Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being an insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Who would be Europe's plausible geopolitical partners other than the US and the Anglosphere?
Mid-sized African countries willing to be paid to receive European deportees. (There are no large ones.)
Between population decline, relative economic winnowing, and its own strategic priorities, Europe will likely lack the capacity to spare for power projection abroad when prioritizing Russia, and other geopolitical powers are unlikely to want to help Europe with Russia. This limits Europe's plausible geopolitical partners.
Unless you want to think in terms of a presuming the breakup of various other major global actors, but I'd expect the EU to break up more than most of the others.
Does a closer relationship with China or India make sense, or would Europe be better placed positioning itself as a leaders of an equivalent to the non-aligned movement in the Cold War?
No, no, and no respectively.
No, a closer relationship with China doesn't make sense, because China will prioritize Russia for its resources and strategic utility against the US and Europe has little to offer beyond market access. This doesn't mean China wouldn't accept that, but if Europe is just wanting to be an uninvolved economy, it doesn't need to be a geopolitical partner to do that, and it's hardly going to fight Russia on behalf of Europe.
No, a closer relationship with India doesn't make sense, because Europe cannot help India with its security challenges, particularly if Europe is a willing market for China and consumed with its own issues, and India isn't interested in Europe geopolitically as much as just a technology transfer target, which will dry up and doesn't require an alliance.
No, Europe will not be a credible leader of a non-aligned movement. Colonialism and post-colonial grievance aside, Europe is currently and probably will be engaging in exporting detention camps against the global south most interested in being a part of it, while the sort of xenophobia that supports anti-Americanism as a guiding principle will be even more pronounced against much of the global south.
How should Europe square US domination of digital media and tech with a much cooler relationship?
Mass censorship and a gradual partition of the internet with a European enclave, mandating use of European government monitored / controlled platforms while criminalizing others.
Should it aim for a "Red Tape Firewall" that makes it progressively harder for US digital services to operate in Europe, both as a cultural-and-security measure and as a kind of technological importation substitution?
As long as it's willing to accept increasingly direct American retaliation against non-digital service sectors, and to have the European digital service sector largely limited to Europe as others take on equivalent red tape firewalls that Europe has justified establishing.
What does NATO look like in a world where no-one trusts that the US would honour Article 5?
Much the same as it does in a world where no-one expects the non-American elements to be able to honour Article 5- people will make their judgements based on the Americans and their strength of relations directly, not the NATO treaty, even as the potential of an American support shapes political issues.
Does it remain as a zombie organisation?
Possibly, though less so if spite lists occur.
Do European countries formally withdraw, in favour of a European alternative?
What would be the point? Just build the European alternative in parallel.
It's not NATO membership that stops a European alternative. It's the point that NATO is the means by which Europeans try to (politely) counter-balance against the French and the Germans, and European Alternative projects tend to be jobs projects disproportionately to the benefit of France and Germany.
There are a lot of ways to try and use that wife metaphor in a counter-argument that come off as variously inflammatory or quibbling about the nature of the relationship. (Like- where is the violent and abusive husband coming from?) So I'm going to move past that after just noting the awkward metaphor.
If you're looking for sort of stupid histrionics an emotional and impatient actor would do, I guess I could point out that taking 50,000-60,000 hostages (the US military presence in Europe) to be held hostage and exchanged for all Europeans in the US and all Americans of European origin willing to immediately migrate over and begin long-term re-naturalization would be an idea. Maybe you can also pressure all European-based religions to excommunicate all American political officials who take positions against European interests, while conducting crackdowns on any churches based in America with branches in Europe. You could also invest into cybercrime, and try to just steal all the bitcoin to fund a European renaissance, while forging American dollars in the gajillions to fuel American inflation while buying all the things.
But you asked me what a focused and thoughtful actor would do. And what a thoughtful and focused planner would do is practice strategic patience and wait while building up strength until they are ready, because thought reveals the need (I am not ready), and focus delivers the patience (I will prioritize getting ready before acting for my own satisfaction).
If doing so also happens to give grounds for further strategic cooperation... that's not a humiliation. Or rather, it shouldn't be, unless there's an issue with having to entice a military alliance when you need one. But there's already that concession going on- just referring to Europe as Europe collectively.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
Iran, perhaps?
Depends how much you want the US in the middle east.
I've seen estimates of Academia as high as 20-to-1 on left-right splits, which is to say less than 5% right. Saying they'll vote 'more' blue is reaching levels of statistical impossibility- you can't have a 5% swing if less than 5% of the voter base is up for grabs.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
replacing weapons or defense articles provided to Ukraine from the U.S. inventory, and
This is your Presidential catch all. He's not sitting out the allocation by not sending things to Ukraine- he's simply replacing weapons or defense articles already provided.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
Bottom line- a more focused and thoughtful European spitelist wouldn't be a spitelist, it would be a clinch-list. Rather than trying to punch the other guy in the face and get pinched back, try to get as close as possible to mitigate his ability to punch you.
A fundamental issue that is both causing the Euro-American rift and would be made worse by a spitelist is that the Europeans are not militarily capable of meeting what it views its security needs as vis-a-vis Russia. This is one of the foundational issues of the conflict with Trump- Trump called on the Europeans to do more, he was laughed at, and now he's in transaction mode. Worse, as bad shape as the Russian military is at the moment, it is still in greater position in the immediate-near term to pivot from any sort of Ukraine stop to do something in the Balkans or the Baltics than the Europeans alone are able to resist.
However, even if you think the US should be classified as a strategic competitor, this doesn't mean you want to start pushing away the Americans as fast as possible. Immediate American departure- especially on hostile terms- is the third-worst case scenario. (The second-worst case scenario is immediate American departure, followed by a Russian Baltic / Balkan crisis. The worst case is if the Americans can't be persuaded to come back.)
