Crake
Protestant Goodbot
No bio...
User ID: 1203
When an imperial power offers the option of joining its hegemony to a smaller state that directly borders an opposing empire that is egregiously antagonistic. Offering the option to join the American hegemony to anyone who wants to regardless of the effects that will have on the balance of power is obviously antagonistic.
That seems so clearly antagonistic to me that i'm not sure your statement is in good faith. Can you explain how you think that isn't antagonistic?
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
1yr ago
Russia is openly concerned about western hegemony expanding near its borders. Therefore western hegemony threatening to expand near its borders is antagonistic.
Offering entry into its hegemony to anyone who wants it regardless of context is universally antagonistic.
You can argue that it’s morally justified but it’s clearly antagonistic
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
1yr ago
What they were supposed to do? One option would be helping Russia to keep occupied areas after USSR has fallen but I am not convinced that it would end better in any aspect.
Simply not meddle with regions directly bordering other empires.
Ideally try to maintain polite diplomatic relationships and worldwide power balance between the big dogs.
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
1yr ago
I feel like this convo is way off the rails.
I do not disagree with you. Empires justify themselves by might anything else is irrelevant.
But that feels divorced from the context of my comment. my previous comment that you are responding to was questioning why is the west expanding its hegemony not antagonistic Russia expanding its “hegemony” Is antagonistic. I recognize that there is a profound difference between the two, in that the west is able to enforce its antagonism, but that doesn’t make one and antagonistic and the other not.
I feel like this conversation has gotten weird and I find myself arguing pure semantics, so I get that my position here is extremely unexciting, but that was the only point I was making.
The west offering access to Ukraine was antagonistic to Russia. I do not see how that is controversial. It also is thin.
This is going to depend on things like the determinism/compatibilism/free will debate. It cannot be freely concluded.
I'm not sure I believe that actual compatibilists exists but otherwise I guess that's fair. I'll think more about how that debate interacts with this one.
This is not what it means to have more explanatory power.
I think it kind of is but that's a larger argument. As this feels to not be the core of the argument, how about I start by just saying it's more coherent and has at least an equal level of explanatory power as the alternate theory. I think to argue explanatory power in depth I would need to know more about what you think moral realism vs. moral relativism predicts, which you have said would require pulling in the debate over determinism/free will.
In fact, if it were, we could on similar grounds jettison the entire scientific endeavor for objective physical reality. No need to go to the trouble of looking for a justification when we can just happily settle for the subjectivist view.
Thats not true.
Science is different in that it has no need to be justified by arbitrary axioms. It has utility as a justification which I think we would both agree is not a valid justification for morals. All science needs to show that it is better science is to work.
The scientific endeavor can be tracked via its utility. If my opponents and I have different science, but their science makes better bombs and medicine, then I should reconsider my science.
But if my opponents and I have different morals, and their morals make better bombs and medicine (let's say they use children in their mines or sacrifice children to create a working immortality potion), that is not grounds to reconsider my morals. Science is judged on utility, morality is not.
moral relativism doesn't have the issue of needing to find a justification for moral axioms that as far as I can tell are fundamentally not possible to justify objectively. Can you explain to me how you can justify a moral axiom without relying on another moral axiom?
I would still like an answer to this please.
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
1yr ago
Why is America/the west entitled to be an empire and behave like an empire but Russia is not.
And I don’t want Russia to try to expand its hegemony either, but America attempting to expand its hegemony near Russia is antagonistic.
Even if you are arguing that Russia is bad and the west is good, therefore an expansion of western hegemony is not immoral - that’s irrelevant to the argument.
I didn’t say is was immoral for the west to expand its hegemony into Ukraine - all I said was that it is antagonistic. Something can be both morally justified, or even morally obligated, but still antagonistic.
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
4mo ago
I am not familiar with the term longhouse in this context, and can't easily find an explanation for the term connected to AI or space exploration. Is it a transhumananist term? Is it a rat term?
Can you explain what it means in this context?
