BANNED USER: temperamental dysregulation
DaseindustriesLtd
late version of a small language model
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User ID: 745
Banned by: @Amadan
Now they're elevating the pitch of nuclear rhetoric; some directly admit this is an order from the top. I agree with the idea that they'll probably aim to nuke bridges over Dnipro and some other infrastructure, then try to flood the seized provinces with fresh meat.
I can, but it deserves an effortpost. Basically, it's not so different from late stage Russian Empire and USSR, only more dystopian, and it'll be scripted on the basis of Kamil Galeev's wet dreams.
It starts with war exhaustion in the ethnic provinces and far periphery (Saha, Dagestan...), provoking sabotage and conspiring in draft avoidance, which then grows into collective scorn for Moscow loyalists who fight against it, and general insubordination to the federal center. This provokes relocating additional police and, soon after, interior troops there, which exposes economically precarious Russian provinces to organized crime, that has been symbiotically coexisting with local administration.
Economy keeps tumbling down; military expenses grow; infrastructure and social services decay, perhaps evoking petty crime and protests of feeble desperate pensioners that need to be put down; everyone with half a brain tries to flee, increasing the load on border patrols and such; Ukraine/NATO keep crossing «red lines» without nuclear response, eroding the credibility of threats; manpower wanes, and less prestigious interior troops too are getting consumed by the war effort – when they fail to provide a quota of conscripts from a province. At some point, state capacity is overextended so much that there's no effective control over a region with a particularly capable criminal or ethnic leadership, nor political will to subjugate it, and it gets ignored by propaganda, like the Ukrainian bombing of Belgorod is mostly ignored now. And those new local elites decide that they needn't be burdened by the toxic Muscovite brand, nor bear the cost of sanctions. They either declare independence outright, or stop paying taxes and begin to surreptitiously trade with international actors cutting out Moscow middlemen. When it becomes clear that Moscow cannot put this down, it sets off a chain reaction and economically, logistically, demographically handicaps Moscow even more.
Soon, the breakdown of order in the interior army begins as local regimens decide that they can be paid as well by breakaway provinces and risks do not justify benefits. At some point Putin's regime either collapses, or its domain is reduced to an impoverished, desperately coping rump state; maybe Zolotov/Kadyrov/Prigozhin/Dyomin/janitor uses the snuffbox at last and pleads for mercy at the condition of accepting American General Governor to sort things out, dismantling Russian nuclear arsenal and personal safety.
This is one relatively optimistic scenario of how Russia might end, with combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties in the low tens of millions over 15 years.
Nuclear use would make it worse but not very different.
Putin's success at maintaining order, coupled with proliferation of the attitude Dean ascribes to Baltics and Finns, could make it substantially worse.
Some of that is already happening.
Galeev in his Russian channel, with more of the mask off than on Twitter:
I see two scenarios for Russia's future: positive and negative.
-
The positive scenario is to walk around like a fucked bitch of a douche bag, under sanctions and paying reparations for decades. We could say that our grandchildren will make it, but let's be realistic. Given the demographic dynamics – they won't be your grandchildren.
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Negative – a candidate for nuclear bombing. After that, see point 1.
The common denominator in both scenarios is the «fucked bitch of a douche bag».
At the same time it is possible to cast off the seal of scum: if you change the brand. Look at the Austrians, for example – they made it work very cleverly after World War II.
If you value the future of your children and your region, start thinking about a new brand right now. Just like Austria isn't getting called out for Hitler (although it would seem...), neither will independent Siberia/Urals/Pomorye get [called out for Russia].
And everything associated with Russia will be banned for generations and to a greater extent than it was with Germany. Because no one will be able to explain why those fuckers couldn't sit at home.
Your dismissal is irrelevant, because you are not a Finn or Baltic country citizen whose perspective and endorsement is the source of legitimacy for border policy.
Was your speculation on future settlements and such meant to merely communicate the personal opinion of a Latvian or a Finn, or did you present it as an argument about security open to rational discussion on a neutral platform? You did the latter, of course, and now you're defending it with the sovereign right to endorse a policy that belongs to citizens of those states, not missing the chance to insinuate disrespect for that right on my part. Pretty lame, IMO.
but at the time earned me a lecture from you about how I would never understand Slaavic brotherhood and how much it mattered.
I think that my lack of sense of collective ethnic responsibility was not only vindicated since late February, but continues to be validated now, given how the other Slaavic brotherhood regions reject such premise ethnic collective solidarity.
...Speaking of collective responsibility. This reminds me of that one time @HlynkaCG accused me of having predicted quick surrender of «globo homo Ukraine», then apologized for having confabulated it due to clustering me together with advocates of that view.
You seem to be playing a game of equivocation and derailment, using a very clear term «collective ethnic responsibility» (such as your belief in collectively punishing Russians) interchangeably with a term «ethnic collective solidarity» that's less clear in context and has something to do with my past or present belief in «Slavic Brotherhood». I'd like to ask you to either be less creative with accusations in the future, or kindly use https://camas.unddit.com to quote the specific position that you refer to, not pull a Kulak or Hlynka (although, whatever I think about Pan-Slavism can't have much to do with the topic of collective responsibility, so this is an unproductive tangent).
European humanitarian law basically follows that to expel someone who has tried to claim asylum, there must be someone willing to accept them who won't put them back in danger, or ship them back to the home country.
Russia is not deemed to be a zone of humanitarian emergency (nor is dodging draft in Russia a «right») so the issue of shipping them back to Russia shouldn't be at conflict with humanitarian law, and indeed people are getting deported just fine now; it'll only detract from the purpose of sabotaging mobilization. Anyway. I recommend an approach that is expedient in this situation of mobilization, not legal asylum, precisely because rights or welfare of Russians cannot be expected to matter to Europeans now. Besides there already exist procedures for asylum seekers and they are used, but it'd be unrealistic to extend those to fleeing Russians in general – although Germany seems to flirt with the idea.