Instead, you want to build up your own strength before they leave, while still leaving the option for them to be there. Even if they aren't being relied upon to fight, there's no reason to make it harder for them to do so if they were open to it in the future, and kicking them out of the country means it's both physically harder to get them in, and much less likely.
Which means, in turn, that maybe you start your aircraft replacement program ASAP... but instead of kicking the Americans out of those bases, you cover more of the stationing costs. It's paying more, yes, but it's making them less likely to leave- and as long as they are in the country, that's still a deterrence value all of its own.
Similarly, cutting off European export supply chains to American critical industries is stupid. You want to maximize that shit. Invest heavily in certain shared benefits, so that IF something bad happens, THEN you can take it down, or threaten to.
Some things are relatively, and can be done at any time. There's never been anything preventing the French from extending their own nuclear umbrella across Europe. Other things have costs and are irreversible- if you announce a French nuclear shield for Europe, then the Americans may change their minds on the need of their own nukes in unit, and withdraw- and if those go, a lot of the political weight does as well. (After all, the American lives are there to help drive the use of American nukes- no nukes, less basis for Americans.)
But start going through these sort of considerations- and thinking in terms more than a decade away, well after Trump leaves office-
-and a spite list will be pretty shortsighted. You don't act solely out of spite of your strategic competitors, you try to coopt them to your own advantage, even when they do things you don't like.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
You took professionalism ethics in your education, did you not? About how professionals get social trust and deference due to not only their specialized skills, but the self-regulation they entail amongst themselves to meet minimum standards of competence and ethics to be deserving of that trust, and holding those who fail to account?
What you are seeing is the consequence of a failure to maintain professionalism, and professional accountability, across multiple professions. And part of that is a result of people just keeping their head down when people try to hijack the profession for non-professional purposes. Social trust has been lost, and deference is being revoked.
Dismissing it as revenge would be part of the problem that lost the public trust. You are not entitled public trust- no one is.
I do like me a good spite list, especially the sort that counters its own suggestions.
Like, any sort of 'phased NATO transition' matched with an immediate SOFA-termination isn't a phased NATO termination, its an immediate NATO transition, because said American NATO officers will be part of the SOFA-termination.
Similarly, a European phase out of American defense procurement corresponding with the immediate theft of American military technology isn't a phase out. You've just cut off the American resupply that would make a phase out work, without having had time to build a replacement, which is the point of a phase out.
The energy phaseout of American energy exports isn't a phaseout if you're requiring all energy purchases to be in euros. For one, LNG is a fungible export- it doesn't matter who you buy it from. Two, you're not actually weakening the dollar by demanding payment in Euros- you're paying a dollar premium for the conversion mechanisms with people who will go along with the Euro requirement, since they can demand higher prices for your stipulation.
The Counter-Sanctions Framework already exists in various forms. They failed not for lack of balls, but for the same reason the inter-European clearing house doesn't work as a way to escape dollar sanctions- European companies want to sell not only to the Americans, but companies and countries that sell to the Americans. Very classic 'Europe is not the world' moment.
As for the economic retaliation measures, it's always a good chuckle to see offers for the Trump-preferred trade dynamics be volunteered in the name of spiting him. Like, Trump is absolutely a fan of reciprocal and symmetrical tariffs- and he'd absolutely appreciate the assistance to the transition to economic autarky from a supply chain cutoff, since it'd remove a major lever of influence. (Most countries want others to be dependent on them). Similarly, corporate tax equalization would be trumpeted as a major win- Europe is a tax haven for American companies from American jurisdiction, and if Europe were to both equalize corporate tax rates internally and start punitive actions against American companies, pretty soon they'd not stay in Europe.
Good spite list, 4/5, would recommend more wine.
How are the American Blue Tribes supposed to get the Europeans, let alone the entire rest of the world on their side against the American Red Tribe?
Even when the Europeans + The American Blue Tribe were also + American Red Tribe on one side in the early Ukraine War, they couldn't get the rest of the world on their side.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
Overly long review of the deal is a bit lower in this thursday thread. Bottom line- it gives the US a major interest hook to stay invested in Ukraine's defense (major influence over the resource economy), sets up a potential payment mechanism that could be used for military aid (justified in the name of defending sites), and gives the US a reserved right to take any action it deems necessary, which is close to the language actually in NATO Article 5. It's basically a reserved right to retroactively claim a security guarantee, without a security guarantee.
As for cut-off, basically yes. General language is that Congress authorizes the President to transfer military equipment, not that everything has to.
That said, I don't think it's likely he will in earnest (read- in totality / for very long). From what I've seen / looked into, this seems more Vance-initiated, and while Trump will back Vance in the moment, I also wouldn't be surprised if Vance takes a more background role in Ukraine stuff going forward- Vance actually is the one without power on ending the war, whereas Zelensky is the one Trump needs to make a deal happen.
We'll see going forward, but I imagine it will be a loud next few weeks, as this will lead into the European summit next week, and they can be expected to circle the wagons around him, and then we'll deal with that summit's fallout.
You're wrong because the media coverage for just about everyone else, propagandistic or otherwise, will insist that it's far greater than that.
Trump may still have already forgotten about it, but he'll be asked about it, and be grumpy to be reminded over and over by journalists eager to needle him.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
For Macron, it's easy- not only internal French politics, but the general French geopolitical ambition to be the leader of Europe vis-a-vis the US. Pay no mind that five years ago France was generally more pro-Russia than the US; Trump is reliable, strategic autonomy, and that means buy more French military stuff and deference to French attempts to define the European strategic interest and concern to be concerned about. (Which- until a few years ago- was distinctly southward rather than eastward, if you listened to French diplomats.)