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
8mo ago
I thought I knew the acronyms around here but apparently I don't because people say pmc all the time and I don't recognize it. What does pmc stand for?
Do you see anything else worth responding to in my post?
If so, what is this "material world" that we are supposedly perceiving?
You know what it means colloquially, but here is a more extensive explanation of how I would describe the material world:
It is the seemingly mostly consistent thing that we infer via our subjective perceptions. We peer through an unreliable lens. There is something on the other side that can’t be perfectly known. Whatever the stuff is on the other side that generally responds consistently to experiment, that is what we call the material world.
It appears to be a system or substrate that follows mostly consistent rules that we, whatever we are, exist within or on.
Science is the practice of measuring and manipulating that mostly consistent stuff on the other side of the lens. Therefore, science does not raise the problem of relativism, because the only justification it needs is that it effectively gives a person tools to manipulate the material world. As long as it is helpful for doing that, it is justified as legit science. That doesn't justify it morally or anything, to be clear. It just justifies it as science.
But morals are not justified by being useful for getting some kind of result. They have to be justified by being good or right or noble. And those do not have the same simple test as science, so they raise the problem of justifying moral axioms.
Not really. Such accusations are cheap to throw around and are usually bullshit.
Alright
Sorry, the what now? Where did that come from? I feel like I'm missing some axioms or something.
I argue it in the following sentences. I specifically said the material world as we perceive it. Should I post the exact same thing again? If you think that my stance on moral relativity is incompatible with my stance on the material world, I think you need to make that argument more clearly, instead of just continuing to say "Wah? What?".
maybe you are missing some of my relevant axioms, I'm happy to fill them in if you're actually curious. It doesn't feel like you are.
Let me clarify what I meant. I could see the flaws in a couple different attempts to science their way across the is-ought gap to a scientific moral realism. This is not what you're doing, so it's not your position.
Ok. Well thanks for that. I agree you can't science your way across the is-ought gap, and have no interest in trying. The fact that at least current New Atheists appear to try to do that is part of why I have low interest in their position.
I'm not that enamored of science.
No reply to my accusation of a lack of charity? That doesn't concern you?
Of the what now? Where did that thing come from? All you have right now are some subjective perceptions.
We start with subjective perceptions but I am not universally against any kind of realism. Science is an effective way to handle the material world as we perceive it. It works as far as we can tell. That's enough for science because that is the grounds on which we judge science. We want science to work, if it does, then it has fulfilled its stated purpose.
The requirements for justifying moral stances are higher because the stated purpose of morality is not "just work". That is why it raises the question of relativism. If all we wanted was for morality to work, then we could compare the moral positions of different groups and the associated outcomes and using that data we could pick the best moral positions. But that is not the grounds on which we judge moral positions, so we have to grapple with the questions of relativity.
Historically, many New Atheist adherents leaned hard naive moral relativist, with nearly exactly the same positions as you. Adding on the papering over of how we go all the way from nothing to magic utility in one shot just sealed the deal for how close you are to where that community was, whether intentional or not. Of course, their naive moral relativism was the biggest thing that they were constantly taking Ls over in Internet Arguments, so a segment of them (including the aforementioned Sam Harris) pivoted hard toward trying to science away the is-ought gap and construct their own scientific moral realism. But yeah, I was more placing you pretty much exactly in that community, but prior to the pivot. Back in the day when I was most engaged in it. As I was getting a better phil education was when this turn started happening.
Well, I am only passingly familiar and certainly not steeped in that context. I don't have your knowledge of their internet argument history. I really don't think my philosophy in general aligns with new atheism, which again, I presume is in favor of atheism. I am in favor of religion.
I feel like you have not been charitable in the course of this discussion. By which I mean you tend to focus on very specific things I have said while avoiding dealing with the central cruxes of the arguments I am presenting - despite the fact that as far as I can tell, you know very well what the points I am trying to make are. And even knowing that, you don't make much attempt to argue with them head on. Instead you focus your responses away from the central arguments. If you were being charitable, the first target of your responses would be the core issue and you would directly explain what the problem with it is.
