2rafa
1d ago
Does disaster in Iran make war with China less likely?
As the fog of war begins to clear after the last ten days, a few things have become evident.
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There is no revolution in Iran. The IRGC’s grip on power has strengthened, or at least not weakened. In Khamenei’s son it has its preferred candidate in power, at least nominally (it may be the institution rather than the man who is in power, but it doesn’t really matter). The IRGC has more than 150,000 men, heavily armed, extremely well trained, in control of more than 40% of the economy. True Shia believers, deeply committed to the Islamic revolution, they know they have no future in a secular Iran and will do anything to prevent it. The secular middle class can flee, as they have for decades, and have low casualty tolerance. Even worse, the risk-takers in that demographic were already killed or jailed in the previous wave of repression. According to various sources, more than 80-90% of Iranian mine laying speedboats and other platforms are still operational. These are very hard to target from the air, they’re small, easily hidden, widely dispersed along the coast. Minutes ago, Fars announced that Iran will not allow a single ship affiliated with America or its allies through the Strait. According to CNN, US intelligence believes mine laying has already commenced.
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The US has only two escalations left open. The first, which is low-casualty (comparatively), is to bomb Kharg and/or Iranian oilfields, pipelines and refineries, and/or Iranian tankers using the Hormuz or Iran’s Eastern ports where they’re scaling up shipping. In that event, Iran’s low cost drones will attack Gulf oil production. The Strait will remain heavily mined and inaccessible for months for cargo traffic. Oil surges to $150, perhaps beyond; the Gulf nations will be forced to sue for peace with Iran, expelling US bases. The regime holds, even still; the people are not armed, resistance is limited. The second option is that the US goes all-in, attempting a ground invasion, arming the Kurds (destroying further relations with Turkey); thousands of American soldiers die but Tehran can likely be occupied, the IRGC retreats to hardened mountains it knows well, quagmire with far higher casualty rates than Afghanistan, and far less US support. Both routes end with the GOP finally turning on Trump and a wipeout in the midterms.
The consequences are clear, and for all his faults, the president has very good immediate political instincts if poor military ones: the US will declare mission accomplished, the president may well personally blame the Iranian people for failing to rise up (“you know, I really thought they’d do it, it’s a shame, you know, but they had their chance”), Witkoff will force Israel’s hand to stop further action like he did with the Gaza deal. Through back channels with Turkey or Russia, the Iranians will agree to slowly stop their action, so that they can rebuild. Iran will quickly complete its bomb. A period of rebuilding and greater domestic repression will follow. The Gulf states will be angry with Iran, but will ultimately draw closer with it out of necessity.
Most importantly, and this is true in pretty much every scenario, the US will have experienced a major geopolitical and military humiliation that makes conflict with China much less likely. Missile defenses shredded by cheap drones that can be mass produced by the million by China will rightly create visions of entire hundred billion dollar carrier fleets destroyed by a hundred million dollars of Chinese drones in a massed attack. Unlike in the Gulf, in a Taiwan conflict in which the US actually fought, bases in Guam, Korea, Japan and elsewhere could definitionally not be evacuated abroad (those forces would be needed to fight).
And while some Americans, Jewish and Evangelical, place eschatological and otherwise deep religious important on the geopolitics of the conflict with Iran (or rather, on its hated adversary), even these people are less motivated for a war with China over Taiwan, especially as chip production diversifies geographically. Who actually wants war with Taiwan? Some AI labs who don’t want Chinese competition? Seems unlikely, open source models will get out regardless. The influential Taiwanese diaspora like Lisa and Jensen? Seems unlikely that they want their country destroyed; most smart Taiwanese I know have made peace with their country’s destiny a long time ago. Neocons? Even many of them seem to be going on record to say this war is a bad idea, and many don’t care much about China for the reasons above.
2rafa
4d ago
Broadly I agree with that kind of two state solution but it’s also very explicitly against the absolute antizionism embedded in the foundation of the Islamic revolution, in which any Israeli state ie ‘Zionist entity’ is illegitimate; this was the Iranian position even when in the late 1980s and early 1990s a two state solution that involved the removal of most Jewish settlements was on the table.