For Zelensky, my views are a bit more speculative, but the very short version is I see a strategic gamble being made here, that there will be enough of a weapon supply line open (particularly via the Europeans, both directly and via the Europeans buying American weapons) to push through 2025. While the loss of American support in its entirety would be significant, the Russians are having some undisguisable issues of their own which are expected to get considerably worse later this year and into next. If you believe that Trump won't close off everything permanently, or can be transactionally negotiated with to keep the lines open, then pushing into 2026 would likely have Putin, being closer to economic and manpower-political limits and even less of the Soviet stockpiles remaining, further reduce demands of long-term requirements.
As opposed to a peace summit with Ukraine without inviting Russia to the table?
This would, indeed, not be a productive way to get actual peace term conditions in place.
Mind you, I don't think it had that purpose in the first place, as opposed to inter-pro-Ukraine-coalition politics, but I fully agree to any point that not inviting Russia to a peace summit makes it a bit of a farce of a peace summit.
Putin has a tender ego, deliberately snubbing and ostracizing him has worked just as well as beating a toddler to make it stop crying does.
And should Putin claim snubbing rights- such as holding a summit without Ukraine or Europe- I would give a shrug.
Coincidentally, I more or less shrugged from the summit earlier this month as well. Propaganda, for sure, but completely consistent with my predictions last fall that the early post-Turmp period would be met with pro-forma rather than substantial negotiations.
I'd also note that this would normalize the consequence of Trump getting a similar result for doing a similar thing.
Having a widely publicized "discussion between two very important countries" first doesn't hurt Ukraine in any way other than wounding its pride, but saving Putin's face might actually help end the war in 2025.
And what if not all the parties involved want the war to end in 2025?
From my perspective, it seems to me that Russia wants the war to end in 2025 because the grind of 2024 for the election year and negotiating shaping are not indefinitely sustainable (as was raised and discussed last year). Reasons why may very, but there is regullar discussions / expectations of significant push potential in late 2025 and into 2026... and with it, the ability to compellingly make demands on terms.
Trump wanted the war to end in 2025 because it frustrates him and he wants to take credit and move past it. Different reads on Trump differ, but I don't think anyone thinks he has a strategic rather than emotional reason for wanting the war to end in 2025.
However, the Europeans and Ukrainians were not the ones who want the war to end in 2025, beyond the general 'we'd love it if our enemies stop fighting' sense, and have consistently signaled hesitation / opposition to a war ending in 2025 on terms Putin finds favorable. Their general position is that better long-term terms are worth fighting longer for, and there is plenty of speculation that they believe Russia's pushing in 2024 is leaving it far more constrained in 2025 and especially in 2026 and beyond.
They have it for their own reasons- the Ukrainians caring more about long-term terms rather than short-term terrain or casualty losses, the Europeans wanting more time for European rearmament- but neither has exactly been shy about supporting more Ukrainian deaths for longer-term security vis-a-vis Russia, which they do not feel they are getting from Trump.
The wisdom / accuracy of their choice may be up for question, but if the war goes on until 2026 or 2027 or even 2028 as a result of this snub-fest, that won't be a failure of the Ukrainians to seek peace in 2025, but a failure of those who actually wanted it in 2025.
(And, for the record, I've my doubts of the credibility of any American shut-off of all forms of aid... but that's another topic and we shall see.)
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
Minor elaboration (Actually- major elaboration but if I took the time to write it all up by gosh I'll take advantage of it-)
The relevant 50% clause was this-
The Government of Ukraine will contribute to the Fund 50 percent of all revenues earned from the future monetization of all relevant Ukrainian Government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian Government), defined as deposits of minerals, hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, and other extractable materials, and other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure) as agreed by both Participants, as may be further described in the Fund Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, such future sources of revenues do not include the current sources of revenues which are already part of the general budget revenues of Ukraine.
Which is to say that the US government never gets rights to the money. Rather, the US government gets rights to the management of the fund, the degree of which would be determined later and have to be approved by Ukraine.
If the US had a functional veto over the fund, it could black how the fund was used, but this isn't the same as control.
This is, however, a potentially major sovereignty-infringing demand, since the 50% of all revenues of ALL relevant resource assets could also include all new future projects- regardless of if the US was involved in them. IE, even European-funded mineral projects would funnel revenue (not profits- revenue) into the US-UKR fund.
This would have huge distorting powers over the Ukrainian economy, to American benefit, since an American veto would mean powers either have to include American firms or some other benefit to the US for an American blessing.
The relevant spending clause to directly benefit the Americans would have been-
The Fund, in its sole discretion, may credit or return to the Government of Ukraine actual expenses incurred by the newly developed projects from which the Fund receives revenues.
Any expense the Fund's American and Ukrainian managers agreed was acceptable- with no limits on acceptability- could use the 50% revenues going into the fund. If, hypothetically, that included American arms sales as an 'actual expense incurred by the newly developed project,' well that's not un-approvable.
The relevant not-security-guarantee clause was
The Participants reserve the right to take such action as necessary to protect and maximize the value of their economic interests in the Fund.
Which bears probably deliberate parallels to
take "such action as it deems necessary."
Which is the NATO Article 5 language, i.e. about as strong as American security guarantees get.
So the 'hook' is the mineral fund with American oversight, the scale of the influence was the bribe to keep the Americans in, the ability to charge the fund for American-approved expenses was the payment mechanism, and the 'reserve the right to protect our investment (which would be lost if Ukraine goes down)' was the quasi/not-security guarantee.
I am pleased to see you have abandoned without defense the claim that Ukraine is a completely irrelevant country to the resolution of the Ukraine War in Ukraine.