There are very many ways for Europeans to allow limited-term residence at risk of deportation, starting with frameworks of Schengen and worker visas. More naively, I don't believe a war is a proper time for EU bureaucracy; a good-enough (i.e. no concentration camps) legal grounds for temporary hosting of would-be Russian soldier refugees that's devoid of your speculative risks (and also precludes submitting an asylum request) can be drafted in a weekend, just like another sanctions package.
I'll increase your levity. I believe you're a cultural chauvenist, not an imperialist
I don't believe this is the sort of belief that's amenable to refutation, as it amounts to not liking people of a particular group who display the universal and normal trait of ingroup cultural preference (which is inherently zero-sum).
And how is that an increase. In my impression, patting oneself on the back for old poetry or "sovl" and sneering at provinciality of hohols (or cowardice of the frog-eaters, or barbarity of... whoever) is a lesser transgression than attempts at imperial irredentism, unless one cares more about status signals than material insults.
If anything, the big issue with Russian chauvinism is that it is sadly inseparable from Imperialism, since for some reason – probably lack of non-imperial symbols of success – it consistently leads to Imperial fetishism and absurd delusions on the topic of Russia's capabilities and entitlements (demonstrated by our president and his support base). I clearly do not share this attitude (proven by consistent hatred of our president's support base and the reputation of a doomer), thus I reject this accusation as well.
And this I note other states reject, as past examples of future ethnic blocks (Russification policy effects and migration waves), weird definitions of ethnic cleansing (ones that currently serve as war justification), and low moral qualities of ruskies (such as those who supported Putin when it was cost-free) leaving home (trying to enter other countries without permission) is exactly how they- and we- have reached this current position. Repeating steps that brought them to the present widens the chance of it reoccuring in the future.
This is an extraordinary show of bad faith and low-quality reasoning (you still haven't addressed the vacuity of your argument on «justifications» too). But since you opt to hide behind ventriloquism, it's not meaningful to continue.
This is barely responsive to my post. Which I suppose happens when one's argument is shown to be without merit and there's no incentive to admit as much.
A future army, because this is a future-threat consideration.
I dismiss this, because a) in no realistic event can those Russians hope to get long-term residence in Finland or Latvia and b) nobody there is even arguing that this is a risk, instead complaining about being a transit country or that Russians have to take responsibility or some such.
Which 'they'? The Russians, or the Finns?
Why Finns, how could that fit the context? Those little miscommunications are a repeating pattern with you, and they are very telling.
Russians of course. Your starting thesis was: Putin has repeatedly used ethnic russians as pretexts to intervene, or threaten intervention, around the region... significantly increasing the Russian national population in the border states- who are almost certainly going to locate themselves to the ethnic russian enclaves- strengthens an ethnic-based framing of a future pre-conflict narrative
How, exactly, does this work? Surely you understand that wars of conquest waged by non-democratic states are not contingent on objective reality behind claimed moral justification, so this framing is as strong or as weak as the propaganda makes it. (Even absence of Russians can be spun into an ethnic cleansing story, if one tries). Your response on the same point to @hustlegrinder is similarly lacking in your usual causal clarity.
Not to put too fine a point on it, Ilforte, but less than a year ago you didn't think there was any chance that Russians would wage war on Ukrainians
Are you really one to talk so smugly of this, given that your specific explanations for the Russian military buildup (forcing the NS2 issue or something) didn't differ much from mine and also implied no war? Also, «any chance» sounds very strong. But okay, I never quantified it, and indeed it seemed implausible, which in retrospect was stupid of me.
I do not believe the Russians who are noping out of the current round of imperialist adventurism oppose Russian imperialism in principle, as much as a personal skin-in-the-game that only applies so long as they do have skin in the game and can't go back to being mostly apolitical passive supporters
And before:
passively supportive imperialists who are only not associating with imperialism because it risks a personal cost... and who, if safe from that cost, have no history/credibility that they won't just go right back to vaguely supporting russian imperialism, only from inside the border territories where they could serve as a casus belli
Assuming this is true: this is but a spin on the casus belli thesis (technically, was a spin on that thesis, now it's just a speculation on morality). The casus belli issue has already been addressed. Without it, what exactly does this add? If they consistently oppose being drafted for base egoistic reasons, they are even less likely to help out with the invasion of the host country (which would be even more personally dangerous). Is this about strategic security, helping Ukraine, or about punishing people who supposedly don't oppose Russian Imperialism in principle?
It's not another issue, it's an extension and continuation of the same issue- a unloyal minority that approaches their host country from the perspective of cultural chauvenism and nostalgia for the external imperial oppressor. If this sounds at all familiar to the current Russian presiden
Wut? This if literary fluff in the shape of a coherent argument. I believe you can do better in distinguishing issues.
Except they wouldn't, because the modern Europeans don't have the same attitude towards ethnic cleansing from claimed sovereign territory as the modern Russians, even self-exiled ones.
This gave me a pause. Perhaps we have differences in worldview regarding what constitutes ethnic cleansing, too? Wiki sounds about right: «Ethnic cleansing is the systematic forced removal of ethnic, racial, and religious groups from a given area, with the intent of making a region ethnically homogeneous». I don't know man, this doesn't sound like, um, issuing short-term residence permits or erecting refugee camps for draft dodgers from a multinational neighboring state.
I imagine in a more equanimous state you'd have remembered that, and managed not to make this into another cause for a lame attempt at deadpan comedy.
they could not make new case-by-case beuracratic systems for unknown thousands of potential applicants whose approval would make their domestic ethno-demographic instability functions worse for the sake of people who until last week were supportive of Russian imperialist revaunchism
This is some heavy stuff.
In any case, if Europeans do not believe in ethnic cleansing, like you assert, they might not believe in collective ethnic responsibility like you do, either.
No, not more importantly. The most important consideration of Russian migration to other nations isn't the Russian status as non-combatants, it's whether the other states give sovereign permission. Russians do not have an inherent right to freely migrate to neighboring countries and set up new lives amongst the Finns and the Balts or the Ukrainians or anywhere else at will. Ethnic russian migration interests do not pre-empt the interests, or sovereignty, of their non-Russian neighbors.