2rafa
4d ago
He can think about the consequences of his technological innovation on society. This is something we ask of many creators; it is fair to ask Mark Zuckerberg if he thinks social media is harmful or what should be done about its negative impact on children or whoever (and indeed this is something Meta at least pretends to care about)
2rafa
4d ago
Stop being vague and start thinking about specifics. If there’s going to be UBI, how is it going to be paid for, how is it going to be distributed, how do the economics of the whole thing work?
AGI euphoria promoters have been much more vague about the post revolution economy than even Marx was in the mid-19th century. “Yeah man everyone will get their $2k a month in welfare bux, you will live in a nice pod and crochet all day or something, this will all happen with minimal social upheaval and the economics will work themselves out”.
2rafa
4d ago
Oh, and you’re 80 years old and easily impressionable. This is the capability of Mossad, plus infinitely more.
Why does responsibility not lie with Trump / Hegseth etc here, or even Americans who voted for someone allegedly so easily manipulated? It’s very much “the Tsar’s advisors are the real problem”.
Imagine the best salesmen in the world working for years to figure out how to sell you something.
The best salesmen in the world are working right now to sell you Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Fanduel, Kalshi, day trading, laundry detergent, whatever. That doesn’t mean one can’t criticize the lifestyle decisions of gluttons, gamblers and spendthrifts.
2rafa
4d ago
It increases it hugely during a conflict. Afterwards the incentives change, especially after a very shameful US withdrawal / unilateral cessation of hostilities, in which case the smart move for them is to complete the bomb, display it publicly, make clear there are many spares distributed across hardened underground facilities, and so a state of nuclear MAD has been reached with Israel.
Twelver Shias really do have a millenarian eschatology but I don’t think that says much about how likely they would be to use that nuclear weapon. In addition, there would be a price to pay for breaking the 80 year nuclear taboo diplomatically, including with Russia and China (since a successful wartime use of a nuclear weapon would almost certainly lead to Poland, Japan and others getting the bomb, which is contrary to the political desires of those states).
Lastly, it’s unclear that a nuclear attack on Israel, depending on scale, would 100% be the end of Israel or (viable) Zionism. It might well be, and presumably this theory involves the subsequent storming (after the deaths of 800k+ Israelis) of the country from multiple sides by an army of angry Muslims, both ‘axis of resistance’ and otherwise Sunnis from Egypt, Syria etc just caught up in the nature of things. But it also might not, Israel would retaliate with nuclear attacks, the population is well armed, it’s possible the US could intervene, there could be a period of anarchy before a Jewish state of a kind is restored, there a number of scenarios.
So certainly it increases the chance, yes. But I don’t think that a regime that survives intact under, say, Khamenei’s son will necessarily do it. That an Iran that survives will get nuclear weapons though is inevitable, surely.
If the war is called off now, the IRGC will press to finish developing nuclear weapons, engage in an extraordinary program of domestic repression and ultimately emerge as the much firmer, more cemented, and even more indisputable ruling elite of Iran. Will they nuke Israel after a cessation of hostilities? I doubt it. If there is a nuclear attack it will happen during a long war of at least several months, probably a rough or dirty bomb using the current 60% enriched material, put together quickly over a month, smuggled into Israel, Dubai, or somewhere else by an IRGC remnant unit operating under limited central authority. Someone like Pezeshkian wouldn’t even know about it until it happened.
The problem is, all of that might happen anyway, underscoring what a poor decision this war has been so far. As I said, there was only one chance to do this and it would have been while 2m+ Iranians were protesting, take out the leadership, police stations, basij, IRGC hubs, then hope that the institutions get overwhelmed with the sheer mass of human movement before anyone regroups, and then bring in US forces to ‘defend’ the (counter)revolution either overtly or quietly. Doing it after all the most aggressive / low inhibition protestors have been killed is pointless, a bunch of scared middle class people in Tehran are now supposed to, what, message each other on Telegram and try to storm parliament, when there are 800,000 soldiers, some who care and some who don’t, and 150,000 deeply ideologically committed IRGC fighters out to avenge their spiritual leader?
2rafa
5d ago
The US isn’t staging attacks from any GCC nation, at least officially. However, the Iranian definition of support seems to include any country with US bases, which is most of them.