I look forward to your future rejoinder that similarly attempts to avoid defending that claim.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
Who the hell thought it was a good idea for Zelensky to fly to DC to talk with Trump face to face?
Which, given his timely response after the meeting failed, and Zelensky's setup for the European summit next week, has me raising an eyebrow on how spontaneous any of this breakdown was. Kabuki theater is a metaphor for American politics for a reason.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
I mean the Europeans had peace summits with the Ukrainians without inviting Russia.
And thus, the Europeans did not have failed summits with Ukraine after not-snubbing Ukraine the week prior, and did not legitimately hurt their relations in the process.
At least the US and Russia having a meeting about their proxy war involves the actual players instead of completely irrelevant countries.
American hyperagency strikes again!
However, I suspect what a lot of people who claim to wish an end to the Ukraine War are going to find is that Ukrainians is not an irrelevant country to the Ukraine War happening in Ukraine.
I've never seen anything like this. I sort of expected Trump to give him a hard time just for the cameras, but this seems to have legitimately hurt relations.
As opposed to, say, holding a peace summit with Russia without inviting Ukraine to the table, which didn't legitimately hurt relations?
This is an embarrassment to the Americans after the Americans embarrassed the Ukrainians and the Europeans. The reason you've never seen anything like this is because you've probably not been watching for it, and non-Trump presidents wouldn't have made this sort of summit after shunning a leader. Tit-for-tats aren't uncommon.
Zelenskyy was in town to sign the much-anticipated minerals deal. From what I can hear the deal was not signed.
Note, also, that the 'much-anticipated minerals deal' would have given the Americans substantial influence over the future of the Ukrainian economy. As in, 'the sort of influence that conspiracy theories are made of' influence, depending how the not-written Fund Agreement would have gone.
Zelensky might have gone forward with it had Trump offered security guarantees rather than the ability to retroactively act as if security guarantees had been offered, but that's on Trump to offer.
Ukraine needs the US much more than the US needs Ukraine. Could Zelenskyy not keep his pride contained for a few hours?
This would presume the issue was over Zelensky's pride, as opposed to terms, or Trump's pride. Also- don't ignore the potential that this may have been in part engineered.
Yesterday, media was reporting that today's meeting only happened because of France's Macron making an appeal with Trump. In turn, the Europeans were already raising their invitation of Zelensky to the 6 March summit. Within hours- which is to say, in time for the European evening news and to set the stage for tomorrow morning's news- multinational media is covering Macron backing Zelensky.
And all on a DC Friday, i.e. the cliche timing for any expected bad news story?
So you have a scenario of-
Previous Week: The Americans have a power play of having direct talks with Russia, at diplomatic expense of Ukraine and Europe
This Week: American President doesn't want to meet Ukrainian President; European VIP intervenes; Because EUR VIP intervenes, Meeting Occurs; Meeting goes poorly; EUR VIP among the first global leaders being cited
Next Week: Just who is more humiliated by US-UKR meeting is weekly news cycle; UKR-EU summit is stage-managed; Europe bolsters position vis-a-vis US; EUR VIP claims mantle of anti-Trump european leadership
Seems like a generally weak argument in so much that it relies on a premise of self-interest as a central part of its disproof, without having defined self-interest, thus allowing the supposition of what self-interest entails in order to deny its relevance as a way to disprove (or rather, prove) the premise.
But this is practically the 'Limits of Economics 101' example - people are not perfectly rational people if you define their interests in [specific form]. Money, typically, or 'material self-interest,' but other forms too.
It's pretty obvious that Scott is trying to tie 'self-interest' to the material sense, because he drops the self-interest line of argument entirely once he has his 'inflation is bad but not everyone's triggered by their self-interest!' argument. The last reference of self-interest is entirely in the material sense, as part of the transition to 'if it's not material self-interest, what does drive political disagreement?'
And self-interest never rises again, despite the plenty of self-interests invokable in the remaining part of the argument. He just changes the topic to quote-unquote non-material disputes.
So when he ends on this point-
That is, this theory predicts that a faction could vastly increase its chances of achieving its material goals just by making compromises on who it flatters vs. humiliates.
The answer is- duh. Not being humiliated by people in power is a self-interest. It is, in fact, something that strongly coincides with your material self-interest, because a political faction can not only do the material deprivation as a means of humiliation, but repurpose those material interests (assets, jobs) for their non-material interests.
Which makes the more accurate expansion some form of-
A political faction could vastly increase its chance of achieving its material and not-material goals just by making compromises on whose material and non-material interests it prioritizes.
Which, again. Duh. And also- in no way a counter-argument of conflict theory, when conflict theory encompasses political disputes in general.
Which, of course, Scott avoids having to deal with by semantically gerrymandering the subject in the first sentence to exclude conflicts that aren't 'material' in nature.
Which is just a 'no true Conflict Theory' fallacy as a foundational premise.
Remzen has provided a link to a claimed copy of the agreement. If true, it reads like what people think the neocon fantasies had in mind in terms of Iraq and Oil, mixed with a bit of .
Even setting aside the article's own acknowledgement of potential changes, the undefined Fund Agreement and any other parallel agreements not formally combined in this one, there are some jumping out points that are interesting in how they can be interpreted in a more... 'if you can't see how a government could twist this, you haven't tried hard enough' sense.
Starting from the Article
This first document will be followed by a Fund Agreement, which will further define the terms of the Reconstruction Investment Fund, created by the U.S. and Ukraine. That document will require ratification by Ukraine’s parliament.
'The fund agreement, which will be more specific than this first document, will be statutory law for the Ukrainian government.'
Which is to say, this document is the outlines, to be clarified in language fewer people will actually see.
