That's certainly important context and pushes the needle in my mind towards it being more genocidal than I initially thought. That said, I think if they modified the phrase when chanting it in English, I think that also changes the meaning. Perhaps one could argue that they're showing solidarity with people who are calling for genocide, and it might be a tough needle to thread there between showing solidarity with pro-genocide people and actually calling for genocide oneself, but I don't think it's impossible.
If it's just one state, don't they share the same military power?
Hm, I always presumed that Palestine would control the area by expelling the Jews, but I can see that I was jumping to conclusions. Since Palestinian government has made multiple costly signals that mass murdering Jews is something they desire, so if Palestine "being free" refers to something like "current Palestinian government takes over all of that land (between river and sea), as if all of the IDF suddenly disappeared or lost their weapons," that's clearly calling for genocide, I would agree. Still, it seems to me there's enough ambiguity in "being free" to give room for doubt. Certainly some - likely many - people use the chant as a way to cheer for the murdering of Jews, and I also sympathize with how hypersensitive Jews would be to being murdered due to recent history, but it still seems unwarranted to call the chant genocidal, at least without independent individual evidence.
Probably the most prominent example of this recently has been the phrase "from the river to the sea." Some people surely use it with a genocidal intent (there should be no Jews between the "river and the sea") while other use it as an expression of solidarity between the West Bank, Gaza, and non-Jews in Israel more generally.
I must admit I'm pretty ignorant about this phrase and why it's considered genocidal. Getting rid of Israel as a nation and even kicking out all of the Jews from there isn't genocidal, just ethnic cleansing, right? Is the issue that that was the Nazis' initial plan before they got to the Final one, and as such we can round one up to the other? That seems like the slippery slope fallacy (though I'll admit that there is indication that the people descending down the slope are doing so by pouring oil on it rather than by carefully inching down by building steps or something).
But I'd also say that, if it's the case that the phrase is genocidal in nature, then it doesn't really matter if the person saying the slogan is thinking to themselves, "I'm saying this because I really want those Jews murdered" or "I'm saying this because I want to show solidarity between XYZ and literally not an inch more;" the latter is still showing full-throated support for genocide, and their ignorance of what the phrase that they chant means just adds on to their ethical failure, and certainly doesn't mitigate it. I'm just not sure how the phrase could be genocidal in nature.
AI is, in itself, a culture war issue here on the Motte, due to the fact that a significant portion of the people - if not here at least in the wider community of which the Motte is an offshoot - believe that AI developments must be stopped at any/most cost, while another significant portion believe that AI developments should be accelerated with no/minimal speedbumps. It's not the same CW issue as the more well known CW issue of AI companies designing their AI to be biased in favor of certain sides of the wider worldwide/Western/American CW, and perhaps one can argue that it's not so much a culture war as an ideological war or empirical war, but I think it's close enough.
I used to think like this, and I'm still sympathetic to this, but I think one thing I realized over time is that, as evil as the ubiquity of status hierarchies is - and it is both true and very very evil, IMHO - it pales in comparison to the evil of attempting to defeat the reality of the situation, which I would say has close to a 100% loss record with mountains of skulls littered along with even greater mountains of suffering people in their wake. If the decision is between the evil of the ubiquity of status in interactions and the evil of believing in the power of the human spirit to overcome this apparent tendency for us humans to commit this evil, I'll choose the former evil every single time.
For me, it means considering that my own response would be nothing but contempt for Stefanik and a refusal to cooperate.
Right, anyone who's being humiliated by having their hypocrisy or questionable ethics pointed out, especially so publicly, will likely want to fight against the humiliation. That's understandable. That doesn't make the person any less (or more) deserving of being humiliated.
I suppose where we differ is in believing there was any noble goal here at all.
Sure, but the nobility of the goal is different from the effectiveness of the tactic. Obviously, many people do believe that there's a noble goal here, but regardless, if the goal, noble or not, is to reveal the hypocrisy or incoherence of the person and thus humiliating them, I don't see how putting oneself in the shoes of someone being humiliated changes things.
If I were to put myself in the shoes of someone who deserves to be humiliated, whether that be someone like SBF on trial or someone being questioned in Congress, I would easily consider my own response to be nothing but contempt and refusal to cooperate. Because if I had as bad judgment and character as those people as to voluntarily corner myself in this situation, I would likely lash out in any way I can out of frustration at my own incompetence or (more likely, IMHO) my deluded belief that I was being unfairly attacked due to some [bad political forces] despite the fact that I did everything right. Regardless, I come to the conclusion that the person was deservedly humiliated independent of my empathy for them. Like, I can feel empathy for Saddam Hussein as he's wildly ranting while on trial in 2006, understanding that if I were a psychopathic dictator who put myself into this corner, that I would be at the end of my rope, grasping for every straw I can, pound the table as loudly as I can, and perhaps be rather mentally off due to the despair or denial of what surely seems like my upcoming conviction and execution. This empathy doesn't somehow make his wild ranting look any more noble or any less deranged to me. Nor do I find any sort of antipathy for the people who decided to place Hussein in this position where his wild ranting is an understandable response that I can empathize with.