The usual Twitter OSINT pages are pretty barren. Nobody (at least nobody public) seems to really know how much of the IRGC command structure is intact, how many missiles they have left, if they’re still producing drones, whether civilian or other leadership is in charge or if it’s individual IRGC commanders targeting and firing with no overall strategy, what’s happening with the new supreme leader election etc.
One imagines actual US and Israeli intelligence has somewhat more insight given how thoroughly the latter especially penetrated Iranian intelligence (although the source inside Khameini’s inner circle was apparently CIA rather than Mossad depending on who you believe) but maybe they don’t.
Most Iranians don’t seem particularly fond of the regime even if they’re not wealthy North Tehran libs, but the IRGC did recruit heavily from the devoutly religious lower middle class, especially more rurally, and many are now second-generation soldiers. There were stories, as the rebel army marched on Damascus, of wailing and praying at Shia shrines there by predominantly overseas posted IRGC families before they were evacuated. The possibility of true believers holding on for a long time can’t be discounted, although at the same time they’re not used to nomadic hardship and living in caves to the extent that, say, the Houthis are.
I don’t think this will end well. If oil crosses $100 next week and polling gets really really bad for Trump I think a unilateral cessation of US military action is possible, framed of course as a “mission accomplished” just like the strikes last year.
The Israelis might keep fighting but they can’t really; Trump already had Witkoff force a ceasefire in Gaza. Then wait for Khameini’s son to be elected supreme leader, he makes the vaguest overture for peace, go back to negotiations, probably agree to another ‘deal’ along the lines of what was proposed at Geneva, and then the IRGC go right back to the nuclear program all the same. The collapse of the Iranian government requires either a full ground invasion (not a brief incursion by an expeditionary force) or a successful popular uprising.
2rafa
5d ago
There are pictures of an allegedly destroyed radar all over Twitter. What that actually means or even if it’s real are questionable.
2rafa
6d ago
Trending on twitter San Francisco has a lot of single men so going for success can backfire.
San Francisco has a bad gender ratio for men, like New York has a bad gender ratio for women.
2rafa
6d ago
Let’s say that by 2030, a significant proportion of global chip production has moved out of Taiwan. China invades or otherwise ‘reunifies’ (use whatever euphemism you prefer) with Taiwan, with minimal or no US intervention. What happens? What are the actual consequences for the world?
China has no stated designs on Japan or even South Korea. Their relationship with North Korea, which actually does have designs on the latter, has in any event deteriorated over the years. The “nine dash line” (or eleven for Taiwan) in the South China Sea is one of the few things both the ROC and PRC agree on as far as territorial claims go, so that isn’t affected - and it’s a much less emotive issue for Chinese nationalists than Taiwan is.
So all in all, why should America care?
2rafa
6d ago
For men it’s usually implied when they talk about women in this way, they’re not envisioning an ugly tradwife.
2rafa
6d ago
Mostly it’s just a way to learn more about your partner’s life and a jumping off point for further discussion
2rafa
6d ago
I bet half of men would accept living a poorer lifestyle if it meant coming home from work to a sweet and stress-free woman who made delicious food with cheap healthy ingredients and beautified the whole house and wants to listen to how their day went.
I bet many women would accept a poorer and more boring lifestyle if it meant a handsome, kind-natured and faithful husband who was good around the house and yard, knew how to repair everything (and did it without being asked) and who devoted themselves fully to providing for and looking after their family (and not drinking or being abusive or cheating).
The reality of traditional marriage, of course, was that many husbands were not honorable or good around the house or happy being providers, many wives were not sweet or good cooks or great mothers. Advocating for traditional marriage is still reasonable, perhaps even desirable, but a simple fantasy it is not.
2rafa
6d ago
In the end the economic success of the Gulf states is more about relative rather than absolute stability and quality of life. Dubai’s economic prosperity isn’t really reliant on rich people; most people - even in the ‘expat’ rather than indentured servant class - aren’t rich.
Instead, it just has to be nicer and more convenient than Russia or India or much of Africa. The middle class that sustain demand in Dubai don’t have Monaco or Gstaad or often even Singapore as an alternative - the alternative is Mumbai, Moscow, Nairobi, Baghdad, Baku, Tashkent, Dhaka.