Note, however, there is no claim that it will need ratification by the American Congress. So not a treaty, but...
Entering into the text itself-
The Fund will be jointly managed by representatives of the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America. More detailed terms pertaining to the Fund’s governance and operation will be set forth in a subsequent agreement (the Fund Agreement) to be negotiated promptly after the conclusion of this Bilateral Agreement.
'It will be statutory law in Ukraine for the government of the United States of America to have a significant* say in Ukrainian domestic resource projects going forward.' *Understatement to be elaborated later
This is your 'the US government, and not US commercial entities, will maintain major influence in the management of the fund, more to follow.'
The more to follow, in turn, should be strongly expected to involve, if not a controlling American interest, a prospective American government veto on the Fund's management on things that the Americans Strongly Disapprove of.
How that prospective veto will be provided will remain to be seen. It (probably) won't be a formal US government veto, and effort will be taken to present the fund as respecting Ukrainian sovereignty so it can pass the Ukrainian legislature.
Which should probably be put on the geopolitical calendar, along with expecting major propaganda narratives on the approach.
The maximum percentage of ownership of the Fund’s equity and financial interests to be held by the Government of the United States of America and the decision-making authority of the representatives of the Government of the United States of America will be to the extent permissible under applicable United States laws.
This makes more sense if you re-word with the bolded clause first, rather than buried.
This is your 'Ukrainian laws limiting foreign ownership will not apply to the United States as far as this fund and it's equities go' clause. This is, while not itself a demand for direct control, allows for outright American majority control of not just the Fund, but potentially projects from the fund.
Moreover, it moves issues of fund management litigation to the American legal system ('extent permissible under applicable US laws'), not the Ukrainian legal system. In other words, to argue that the American side of the Fund is mismanaging the Fund, this must be argued in... American federal court.
Neither Participant will sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of, directly or indirectly, any portion of its interest in the Fund without the prior written consent of the other Participant.
This is your 'Ukraine cannot force the Americans to give up any controlling interest of the Fund' clause, while enabling an American veto of Ukrainian desires to offload their own shares to anyone the Americans don't want to be able to buy in to the Fund and the monies it manages. How like that is will, in turn, be a matter of how strong the American potential veto power is.
Depending on how 'interest' is used- and I strongly doubt this is financial interest- this is likely to enable an American veto on Ukrainian government selling project elements / control shares to anyone the Americans want to resist, even as a Ukrainian decision to do so would likely water down its own control in favor of the American government's interest.
- The Government of Ukraine will contribute to the Fund 50 percent of all revenues earned from the future monetization of all relevant Ukrainian Government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian Government), defined as deposits of minerals, hydrocarbons, oil, natural gas, and other extractable materials, and other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure) as agreed by both Participants, as may be further described in the Fund Agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, such future sources of revenues do not include the current sources of revenues which are already part of the general budget revenues of Ukraine.
This is the 'hook' for the American government to have a long-term strategic interest in Ukraine. it is the geopolitical bribe / American interest mechanism to keep the Americans engaged, and with stakes in the survival of the Ukrainian government.
This deal clause requires no specific input of the American funds, but is rather a systemic transformation of how Ukraine's natural resource extraction economy- as least the government owned portion- is run.
In maximalist terms, this language- without mitigation in the Fund Agreement- would be that 50% of revenues of ALL future resource projects would go into the US-overseen fund, even if the USA is not involved in the project. So if, say, Ukraine and Europe make their own mineral deal under Ukrainian sovereign control, 50% of the revenue of that European investment goes to the American-influenced fund. And it's not just natural resources, it can also- with the agreement of both US and UKR- also include other critical infrastructure, such as gas terminals and ports.
While this does not effect 'current' sources of revenues, meaning those could be further invested into and expanded, it does open up negotiating space to claim jurisdiction of future new resource investments that provide money to the Ukrainian government. If China wants to open up a new agreement, and start a new mine on a new find, then 50% of the revenue- not the profits, the revenue- goes into the American-managed Fund, regardless of how Ukraine and China split the remainder.
In more moderate forms, this is likely to be tempered by (undecided) Fund Agreement and the interpretation of 'relevant.' One should probably expect this to apply to projects heavily invested in by the Fund Agreement.
Which- itself- would be a very, very potent influence measure... because that would mean that any government-owned natural resource fund that uses this fund as seed capital- say as part of a joint venture between the Fund, Ukrainian Industry, and Europe- would, as long as the deposit is formally owned by the Ukrainian government, plausible send 50% revenue here.
Since the Ukrainian government will want to use this fund to invest in major infrastructure efforts, especially if it can be used as a matching capital share with other investors (say 25% Fund, 25% Europe, 25% UKR govt, and 25% private), any infrastructure project this fund is invested to should be expected to hit the threshold of 50% revenue to the fund... and while that may be used to cover the other investor interests, it also leaves 50% of the revenue back in the influence of US+UKR management, which is now more able to invest in more things.
-break-
Bringing both varients together- regardless of whether it's a maximalist or 'moderate' form, this clause gives the US influence on Ukrainian natural resource economics that scales with the power of the implicit veto. If the veto is strong, then American interests have to be considered from the start of any buy-in phase.
How will American buy-in be considered? That's up to the American government. It could be the inclusion of American companies into contracts, or terms and conditions that exclude American geopolitical rivals. It could even be geopolitical favor trading... or just plain money. (Unlikely the last, though- the US can print its own dollars.)
But this clause can also be used quote/unquote 'aggressively' against third-party interests. If the Americans and Ukrainians agree that other critical infrastructure should fall under the fund... why, then the revenue has to go the fund. And while there will doubtless be means for the fund to pay the competitive business case / profits back to those prior partners... well, if they want to stay competitive, then they start acting in response to the fund.