Right, thanks. Admittedly I suspected this will be how you'll read it, which is why I wrote it ambiguously like this, and I know this isn't my broken English but your blinding, zoological ethnic prejudice that predictably determined this queer reading. Pease spare me more snark; few things could be funnier than what you're doing here on reflex, condescendingly explaining sovereignty to an imagined petulant Imperialist who asserts such a right to freely immigrate and colonize. (I don't believe in the usefulness of the doctrine of rights at all, in any case – at the bedrock, there are only interests and capabilities).
My claim here was that the subset of Russian males attempting escape and not posing current military threat will, in the case of being turned back, be mobilized for war (primarily in Ukraine), reinforcing Russian forces that are currently attempting annexation of parts of Ukraine. Which is, indeed, from the official European point of view, somewhat bad and more important than welfare of those males, and (I argue) more important than special pleading about ethnic blocs of the far future, weird definitions of ethnic cleansing, low moral qualities of all ruskies who leave home when staying becomes immediately life-threatening, and other 300 IQ bullshit.
Well, yes, the Finns and the Balts governments are making decisions to prioritize their own safety. Why shouldn't they? The responsibility of a nation is to its people, a state to its citizens, and a democracy to its voters. Ukrainians are none of these in the Baltize area.
Sure, they take care of their own. Can't say anything against it! I don't believe in the doctrine of rights, after all.
And of course they're under no obligation to spell it out. Because there is a pretension of broader solidarity, and it's convenient in many ways.
This looks like another serving of your isolated rigor. Not so long ago you jeered about Russian incapability to respond to possible blockade of Kaliningrad due to exhaustion of troops and materiel, especially in the region; now you mention the threat of draft dodgers (drafted, to begin with, due to further exhaustion) becoming an «oppressed minority» pretext for invasion (of a soon to be NATO country). Which army will be doing that? And army of which state, seeing as Russia isn't likely to survive this?
Much of the pre-February rhetoric from Moscow on multiple fronts could be leveraged against Russia's more northern neighbors, which was one of the reasons Europe reacted as strongly as it did when Putin followed through with his threats with actual invasion. Just from this angle, significantly increasing the Russian national population in the border states- who are almost certainly going to locate themselves to the ethnic russian enclaves- strengthens an ethnic-based framing of a future pre-conflict narrative.
"loading Dean model"
So how exactly do they change incentives for another invasion? Will this framing be recognized as legitimate by any party of interest, after Ukraine? Certainly not, unless long COVID makes us all unable to form long-term memories.
Is an invasion likely to be assisted from within by those who noped out of the current round of imperialist adventurism? I don't think so.
Will this pretext be recognized as less far-fetched than one relying on already-present Russian minorities who are clear civilians and not draft-dodgers? That's 1/4th of Latvian population, by the way. It will not. (From what I can tell, many of those Latvian Russians are USSR nostalgists, despise their host country and their disenfranchisement/deportation would be prudent, and same for their ilk in other countries; but this is another issue, and their genesis is different too)
Anyway, I have one idea about precluding this scenario: don't give them citizenship or long-term permits. (Nobody intended to, of course.) And needless to say they could be kicked out once the war is over.
Adjudicating their morality and stance on the war can be done on a more or less effortful case-by-case basis. Few of them will be ideological peaceniks willing to emigrate at personal cost just to protest etc., but few people ever deviate from vague my-country-right-or-wrong and my-family-comes-first mentality. Hopefully Europeans can tell a gopnik who pissed his imperial pants once asked to walk the walk from an autistic guy who's been learning Portuguese and Leetcoding the last six months (such as a few of my pals left behind); a 15-minute pen and paper test could suffice.
More importantly, this isn't only about them and their would-be hosts. All of them are non-combatants for now. In case of Europeans proceeding to assist the mobilization, they are getting drafted and sent down South as reinforcements.
I don't buy your long-term explanation. What's being done is pure unstrategic pettiness and moral grandstanding.
And if this is grand strategy, it's one you tactfully decided not to bring up: safer for Finns and Balts to have them die killing Ukrainians.
also in part because it has led to our little brother nation Estonians and other Baltics calling Finland an unreliable ally. This rose to a fever pitch just before Putin's mobilization announcement, making it all but impossible for border closure proponents even consider backing down and making it even harder for the Finnish government to maintain "b-but... the law..." position. Any arguments that now the border-crossers are going to be mobilization dodgers are just going to be met with newly-minted claims that since Putin and Shoigu implied that it's West that Russia is at war with, young Russian males crossing the border might just be destabilization agents and a danger to Finland.
Understandable, thanks for the explanation.
I don't know if he will use nukes. I thought the war preparation itself will resolve as a bluff to assuage the wounded pride etc. Miscalculations are hard to predict.
but it's my extremely strong belief that he's not a Nationalist (of course neither was Brezhnev). He's not any -ist or -ian or whatever. He's a tiny psychopathic Mafia don out of his depth. He's occasionally aping a Nationalist, an Orthodox Christian and a strongly identifying Russian because that gives his overwhelmingly Nationalist Russian Orthodox plebeians (which is to say, just Ruskies with default firmware) some warm fuzzies; back when they weren't reminded enough of this cheap and robust mindset, he would talk more about economic ties and development and shiet. He will turn on a dime and call himself a liberal, then appoint a homosexual to oversee traditional morality (including beatings of gays), then criminalize hate speech and Russian Nationalism so that nats die in prisons, then say he's reading a Russian Fascist Ilyin and sign an essay endorsing nationalistic talking points, then go kiss the Wall in Israel, then fedpost on air about Judeo-Bolsheviks, then endorse tribal minorities abusing Slavs, then send them and Slavs together into the meat grinder to subjugate a slightly different sort of Slavs. He'll call Azov «neonazis» and threaten retribution, then release them. He really is unshackled by any ideology, moral code or decision theory, and his behavior is, if scrutinized in good faith as the behavior of some political visionary, grotesque and mostly incoherent.
