Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Eh, I think Sarah Palin will be the front runner for some time yet.
Oh, certainly. Her poll was obviously motivated. If the Democratic party's army of pollsters looking for good news weren't able to see such trends, it wasn't for a lack of looking.
I'm thinking more of the other herding polls. I suspect some of them may have been pushed slightly higher not just on grounds of uncertainty, but to avoid a self-fulfilling doom spiral from dispiriting the Democrats in the final phase. That level of uniformity between polls is extremely unlikely, particularly when there are plenty of incentives to lean out.
Herding is a defense if you believe organizational embarrassment is a priority, but I don't think that applies to many of the organizations that were herding.
True nerd power right there. We approve.
I want to see more of PA/WI/MI, but at the least it seems the Selzer poll was... wrong.
I suspect that not just the Selzer poll was trying to lead opinion rather than reflect it.
The question mark of North Carolina is how much the hurricane disrupted election infrastructure. IIRC, the hurricane most devastated the western part of the state, which is the redder.
I don't claim to have looked closely at how post-hurricane election efforts resolved, but between displacements and flood aftermaths that is the sort of situation where slow recovery leads to depressed turnout.
A couple guesses / theories.
For one, Florida was the Covid refugee state for a lot of the New York / North East lockdown dissidents, when covid-driven migrations largely trailed the election. New York saw a lot of out-migration during the lockdowns as part of a broader emegration trend, and despite the stereotypes / theories that people go back to voting for what they just left, there's a separate dynamic in that the discontents are the first to go and the most to go. A flip side to this, in turn, was emigration of Florida democrats to other places. LGBT-aligned Democratics reportedly (though I've never found strong numbers) left the state in significant numbers during various culture war fights for friendlier ideological neighbors. Culture war national media fights like the 'Don't Say Gay' fights had their own impacts to local voter pools.
Second, the Cuba lobby has stopped being competitive and strongly dislikes the Biden Administration's policies and became straight up [R]. The linked article from Responsible Statecraft casts that as a failure of the lobby rather than of the democratic party, but the issue is that the 'Cuba Lobby' isn't really just Cubans anymore- it also has substantial crossover with the Venezuela block, where most Venezuelans who've fled over the last two decades have ended up (other than Texas) in Flordia. Now, obviously the illegal migrants themselves aren't the voting block, but rather the legal resident / citizen families, and communities. There is a substantial and under-appreciated (or unheard) hispanic anti-socialist block, where anything that comes across as pro-latin-american-left is looked at with suspicion.
You can see here from Florida voting data that third-generation migrants in particular are considerably more likely to vote for Republican than Democrat, even though Democrats have slight leads on first and second generation migrants. That reads to me in Florida as Cuban and Cuban-adjacent migrants in particular, incorporated into the cuban political machine.
A third point is that since 2012 DeSantis broke the back of the local Florida Democratic Party while building a much stronger voter registration base. One of the things the Florida Republicans have done is functionally limit the role of out-of-state registration/mobilization groups, which limits the ability of the Democratic national party aparatus and various activist groups to substitute for Florida Democratic Party shortfalls.
In short, a FDP doom-loop where a loss of Democratic organizers led to fewer voters led to less ability to organize leading to worse results leading to dispirited partisans leading to more emigration leading to less mobilization ability, even as the Republicans had a win-loop of increasing Cuban-support, sympathetic immigration, and organizational advantages that built upon each other.
Very significant, and much more likely if it holds.
African Americans have been voting Democrat at about 80% or above for the last half-century, and in the upper 80s/low 90s since 2000. Any sort of notable decrease from that has significant follow-on consequences.
The reason for that is that by the nature of bi-partisan gerrymandering, parties want narrow-but-reliable margins in various voting districts (so as the maximize the value of their voters / increase the wasted votes of the as-big-as-possible-but-minority opposition. For several census periods, African Americans have been that reliable voting block. As such, a decrease in their turnout threatens to flip various narrow-held seats. This could, for example, help ensure a Republican Senate for the next two years (which would mean considerably more for a Trump presidency on issues like judges).
It also matters because African American are a core part of the lower-income-strata of the Democratic coalition, and so serve as a better proxy for that end of the Democratic base turnout than the upper-middle-class Professional Managerial Class (PMCs). Kamalla Harris was specifically chosen as Biden's VP / became the candidate specifically because she was supported by the African-American political machine wing of the Democratic Party, who were Biden allies. Harris is supposed to run exceptionally well with them, and thus if her strongest part of the coalition is underperforming, it's more likely that related parts of the coalition will also do so.
If Harris loses the Democrat's working class, she loses, as the PMCs are too concentrated in urban centers and the coasts to carry the rest of the country.
Which sticker?
Except for a few the program is already perceived by the kids as geeky and uncool enough as is. For those who actually want to be there and those who enjoy it, but won't say as much, it's demoralizing and embarrassing. (There are inter-school events & competitions to be embarrassed at.)
Sounds like there's a story there. What sort of competitions embarrassed you?
Personal antipathy and feuds between users are a pretty normal sight here, though. Normally one would expect mods to act as a, well, moderating force on them - yet this sort of statement fills me (and presumably anyone else who would disagree with him) with negative levels of confidence that in the event of an interaction gone sour I would get a fair hearing.
And yet, has Motte moderating not moderated feuding in this very thread?
This thread has not, in fact, devolved into a personal antipathy feud despite the instigating callout via @username to ensure notification, the attempt to litigate new arguments not even raised in response to the original AAQC while using pejorative framings, and aggressive follow-ups trying to re-argue the topic with multiple people. The instigator of this round did not face punishment for disagreeing or disliking the person they were trying to incense.
Neither will you, despite adding yet another item to my list of memorable pejorative characterizations as a american-jewish-polish-anglo-slavic neocon-fascist-zionist-neoliberal man-bitch. (Yes, this is humorous to me. No, I am not insulted. I have not / do not / would not support any report against you for it.)