Point is- either way, this clause allows the US to exert a greater and greater voting influence on long-term investments in Ukraine, as the more projects that fall under the fund's umbrella, the more raw revenue that does, and thus the great the influence of the US government on the resource-base investments back into the Ukrainian economy. This isn't just influence within Ukraine, but every major corporation that wants to invest in Ukraine, who either wants to capitalize on the funds capital, or has to bring its own instead.
And naturally, the more influence the US government has, the more interest the US government will have to protect that level of influence investment.
The Fund, in its sole discretion, may credit or return to the Government of Ukraine actual expenses incurred by the newly developed projects from which the Fund receives revenues.
This is your door-opening 'any expense the American government controlling share consents / approves of can be covered by the fund, and lawsuits objecting to the contrary don't have standing in court.'
More pejoratively, this is a potential slush-fund clause.
Since the expenses are those incurred by the newly developed projects, not just for the purpose of the newly developed projects, this offers a lot of leeway for interpretation and approval.
On the 'reasonable' end, this is saying the Americans and the Ukrainians may approve the Ukrainians using fund resources to pay for things like, say, mining companies starting new projects that in turn will fall under the fund. Presumably American, and not Chinese, if you to avoid that American veto. Or even just American allies, who get a Fund Approval for an investment in Ukraine in exchange for some help somewhere else.
On the 'that's not what someone whose last name ends with -tin wants it to mean' end, momma needs a new Patriot Battery to protect a Fund site. Which is, in a manner of speaking, an expense incurred by the government of Ukraine to the site owned by the government of Ukraine. And the American government official will doubtless diligently research all the facts before solemnly nodding and approving the fund being used to cover that project site expense.
And if you disagree, that is the Fund's sole discretion. And if you disagree with that, take it to American federal court, who can kick it out on standing, or on grounds of that being the Fund's sole discretion, or in general deference to US government foreign policy, and so on.
Contributions made to the Fund will be reinvested at least annually in Ukraine to promote the safety, security and prosperity of Ukraine, to be further defined in the Fund Agreement. The Fund Agreement will also provide for future distributions.
This is your 'the Fund will be expected to align to the American fiscal planning cycle, and can spend more often if the Ukrainians can persuade the Americans.' Things that directly benefit the Americans are more likely to persuade the Americans.
This is also 'the Americans will get to negotiate/write into into the Fund Agreement the means by which the Ukrainians can use these funds,' which is a way to write in anti-corruption and oversight mechanisms.
- Subject to applicable United States law, the Government of the United States of America will maintain a long-term financial commitment to the development of a stable and economically prosperous Ukraine. Further contributions may be comprised of funds, financial instruments, and other tangible and intangible assets critical for the reconstruction of Ukraine.
'And other tangible and intangible assets critical for the reconstruction of Ukraine' is your weasel words for anything, up to and including weapons.
Ukrainian defense capabilities, after all, are tangle assets critical for the reconstruction of Ukraine, since Ukraine won't be able to rebuild as effectively if it can't be expected to defend itself.
The Participants reserve the right to take such action as necessary to protect and maximize the value of their economic interests in the Fund.
Also can be read as 'the United States reserves the right to take such action as to protect and maximize the value of their economic interests in the Fund that would drop precipitously if the Russians were attempt to attack Ukraine in the future and directly seize the American economic interests.'
- The Fund Agreement will include appropriate representations and warranties, including those necessary to ensure that any obligations the Government of Ukraine may have to third parties, or such obligations that it may undertake in the future, do not sell, convey, transfer pledge, or otherwise encumber the Government of Ukraine’s contributions to the Fund or the assets from which such contributions are derived, or the Fund’s disposition of funds.
This is your 'the Americans expect to have oversight not only on Fund contracting processes, but also means for this not to be pre-empted by other agreements promising revenue shares to other countries instead of the Fund.'
Enforceability of the later is questionable, but this goes back to implicit American veto power over the fund that 50% of revenues are going into, and what that means in both the extreme and 'moderate' forms.
- The Fund Agreement will provide, inter alia, an acknowledgment that both the Fund Agreement and the activities provided for therein are commercial in nature.
This is your 'commerce is whatever we say it is as long as money moves, and if you disagree then see us in American court' clause.
Less flippantly- this is extremely superficial covering language, as anyone remotely familiar with the American regulatory environments should know. And if you aren't familiar- the commerce clause is the primary authority mechanism that the American Congress use to pass almost any law in Congress. The American government understanding of 'commerce' is extremely broad.
Coincidentally, the Commerce clause authority-
[The Congress shall have Power . . . ] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
-is also used to regulate foreign military sales.
So this part of the agreement is saying- 'Among other things, we acknowledge the Fund Agreement is commercial in nature. Signed, The People who Consider Arms Sales Commercial In Nature
- The Fund Agreement will pay particular attention to the control mechanisms that make it impossible to weaken, violate or circumvent sanctions and other restrictive measures.
This is your 'the Fund, and thus 50% of all Ukrainian resource revenues governed by the Fund, will comply with American sanctions globally, and the Americans will watch the control mechanisms' clause.
Depending how it is implemented into the more nuanced fund agreement, of course.
- This Bilateral Agreement and the Fund Agreement will constitute integral elements of the architecture of bilateral and multilateral agreements, as well as concrete steps to establish lasting peace, and to strengthen economic security resilience and reflect the objectives set forth in the preamble to this Bilateral Agreement.
This is the hook for getting it the Ukrainian government's commitment.
This is the 'Ukraine's bilateral relationship with the United States will be dependent upon actually implementing this agreement and all the implications above' clause.