I could pretty immediately see the central flaws in a couple different attempts, so I kinda stopped paying attention to it as I drifted away from caring much about them more generally.
Wow, what a statement. If my position is so obviously retarded then show me by engaging it head on. I ask you multiple questions in most of my posts, you ignore them in general. You are continually dismissive in your responses, despite my best attempts to engage in good faith. Where's the charity?
I think you are pigeon hole-ing me really incorrectly.
because I can now tell that you've been too steeped in the New Atheists.
I really really am not. For one, aren't they are all stridently opposed to moral relativism?
I have no love for them as an ideological group and also have not read much of their stuff. Looking up the people that define that group I can honestly say that while I have heard of some of them, the only one I have really read at all is Dennett, who I do enjoy. But I don't agree with their beliefs and am not that familiar with their thoughts. Clearly they oppose religion and the things that come with it and I am deeply in favor of religion.
I do not think my beliefs line up with the New Atheists in general. Wasn't someone earlier in this thread saying that Sam Harris was trying to compose an objective system of morality based on naturalism? That flies in the face of my entire position.
There's not going to be much value in proceeding beyond simply suggesting that you spend a bit more time in some philosophy courses... You've run absolutely roughshod over centuries of philosophical underpinnings of science
Dude mean. I'm pretty familiar with the philosophical literature. It's embarrassing to retreat to a call to authority but I went pretty far into the philosophy class tree in undergrad and it was a college with a well respected philosophy program. I took lots of upper level philosophy courses. I don't have a philosophy PHD but I'm also not green by any measure. I guess I reject some of the established positions of analytic philosophers, but I have read them, and I have a lot of love for the continental literature as well. I don't think a lack of knowledge of the canon is the issue here.
Not a single word on what the actual object of science is, nor why such a thing should correlate in any way to "utility", whatever that means. If you lived in a Matrix where the only thing that seemed to bring you an ill-defined "utility" was pressing the experience-machine-go-heroin button, I guess that would be the proper domain of science or something.
Ah, ok I think I see the confusion. You're interpreting my use of utility to be the same as economists or utilitarians; essentially the same as human pleasure (I know they quibble about the exact meaning but something in that space). That was not what I meant at all. I meant it in the informal or scientific sense of a description of the degree to which something is practically useful. If your science makes tall buildings that don't fall down, medicine that heals the sick, and bombs that explode well - then it is good science. Good science correctly predicts the material world and successfully provides control over it. The more it does those things, the better science it is. I wasn't trying to refer to utility as human happiness/pleasure at all.
You've run absolutely roughshod over centuries of philosophical underpinnings of science
I really don't think I have. Science's core objective is to provide us with a reliable and predictive understanding of the natural world. Its success is best measured by its utility, and in a scientific context, utility refers to the practical applications of scientific theories and findings. That might not be the only goal of science or the method of science, but it's a very strong measure of its success. If your science doesn't work when applied to physical experiments, you go back to the chalkboard. That position does not "run roughshod" over the philosophical underpinnings of science.
With that explained, do you feel your matrix thought experiment is still relevant here? I think it was based on the assumption that I meant utility like utilitarians do, but if I am misunderstanding, please tell me.
I'm sort of proceeding by reductio ad absurdum. Seeing how your test here would play out when turned against something you like. You seem vastly less willing to be even a tenth as stringent in favor of bounding over giant buildings in a single leap (of faith).
I'm not sure I follow what you are saying. Is the reductio ad absurdum argument you are making the matrix thought experiment? If not can you lay the argument out again please?
when turned against something you like.
What thing that I like?
Nothing interesting seems to follow from this.
I disagree, but interesting or not, my account of the nature of morality more closely aligns with reality and has more explanatory power.
From the evidence we have, it appears that morality is relative. I am making the argument that just because morality is relative that doesn't rob us of morality. It doesn't lead to moral nihilism and it doesn't decrease the relevance of morality in our lives.