Instead, the mod-hat was invoked on grounds of... characterization of evidence (such as the ease of finding), and characterization of opposing arguments (whether a single opening paragraph in the opening of a three-phase argument is the core argument), and eventually moderation practice (when the instigator chose to escalate a minor pushback), rather than the characterization of character.
And this was in no small part because I was considering the moderation team's response when I declined to take the bait / rise to the offer.
It was certainly tempting to indulge- it was a quiet weekend, it would have been easy to play to a crowd, I even had a much longer post lined up and everything- but I declined and deleted a non-trivial amount of time's work and limited myself to a minor riposte and explicit disengagement because of the moderation team's past efforts to cultivate a climate where feuding is discouraged. Further, the restrained response came before moderator involvement occurred, and was maintained afterwards despite apparent moderator sympathy increasing the freedom to action in what one could get away with without significant censure.
Because it was discouraged, I declined. Because I declined, there was no back and forth between users. Because there was no back and forth between users, there was no mutual feuding. Because there was no mutual feuding, moderation could occur on content-neutral ground of how the feud attempt was approached rather than cleaning up the aftermath of one.
To reframe- a user credited even by a self-identified critic for single-minded determination and attention to detail restrained themselves from engaging in impassioned defense. The absolute level of feuding was visibly lowered by the absence of what easily could have been indulged in with those very traits. The user who invited feud was neither punished or threatened with punishment for character criticism, but the content-neutral approach they took to it and their response to that.
This should be what success in moderating feuding looks like. We are seeing the absence of feuding- twice even, thanks to you and I- between people are known to strongly disagree.
I think that, at best, you have actually failed to understand what Dean's post was really about.
The OP is aware of this because the OP was told so at the time, in the response to the response to the AAQC.
To quote myself-
You seem to have misunderstood the point of the opening, which was to contest your characterization of the limit of child soldiers, which itself wasn't limited to Hamas. A child soldier is not a 16 year old. A child soldier is a child who is used in the function of war, regardless of their age, and as such age alone does not disprove someone from being a combatant unless the age is so low that they physically cannot.
The issue of child soldiers was raised as was a definitional dispute, and as an omission not addressed by the NYT editorial that served as the OP's basis of posting. Moreover, child soldiers had nothing to do with the majority of arguments in the post nominated for the AAQC, and it was only one of three opening arguments of omissions from the first third of that argument's post. The concluding arguments didn't even raise child soldiers as a basis for the children being shot when listing a half dozen competing hypothesis.
Since this clarifying argument was not disputed, challenged, or otherwise responded to, and the entire subject of child soldiers was only used in the AAQC as the introductory lead-in / hook and to establish a relevant topic missing from the NYT editorial, it is possible that the clarification has simply been ignored to further advance criticism of the position, just as the sources discussing to the Hamas youth wing child soldier activity within the last decade that was referenced within your article was also ignored.
For those who haven't read the article...
Nara's article was "Child soldiers in Palestinian groups: forced recruitment and use of minors as a violation of International Humanitarian Law". A Hamas/Gaza relevant section after a global islamic review is the pg. 28 section.
There is also a sustained allegation in international reports of military training of minors in summer camps run by Palestinian authorities (Child Soldiers International, 2001). This is something that continues to occur today, where every summer Hamas summons thousands of Palestinian children and adolescents to its ‘summer camps’ (Truzman, 2021). The armed wing of the Gazan organisation argues for sustaining these military instructions within the strategy against Israel and among the sacrifices necessary to curb the Israeli occupation (Truzman, 2021).
The camps of the ‘Liberation Vanguard’ - the name Hamas gives to its youngest members who train with the al-Qassam Brigades - have been going on for years and train them with tough physical Daniel Pérez-García Child soldiers in Palestinian groups: forced recruitment and use of minors as a violation of International Humanitarian Law and mental tests (Mustafa, 2017). In addition to training in the handling of weapons such as the well-known AK-47, they are trained in the same way as the armed forces of a conventional army and in irregular tactics (Mustafa, 2017). Among other special training in asymmetric and irregular warfare, the armed factions of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad teach their youngest members to kidnap IDF soldiers (Truzman, 2021). In the propaganda publications of both groups, it can be seen how the individuals in question are minors and how these methods are disseminated on digital channels such as Telegram (Mustafa, 2021).
Truzman, 2021 is in turn referring to "Hamas defends its military summer camps for children and teenagers" By Joe Truzman | July 1, 2021 | FDD's Long War Journal, which covers Hamas's military wing's own self-coverage of their camps for children and teenagers. (Notably, these videos may include children younger than 14, though I'm personally uninterested in quibbling over exact frames or individual child assessments.)
From the link in the article, you can in turn watch footage of the camps, originally published by relevant organizations. Here are two videos that were posted on X (formally twitter).
A separate children camp video, this one from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which is another major Gaza-based group that coordinates with but is not formally part of Hamas, but which is a part of the Oct 7 war) shows children training on hostage taking.
In both of these cases, not only was the material from within the last decade, but the video footage shows the watermarks of organizational channels producing / distributing these videos. These were, in short, self-publicized propaganda pieces, though not intended for an English-speaking audience.
An expressed inability to find these videos is not evidence of absence.
...and this is just on the 'yes, they are training children for combat activities,' by relatively uncontestable sources (i.e. derived from the Gazan groups themselves self-publishing). There are certainly semantic quibbles I'd expect on 'well, that's just training, that's not proof of intent to use them while they're children,' which certainly a take for an ongoing practice in the current war.
A practice that coincidentally aligns with the 2020s intifada-era reporting that was disqualified by the time bounding. A time bounding which also establishes a limit of over a half-decade of Hamas having centralized control over the gaza strip and asserting increasing influence over the gazan media sphere. A media influence done following the late-2000s drubbings the Palestinians received for their use of child soldiers during the Intifada. Media efforts demonstrated in the Hamas 2014 media policy to shape coverage and thus foreign perception of how Hamas conducts attacks, including by limiting showing the preparations of attacks. Policies that have largely remained in effect for non-Isaeli-backed media working from Hamas-controlled territory.