I am genuinely baffled by the efficacy of this sort of questioning when it comes to public optics. Are people not interested in or capable of putting themselves in the shoes of the individual being questioned?
What does putting oneself in the shoes of the individual being questioned have to do with it, though? We can empathize with dishonest, bad people while still appreciating it when they get more revealed for being dishonest and bad to more people. When someone like SBF gets put on trial and convicted, I can empathize with him while also appreciating that it is a good thing that our court system coordinated to kidnap him, judge him, and condemn him to imprisonment for some amount of time, TBD.
When I watch this sort of dishonest badgering with such an obvious goal behind it
I think this sort of badgering works in cases like this where there's an obvious noble - if controversially so - goal behind it.
Your post puts my pause about supporting EA into better words than I possibly can write. I've always found it... cheating, kinda?... that the entire premise of EA seems to just be brute-forcing morality and ethics by shoving as many zeroes into a number as possible. And that's how we get what you have described here, where it's easy to say that you've saved 200,000 or however many lives, but then people don't interrogate that result beyond that. People just see the number and go "wow that's a lot of zeroes so it must be good".
I have the exact opposite intuition about "cheating." To me, regular charities seem like cheating, since all most people do is give money, get warm and fuzzy feelings, decide that that means they did good, and then profusely refuse to actually verify how much good they did. It's essentially stolen valor - getting all the personal benefits of appearing altruistic without doing any of the difficult work of helping anyone out which is normally implied by things like "charity" and "altruism." Which looks a lot like cheating. EA at least seems to make a gesture at having some referee system in place to detect cheaters.
The thing is, as we see in international sports all the time like in FIFA or Olympics, the best way to cheat is to set the entire system of judgment itself as corrupted in your favor, so one could probably make a good argument that EA is performing this "meta-cheating" by claiming to actually be setting up objective standards for effectiveness while actually setting up corrupted standards that lead to [charity I like] being [effective]. The tough thing for EA is, every single person, down to the individual, involved in the EA movement could be perfectly transparent and honest with perfectly good intentions, and overall EA could still be engaging in this "meta-cheating" due to the biases that all people are susceptible to, and so they have some responsibility to set up the structure in such a way as to counter and negate these biases. I think they may be failing to do this properly.
But in terms of their attempt at brute-forcing morality, this seems to me the correct way to counter the massive "cheating" that's happening in basically all realms of altruism in our lives, even down to individual relationships, where most people don't bother checking and just get the beneficial warm and fuzzy feelings through "cheating" without doing any of the work that is supposed to make someone actually deserving of those warm and fuzzy feelings.
If they believed their altruism was ineffective they wouldn’t do it, and if they believed their motivations weren’t altruistic they’d presumably keep the money for themselves and those they cared about, or simply pursue naked political lobbying
I'm on net pretty neutral with respect to EA, but I don't think this line of criticism makes sense. To some extent, it's true that everyone who engages in charity do so out of belief that they're effective and that they're altruistic. But believing that you are those things doesn't tell us anything about if you/your charity actually are those things. And where I think EA at the least makes gestures at doing (and they might do nothing more than those gestures, let's be clear) is checking if they really are effective (they do seem to have a big blind spot in checking if they really are altruistic - believing that you're altruistic is, at best, a neutral signal and most likely a negative signal of one's altruism, and I don't think I've seen EA engage with this).
I think there's a strong argument to be made that, in their attempts to check if their (self-perceived) altruism is effective, all they're doing is adding on more epicycles to come to the conclusion that [charity they like] also happens to be [the most effective]. I honestly don't know enough about the logistics of what EA does, but certainly that should be the default presumption, sans clear indication that they're doing the hard work needed to check all that, such as giving oppositional people full access to all the tools to make the strongest argument possible against whatever charities they like (or for charities they dislike). And the more popular/decentralized EA is/becomes, the more that EA people will follow this default pattern of convincing themselves that [charity I like] is [the most effective] because memes like this always get implemented in the laziest, most intellectually dishonest way when spread out among a wide/decentralized populace.