There are a lot of interesting game theory implications for what a Ukrainian refusal to do this deal would have, especially in the context of the expected progression of the war in Ukraine over the next several months. Which, in turn, has a lot of security-politic implications that will be interesting discussion points later this year.
But too in depth for here.
The Government of the United States of America supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace. Participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments, as defined in the Fund Agreement.
This is your 'the United States government reserves the right in the future to retroactively act as if it had provided Ukraine security guarantees, without technically offering a security guarantee' clause.
is this a security guarantee in and of itself? No. Also, you wouldn't expect the security guarantee in the economic relationship document. If that happened, then a breakdown of security relationships would mean a breakdown in economic document, and clearly this is a Purely Commercial relationship. It said so right up there earlier, remember?
Is it the sort of strength of language that someone in Ukraine's position who wants an explicit security guarantee? Also no. The popular concept of a security guarantee is far more muscular.
But as a basis of comparison, consider what the NATO Article 5 guarantee actually is.
NATO Article 5 is just a promise that other states will-
take "such action as it deems necessary."
And if you remember the earlier clause of interest...
The Participants reserve the right to take such action as necessary to protect and maximize the value of their economic interests in the Fund.
So no, this isn't a security guarantee. The Government of the United States just happens to support Ukraine's efforts to obtain security guarantees, will seek to identify necessary steps to protect its interests that this fund would significantly grow over time, and reserves the right to take actions on the same scope as a NATO Article 5 invocation.
Except, as a matter of choice, not because it's a security guarantee.
Because security guarantees would make this a non-commercial document.
And because it's not a security guarantee, it won't conflict with any Russian demands that there be limits on American security guarantees for Ukraine.
Which this isn't. At all. Because that would be non-commercial. No strategically objectional things here, no siree.
This is worse and better than a security guarantee in some respects. It is a 'reserves the right to act as if we provided Ukraine a security guarantee,' which is not in contradiction with promises to not offer Ukraine a security guarantee. After all, it's not a guarantee- it's just that the United States reserves the rights to protect its / Ukraine's investments in things an expansionist, oligarchic empire might want to seize.
No word yet if Russia offered an implicit American veto over the commitment of 50% of national resource projects going forward.
American weapons, and implicitly greater Ukrainian involvement in the US-Russia negotiations, and longer-term American strategic interests / investment in Ukraine to 'keep the Americans in' as a counter-balance to Russia.
You remember those outrage articles from the last few weeks of Trump demanding extortionate amounts of critical minerals from Ukraine? And how Trump had paused weapon shipments of stuff already promised-but-not-delivered? And the recent Trump-Putin summit, where both Ukraine and Europe were non-invited to? This is what they were building towards.
Exact terms will be seen when it comes, but the basic premise is that this will be a typically Trumpian 'yuge' project in Ukrainian rare earth minerals, with the timeline to start being an ambiguous period in the future (presumably post-ceasefire). American corporations will get to be involved, and the general number I've seen thrown around is 50% of... something. Whether that's 50% of the profits, or 50% of the rare earth minerals extracted being allocated for US purchase / resale, or something else, it's unclear. Regardless- potentially exceptionally high by norms, where states tend to want to maintain a controlling stake in their natural resource projects, and since 50% is committed to the Americans, that means if Ukraine wants to sell other shares (such as to the Europeans), it may be doing so at its own project shares, rather than being able to dilute American project presence.
However, it's not 'just' extortion, but also transaction.
In the near term, signing is almost certain to unfreeze currently already-promised-but-undelivered weapons. Further, it probably comes in parallel with a new framework of continuing American arms support to Ukraine- probably some sort of 'we're not giving these away, but you can buy, and we can discuss favorable loans,' possibly backed by the Europeans, in a different agreeement. This will let Trump defang a non-trivial amount of the Ukraine-aid-skeptics whose motive is money, since going forward more of the weapons will be formatted as sales rather than donations. Since these weapons might be purchased on Ukraine's behalf by the Europeans (who look about ready to radically expand their borrowing potential), or possibly against the frozen Russian funds in European control (and thus putting a ticking clock pressure against Russia on prospects of getting those funds back), the weapons-transfer terms that may or may not formally accompany this deal are probably the more relevant gain in the near-term.
In the medium term, this concession will probably be the basis of Ukraine being a seat at the table in the negotiations (which, strictly speaking, was required for negotiations to be credible), while also creating an expectation against the 'Trump will end the war and the Americans immediately abandon Ukraine entirely.' Even if the Americans get a lion's share of the [profits], this is a lot of gain for the Ukrainian post-war economic restructuring, a basis for rebuilding the country's economic foundations after having lost the industry in the Russian-occupied east (with new mega-extraction efforts created a new baseline), and an encouragement for further European investments.
In the longer-term, it's these sort of investment-interests that provide an acceptable-to-Trump hook for longer-term American involvement in Ukraine post-war, which is part of the real prize for Ukraine. Precisely because this is liable to be framed / accused of being a Very Good Deal (extortion) for the Americans, it becomes a basis for even the Republican-Trumpian coalition to continue to have an interest in ensuring Ukraine's survival... since if Russia were to re-invade and roll over those investments, that would be a rather significant lost investment / rare earth stream. Here is a map of the relative dispersal of rare earth estimates in Ukraine. While pre-war it would have made far more sense to invest in the more developed east, a post-war investment in the west would help have a more secure future-war economic base not in short range of the Russian eastern front line.
Which is why even though the deal expected this week isn't expected to have any sort of long-term security guarantees, it sets the conditions for a longer-term American Interest in Ukraine which is what leads to such security support. Not just from the Americans, but also the Europeans who will be using this extortion for their own counter-balance investments, to further their own economic and thus military interests in Ukraine. As such, even if Ukraine isn't 'formally' part of NATO, Ukraine is 'purchasing' NATO-member buy-in to its future survival (and thus ability to maintain the concessionary deal).