But such takes occurring is the reason that child soldier conventions are very, very clear on military training as the form of induction, indoctrination, and preparation for having trained children on hand able to fight as children. There is no military necessity argument for training children instead of adults if you want adult soldiers.
This is not covering other militarily-relevant roles for children in war, which can include use as observers, couriers, workers, or other forms of aid that remove forms of protection, including the long-recognized Hamas practice of children amongst the human shields. (I particularly appreciate the photo on the bottom of page 9.)
It is also not covering easily-findable but also easily-dismissed-on-account-of-(Israeli-)sourcing from the current war, which includes reports of children-sized explosive belts, children carrying explosives in vegetable bags to hamas ambush points, and of course the role of the child hostages taken in Oct 7 as bait to lead Israelis into ambushes.
(Yes, the last one is complicated. Yes, it also counts. Using children as bait to lure or help trigger ambushes is a form of child warfare. No, the child does not need to be willing, or even there. Child warfare is what children are used in warfare for.)
I have always regarded the AAQC process as a very important "carrot" for the community, and one of the best things to come out of the old SSC subreddit.
For the sake of positive reinforcement- I appreciate them, I welcome the chance to read them, and I hope they continue for some time to come, by you or otherwise.
Thank you and the team for maintaining the system that lets this happen.
Well, that's one way to argue off you own limitations, I suppose. I appreciate the simultaneous temporal qualifier to dismiss any older findings from the multiple international observers mentioned, and the qualifier of your own search efforts when you weren't aware of those older reports in the first place.
As such, I still stand by the post I left off with when I departed that topic.
And if you wish to claim that Israelis shoot children, and then launch screeds on the jews being uniquely evil, you should provide a source that accuses the Israelis of shooting children, instead of claims that children were shot without an attribution as to by whom.
Which serves as another basis of the non-linking, since the lack of relevant sourcing to support a surprising and significant claim (like 'the Jews are deliberately one-shotting children') has been a reoccuring theme of this thread.
But to compare my submission to a contribution like Dean's series of comments-- these are in a different weight class with regards to quality, insight, and effort.
In defense of everyone else, I was on bed rest for about half of those, which explains both the availability of time.
I also highly appreciate the inputs that everyone makes that make it into the AAQC list. Don't underestimate yourself and what might strike a chord.
This is months after you wrote this and I was not the intended audience, but after re-seeing this by chance of you linking it in another post I want to leave my regards to it. There is hard-earned wisdom in this that speak to me. It has been an aid in resisting certain mindsets I am not immune from, and I would be a lesser person without it at times, which is to say I would be a better person if I remembered it more often.
Thank you for writing it, and I hope you keep linking back to it in the future.
Politico's MO changed in the years since the 2021 purchase by Axel Springer, which is a major German media conglomerate. What used to be a US-centric paper with a major EU counterpart wing has more or less been reversed by an Atlanticist-German ownership.
Not as many overt changes as one would expect, but very much a 'this is the uniparty' sort of dynamic.
At time of this posting it's at 18 million views in the same number of hours.
18 million hours? Jesus Christ, that was before Jesus Christ!
(Sorry, couldn't resist.)
So assuming a second Trump term, do you expect him to actually be good on foreign policy?
In many ways I am more pessimistic about the international environment than most people, and while I am optimistic in some respects (particularly on Western versus PRC/RUS/IRN axis competition) my position could boil down to 'I don't think anyone can be expected to do 'good' on foreign policy over the next years/decades,' because drones.
What many posters in this forum think AI may imply in the medium to long term in terms of major upheaval and disruption, I view drones implying in the short and medium term. I believe that drone warfare has hit a tipping point where we are already seeing a transition in the balance of power between offensive and defense in favor of the strategic defense, and that this has major implications for all forms of expeditionary and aggressive warfare, i.e. what the US is already built to do, and what revaunchist powers like Russia and China have aspired to be able to do. Drone technology is emerging in a way that is providing a historically unparalleled ability to debilitate state resources, and that is going to fundamentally change how nations approach military defense (and offense) in the next 30 years compared to the last 300.
This is a bit conceptual, so I am going to try and break it down a bit.
In the field of military history, there's two related and distinct concepts you may or may not have heard of: a military revolution, and a revolution of military affairs.
Military revolutions are major changes in tactics and strategies that are driven by emerging technologies. This is things like how guns changed reliance on bows and arrows and melee, how rapid reload / sustained fire weapons changed Napoleonic armies to trench warfare, how tanks and motorized vehicles changed trench warfare to maneuver warfare, and so on.
Military revolutions are, by their nature, often very bloody because they represent periods where new optimizations can have disproportionate effect, and rebalance the balance of offense vs defense in ways that make previous strategies or paradigms unworkable. For example- the AK-47 represented a modest military revolution because the ability to mass produce cheap, reliable, and effective light infantry weapons that could be distributed to guerilla groups made colonial empires fundamentally unviable. Empires could not justify the cost-benefit of maintaining colonial holding by force, and so the strategy of the post-WW2 era gradually became to disengage from colonial empires.
A Revolution in Military Affairs is worse / bloodier / more significant.
A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not just a change in tactics, but when technological or organizational changes irrevocably change how warfare itself is pursued- particularly by changing the relationship between the populace and how war is conducted. These can be technological changes, but they can also be organizational or social changes.
The exact criteria and lists may differ, but five examples include rise of the seventeenth-century state system (where permanent standing armies were maintained by the state rather than reliance on ad-hoc raisings of mass armies or fuedal forces), the French revolution (where nationalism changed the relationship that the populace had with the state and the execution of warfare), the industrial revolution (where military-industrial capacity not only became critical for arming mass armies with advanced capabilities but could be used to bolster other forces by sparing surplus capacity at a scale never previously done), World War I (where machine guns, trench warfare, and special weapons like gas led to historically unprecedented killing potential with demographic-levels of impact), and superpower nuclear competition (where the conduct and selection of wars to fight over sharply veered away from ever-larger conflicts to avoiding total wars of annihalation between not only nuclear states, but other states in general).