But he can get very serious on particular occasions. Insults (Nemtsov and Saakashvili who called him a shorty, foreign leaders who don't respect his autoritah and don't want to listen to his bloviation). Legitimate threat to safety, power and prestige (Navalny, journos digging his dirty laundry). Betrayal (Litvinenko, Skripals). And trouble for his vassals. He does not tolerate betrayals, and he seemingly does not betray his own. Right now, Russia has conducted a prisoner exchange with Ukraine. 215 Ukrainian and foreign fighters for 54 Russians and this piece of shit Medvedchuk. You see, he's Putin's kum: Putin is a godfather of his daughter. They're family.
Sure he has embezzled resources provided for subversion of Ukraine and implementation of those frivolous Imperialist schemes. Sure that's cost tens of thousands of Russian lives, and possibly everything. But Russia is a footnote to the clan's well-being. Mere substrate. A project dedicated to the promotion of Russian power is only another кормление, a domain to extract rent from, for a clan member.
That's all pretty fucking horrifying, and probably will transpire, nukes or no nukes.
Looking into Putin's early career, I've just read an interesting interview, admittedly from a suspect source: an Israeli-Russian arms dealer who filed some lawsuits against Putin-affiliated companies for scamming and forcibly removing him out of his businesses in the 90-s-00's. (and beating him half to death). He talked on a USA-funded Radio Freedom. A terse intro in English.
The point is, he says the same thing I've seen from many other people personally acquainted with early Putin: that he is absolutely, purely amoral. This image reminds me of Achilles Desjardins from Peter Watts' trilogy. Except Achilles was very smart and rational.
To be clear, I do not subscribe to this interpretation: Putin clearly has some attachments, some scruples, it's just this sentiment is reserved for «his people». And I don't mean Russians or something, but literally his little mafia team. Then again, even Achilles Desjardins mourned his cat.
With time and age, men become dumber, emotionally unstable, insecure, fall into echo chambers, come to believe in nonsense. But they still have habits and customs to guide them. Old Putin, Putin we have today, may be both stupidly irrational and completely devoid of conventional morality that could have prevented self-defeating extreme moves on its own.
Two short excerpts:
[...] But then an unpleasant thing happened: they called me and told me that there had been a general meeting of shareholders, and they signed the documents for me, which was probably true. According to the general practice, there are a lot of such things even now, when some part of the company's shares is assigned to a bum or to someone who is sure not to come, for whom they sign, and everything is fine. Because if you start dividing shares, there are a lot of questions from other co-owners. But this way they put it aside and put their signatures on it. It's a common practice, in fact, such an "unallocated stake".
I was offered to buy documents with which I could go to the police and to court. I came to the meeting, waited in the cafe "Victoria" in front of my house. It's a cafe with a counter, and then a restaurant and separate offices in the restaurant. I waited for the guy who called me. Another guy came up, said this one wasn't coming, if you need papers, come and see. I went into a separate office in the restaurant, got hit in the head, a hole was made in it by hitting me from behind.
– When was this?
– December 2003, after Dima Skigin died. They hit my head, kicked me hard, ripped my pancreas, ruptured my intestines. It was highly unpleasant. Along the way I was told several times: "Sigma, Sovex - just forget it, good man" - in the process, so to speak, of the beating. Well, I ended up in the hospital, they cut me open, did a laparotomy, I can show you the scar from here to there. They operated for four hours and still saved me, although it was not clear on that subject. When I recovered, took off for Israel. I tried to find out what happened to the company, because it was a silly situation: on the one hand you seemed to have shares, but on the other hand they were useless.
[...]
– Aside from civic position, or rather, one of its manifestations, there's another goal here. Whether or not you can punish someone is another question, but you can point the finger: this is a bandit, and this is a thief, and this is a crook. Just, you people, know that, and then how you deal with them is your problem.
– For whom exactly do you want to point with fingers?
– For people here in the West, among all else. Because a man with money comes, and until recently very few people were interested in how many old ladies were hacked to death with an axe for this suitcase of money. So I would like to point to the facts, and then people will decide for themselves how to treat this. You can shake hands with them, or not.
And regarding Vladimir Vladimirovich himself, he is a person who is, how should I put it... When we met with him, and, understandably, I was considered a CIA and Mossad agent – an Israeli, an arms dealer – I was struck by a feeling in him that is hard to convey verbally. He is not human in our understanding. It was not something infernal or like he's demon-possessed, but, apparently, something very strongly broke inside him, there were no human reactions. I don't even know how to describe it. I had various acquaintances at that time in St. Petersburg. There were people who loved women, money, cars. But they were very much alive, they had certain inner limits, set for themselves: I'm going to do this, but this here I won't do, else I won't respect myself. Vladimir Vladimirovich showed that he was not burdened at all. Either the KGB school had taught him that, or something else, but it was clear that there were no ordinary human standards – no gratitude, no boundaries. I'm trying to find a metaphor.... Well, some beyond-scary bandit wouldn't strangle a girl with her own ribbon for a candy bar. After all, it's kind of awkward. But here it was clear that there was only expediency and nothing else.
That's the horror of Soviet man in general, who has lost the notion of good and evil in principle, and this man had no such inner conceptions at all.
– Can you give me an example when this became clear to you about Vladimir Vladimirovich?
– No, just from the general stylistics, when certain phrases were uttered.
– It's just that there are completely different opinions. He made an extremely positive first impression on many people. In the '90s he said the right things about the development of small businesses, the free economic zone, banks, and so on and so forth.