I would also say, given that we know this pattern about the populace, EA has, in some real sense, the responsibility to craft their memes such that if they get out to the wider populace and actually become popular, that the people who lazily implement these memes in dishonest ways don't fall into this extremely common trap of matching [thing I like] with [good] while building up a whole facade of pseudoscience/pseudomath in order to justify it. I'm not sure EA is very concerned with this at all, and I'll admit that the defensiveness I see from EA when they're criticized both about their core mission and about their more superficial PR aspects doesn't make me optimistic.
The answer is 10 000-20 000 sq miles(for electricity in the US), which is the size of lake erie. For all the energy in the entire world, it's going to be a small fraction of the sahara.
That figure, I think, comes from this report that was linked in your link. Having skimmed it, I can't tell the exact methodology they use, but it seems they take some sort of weighted average of the area/energy/year of the various solar plants in the US and use some basic modeling as it extrapolates up. I see no mention of transmission losses or of attempting to model the geographical and grid locations the next solar plants would actually be built to reach the power production that actually does power all USA households.
Locations aren't fungible in power plants due in part to transmission losses (among other factors), and obviously this is even moreso for solar plants because location directly affects how much sunlight is received and also the weather which is affected by the location. As such, any sort of meaningful estimate of solar plant area we need to power all USA households is necessarily going to involve modeling specific plants in specific locations to match the load that's being drawn at various locations without negatively affecting the grid with congestion and such. Whatever modeling that's being done in that paper doesn't seem to come anywhere near that.
Solar and nuclear together, perhaps those two techs could be all we need for our energy needs; I'd say nuclear would be holding up 99% of the burden in that case, though.
That's before getting into the massive battery (and other energy storage) build up that would happen to account for solar's intermittent uptime if we were to go full 100% solar.
A lot of feminists believe that men use sexism to gain power over women. It is literally what they believe, so why it should be "psychologizing" to say that maybe they also believe that women can also use sexism against men to gain power?
I don't know if "psychologizing" is the right concept, but I'd say that that's "misunderstanding" what (these) feminists believe. When they say they believe men use sexism to gain power over women, they're saying they believe something very specific with respect to men, women, sexism, and power, with no generalities about how these concepts can actually relate to each other. Sexism isn't a general thing that people can do to others by discriminating on the basis of sex, it a specifically BAD thing that only MEN can do to only WOMEN (and other non-MEN). Power isn't something people have over others as determined by what they can make others do or whatever, it's something only MEN have that they wield over others including WOMEN who thus get sexism applied to them.
So inferring from "they believe some people X does action Y on other people Z" to "they must believe that, at least theoretically, people Z could do action Y on people X" is misunderstanding their beliefs. They are perfectly capable of believing the former and disbelieving the latter in a perfectly consistent way according to their own worldview. You're not engaging with their beliefs and logic on their own terms.
I'm reminded of arguments about (other goals of) communism and how every one of its failures are somehow the fault of some foreign entity. At the end of the day, if you couldn't make the State wither away, it's a failure. Doesn't matter if it was apparatchik greed or the CIA that caused it.
I know too little about the topic at hand to have a meaningful opinion on it, but the discussion here reminded me of something like this, as well. Part of the responsibility of any social or political project is being robust against malicious and/or unexpected forces that come about to throw a wrench in the system. If some unexpected technological advancement or sabotaging entity successfully throws the movement off course, then the failure rests entirely on the people pushing the movement, in not taking the correct precautions or not making the correct adaptations.
I'd also say that the whole time span excuse seems either misguided or, I suspect, just motivated reasoning. If we posit that the sexual revolution started around the 60s, it would follow that the first generation of people who grew up in that environment had kids in the 80s-90s, which means that the first generation of people who grew up raised by people who grew up in that environment were entering their young adulthood in the 00s-10s. It would make perfect sense for such a society-wide transformation to have different effects on people who saw the transformation as adults, on people who saw the transformation as kids but were raised by adults who were accustomed to pre-transformation, and on people who only knew life post-transformation, raised by people who mostly knew life post-transformation. This can't be extended indefinitely, of course; at some point, the multiple generations of people living better lives makes it clear that whatever issues that came after must have been extrinsic (which then gets to the previous paragraph, that failing to account for extrinsic, unpredictable factors is just as much a failure as any other), but given what we know about the human lifecycle and societies, 2 generations seems well short enough a timeframe to draw a direct line.