RMAs are rarer but more significant than MRs because of the social change dynamic at play. Going beyond changes in tactics, the changes in how organizations or polities pursue these new paradigms often lead to disproportionate, and thus self-feeding, effects where actors pursue not just the technology to use in the old way, but pursue the new social and institutional evolutions that further propel the technology. For example, the rise of precision bombing from the US gulf war has changed how countriess across the globe approach airpower- no one builds for carpet bombing fleets anymore, and instead precision fires or precision-missiles in lieu of precision-bombers dominate.
My view is that weaponized drones represent both a military revolution (they are effective weapons changing tactics and strategies, as seen with how the Russia-Ukraine War has adopted to both sides using them and trying to counter their use), and a revolution in military affairs.
The Ukraine War in particular, but also the Iranian use of drones in their proxy conflicts, have demonstrated how societies themselves can basically grass-roots up militarily significant contributions from common commercial product. Weaponing small commercial-off-the-shelf drones with what amounts to hobby-shop equipment is what allows a 1,000 dollar drone project to destroy a 100,000,000 dollar piece of military equipment at a 100,000-to-1 cost ratio.
Which is another way of saying, for the cost of one modern fighter jet, you could conceivably invest in more drones-that-can-kill-parked-fighter jets than there are fighter jets in the world. That is something that no state in the modern world can afford to brute-force through, and in the current era counter-UAS is hard but drone warfare is easy. Typically far less cost-effective than the drone-to-aircraft example, but still easy and still cost effective.
What makes it a RMA and not just a MR, however, is the accessibility to non-advanced economies and non-state actors.
The Ukraine War has demonstrated how you can have a distributed practically grass-roots drone warfare program put together in a matter of months across a coherent society even when being directly attacked by an existential invasion threat. The Iranians and IRGC have demonstrated how proxy drone warfare can be deliberately proliferated across sectarian group alliances to have impacts across entire geopolitical regions, to a point where quasi-stat / substate actors like the Houthis can produce their own drones despite being under regional blockades and air power. Terrorist groups like ISIS and criminal groups around the world have demonstrated how even non-state actors can access and utilize customized drones for operations.
What this means is that drones represent one of the biggest challenges to state military capacity in history. What the AK-47 did to the viability of colonial empires, drones may do to the entire concept of expeditionary organized armies, where any state that tries to organize a military to take unwilling territory by force will face cost-disproportionate losses that wreck the cost-benefit justifications for going to war in the first place.
This also means that states will have exceptional incentives to develop security states able to detect, trace, and go after drone use. Partly for normal law enforcement, but partly to mitigate the risks of asymetric wariors / insurgents moving in to start attacking high-cost targets in core regions. This will likely lead to vastly expanded / normalized security state technologies to track people and computers and drones, far beyond the sort of counter-terrorism authorities introduced in 9-11. These means to mitigate UAS threats can, in turn, counter the ability of other states to penetrate protected population centers that would normally be done for prepatory operations.
This, in turn, means that various forms of military conquest / forced entry into unwelcome areas is going to be less possible than ever. No one looks at the Russian experience in Ukraine and thinks 'I want to win like that,' and drone proxy warfare will likely make that increasingly a norm rather than exception. Any state that tries to force itself into another state is risking itself to proxy support for the invaded by any number of states with their own attack UAS capability, quite possibly AI-trained to recognize the military equipment being used to invade. There are some contexts where proxy resupply may be impossible- I think Taiwan is credibly screwed due to blockade vulnerabilities- but in general I am not concerned about China invading or establishing puppet states from asia to africa.
The flip side, though, is that I am concerned on the ability of the US to maintain air bases or war stocks in foreign countries where the local government/people don't want it to be there. I don't think the US could have maintained the Iraq or Afghan occupations for as long as it did if the US had invaded in 2023 rather than 2003. Not unless it was willing to make some significantly different decisions regarding partition or siding with ethnic majorities. This will credibly not only apply to the specific territories where a small state might welcome a US presence, but also to the neighbors who might host / turn a blind eye to anti-US militant activity crossing borders. (An example here would be how the Houthis in western Yemen were able to use UAVs against the UAE all the way across eastern Yemen.)
In other words, the drone revolution- both as a military revolution and revolution in military affairs- cuts both ways. It will drastically increase the cost of American adversaries trying to pursue revanchist invasions. It will also drastically increase the cost of American expeditionary adventures abroad, or even to US opponents in any given conflict who can send asymmetric forces to attack distant airbases elsewhere. It is going to lead to a lot of blood in parts of the world where things aren't so clear cut, whether it's already ongoing conflicts, sectarian divisions where both sides can credibly reach drone capabilities, and/or efforts by geopolitical actors to create drone-empowered insurgencies where they don't already exist. Costs and casualties will climb.
If you noticed that there was no reference to political candidates in this, that was the point- this is a foreign policy problem driven by dynamics beyond any candidate's ability to prevent. No matter what a candidate does, great harm and damages will occur around the world regardless- and thus everyone will 'fail.' Anyone with an interest in saying 'they didn't succeed' will have more than enough to fill the confirmation bias regardless of how well they do relatively, and there is unlikely to be any credible or plausible metric of what 'success' looks like going forward.
What is he going to do about Ukraine, about Israel, about Iran, and about China?
Unironically, if he does 'nothing'- does not start a conflict, does not join a conflict, does not participate in a conflict- that could be a better action (or inaction) than doing anything 'about' them.
Americans often have a bias for action- 'don't just stand there, do something'- that would typically be associated with being proactive and more impactful policies, but in the context of the drone RMA represents a major risk. If you forward deploy extremely expensive forces, you are putting them in range of drone users, and if you actually commit those forces to a conflict then you are giving those opponents the reason / basis to actually act against them. This would be the case if, say, the US joined Israeli airstrikes on Iran- Iran would seek to retaliate with its drones, and there are American logistic bases in Kuwait right across the water.