– I think that both Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky fell for this. Because a man unwittingly models his interlocutor in accordance with himself. As they say in the criminal world, there are some "understandings," some framework, within which a person will constrain himself. But here, as it seemed to me at the time, there is no such framework at all. And it also seemed to me at the time that the man has some kind of fetish for money, with money as an abstract idea. Maybe as a way to protect oneself from this world. It was clear that he also joined the KGB in order to have the organization propping him up. In general, it was clear that he was trying to protect himself, and that for him this sacred fetish of money was simultaneously a protection from all possible trouble. And if you add here a common idea, popular in Russia, that "everything can be afforded for money"...
For start USA holds about 300 000 000 000 $ hostage
Come on now. I agree that there's still some way to go to the bottom even purely sanctions-wise, and perhaps Putin still fears it (although by this point he probably should fear shunning by other anti-Western parties more). But we know those 300B go to Ukraine just like my Tesla stonks go back to USA and NS2 goes to hell and Russian conscripts trying to flee into your country go to Donbass.
Edit: oh you don't mean frozen Rus reserves it seems. I should sleep more.
In good news: one of my friends made it out, we've met up.
The second is that armoured vehicles are very good at surviving heat and blast effects - one Cold War study found that tanks require approximately 45 psi of overpressure to be reliably rendered inoperable.
Don't forget that shitty Warsaw Pact armor is designed specifically for fighting in conditions of nuclear warfare.
It's not very fair to dismiss my arguments on grounds that I could as well have made worse ones in a counterfactual world where there were more evidence against my case. It's just bad faith. Suppose I claim that in a world where there's as much data in favor of Putin being minimally tech-literate as there is for Trump, Medvedev or Obama I'd have agreed with you, but in our one the specific evidence provided (testimonies of pro-Putin people, a single terrible montage in many years) supports me better. Well, this cannot be proven, can it?
Even astroturfed personas are based on some nugget of truth. Putin's macho persona, for instance, is due to him liking sports and especially sambo. To give off a fake impression of his familiarity with sambo, his side would have had to somehow fake his personal connections preceding access to substantial power, a ton of photo and video content and so on; that'd be hard-ish and prone to failure. It's about as hard to fake tech literacy; and Peskov's insinuations that Putin is tech literate would be really sus without faking more context. So I buy that he really is a tech illiterate sambo guy.
But your idea doesn't depend on him being tech literate, so that all is a tangent. You're arguing that he has the high-level understanding to make use of modern information infrastructure, or keeps around some people who can do that. This is what I'm analogizing to LW mindset (again, it's not fair to dismiss that as a rhetorical device, it's a good faith reference to a phenomenon we discussed earlier). It can be called «generality hypothesis». LW AI riskers assume, in short, that almost all powerful AIs will act like utility maximizers cutting the shortest path towards maximum reward value (inherently so, or with extra steps). This is far from certain; it may well be that many strategies towards capable AIs that are currently in development won't exhibit this property. Likewise it's not clear that Putin's political success to date indicates that he's a self-aware political power maximizer who understands that knowledge is power, proactively seeks out knowledge and devises strategies from domain-specific first principles. Or as you put it:
an autocrat would learn to filter higher level signals on which his survival depends. Higher level means he is like a mediocre CEO/ early modern ruler -- he doesn't know how stuff at lower level works, he knows how to build and manage patronage networks, play them against one another and how to discern through them any conflicting information. That's rather weak assumption on his part
I do not think this is a weak assumption at all, or that it should be the default hypothesis, or follows from your observations like reshuffling of administrators (this might happen in any disturbed hive, mechanistically). My null hypothesis is that ours is a (perhaps extremely) degenerate case of autocracy, that Putin is not that savvy at this autocrat thing, and owes his success at staying in power solely to narrow specializations like building a small intensely loyal mafia family and murdering key people outside it. It just so happens that his dacha cooperative also controls the levers of power in Russia and can act like a Singleton; their power-grabbing aptitude and toolset don't generalize to other scenarios.
I also do not believe that inter-service rivalry in Russia has a noteworthy epistemic dimension and doesn't amount to mutual distrust and libel, to prevent them from ganging up on the Czar. The task that he was solving and proved adequate for, centralization of power in Russia, did not require data from beyond Russian «patronage networks» so his tools may not have evolved to gather or transmit such data. He knows very well that Gerashchenko won't stab him in the back (now for certain!); he didn't know whether Medvedchuk had any pull in Ukraine or whether Yanukovych stood a chance, and may be equally misinformed now with regards to the war effort. This is all without even getting into speculations about his own wishful thinking and echo chamber effects.
I am not sure we can reduce uncertainty here by discussing precedents. Mine is certainly a maximalist position. Let's see how our respective models hold.
And when we observe so little, it's your personal priors, which mainly speak, not the likelihood.
That's fair enough.
On the topic of securing lines: any comment on Finns and Balts blocking escape for Russians who flee mobilization, Latvians allegedly even planning deportation for residence permit holders? I mean, is this just reflecting the popular desire to inflict punishment on Ruskies cost be damned, or that old chestnut that «if we force them to stay, they'll effect a regime change»?
Because I guarantee you that there will be no bottom-up regime change. They'll just get caught, drafted, trained and sent to fight in Ukraine.
Oh well. I did okay, all things considered.
Mobilization-that-is-not-mobilization, he pretty much literally announced it: reservists are getting «partially» mobilized, will get retraining and same compensation as contractees. I suppose what they won't get is a ticket outside. F for my «smart» Physics Ph.D friend who went through the military department instead of bribing the commissariat (and/or finding a disqualifying health issue) like all normal self-respecting people. That said, for now the partial-mobilization only applies to people with real experience in the army. Shoygu has given a ludicrous interview where he states precise numbers of Ukrainian dead and wounded as well as how many «mercenaries» are left. He announces reaping 300 thousand reservists for starters.
Kherson, LDNR and Zaporizhzhia referendums, okay. «Our main goal has always been to liberate Donbass from neonazis». More nuclear wunderwaffe bluffing... so that's the default scenario, he'll try to claim Kherson etc. join Russia and further UA attempts at regaining control will merit nuclear retaliation. (Reminder that Ukrainians have been bombing Belgorod oblast and Crimea for a while, pretty much burning entire random villages in the former by now, to no proactive response from RF).