Which, naturally, is something the Russians do not want, which is reason enough for the Ukrainians to consider it, even if they would prefer more favorable terms than Trump is demanding.
Do you anticipate large scale (50%+) reductions across most agencies,
Not really, no.
Reduction in force applicable consistent with applicable law runs into the point that applicable law is what authorizes and appropriates for those work forces. Moreover, the OPM memo makes some, hm, substantial carve outs.
VI. Exclusions Nothing in this memorandum shall have any application to:
- Positions that are necessary to meet law enforcement, border security, national security, immigration enforcement, or public safety responsibilities;
- Military personnel in the armed forces and all Federal uniformed personnel, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Commissioned Officer Corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; ...
- The U.S. Postal Service. Finally, agencies or components that provide direct services to citizens (such as Social Security, Medicare, and veterans’ health care) shall not implement any proposed ARRPs until OMB and OPM certify that the plans will have a positive effect on the delivery of such services.
So if you're not even touching the Department of Defense (which according to google has about 1/3rd of the non-military government labor force, or 30%) and you're not touching the postal service (one fifth, or 20%), in just two carve outs you've already exempted over 50% of the government's non-military employee base. And on top of that, if the analysis of the welfare state cuts is that cutting hurts, don't.
There is an expression that when you look in terms of overall budget, the US is either a welfare state with the world's biggest military, or a military with a welfare state. The welfare state is the dominant part of the budget by far, and most of that spending is automatic based on eligibility and not discretionary spending. Of the discretionary spending, about half is on defense.
and how does this square with the proposed budget that will apparently add trillions in debt? What am I missing?
Trump is not a fiscal conservative.
Trump is in an alliance with fiscal conservatives, who believe that cutting the scale government is key to reducing / reigning in government spending. In turn, these fiscal conservatives don't believe that the military should be cut, but tend to believe the better way to control military spending is to avoid various conflicts (like Ukraine support).
There is a confluence of interests in that Trump wants to cut the government because he views it as a basis of resistance (because the Democrats loudly boasted of the fact last time around), and the fiscal conservatives see it as an opportunity to cut back the regulatory state (which includes advocating for / overseeing constant expansions of entitlemet spending).
I'm most interested in how all this shakes out politically. You can fire all these people, but when these salaries amount to a tiny fraction of the budget and is an easily exploited issue for your enemies (e.g., firing veterans and people close to retirement never looks good),
This is why the framing has been 'efficiency' and 'waste' rather than the people executing them per see. USAID was publicized in the way it was because it was an easy scalp with a number of silly things to point at. Discussing the waste in turn distracts from who was administrating those actions.
This is also why OPM's memo talks in terms of 'redundancies' and 'low performers.' If a veteran is fired because they were a bad worker, the political salience is lost if it turns into some form of 'bad worker says he shouldn't be fired because he's a veteran.'
and there isn't much progress in reducing consumer prices,
None of these parts are about consumer prices, which themselves have a politically priced-in expectation of rising due to the trade barrier disputes.
Setting aside the end of some artificially low prices that were pursued last year for domestic political advantage (such as the Biden administration cutting off LNG exports in 2024, which forced the gas to be sold domestically for cheaper domestic industry and all that matters), Trump's base generally has priced in that trade disputes mean short-term issues for longer-term improvements.
The less politically engaged may not, but that won't matter as much for another two years.
you'd think the House and Senate could easily flip in two years.
Again, priced in.
Which is why Trump and Musk and such are going in quick and hard. They have probably built in the assumption they won't be able to make such cuts later. Trump is a lame duck president regardless, and you should generally expect the governing part to lose their trifecta quickly.
I endorse Monzer's interpretation that a fair bit of the recent discord is basically just a smoke screen / distraction at some proposals to cut more politically popular things which amount to larger fractions of the budget.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
I agree that another USAID-sized scalp is unlikely. I also think that the social spending cuts are where the real money are. I'd even agree that DOGE and USAID are basically a smokescreen / firecracker diversion- the loud sparkly distraction to the much more substantitive cut that couldn't be done without it.
I think there are other scalp areas to pull, though I think it's far more likely to be in collaboration with agency heads rather than in antagonistic opposition to them.
The USAID takedown was not-so implicitly staged (physical resistance in a non-working Sunday in DC, for Rubio to be appointed on Monday?) over the access to the data networks, using the executive authority card borrowed from Trump. This was part of the Trump Administration's establishment of control over the information space (literally) of the executive branch, and to demonstrate formal control over the information.
This establishes precedent that allows / enables / 'forces' Department Heads to grant some level of access to DOGE to various networks for program reviews. And these, in turn, 'force' Trump appointees- many viewed with skepticism or hostility- to either go along with unpopular things ('I can't help it, DOGE made me), or- as in the case of the OPM- champion their agency against the DOGE. (See the OPM email- bad from a DOGE-independent-power perspective, good for making alignment with the agency head seem good for continued employment as a protector.)
I'm all on board with the kayfabe, and suspect that going forward access to data won't be so confrontational, and DOGE will often happen to identify areas that Secretaries and such won't be so unhappy to 'have' to cut.
Dean
Flairless
7mo ago
We are in full agreement! I endorse your elaboration.
The premise that DOGE can fire anyone derives from a misreading of the USAID takedown. That created confusion / alarm, but the idea that Musk had firing authority over anyone, even Trump's appointees, is a misreading.
I particularly enjoyed the Xianxia, very deserved AAQC!
Pease feel free to do more in the future!
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