In this sort of context, the better posture / strategy is to not be participating, but being ready to, to establish a deterrence factor that allows you more limited but below-threshold actions. Those American bases in Kuwait may not be able to support attacks against Iran, but maybe they can shoot down Iranian drones sent against Israel, which is a desirable effect in and of itself. In the meantime Iran knows that if they tried to attack those Kuwaiti bases, then while they might do damage they would receive far more damage than they currently are as the US would enter its own 'use it or lose it' dynamic and would utililze what it could as much as it could before drones rendered it unable to. In this way, the US preserves its ability to maintain a beneficial effect (mitigating Iranian attacks on Israel) for a longer period, and at a lower cost (which is what allows it to persist for longer).
This is where a non-interventionist instinct is a directionally correct strategic bias vis-a-vis a more interventionist impulse. Instinct alone is not sufficient- there are going to be costs and risk taking regardless, there is more to a neutral jing strategy than doing literally nothing, and there are contexts where the general trends would not apply. I am not making a general claim that any war the US enters in will lead to it being dogpiled across the world and all bases destroyed by drone swarms. But erring on the side of caution by expecting clear interests and clear partner buy-in is going to be an increasing positive as potential costs raise.
/
To return to your question, you ask 'what would trump do about -topics-', but my response is that it's more important what he is NOT likely to do- try to get directly involved.
Unlike the foreign policy establishment opponents broadly aligned against him, Trump is not likely to embrace an R2P intervention (which would expose a US presence to proxy militants supported by hostile competitors), or maintain an indefinite exposure to asymmetric drone attacks (the Iraq/Syria presence, which he was thwarted in his withdrawal from in his first term), or stay to assume the costs of fighting for a country that doesn't want to fight for itself (the Afghanistan context). He is unlikely to prioritize the harmony and good regard of host partners over systemic cost trends and risks. He is unlikely to expand US commitments or exposures to new areas or partners without clear interests and gains for doing so. He is likely to engage in limited tit-for-tat strikes or counterstrikes that will lead people to accuse him of failing or falling into that escalation spiral, but tit for tat is probably the best response possible and a more stable strategic equilibrium than outright ignorring proxy attacks.
This will almost certainly come at the opportunity cost of things he could do more of but isn't inclined towards. People who think the US should intervene for the right thing are probably going to be disappointed by a lack of interventions in general. Anyone whose self-image of what it means to be an American on the world stage may cringe at the missed opportunities, the tolerance for the intolerable foreign leaders, and so on.
But- per my thoughts on drones- this is a feature, not a bug. The expectations Americans have of relatively low-cost/low-casualty wars are not keeping up with technological reality. The Gulf War standard of conflict success is gone and is not coming back any time soon. The best bet the US has for maximizing effects and minimizing costs is to help those who are willing to fight (and pay) for themselves, rather than assuming the burdens of fighting (and paying the costs) for them.
This, however, is not going to come easy, and it's certainly not going to be held in high regard by partners who prefer the US operate under a different paradigm (and assume the costs of doing so).
Obviously the president is not the nation, but I think the regard with which other world leaders hold the POTUS reflects the regard they hold America (and specifically, America's likelihood to take action in its best interests).
I dispute that the regard other world leaders hold the POTUS reflects American standing, and think you are falling victim to the classic conflation of being popular with being influential while tethering yourself to a stunted view of who the audience that matters is.
In diplomatic contexts, a classic basis of leveraging/manipulating people is to go after those whose self-image is centered on being perceived well. If specific person(s) can convince you that your reputation depends on their approval, you will not only prioritize their interests over your own (because you will rationalize that their good opinion is your interest), but also their views over the views of other observers. Because 'they' are/should be the more important partner, 'their' opinion matters more, and 'they' can speak for the rest of the partner-population because they are more important.
Which is how you get the Europeans/Americans conflating 'Europe/America' and 'the west' and 'the world' depending on whose gravitas they want to speak with.
The issue being, of course, that the interlocuter whose good opinion you want does not represent more than themselves, and their interests are not your own, and when you start changing yourself for their regard you are giving them power over you to the detriment of not only yourself, but your own power base.
In the domestic American political context, this dynamic is analogous to the (now former) Republican elites who were more interested in Democratic-aligned media respectability than in the issues Republican voters cared about. Republican party elites who were concerned about respectability politics routinely made observable concessions on party base priorities while seeking accolades from respectable media. They did so despite even though increasing majorities of those interlocuters sympathized with, were members of, or actively cooperated with the Democratic party against the Republican party positions.
This parallel's implications should not be subtle, because they are not unique.
I'm not sure what your grievance here is; you share the silly belief that I'm concerned whether State Department officials will be welcomed at European wine and cheese parties, or you think I dramatically underestimate how well Trump can play other world leaders and not be played by them? (I have already said I think Harris will absolutely be played by them.)
My 'grievance' is that you are raising a concern of a situation you were already happy with. You've already had a president who was played and flattered to- that was Barrack Obama.
In a geopolitical sense, Obama was an exceptionally vain president whose primary theme was wanting to be seen as historic and symbolic and appreciated for his ideas, and Obama's focus-zones-of-choice were those that played to glowing coverage. As Obama was more or less a Eurocentric Atlanticist by instinct, and the Europeans were very happy to flatter that, that's where he spent most of his time (and where he spent a good part of his initial retirement). In areas far more removed from American political sensibilities and where the coverage was less consistently glowing- such as Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and most of Asia- Obama was far more distant after the initial honey moon and usual requirements.
This might be fine if Obama's popularity in Europe actually translated into major policy wins in Europe, in using increased popularity to shift the Europeans in more advantageous ways, but not only did this not happen, but Obama was instead lobbied into European-favored paths to American and even his own detriment.