The guy's alive, for now. Very mildly surprised to see it.
His hand is twitching.
Meanwhile Armenia and Kazakhstan are shutting down the Russian "MIR" payment system.
He's all out of ideas, has no balls for big moves and is completely unable to admit mistakes. This looks like agony. Unfortunately it can go on until many more people are dead.
We should not expect the Ukrainian commanders to be much different than the Afghan allies the US was funding and training for 20 years
You really should, Ukrainians are not like Afghanis, or if they are, they're closer to the Taliban.
Oh well.
That's not unlike LW concerns about artificial intelligences: one needs to start with certain unspoken assumptions for these ones to lead to where you see them going. Sure he is motivated to survive: it's not clear he knows effective means to maximize his odds of survival, that's the whole problem (starting this war has done very little good for his long-term survivability, I think). I don't see reliable indications of Putin knowing how to use personal computing devices, or knowing that they're safe and worthwhile to use, or believing that people who use them are trustworthy. Klimenko asserts he doesn't use any gadgets or Internet. His professional career started and ended while they were of no consequence, and computers were basically specialized scientific/military tools (in his world at least); ever since then he's been bossing other people around, and mainly people from the same generation and way of life, people who are his direct threats, by means that have changed little since Assyria or, at most, Medieval Muscovy. Decades ago there were some staged videos of him using a PC I think; this, too, looks fake as hell (though maybe not as fake as these people believe).
If he doubts the quality of information, surely he can arrange a randomized controlled trial and order 10 independent analysts to report to him.
As LWers like to say, we have trained doctors who can't handle elementary statistics crucial for interpreting test results. How the hell is Vladimir Putin supposed to know what an RCA is? Where will he get «independent analysts», through which causal chain – would he, like, growl at one of his 3-5 direct retainers and order to round up some eggheads in an unbiased manner? Why would he see reason to doubt his advisors in the first place? You assume an outside view, expected of a guy with an intellectual interest in governance and social structures, who has read books and articles and blog posts on history, politics, economy, epistemology... But you are not him. He's a political animal: that much we know. We can't really say more.
In your analysis, he's basically unable to affect precise terminal outputs; this seems fair. We don't really know if he receives meaningful inputs either. You probably remember that event. Kremlin may be the biggest Potemkin village of them all. Potemkin zoo, even.
As for awareness, Putin can observe the whole internet, including western media and analytics, which he surely understands is more reliable.
Why are you so sure about that? Both the capability and the interest in doing anything of the sort.
Some of my friends have gone back to Russia (many others never left in the first place). I really hope they're not going to be mobilized, so that may bias my reasoning (in what direction, though?).
In short, yours is a reasonable approach, but
A. despite the unexpected cohesiveness of the regime in the face of many grave setbacks, we still need to ask whether the «collective Putin» is collectively deluded; and that matters a lot. Aside from Putin, there are two names most associated with personal agency and most shilled in Russia these days: Prigozhin and Kadyrov. I can't believe that either is remotely as optimistic as Putin about the outcome of the war; both had exposure to major shit in life, and learn about the frontline from battle-tested allies, unlike Putin with his «folders» full of sycophantic nonsense. It may be that their displays of belligerent enthusiasm are in line with a long-term aim to build personal armies and survive as warlords; in that case, the subordination mechanic can begin to unravel without any watershed event like a coup, both in ways of creatively fulfilling orders and creatively dodging them, and that'll determine more than Putin's opinions from now on (there are other signals for this tendency too). It is also plausible that people closer to the First Body are aware of the state of affairs, and we will not see Putin's speech tomorrow, or we'll see him reading someone else's script.
The biggest argument against that is that we have a great deal of mostly intact interior army, and that's the backbone of the system. The Interior Ministry (cops, many of them militarized) – 830 thousand; National Guard – roughly 400k (most are literal guards, as in, non-departmental security service, glorified watchmen, but still); FSB – 200...350k. Assorted departmental security that's not subordinated to the National Guard – something like 100k (+some in the Army). Federal Penitentiary Service - maybe 300k. Federal Security Service – about 50k. And the list goes on. In total, Russia has over a million somewhat combat-trained men, 1% of the total population, who are not in the regular Armed Forces, and (almost) all of them are in structures directly controlled by Putin's loyalists such as Zolotov (off topic, both him and Putin remind me of the main character of the incredible short Polish animation Fallen Art; as does this entire situation).
Russia really is not committing fully to the war, just like Z-patriots assert, because the true existential war is civil; framing Ukraine as the breakaway province doesn't change the fact that the dominant threat model is internationally recognized provinces telling Moscow midget to go pound sand. Still, it is possible to mobilize some among those and reinvigorate the occupation force, while limiting exit options for reservists and also maintaining sufficient deterrent against wannabe warlords.
B. Putin is not a strategist. He's an amateur, an armchair geopolitician, doing things for his own personal immature satisfaction. My favorite analogy is an out-of-shape guy who watches soccer and comments disdainfully on skills of people on the field (is this a universal type?), only to end up transported there. He cares a hell of a lot whether Macron or Scholz «respect him as an equal», he gets hurt by words and can throw a fit. He can LARP as a wise leader with some long-term outlook but that, too, is done for immediate impressions. What I mean to say is that Putin may be driven entirely by his spite and unwillingness to lose face, rather than any specific belief about the game board, and can do things that only make sense narratively, not militarily, including a limited nuclear strike.
All in all, if Putin lives, I expect some mobilization-that-is-not-mobilization, copes about our successes at protecting the people of Kherson, patting oneself on the back about referenda, maybe snark about NATO-Turkey-Azeribaijan-Armenia, stern warning to traitors who think that they can exploit the war for their own gains – nothing decisive; and more consternation from patriotic bloggers.
I may be severely mistaken.
What would I have done in his place, while holding his stipulated beliefs? Heck if I know.