I do agree that the narratives you wrote are believable and realistic ones, certainly compared to the one where Alice is just given a choice between Bob and Charles, which is more akin to a romantic comedy or dating show than an actual real experience of a typical woman. And yet, I believe the revealed preference matters a lot here, because women, like all people, have a choice in terms of what kind of person to pursue for a long term relationship. Alice's choice to value Bob's charm and good looks and not check for signs of what kind of happiness or misery a long-term relationship would provide her - or perhaps to check but to discount - tells us something about how much she values happiness and (lack of) misery in a long-term relationship. Of course, people can't be expected to think in reasonable long-term horizons in the realm of romance, especially if heightened hormones are involved, but then I'd characterize that lack of foresight as part of their preference.
Ironically, I would wager that after Alice & wife-beating Bob have been married for a while, and if God came down and gave Alice the choice to rewind time and live what life would have been with Charles (let's say He also shows her what Charles was like to Diane, i.e. decent), in most cases, she would choose to switch. I don't think this really tells us much about her preference or what she would rather have, though, since these things don't exist only in thought experiments. At best, I think it would tell us that Alice would prefer to (or wishes to or sees herself as) be the type of person who prefers Charles, not that she is someone who prefers Charles.
I actually wonder what "20th percentile" even translates to in terms of physical attractiveness. Like, are we considering all humans, all males, all men, all men of a certain age range, all single men, all single men of a certain age range, or what? In any case 20th percentile isn't so far in one direction as to be unbelievable; I'd wager well over 20% of the posters here are below the 20th percentile in attractiveness - when controlling for age, wealth, nationality and such. But I'd wager that very few are below 20th percentile if you consider all men, since there are so many men out there who are malnourished, sickly, deformed, or unhygienic who are unfortunate to live in very different societies than us. If SkookumTree is closer to the former 20th percentile than the latter, it's both believable and also a situation that's nowhere near as hopeless as he's making it out to be. If it's closer to the latter, that's definitely worth doubting.
Fair enough in terms of happiness. I think that just shows that, for many people, including some subset of women, happiness just isn't all that important a thing to aim for in a relationship, and they would prefer to be in a relationship that causes them less happiness and more misery than one that causes greater happiness and less misery, since there are other factors in the less happy and more miserable relationship that make it overall more desirable. I'd agree that if SkookumTree thinks that women would be happier being in a relationship with an active wife-beater than with him with all his awkward shortness, then he is wrong, and not by a little, but by a lot. But I think there's a large chunk of truth to be seen here, which is that many women would prefer being in that unhappier and more miserable relationship than with him, as shown by revealed preference (I also think he vastly underestimates both the quantity and quality of women who would prefer the opposite).
You're so myopically mired in self-pity that you actually think there's even the remotest chance that a woman would rather be in a relationship with a man who beats her up than you. You shouldn't be "open to the possibility": it's preposterous and a grave insult to every victim of domestic abuse in history.
I have no disagreements about how pathologically self-pitying SkookumTree is in his comments, but I don't think the rest follows. The revealed preference of many a woman is to be in a relationship with a man who beats her up rather than with someone who's awkward to the level of what SkookumTree believes he is. It's possible to discuss if those are her "true" preferences and what she would "truly" rather do, and there's room for such factors, but I think the pudding they actually choose to eat is where the proof is.
Personally, I think this sort of thinking stems from a sort of "Just World Hypothesis" when it comes to romance, particularly that moral qualities that society in general sees as good in a man also translate to romantic success, and as such, if a man has romantic success despite having negative moral qualities such as beating his gf/wife, then there must be something that corrupted and manipulated the women who keep volunteering to be his gf/wife. When I think the more straightforward and also more correct explanation is just that there's only coincidental overlap between these two categories, and women, like all people in many contexts, often tend to be prefer things that are unhealthy for them over things that are healthy for them, if those unhealthy things provide other benefits that the healthy things don't.
This is very much like saying "the desire to genocide armenians is not evil, only acting on that desire is evil." Or "the desire to torture dogs is not evil, only actually torturing dogs is."
No. The desire to commit evil acts is evil. Pedophilia is evil, even if never acted upon. And everyone is right to be wary of anyone who claims to be, or appears to be a pedophile, because that is evil.
Taking for granted that the desire to commit an evil act is also in itself evil - a controversial opinion, certainly, but one we can just entertain for the moment - this doesn't imply that pedophilia is evil, since pedophilia is a preference, not a desire. It's very possible for someone to enjoy the idea of themselves raping children without having any actual desire to act on it by raping children. It'd be easy to claim that this is splitting hairs, but it'd also be wrong to claim as such, since preference doesn't imply anything about a willingness to act, whereas desire does, and this is a very meaningful, very consequential difference in terms of how that person behaves. You can, of course, just posit that this preference is something that's intrinsically evil, which is perfectly cromulent.