Not only were longstanding American grievances not resolved by the EUropeans (NATO underinvestment, growing Russian gas-dependency, increasing Chinese network/infrastructure access, asymmetric protectionism by the Europeans), but the Europeans alternatively were able to lobby the Obama administration into, among other things,
-The Russian Reset (part of the German-preference for prioritizing Russian economic engagements over more pro-US eastern european partner security concerns; the aftermath of this helped lead to the Democratic over-compensation and russia-gate scandals)
-Brexit campaign lobbying (which was not only likely detrimental to the intended effect, but cultivated a higher level of partisan-driven political influence efforts)
-The Libya intervention (which was European grudge match against a former cold war foe who actually acceded to major US demands in the previous decade)
-The Syria Red Line debacle (a product, and then consequence, of Franco-British intervention partnership)
-The Iran Deal (a Congressionally-unpassable arrangement which offered major economic opportunities for the Europeans)
-The Paris Climate Accords (another Congressionally-unpassable arrangement which furthered anticipated EU-protection policies but which contributed to American political polarization due to its adoption into EPA regulation and following court cases)
These are not things that are in and of themselves 'bad' or indefensible in why they were approached, but rather indicative of high-profile ways in which the Europeans were able to assert more influence on how the US approached certain issues than vice versa, in ways more clearly beneficial to European than American-consensus interests (not least because many were beyond any American consensus but hoping to create new fait accompli).
Sometimes this is fine, quid-pro-quos are often one-sided in isolation, but the failure-state of pursuing regard (which Obama got quite a bit of for agreeing with what the Europeans wanted) and falling to flattery (clearly the Europeans were quite convinced by Obama's high-intelligence rationales).
To return to the grievance- your complaint, even when shadowed in both-sidisms, has already come to pass. The most recent well-regarded president is a president who was so routinely flattered for his wit and charisma that it generally isn't even recognized as flattery. This has already happened. It was not an objection at the time. It is not a credible objection now.
I think very few people here have opinions worth valuing. I didn't ask you to value mine.
I did not claim you did. I will now ask why you made an argument based off of your opinion, if you don't think it's well informed enough to be worth valuing.
It's the same sort of self-negation that accompanies several of your criticisms and predictions. 'Everything Trump does will be terrible and fail, unless it succeeds in which case it was/will be worthless.' 'My opinion is strong and argued at length, but I won't claim it has worth worth defending.'
Well, which is it- is your opinion strong, worthless, or both?
I am poking you in the eye on this because part of the derangement in TDS comes from the totalizing mix of simultaneously asserting 'worst thing ever' and accompanying 'can't possibly be good' when worst thing ever doesn't occur. Not only is this contradictory in its own right, but it's a form of patronizing dismissal of the opinions of others by dismissing the relevance of the not-failures others may value as successes... which goes to part of why Trump is simultaneously successful and so triggering to PMC types with TDS, because Trump champions issues that are/were dismissed as unimportant, and disregards things claimed to be important.
Hence the blunt challenge on if you think your opinion on Trump foreign affairs is worth valuing. If you do, it's fine to say so and we can go into challenging that basis- but if you don't, but you are making strong claims anyway, that is itself unsound / not logical / the D in TDS.
I confess I am not sure what exactly you think I am wrong about, other than apparently not having a high enough opinion of Trump, and overestimating Europe's importance? I am willing to be persuaded on the latter point (and maybe on the former, but you haven't really tried).
And I shall probably not, since I just lost a bloody lot of effort trying to put together an effort response, including a post on issues with your previous post. That was lost for good, but here is try two for your question on overestimating Europe's importance.
/// Trump's Effectiveness Abroad ///
On Trump's effectiveness abroad, the short version is that unless you have a second language skill I'm not aware of, your impression of how effective Trump was and how he was perceived is shaped by the Atlanticist-dominated media coverage of international relations, i.e. Western European and State Department liberal types (many of whom are reading western european media company coverage) who are the prime targets of TDS. This is not an unbiased or objective audience. Outside of Europe, Trump's reception was 'normal.' Lower general opinion than Obama, who was and cultivated a rockstar popularity, but Obama was also rarely willing to press issues at the cost of his popularity.
Trump acceptance in turn followed from that he was generally willing to let partners focus on what they wanted without 'usual' levels of US interference (read: Trump was willing to buck the local ambassador and not make issues of things the local embassy might ask for government pressure on), as long as he got some signature concession. Mexico got substantial lack of pushback on its internal reform priorities (including rolling back the Mexican oil industry liberalization) after it supported NAFTA renegotiation and did Remain in Mexico, Japan got to play a leading role in the Quad and facilitation in Philippine influence and access after its own trade agreement, Korea got to pursue sunshine policy 2.0 with American facilitation (including the Trump-KJU summit, which was a South Korean success that tends to get ignored), and the Israeli-Arab normalization had a bunch of different angles of who got what for what.
When you (sarcastically) claim you are accused of not having a high enough opinion of Trump, this is true, but not because you should have a high opinion of him. Trump's effectiveness abroad was quote / unquote 'normal.' It was not terrible, it was within historical norms. Trump was a transactional president who did far less to meddle in some places than other presidents have in the past, and while that may seem a low bar to clear that is a still a bar many American presidents failed at.
/// The Europe Exception ///
The only place Trump was particularly 'bad' at was Europe, which is also by design the part of the world with the most reverse media influence back to the US (because when your national security for 50 years depends on American opinion, you invest in shaping American opinion).
There's plenty to be said about the extension of US politics into European political thought (such as how BLM protests of the Obama administration were echoed in European countries without the issues), and how the Obama administration tried to subvert Trump (at the same time the Obama administration was locking in the Russia-gate narrative domestically, Obama in his farewells to Merkel more or less encouraged her to consider herself the leader of the free world- imagine what your perspective is if the American president says 'don't trust my successor' even as American intelligence leaks are insinuating a Russian stooge), but the crux of the policy differences between Trump and Europe was the already emerging breakdown of the strategic logic of the cold war-originated alliance.
During the Cold War, the US granted European countries systemic economic advantages vis-a-vis US industry in exchange for strategic deference. Sometimes this was for things like the Marshal Plan, but it was also done to help other parts of the US alliance, such as trading concessions to American markets for letting Korea get access to European markets. The EU, when it was forming in its current form in the late 1990s/early 200s, inherited many of these concessions, even as EU collective bargaining had an often explicit purpose of improving European negotiating positions against the US.