On your view, there are no grounds on which we can say, "The nazis were wrong, and exterminating Jews is not good." We can only say, "There are some people over there who think that exterminating Jews is good and some people over there who think that exterminating Jews is bad. Nothing interesting seems to follow from this."
I think I have made a strong argument that this is not a necessary result of moral relativism.
The behavioral result is identical in my account and your moral realist account. If I am a moral relativist who thinks the nazis are wrong, I will say "There are some people over there who think that exterminating Jews is good and some people over there who think that exterminating Jews is bad" also I can say "I am one of the people who thinks that the nazis are wrong and exterminating Jews is bad" and I can act accordingly to stop their abhorrent behavior.
Nothing has changed behaviorally from your account, as both the allies and the nazis are going to behave the same regardless. Even if I was a moral realist the nazis were going to act in line with their fucked up beliefs. I was still going to act in accordance with my beliefs.
The difference between the accounts is their explanatory power. moral relativism doesn't have the issue of needing to find a justification for moral axioms that as far as I can tell are fundamentally not possible to justify objectively. Can you explain to me how you can justify a moral axiom without relying on another moral axiom?
There's twenty-one people over there that like cilantro and one person who doesn't. I can't actually say that "they" believe that cilantro is good.
Ok, Sorry if I miswrote that or wasn't clear enough. You can say that they, the 21 people who believe cilantro is good - believe that cilantro is good. That seems essentially definitionally true and not an error of language.
In any event, you changed what it is that I said would be an error in language. I asked, "Looking at those twenty-two people, can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"? I think that even trying would be an error in language."
I don't think I changed what you said. I made it clear what I thought. If there are groups of people who think cilantro is good or bad, that does not provide you any ability to extract from the fact that they believe those things the position that cilantro is good or bad. Their moral conclusions are largely irrelevant to whether you can say cilantro is good or bad, that would have to be based on your own axioms. most likely you wouldn't think that cilantro has a moral weight, but I have no problem imagining a culture that does, like this theoretical group.
If your axioms are that cilantro is morally good, then it is not an error of language to say that cilantro is morally good.
However, as I said earlier, it is logically incoherent to say that is it objectively true that cilantro is morally good. And definitely logically incoherent to say that it is morally truer that cilantro is good than that cilantro is bad. What is objectively true is that some of these theoretical people believe that cilantro is good, and some of them believe it is bad. That is objectively true. Determining the truth of the statement "cilantro is morally good" is where logical coherence breaks down.
That wasn't what I meant. Your axioms are already primary to you. So if we share an axiom that axiom is primary to you. I didn't say anything about my experience. There is just an overlap of a preexisting condition of primary-ness. I am not saying my axioms have any effect on what is primary to you.
Your axioms are primary to you. Let's say there is an axiom called axiom A. If axiom A is an axiom that you hold, then it is primary to you. If I hold axiom A, then axiom A is primary to me, because it is one of the axioms I hold. Therefore if you and I both hold axiom A, then it is primary for both of us and acts as primary, substantial moral common ground. You don't have to care about my experience or my moral axioms whatsoever. But if we do share them, then those axioms are primary for both of us. That's all I was saying. And with that common ground then we can communicate about morality. That is the basis of a shared morality. Even if you don't agree with me that moral axioms are subjective, the ones we share are still primary to both of us.
That two people happen to share some set of subjective things does not somehow elevate them to being any more primary.
No elevation is needed. Each person already believes the thing, therefore the thing is primary to them. I am not saying that there is magical effect creating new primacy from their shared moral axioms. I am saying that all of their moral axioms are primary to them, therefore if they share them, they have common ground and will agree that those axioms are primary.
Looking at those twenty-two people, can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"? I think that even trying would be an error in language.
I am saying that if all of those people share the axiom that cilantro is good, then they can all agree that cilantro is good. That's all.
can I say that cilantro is "good" or "bad"
If you are one of these people with the axiom that cilantro is good, then you will say that cilantro is good. If you hold an axiom that it is bad you will say it is bad.
If you are a third party with no opinion about cilantro, then I think the moral status of cilantro will be undefined for you, or perhaps it will seem like a weird and alien thing to attach moral status to. As it does for me in real life.