The real question is how many missiles Iran actually has.
The Ukraine conflict has different dynamics - Russia proper isn’t being seriously bombed (the occasional Ukrainian gambit in Moscow aside, it’s just the border; it’s not like drone factories in the far east are being hit), and Ukraine is obviously being heavily supplied by the West, and Russia isn’t bombing German munitions factories either, again the occasional bout of sabotage aside.
In Iran, launchers, factories etc are being hit as soon as they’re identified by Israeli and US intelligence. There may be some resupply from Russia, but Russia is also allies with Saudi Arabia and has extensive diplomatic relations with the Gulf, so the extent of Russian munitions support may be limited by both that and the ongoing war in Ukraine taking priority.
How long can Iran’s conventional forces hold out versus how long can Trump hold out rising oil and LNG prices? That is really the question. For the Gulf, it’s better if oil spikes (this is why Qatar’s energy minister is now alluding to $150/barrel costs, which we’re nowhere near right now), so that Trump is forced to sue for peace, so that the attacks on the GCC nations stop. The ‘worst case’ for the GCC is a protracted collapse and IRGC remnant guerilla forces using Houthi strategies on the Hormuz.
2rafa
6d ago
She didn’t have any major wins and she isn’t the architect of the immigration and deportation policy in any case.
2rafa
8d ago
I don’t think this is true. We have glimpses into the behind-the-scenes depravity of the Gilded Age; the Maiden Whores of Babylon; the infamous Stanford White scandal, several others besides. And this was when the press was even more corrupt and in many ways deferential than today.
2rafa
8d ago
If the US had taken out Saddam, picked another senior Baathist and told them to be a little nicer to the Shiites, and kept the Baathist army mostly in place, that could indeed have happened.
2rafa
8d ago
But why don’t you ascribe any agency to Trump, here? You consider it necessary that one must have manipulated the other into war.
2rafa
9d ago
From the recent Merz photo call:
The first question Trump's asked about the Middle East is if Israel forced his hand. "No, I might have forced their hand," he responds.
Referring to Iran, Trump says: "We were having negotiations with these lunatics, and it was my opinion they were going to attack first."
"I didn't want that to happen," the US president says. "So, if anything, I might have forced Israel's hand."
2rafa
9d ago
It’s certainly a very convenient defense going into midterms. I don’t think it makes a lot of sense though. From an Israeli perspective this is all 6-9 months too late. The IRGC is too deeply embedded to overthrow with a decapitation strike on the civilian/clerical leadership and the biggest protests in 30 years were quickly and mercilessly crushed a few months ago. Nuclear sites and stockpiles are dispersed and deep underground and it would take a nuclear strike or boots on the ground to have any chance of destroying them now.
The timing and other (eg WaPost) reporting suggests that MBS / the Saudis gave their go-ahead last week, which would be a major turnaround from the last two years of rapprochement with Iran on their part.
Possibly something to do with the negotiations; it was very interesting that even Oman and Qatar were hit by Iran.
Right now, not much has happened and foreign policy simply isn’t a very emotive issue for most Americans.
So far every knife out for Trump has failed. When the first real hit lands (when he gets unpopular enough and someone - probably not one of the central players - is willing to gamble on going all in) everyone will reposition themselves. I don’t think this means it’s over for Rubio or Vance necessarily. The Democratic base was antiwar since 2005 and they chose Obama, Hillary, Biden. Immigration, law and order and the economy are the top three policy issues for Republicans.
My feeling is that:
Casualties (which may well remain moderately low) don’t typically blow back in the face of wartime presidents. If anything, deaths make people mad and angry and bloodthirsty. Vietnam wasn’t even an exception until it had been a very long time indeed. If Iran sinks a big ship and kills 200 US navy sailors a lot of ambivalent Republican commentators will say “well now we do have to punish them”.
Trump’s tariff performance suggests he isn’t willing to allow oil to be much above $100 for long at all. A comparatively ‘principled’ or ideological neocon might try to make a case to the public, Trump won’t. That might not save his polling (which has been in decline for a while) but it might be enough for Vance and Rubio.
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