indicates that the commenter believes that his ability to believe something implies anything to do with anything, including how bad his enemies are. The commenter is explaining why he has the ability to believe something, and that it is due to his enemies "sources like the BBC and the UK police" having established themselves to be bad as dependable information sources. You can argue that they have not established themselves to be such, but there's nothing in the comment indicating that the commenter's ability to believe this is proof/evidence/argument/etc. for the notion that these sources are bad sources. That they are bad sources is already part of the premise, not something being argued for.
I had a heated 3 month fling with FTL back when it came out before I went somewhere for vacation and quit cold turkey. It was first roguelike (and one of my last - definitely not a good genre for me), and adjusting to the expectations of extreme punishment plus cruel RNG took a while. I remember it took me dozens of tries to win the game for the first time, and then I beat it immediately on the next run. And from then on, it was like a 50/50, which really surprised me, because of how utterly wrecked I used to get, and it's not as if the challenge had changed by leveling up or something.
In the middle of it, it felt to me like roleplaying in a very pure way, creating a narrative of a desperate ship captain in this scifi setting who needs to pull on all resources and luck to barely edge out survival for one more node. I don't think I've gotten quite the same experience from other games. And, unfortunately, I think I'd prefer to keep it that way, given how much time I'm likely to waste if I found something similar.
Nick Fuentes is probably the second most important person to watch on the Republican side after Trump himself. He has a lot of "energy", and has the benefit of being extremely online. People keep making the mistake that the "real world" is more important than a small fringe of online crazies, and they keep getting proven wrong over and over and over (e.g. with woke, the alt right, gender identity on Tumblr). The arc of MAGA is long, but it bends towards Based.
I know very little about Fuentes himself, but the analysis here seems wrong. The alt-right, as best as I can tell, has had pretty much no impact in actual policy and very little in terms of national discourse around politics and ideology. Which is as expected from a small fringe of online crazies.
The "woke," and gender identity on Tumblr (subset or, at best, nearly fully overlapping set with "woke"), on the other hand, have obviously had immense and consequential influence in both, and this is due to the fact that they weren't a small fringe of online crazies. Rather, by the time this sort of argument was created to shut down the people trying to bring attention to the anti-liberalism of the ideology that would go on to evolve to something called "woke," ie around early 2010s, it had already been hegemonic in academia for at least a decade and nearly ubiquitous for multiple decades, with plenty of signs of mainstream journalism and mainstream entertainment getting bought in.
So things correctly labeled as a small fringe of online crazies had little impact on real world politics and the everyday life that it influences, while things incorrectly labeled as such did have big impact.
Maybe this Fuentes character's ideas will break into the mainstream over the next 3 years, but so far, him being just a big fish in a small, fringe, online, crazy pond doesn't make me think he's particularly worth paying attention to with respect to national politics.
There are some people that treat advice as a full on gift giving process. They expect accolades for giving the gift. They expect the receiver to at least pretend that they liked the gift. And the gift they'd always like in return is for the receiver to act on their advice. This seems like a toxic approach to me.
As an aside, this seems like a toxic approach to gift-giving, not just advice-giving. The entire point of a gift is that you're giving it to someone without expectation for anything in return; that's the very nature of the gift that makes it a gift, as otherwise it would be an implicit bribe or payment. The gratitude and pomp and circumstance can be pleasant and even appreciated when they're there, but expecting it in return for a gift means that it wasn't a gift in the first place, it was a payment, in order to get the receiver to play-act the part of "grateful gift recipient" for the gift giver's satisfaction.

OK, but then that changes the meaning of the statement fully. Because doing such an obviously stupid thing is irrational. Which makes your statement mean something like, "If you're committed to being irrational by falling back to Bayesian pattern matching, then it's not irrational to land at this conclusion." Fair enough, 100% true and defensible. Also doesn't contradict or challenge at all the notion that journalists are being irrational in being quicker to label white-on-black killings as racially motivated than to label black-on-white killings as such.
Yeah, no. You need zero priors weighted towards that. Entirely unprovoked murder on a random stranger followed by commentary on that stranger's race doesn't need one to have a prior leaning in one way in order to conclude racist motivations.
If person X killed ginger Y, and one of the only specific pieces of information we knew about the motive was X muttering "got that ginger bitch," we would absolutely be justified to conclude tentatively (as is the case for all conclusions we're talking about here) that he was motivated by some sort of bigoted hatred against gingers. It wouldn't be a particularly strong conclusion, one that could and would change as more information came in, but it absolutely would be the correct conclusion based on the available evidence.
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