I think that even trying would be an error in language.
maybe it would be an error in language for you as a third party with no opinion on cilantro to say that cilantro is good or bad. But it would certainly not be an error of language for you to say that those people over there believe that cilantro is good. That would be a simple description of the reality that those people believe cilantro is morally good.
and for that strange group of people who believe cilantro is morally good, it would not be a error of language for them to say "cilantro is morally good" - because that is what they believe. You would say that they are incorrect, but there have been lots of humans with moral axioms you would say are incorrect or bizarre, and I doubt you would normally say that their expressions of their weird beliefs are an error of language.
I mean, your subjective things are pretty secondary to me. The same reason why the nazi's subjective things are secondary to you.
Well only assuming we don’t share the same moral axioms right? What if we share most moral axioms besides the axiom that morals are relative?
Then the axioms that define my perspective wouldn’t be secondary to you, by virtue of being the same as your axioms which are primary to you.
I think it's incorrect/incomplete.
Ok well that’s not very informative or fun but it’s honest. Thank you.
In what sense? Probably not in the traditional sense of the word.
Lol fair enough. I am not a moral realist. I mean real as in subjective things actually exist, but I am fine taking the moral realist definition in this case. There are plenty of philosophers who have have argued that subjective things are "real". I agree with those philosophers, but I'm not interested in defending the definition of real as it's not really needed for my position right now.
Instead, how about I say that subjective things can be overwhelmingly profound and important. They are in no way of less importance than physical material facts. They are not secondary.
I didn't say that I don't think you hate nazis enough, make strong judgments, say that your position is despicable or offensive. I just tried to understand and describe your position accurately.
I think that's dishonest. What is your honest moral judgement of my moral judgement of bad/evil people? You are saying that when I say that people are bad, I don't mean that they are actually bad. How is that not the same as saying that my moral judgement is not the right kind of moral judgement?
You have continually implied that moral relativism as a position is insubstantial or just incorrect. I am not offended, that's the default position. I just want you to argue with what I have said.
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
9mo ago
The relativist stance simply describes the reality that morality is constructed by humans. If I live in a monoculture I have to live under its moral axioms, which is fine. If I need to make a moral argument I will use those axioms as my starting place. I don't see why that position is abhorrent to you.
Crake
Protestant Goodbot
10mo ago
Fair. I'm sure they did. But they didn't kill themselves very often and generally succeeded in reproducing their lifestyle to the next generation.
You're wrong that these things can be easily separated.
I am not a fundamentalist christian. Some fundamentalist christians do not believe in evolution. In fact, evolutionary theory is directly contradictory to what they do believe.
There's "facts" about the world as far as the teacher/establishment understands them and there is "what ought to be done about the state of the world" sort of material,
If I was a science teacher for their children, I would want to teach them evolution (assuming I am following your definition of what is and isn't indoctrination). Evolution is a "'fact' about the world as far as the teacher understands it". However, me simply teaching what I believe to be factual, despite not being a moral value to me or a description of what a person ought to do, would be a threat to their worldview.
My simply providing what I see as facts would be hostile to them. Therefore, personally I would not want to do that - as that seems immoral to me. I would be indoctrinating their children into a worldview that was hostile to the worldview of their parents.
Do you see how I think all education is indoctrination, despite the fact that I am not trying to "raise an army for culture war reasons"? I am actively laying out boundaries of how not to do that.
can you antagonize an avowed enemy?
Yes. There are many situations where avowed enemies tiptoe around each other and do their best to avoid any escalation of conflict. Mutually Assured Destruction would be an example of a situation where two avowed enemies would actively try to not antagonize each other, because of the potential consequences. In fact I think that's a really good example of what I mean by antagonism. The kind of action you would avoid in such a situation.
Or, can you antagonize a guy in self defense?
No. If the enemy attacks you and you harm them in self defense, I could certainly imagine the enemy claiming that that was an act of antagonism (in fact that may be the default claim in such a case) but from an omniscient 3rd person perspective that would not be antagonism.