However, I'm not sure that generalizes to discounting attacks, which are different from neutral beliefs. People who make the most vocal and virulent attacks against a side are not ussually the ones most motivated by a dispassionate commitment to the truth alone, and their vitriolic attacks are often motivated by more-extreme-than-median beliefs about the thing they are attacking.
These are reasons to expect that an attack will be less likely to be accurate than the median belief of the defender in general. I certainly admit that the most virulent attackers on my own side are often wrong or being misleading about my opponents, in ways that often make me cringe or make me angry at them. This belief about my own side's bulldogs being unreliable transfers to my beliefs about the other side's bulldogs.
I think this is missing a big portion of the picture, which is noticing that when my side makes statements of neutral beliefs, they are often misconstrued by the other side as attacks. At the very least, they react strongly and sometimes harshly in a way as if they thought they were attacks. As such, when I perceive people from the other side as attacking me, my first and main concern should be how I am misconstruing their neutral statements as attacks. I should also understand that my own biases against these perceived enemies will make it almost impossible to avoid convincing myself that these are attacks so as to justify my dismissal of them on the basis that attacks are more likely to be false than mere neutral statements of fact. As such, I would require an extremely high bar of proof to be convinced that something by a perceived enemy is an attack, because if I allow myself not to have such a high bar, then I'll almost definitely fool myself into believing what's convenient for myself and my ego.
There are no certainties in life besides death and taxes, but I think "humans will fail to coordinate to stop AI doom" is close enough to certain that I'm willing to round it up in my mind for all meaningful intents and purposes. Given that, then trying to coordinate to stop disaster means pouring money, time, and effort into a black hole, which creates a huge opportunity cost. Why not pour that money, time, and effort, into making the party as cool a party as possible? Again, if this party is the very last thing that the very last human who has ever lived and will ever live will experience, then I think it matters quite a bit just how cool it is, and so this effort seems worth investing into. Best case scenario, I was wrong about my certainty and we're left with a whole bunch of incredibly useful and efficient AI tools all over the place while humanity keeps unexpectedly trucking.
This is largely my own view as well. I figure, if AI doom is on the table, there's precious little we humans can do to actually prevent it from coming; not from a physics or computer science perspective, but from a politics and sociology perspective, I believe it may be the case that we humans literally cannot coordinate to prevent the AI apocalypse. As such, we should just party until the lights go out - and the faster and further we can advance AI technology right now, the cooler the party will be - and that coolness matters a lot when it's the very last thing any human will ever experience. And hey, in the off chance that the lights don't go out, then that means all that investment into AI technology could pay off.
Whereas if a stranger online tells me that I'm weak, lazy and pathetic, that's probably because it's true.
I agree with most of what you wrote above this, though I'm ignorant of if it is actually true if you look small, fat, or weak. But I'm not sure how you land on the conclusion that a stranger online telling you these things is an indication that these things are true. Strangers online are not known for their honesty, nor are they known for their great judgment. I think it's quite possible that they're telling you this because it's true, but I'm skeptical that it's probable. If a stranger online told you you were strong, conscientious, and great, would you also presume that it's probably because it's true?
I noticed this too, and I think it's common enough to the extent that now just adding on an apostrophe, with no "s" after, is a correct way to turn a singular noun that ends with an "s" into a plural. It's kinda like how "I could care less" is one correct way of conveying that "I care so little that it is physically impossible for me to care any less than I already do", or how putting the period or comma at the end of a quotation after the closing quotation mark, like I just did earlier in this sentence, is just as correct as putting it immediately before the quotation mark, because so many people kept doing the former despite what our English teachers taught us.
Just be careful not to get ahegao and ahoge confused. They'll lead you towards very different things.

This isn't true, though. "Aimed at the youth [in urban areas]" doesn't imply that the demographic properties of the characters reflect or have any significant similarity to the youth [in urban areas]. Of course, the argument that a character who fits Miles Morales's situation is more likely to be black than white is perfectly cromulent. But also of course, the idea that the distribution of demographics of characters in a fictional work ought to somewhat realistically reflect the real setting in which the story takes place is an artificial one that producers can freely choose to follow or not. And notably, a near-universal refrain from SJ when it comes to media has been that demographics in media somewhat realistically reflecting the real setting is neither good nor necessary; the demographics in media ought to reflect what they believe will help accomplish societal goals such as, e.g. girls and minorities being able to "see"
themselvespeople with demographic similarities to themselves in respected positions of power so that they are more motivated to pursue such things. And given that "somewhat realistically reflecting the demographics of the real setting" as a priority has been basically abandoned and destroyed, I think it's clear the overrepresentation of minorities is a completely free choice that could be changed trivially to representation-reflecting-proportion-of-population.More options
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