This was because European and American competition is an explicit policy consideration of the relationship. Again, the stated purpose of the EU common market is to get better deals (for Europe) at the expense of others (the US). A united European polity was considered a way for the Europeans to compete with the US in the post-cold war, and there's no shortage of international relations scholarship about how European rule-making would restrain and shape others (including the US) to European benefit. European centralization and unification has been a common idea and explicit goal of many relevant European elites involved in EU politics. However, during the post-9-11 Iraq War, the Bush Administration broke the back on European solidarity when the Franco-German attempt at a pan-European objection to the Iraq War (in part because of their particular bilateral interests in Iraq) was undercut by the UK and coalition of the willing who supported the US invasion of Iraq. While this broke the attempt at a European common position, you will also note that this effort was breaking the core logic of the alliance- an inherited economic incentive for Europe, but not a deferential strategic asset for the Americans.
This was the start of the 'modern' call for European strategic autonomy from the US- the notion that an autonomous Europe is needed to not get into American wars 'it' didn't want to get involved with. Given that the coalition of the willing and American coalitions in general are voluntary, the primary way to advance European strategic autonomy and not get involved in an American conflict was to... not spend more on NATO, which would bring into conflict with Russia, at a time that the Franco-German consensus was that Russia was a critical economic partner and also a counter-balance to American influence in Europe (and also extending that peace dividend could help prop up the post-financial crisis challenges to the governments).
The Trump-Europe issue, for all its messiness and propaganda, basically revolves around the context that a critical mass of the European elites wanted the benefits of an inherited economic-concessions-for-military-deference bargain, except to cut out the military or deference requirement and disagreement of who the threat actually was.
If this doesn't seem unreasonable, consider why typically states pay mercenaries, and not the other way around.
Put another way- in so much that trade concessions are a form of payment for future services, the Americans are not the mercenary in the US-Euro security relationship: the Europeans are.
/// How Much Would You Pay For European Allies? ///
The strategic value issue, in turn- the 'why is Europe important to the US'- is that Europe simply can't offer much value as a military asset, even if it wanted to.
Europe is a critical enabler for the US to fight against Russia, but the primary reason (besides morality) to fight Russia is if you are allied with the Europeans who Russia's revanchism threatens. There are separate issues of what Russia would do to prolong conflict with the US for ideological/revanchist/other mockable reasons if the US did pull out of Europe, but fundamentally there is no need to fight the Russians over Europe if you don't consider Europe worth fighting for. Europe helping the US ability to fight Russia is an advantage for the Europeans, not the Americans, and in so much that there is a cost saving here, it is enjoyed by the Europeans, not the US, who would be avoiding far greater costs by simply not being obliged to fight.
The challenger the Americans care about, on the other hand, is China. This is one of the few bipartisan consensus points for the US over the last 25 years. Russia can break itself and half of Europe apart, and the US would be fine. China is the only power with the mass and industrial capacity and- critically- naval potential to threaten not only the American ability to go where it chooses, but to reach back to the US.
The things is, all the reasons that applied to the Europeans not wanting to align with Trump against Russia apply even more so to China. China is not a military threat to Europe per see. Unlike Russia, there are not territorial conflicts or near-term revanchism. China is a major potential market (that Germany is hooked on), China is a major potential investor (that post-financial crisis Europe is struggling to find sources of). China is a very clear advocate for a multipolar world order, and while China would prefer to be the biggest pole it's also not exactly going to be competing for Europe, so a Chinese multipolar order has overlap with a European multipolar order.
When the Europeans say they don't want to get roped into an American conflict, the American conflict they're thinking of is typically going to be the US-China conflict.
And here the value of the Europeans as military allies is dismal. Not only has NATO underinvestment crippled European military in general, but the Europeans haven't had the right kind of capabilities. A US-China war is functionally a naval war, and the European armies undercut by decades of underinvestment are far easier to fix than navies with the same restraints. There's a reason when there's talk of European Indo-Pacific power, they are talking about small islands on the wrong sides of the Pacific.
Now, this doesn't mean that the Europeans can't contribute anything to the US in a china conflict. However, the most valuable things the Europeans bring to the table is not their military support, but other things. Like... money and trade flows.
Which is the conflict that the US and Europeans have over NATO costs. And trade relations. And which the Europeans with significant China exposure threaten to lose quite a bit of if they side with the US over China in a US-China conflict. And which competes with the strategic logic of who is paying who for their geopolitical support.
Ya know, people like to mock "fashionable Euros" like our relationship with NATO and European trading partners is a fake Gay EuroVision contest, but Europe (and the Commonwealth) is actually still pretty damned important - more important (at least to us) than the rest of the world, I would argue.
But you didn't argue that. You didn't even claim that. Your argument was scoped to 'the world,' not 'the pretty damned important (at least to us) Europeans.'
That is a common eurocentric tendency, and eurocentricism is as defensible a geopolitical bias as any other, but while Europe may be a peninsula was an ego problem, it is certainly not the world. It's not even the most important part of the world to the US- and that's a point of US bipartisan consensus for nearly the last 25 years.
This is without touching on whether the Europeans should be 'more important' is a prescriptive argument, not a descriptive argument, and one where a lot of lobbying occurs precisely to shape your perception in that direction. You later arguments in this very post reflect the narrative priorities of non-American states whose objections are grounded in zero-sum interest differences (such as how the relative tariff advantages should be between the European Union negotiating block and the US economy, and whether European non-investment in defense spending should shape American security commitments to the Europeans).
I do not think Putin actually respects Trump and I think Trump is too susceptible to flattery. Do we think China, and our Japanese and Korean allies, respect Trump more?
Sure. Why not- it's not like they have any particular respect for Harris (whose start as a girlfriend of a connected politician is not exactly secret), or Biden (probably the most credible madman-theory nuclear leader in a generation), or even Obama (whose own susceptibility to flattery was well known and for whom the derogatory comics abroad would generally not be printed in any reputable American media).
But it's also irrelevant on two fronts.
First, as a matter of argument, because you've shifted your goal posts to 'respect Trump' from 'America's standing.' This is a fine motte to retreat to, but it's still an abandonment of the bailey.