P.S. Girkin is quite aware that the war may be strictly unwinnable but, like many others in that camp, he's fully committed to the idea that failure = death (and it most likely is for him!), so calls for maximum effort and doesn't much care about the odds.
including the scary looking scythe style fighting knives
This is called karambit, apparently. Had one in my collection long ago; passed it on to a nephew, who'll probably need it more in school. Supremely useless junk (all edge, no point – I'm tempted to say; alas, it has one). But intimidating. It was also technically legal but skirting the border of the law, where blades over 90mm and with a proper guard are deemed «cold weapons». There's a number of those criteria, much like with firearms in the US.
Regardless, as far as attitudes go, Canada looks better than expected.
Not surely at all. You overestimate the universality of engagement and social interest. I've almost forgotten they exist, for instance.
Biden is a bit slow. Pandemic took a lethal hit when George Floyd died, and ended when the war began; if not for war, it could as well be finished off by climate disasters in Asia or something. There can only be one Current Thing, it seems. As a sort of reverse doomer, I think the pandemic has served its purpose as a long-awaited opportunity for certain updates. We now have a strong rhetorical casus belli against «existential risks» and «irresponsible research» in general, that will fuel EA cluster and be used against independent AI. We have all the infrastructure for another round of lockdownism, if needed. We have unprecedented synchronization of policies and propaganda in developed and even many developing nations, that is further refined with sanctions on Russia and China.
But also, and less conspiratorially, pandemic is over only in the sense that we’ve learned there's not much else to do. What has transpired was more or less the best that institutions of the world could manage.
No widespread seriousness and autonomy for voluntary self-isolation for a few weeks to let it fizzle out.
No shutting off underdeveloped countries plus top-down China-style quarantines to achieve the same result artificially.
No fast vaccine rollout to win time for a more substantial response.
No stockpiles, no robustness in logistics, no nothing.
No will to take it on the chin and go on.
So we all had to deal with some fraction of tyranny, for months in some places and years in others, ravage global economy, and with over six hundred million confirmed cases and who knows how many nobody bothered to count – either get sick with high probability, or tolerate vaccine side effects, or get both the vaccine side effects and sickness. Okay. Best we could do.
It's not clear if it's meaningfully over. The economy is still reeling. Most of the important reasons behind this bizarre failure have not gone anywhere (shutting down virology won't make our logistics not shit itself when the next major disruption happens). We're just mentally exhausted with COVID as a newsworthy topic, and that too may be in part because of its lasting effects on cognition. But... to interpret that as lasting effects of infection would be rash. This stubbornly peddled narrative seems to be almost pure bullshit. Maybe the real cause, inasmuch as the effect is real, is exactly the collective long COVID we all had, 2020-2022. I'm happy to see it go, but consequences may linger.
I’ve seen curly single quotes (the right one is also the «good» apostrophe) used for nested quotes (I'd have preferred „…“, but alas) and also for ‘paraphrases’ or sarcasm. So that may be a legible mark for quote-like pieces of text with extra features.
In general, I recommend looking into stylistic guides and picking an approach to use consistently. Best of all to go with something ubiquitous, i.e. suggestions common for Chicago and AP style, because people are already primed for it by experience of reading posh outlets with professional editors, so they have both the skill for parsing it on the fly and the subconscious association of such style with a respectable source.
Or you could go the opposite way, using less common quotation marks like «» or something for paraphrases.
Needless to say I disagree with your analysis. Ukraine is not only a sovereign country but one acknowledged by Russia, and given specific – broken now – assurances, hell, Putin even congratulated Zelensky specifically with winning presidency, like he did for all his predecessors! It's the perfect opposite of the consistency demonstrated by the Chinese with regards to Taiwan, and the Chinese are piss-poor diplomats themselves. I thought that «no take-backsies» is one Schelling point everyone could reasonably agree on. (The notion of NATO as a rival empire is not utterly useless in practice, but from the perspective of those «gobbled up» countries...)
But it's notable that the more unhinged Russian propagandists are also deploying this analogy.
Egor Holmogorov of RT, September 17th:
Previously, during the period of indulgent wehaventevenstartedyetting, which has cost the lives of thousands of military and civilians, the motivation for the war was mostly positive: our folk, the reunification of the Russian people, the rich country created by our hands, Vladimir Monomakh, the Word of The Lay of the Host of Igor, and so on. Even suppressing the Banderites was, in general, a gleefully positive motivation: they would be judged by us for Odessa.
In a context where the «superpower Ukraine» manages to attack on three directions at once and we have Balakleya breakthrough, Izyum loss, Volchansk escape, Schrodinger's Kupiansk, and patriotic convicts are our main hope, we are forced to resort to negative motivation.
We will have to defeat and destroy Ukraine even in the (unlikely) event that we cannot reunite [with] a single person, even if we have to tear down to the bedrock all the factories that were built and poison all the black earth, even if we have to cut the tendons of our own economy and lose many of our best young men.
If the choice is between a Ukrainian victory and a global nuclear war, nuclear war is preferable.
If Ukraine wins (any result that is not an unambiguous victory for Russia will be considered Ukrainian victory), there will be no neighborly coexistence with Russia. Ukraine will blow up Russia from within.
First, the very notion of «Ukraine» and Ukrainianness will expand more and more, from Voronezh to Kuban. Given that Ukraine is a product of the imagination, no one and nothing will prohibit it from imagining ever broader borders for itself.
Second, the incident will go into mass production. Every national republic, every sub-republic, every sub-ethnos, every regional identity will aspire to become Ukraine.
Third, Ukraine will become the hegemon of the Russian domestic political space: at the behest of the Ukrainian consul, leaders of the Russian opposition will be appointed and displaced, and it will cease to be the opposition and become the [establishment] power or semipower.
Fourth, Ukraine will become an armed battering ram of the limitrophic Russophobe bloc, which will come for our scalp in five years after the cease-fire.
In other words, there will be no peaceful life for the Russian Federation in the case of a mythical «armistice» with Ukraine and, even more so, in the case of its triumph. There will be the end of Russia as a state, the Russians as a nation, and even of the cowardly RFian elite (without replacing it with one really deserving that term).