Fair enough. Instead of "I assume that they will use their leverage to fuck over their opponents" how about "I assume they will use their leverage to further increase their postion and weaken the position of their opponents".
But this happens even between the tightest of allies, the best of friends. The US-Britain alliance couldn’t stop the US from interfering in the Suez Crisis and US decolonization efforts against britain and france. Refusing an alliance from another power’s sphere without compensation is not the baseline, it would be insanely friendly behaviour. It’s essentially putting their interests above yours, self-sacrifice.
I don't disagree with anything you've said here. I'm not sure how that is an argument against my pedantic point. I'm continuing to argue my pedantic point at this juncture because you have requested it, to be clear.
Those actions may or may not be acts of antagonism. I think between allies I might be more likely to call it just rude, but there is little difference. If the US did something it thought would really truly cross the line in offending its ally, then that would clearly be antagonism.
What I meant is that 'avoiding war' sounds good, when really it erases the agency of the other party who declares war, the moral responsibility of the war in the france case in fact rests entirely on her shoulders. You say you expect ‘the conflict’ to escalate, but the conflict doesn’t do anything, it’s an inanimate object. Russia, like France, will escalate if they don’t get what they want. You say Martha's vineyard is important to the US, and ukraine is not, but it is the same moral calculation whether the opponent extorts a trillion or 2 dollars.
I feel like you are being intentionally obtuse in interpreting my position on this. The united states can have an aggressive warlike posture with russia, or a neutral posture, or a friendly posture, or a conciliatory posture. Do you disagree with that?
I don't think that Ukraine is not important to the US. Ukraine may very well be important to the US tactically, but I would like to have a neutral posture with russia. Ideally even a friendly posture with russia. I think everyone would benefit from us finding a path of cooperation between America and Russia, and I see inviting Ukraine into the Western hegemony as indicative of an aggressive posture. A move that may be tactically essential in the case we go to full war with russia, but tactically not relevant if we can find a path towards my preferred future in which we cooperate with russia.
I would like to let Russia have Ukraine in the pursuit of cooperation between West and Russia, something that I think is not an insane position but I think you write off out of hand for moral reasons that are not part of the pedantic component of this argument.
I do not see embracing Ukraine as an act of glorious liberation. I think you do. Beyond the pedantic argument I think this may be the fundamental disagreement. That is fair.
Finally:
To me, antagonizing is not justified by definition
I really don't get this. Why would it be definitely unjustified in all cases? You think it always wrong to intentionally annoy or bully your enemy? On what grounds?
That is so wild to me. If you and I were playing a war game, and I, your stated opponent, started forming military alliances with a bunch of entities that are in a good position to fuck you up, of course you are going to find that concerning. That's antagonistic! What is your definition of antagonistic?
Of course not! I absolutely do not expect the united states to avoid antagonizing its weaker opponents. I expect any world power to play their cards for all they're worth. I assume that they will use their leverage to fuck over their opponents. But when we look at the actions taken by a specific entity in world politics, "antagonistic" refers to an action taken by a an entity that is likely to appear knowingly threatening to another entity. It's not a moral judgement. Its just a question of, when party A does this, is that something that will make party B uncomfortable, and is it also something that party A knows will make party B uncomfortable. If so, then it is antagonistic. I'm not saying party A shouldn't do antagonistic things. It just seems clear cut to me that doing things that make russia uncomfortable is antagonistic - and I don't see how that means that "the word has been hollowed of meaning".
I don't expect the USG to avoid antagonizing russia. I expect them to act predatorily whenever possible, but I don't agree that avoiding conflict with russia actually would be to their own detriment or to the detriment of the people of that sphere. Again, I know that america will act aggressively, but as far as I can tell it would be to everyones benefit is they did allow russia to shore up its position. You act like my position is totally unheard of but the concept of "balance of powers" is not alien. I don't expect america to pursue a balance, but I would prefer a balance exist, as an unbalance seems to increase the chance of a real war breaking out. I think a balance would be to everyones benefit.
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