Second, America's standing on the global stage doesn't derive from personal respect for the President of the United States as a person. It derives from the fact that the Americans have a lot of money, a lot of military logistical power, and a government able (and willing) to use them. The opposition to Trump in many cases does more to harm American standing than Trump himself, because it gets in the way of what the US government could do for them in any quid-pro-quo.
Africa and MENA might or might not like Trump more (Harris they will probably see, correctly, as an easy mark for more American largesse). I guess you could say that Iran and the Arabs and North Korea are more afraid of just how crazy Trump might be. It's somewhat of a toss-up but on the international front I think Harris is very marginally better for us. I think world leaders will mostly roll their eyes behind her back but carry on business. Trump throwing a monkey wrench into everything may be a feature and not a bug to his supporters, but I don't think that actually helps us. All his promises about tariffs evening the playing field and "making NATO pay its fair share" are going to be either empty, or disastrous, and "make them believe you are crazy enough to start a war" is not, IMO, actually a good strategy for preventing wars.
Is your opinion on global politics or good strategy well informed enough to be worth valuing?
You've given a lot of tropes here, but please believe me when I say that not going through them line by line is a courtesy to forum standards. Suffice to say, it's a classic ethnocentric American perspective with many of the classic American tells (poor latin america, unworthy of American attention as ever), and lacking any significant demonstration of awareness of how American presidents actually impact other country's politics. In so much that it reflects a foreign perspective, it's an obviously European-based foreign perspective... which is to say, one of the most compromised by American political feedback loops in the world, which frequently blends American and European ethnocentric narratives, and a dynamic completely non-generalizable to the world as a whole.
While European-American political overlap (and contamnination, if one prefers) is certainly a valid topic of discussion, it's not a particularly relevant one to the world that doesn't share major American-centric media constellations or have as active an effort of purposely shaping and influencing American political-elite opinions through major media organization relationships.
Probably for the best, give how likely you would be to lose that bet. It's not like Trump has to do 'great' to not 'epically fuck up,' which was the bar you set.
From your post, you'd be wrong if Trump just did as well as last time. Heck, you'd still be wrong if he did worse than he did last time.
Actually you lead me to something I've thought for quite a while in the 2020 aftermath -- the way that courts require proof of fraud that turned the election directly led to the low quality of some of the Trump campaign's lawsuits. If you are expected to prove not only that there was fraud against you, but also that the fraud amounted to at least some specific number of votes, unless you have significant cooperation from the folks counting the ballots (hint: Trump did not) your only play is to throw everything you have at the wall and hope that enough votes are found to stick.
It is a bit a structural trap, yes. By requiring the standard of impact to raise to 'outcome determinative', it prohibits the sort of indicators that would normally be pursued to identify/recognize outcome-determinative fraud, while at the same time systemically encouraging weaker, and thus easier to dismiss, expansive-but-weaker claims whose dismissal can be used to justify claims of no fraud. Defenders can point to the dismissal of unfounded accusations as proof that there is no basis of accusation to warrant further examination, while ignoring that the scoping of acceptable arguments gerrymandered what would be investigated from the start.
In metaphorical terms, this is the equivalent of demanding proof that most of an iceberg is below the waterline, and then only reviewing reports from the people who then claim to have seen underneath the water from an impossible distance.
Yes, it was impossible for them to have seen the things they claimed. No, disproving their claim of having seen underneath the water does not actually disprove whether there was an iceberg. You've already filtered out the people who would only claim to have seen the tip of the iceberg. This procedural hurdle works because the requirements smuggled in a change of argument centered around the already-filtered observers, and from a position that starts from a presumption of negation (there is no reason to believe the existence of something not already observed), rather than precaution driven by the nature of the observed (the nature of floating ice is that the majority will be beneath the surface, regardless of whether the underwater mass is observed or not).
From a legal system built on a presumption of innocence, that approach may make sense. But the threat of an iceberg comes from the nature of the thing, not the characterization of the observer of the hard to observe bits. If you steer a ship on the principles of 'harmless until proven sufficiently harmful,' you are going to sink a lot of ships, and certainly more than if you didn't have such a high bar on sufficient proof of sufficient harm.
This is far from the only context where this sort of standard would be detrimental. There are plenty of contexts where the signature of something is far more detectable and demonstratable than the following force that effects. Dismissing the signatures because the signatures themselves are not sufficient force is just ignoring the signals.
Trump has always had a bit of a plebian sense of wealth. The expression a decade ago was that Trump lived like how poor people thought the rich lived, as opposed to how the rich actually lived. In that sense, he's the 'what the Everyman would see himself doing if he had Trump's wealth.'

It will be interesting on how this plays out in internal democratic party politics over the next few years.
This election has definitely shown the limits and the breakdown of the Obama wing of the party. I forget who first made the comparison of Obama's having a Chicago political machine approach to national politics, but this election had so many of the tropes of a machine-led political campaign. Starting from the efforts to build a controlled-opposition via Cheney's wing in the 2021, to the organized lawfare campaigns, to the heavy media influence efforts, to the Democratic candidate switch and even harder narrative efforts. Even these last few weeks of polling and polling coverage have been weird- not just the outliers, and what I now suspect were attempts to paper over / prevent a despair spiral, but coverage of topics not actually matching to voter sentiment. It was a political machine trying to do what a political machine does.
It's also clearly broken down without Obama's star power to drive it, and Obama's technocratic wing of the party always hinged on the argument of 'we're the best at winning.' It's kind of clearly not, a lot of the Democratic old guard is on the way our if not already done so, and so a lot of the party is going to be up for competition going forward.
One thing that is going to matter, though- and one of the things that keeps a political machine working as a machine and is why the Democratic Party is one of the oldest political parties in the world- is the role of loyalty to the machine. The muslim wing voting as a block made a point about power, but it also made a point about reliability. That, specifically, will not be resolved so easily as some accommodation, especially when the anti-Israeli opinion is still a minority position for most of the American electorate.
More options
Context Copy link