The victory of Ukraine will not remain the victory of Ukraine. It would be the beginning of our collapse.
What is our true defensive goal? To prevent the completion of Ukrainian ethnogenesis.
There are those who believe that such ethnogenesis has happened long ago. There are those who believe that it has happened recently. This is all completely immaterial nonsense. In history, there are many cases of violently and timely interrupted ethnogeneses. The most striking is the case of the American Southern Dixies. Should they have won the civil war (which was fought by the Northerners for the first two years in «we haven't started yet» mode), and the Dixies would become a completely different ethnos and nation than the Yanks. They had everything needed for it. But they were suppressed – and, though nostalgic and even dabbling in separatism a little, they remained Americans.
Our current clash with Ukraine is a lot like the American Civil War. And despite all our sympathy for the Confederacy, Lee and Jackson, objectively we are the North in this war. And we will either win and become a superpower, or we will be defeated and lose our place in history forever.
Fortunately, Ukraine doesn't have its own Jacksons and Stuarts, and Izyum is not exactly Fredericksburg. But we have plenty of McLellans, and we need our own Lincolns, Grants, and Shermans.
Failure to wage war with decisive aims is tantamount to defeat. Defeat would put an end not only to the Big One, but to present-day Russia and its future as well. If we just do not start, we will simply end.
If they don't care, what point is there to their empire? What claim to moral superiority would they have if they abandoned even Western Europe? You don't believe empires, religions and peoples can have a point. But most believe that some of those are vehicles for genuine values of individual humans to affect reality. Some to good, some to bad ends.
Sure it's mostly bullshit, sure American elites are cynical and exploitative in their own right, sure there's the meta game where unipolarity will probably be catastrophic. Yet Pelosi is making noises supporting Armenia – a de facto unfriendly state – in its time of trial, and Putin is opening a Ferris wheel in Moscow while scores of 200's are rolling into Rostov or are left to rot in Ukrainian soil. It's pretty much impossible to make a coherent moral case for why he's less in the wrong here. As for naked geopolitics, you'll have to invent better epicycles to explain how a hostile empire is better than one you live in.
Kulak. I've brought it up before. My great-grandparents were Kulak Cossacks. They had their own little «revolt» and were curbstomped so hard I only had one blanket and two torn-up photos left as mementos. The folks in Kremlin are institutional, spiritual, legal inheritors of that system. To support them, to excuse them, to downplay their evil is morally bankrupt, and in your particular case plain ridiculous.
Contrarianism is not good enough, because it eventually leads one to contradict oneself right at the core. Please stop doubling down.
That's one hell of a story – almost unbelievable, but you're trustworthy. I've had a comparable amount of thuggery and injustice happen to me in all of 2008- early 2022. (Well, plus a couple fights using knives, that were, honestly, easy to opt out of if not for bad temper). Months ago you've said «welcome to Europe», and I've already had worse law enforcement interactions here in Istanbul, borderline-lethal; maybe that's more an issue of culture clash. All said, it's an okay-ish city, a livable, if petty, tumor bursting out of Eastern Rome's fossils. I still think it'd have been better by this point, had we conquered it back then; but Brits had other plans with regards to Orthodox Christians and Ottomans.
It's true that mainstream Russian culture is atrocious (well, we've fixed the part with drab clothing, more or less). But is it even meaningfully Russian or anyone else's? It's another generic segment of disenchanted global squalor powered by racing rats squeezed between street hustling and institutionalized corruption, a shitty shallow pastiche of the West plus some uninspired marketable kitsch reified by tourist eyes; McDonalds and shaverma topped with lubok, klyukva and khokhloma. To me, the symbol of its true form is a gopnik in MARVEL t-shirt; they've switched over to those from Abibas knockoffs. There's more to be liked in the Baltics or say in Germany.
I can't feel that Germans or Balts are alive, though. Prosocial, content, competent last men, serious about all transient matters, wheels of culture busily spinning in the air, smug sense of moral, civilizational and racial superiority serving no point, detached from any lofty ambition. Anglos have more «soul»; they only need like 1 SD and two diplomas extra to come across as real as Russian randos from imageboards and group chats that I've collected as friends over my life, shards of what we were to be as a people.
Maybe that's just nationalist cope. After all, Estonians have made Disco Elysium.
Kurvitz considers some aspects of Disco Elysium "essentially Soviet", referencing the Soviet Union's science fiction tradition and the Strugatsky brothers: "They were people who took responsibility for the heat death of the universe", he explains. "When they were writing books, this needed to contribute to the ultimate fate of the universe. Because they didn't have money obligations, so what are your obligations then? So this kind of serious responsibility for, what the fuck does a piece of entertainment really do to the human mind, and what are the responsibilities therein, that I think is very, very, very prevalent in Disco Elysium."[5]
Kurvitz has a green-gold bust of Lenin on his writing desk, which he claimed formerly belonged to Estonian communist writer Juhan Smuul. "I guess my favourite thing I like to say about this is that for me it's just a wholesome tradition. It's about loyalty, it's about the country where I was born. This is how I was raised, this was who I was told to follow, and I would be a naughty revolutionary, kind of an edgy rebel, if I wouldn't have Lenin on my writing desk."
So it goes. It amazes me, and depresses much more, that USSR could be inspiring to anyone, that this sort of sincerity and seriousness proved to be special. Our sort of «soul» is the crudest thing, sorely lacking in dimensionality. But it appears to be a real thing. And it's still suffocating to be surrounded by people who don't have it and only rarely feel the lack, while noticing all of our tangible shortcomings.

...Good catch.
But he's not a consistent opportunist either. Maybe a nihilist? Anyway he does not subscribe to any systematic ideology like nationalism; if his guiding heuristics were reified into abstract formulas, I can believe that they'll be what he says on the matter of «lessons of streets of Leningrad». Hit first etc. – very rudimentary game theory.
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