Dean
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Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
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The Guardian has an article titled Putin reportedly calls for Iran to limit damage in any retaliation against Israel as a starting point. Rand published a think-piece earlier this year titled Why Russia Doesn't Want War Between Israel and Iran. Stimson has a piece on how Russia Benefits from Continued But Calibrated Israel-Iran Hostilities.
It's not a single article or even group of articles, and it's been a dynamic that has evolved over years, so it's less recommendations of specific readings and more on topics.
Key points are on the foundations of the current Russia-Iranian good relations (it's the sale of war material from Russia to Iran in exchange for technology / other goodies), the evolution of Russia's relations with Israel over the same period (Russia has shifted from a relative neutrality to a default alignment to Iranian positions vis-a-vis Israel, but not pro-Iran vis-a-vis other regional arab states), the various shuttle diplomacy the key actors like Shoigu to the Iranians earlier this month (a Security Council rather than diplomatic VIP indicating security-focused engagement in the context of the Israel assassination of the Hamas leader in Iran), the Russian diplomatic / information framings and implied recommendations around the time (condemning the assassinations, but various 'Anonymous Sources' allusions offering suspected motive that the assassination was to scuttle peace and draw the US into military action, i.e. to resist the assassinations Iran should not complete the scuttlign and draw the US into military action), and the under-whelming Iranian response and similar Russian leadups in not just this incident, but earlier ones (demonstrating successful lobbying in general against more powerful retaliations).
You can find some academic / think tank papers on Russia relations / interests in the Middle East as well. Rand had one in the last few years on Russia's interests given that it's preoccupied in Ukraine. There's also a general history of reading into Russia's tradition as a geopolitical spoiler in which Russia wants to be part of the negotiation for resolving any conflict, as a way to build influence / interests, but the flip side is that if Russia can't profit / can't get involved to profit, it doesn't want there to be the sort of conflicts that move things forward in ways that might leave it out.
For not-so-private lobbying in general, the Russians have a diplomatic narrative trope in that when unclear actors do something to someone else that Russia is seeking to influence, they often hypothesize a motive that just so happens to be what the Russians want the party to not do. This creates narrative structures like 'This was totally bad and done by Bad People and I'm on your side, and I'm not going to tell you to not do the thing you might want to do just because I don't want you to do it, I'm just gonna say that the people who did this to you want you to do the thing I'm not going to tell you not to do, and so if you do it you're playing into the Bad People's hands.' It's not a uniquely Russian trope, or omnipresent, but it's familiar enough in the same way that certain commentary tropes can be distinctly European or American.
William Spaniel is a good theoretician, and I fondly endorse him for anyone who wants some good-faith game-theory considerations or framings of the conflict (or other contemporary geopolitical topics, which he uses as examples for game theory implications rather than speaking from an advocacy position).
The limitations of it- which he does note- is the lack of clear buy-in from necessary participants (including Trump, let alone Putin, or the Europeans). It also- which he does not note- works from a presumption of American-centricism (which he does not dwell on because it's not important to this argument on theory).
In the sense of avoiding a mess rather than stepping in it, I suppose.
I don't know how you can complain about weasel words and deliver this whopper in the same post...
I appreciate your pre-emptive concession of your lack of ability, which was certainly well warranted by what followed.
They aren't, for much the same reason that Russia has been not-so-privately lobbying Iran to not expand the current conflict with Israel: if the people currently selling Russia war material get into their own major wars, they are going to stop selling material to Russia, and if Russia is seen as part/party to these broader conflicts, then Russia's ability to try and disengage from Ukraine next year via a negotiated cease fire goes down.
There's also the point that there's no particular interest for the Chinese or North Koreans to to start a war for Russia's interest rather than their own. North Korea, for example, is presumably making bank selling munitions to the Russians.
And bad ceasefires can lead to worse. C'est la vie.
The problem here is the Russian progress in the east. Once Kramantorsk falls, the line gets much harder to defend, and the chances of a rapid collapse of everything east of the Dnieper gets a lot higher.
Rapid as in, what, another century?
This is a funny misreading of the map and the progression of the last year of the war, but still a misreading. Setting aside that the Ukrainian collapse cascade trope has been trotted out for every significant urban area since the start of the war, the fundamentals of why Russian progress has been limited to marginal advances in very narrow parts of the east remain. Marginal advances over time add up, but there's a reason you need regional zoom-in maps rather than the early-war whole-of-country maps of the frontline to see an appreciable difference between the end of 2022 and current 2024. It's the same reason the Russians characterize their advances as 'significant' or 'consistent' more often than 'large'- large implies a lot of territory, when what has actually changed hands in 2024 is very small compared to metrics like, say, what the Russians achieved in early 2022, or the even larger breakthroughs that would be needed to reach the Dnieper. The 2022 meme of Russia's imminent encirclement of Ukraine's eastern forces comes to mind- and note how many of the main cities you've heard about in the last year or two are in that snapshot.
And these Russian fundamentals rely on things that are limitations as well. The Russians have been relying on overwhelming artillery overmatch since mid-2022, but don't have the logistics or mobility means to push that artillery fast. The Russians have made a policy-level decision to rely on volunteer/contract soldiers rather than mass mobilization to carry on the offense, but the ever-increasing signing bonuses are indicative of a military not meeting its recruitment goals for what it thinks it needs, and it's highly doubtful they could continue this sort of personnel expenditure for years more. The level of equipment for the units the Russians do have are indicative that the limiting factor of the Russians now is their equipment rather than manpower to fit the kit, which mitigates much of the utility of a mass conscription for numbers alone but also demonstrates a retrograde from mobility warfare given that the equipment is more and more earlier cold-war standard.
These limiting factors do not mean 'Russia will be unable to fight,' but rather that even as Russia chooses to fight, that doesn't mean it has the capabilities- militarily, politically, structurally, manpower- to do any sort of 'everything to the east bank of the Dnieper' breakthrough.
Also, this is an industrial war, not a low intensity police action like the two Afghanistan wars. Barring a Korean War-style partial armistice, one of the sides is going to get too heemed to continue, sooner rather than later.
Later rather than sooner, given what both sides have demonstrated their ability / willingness to mobilize, and at current industrial trajectories the Russians at maximum relative advantage have been unable to threaten the sort of gains made in the opening months of 2022, let alone destroy the Ukraine coalition's industrial base.
As an industrial base argument, Russia isn't against Ukraine, it's against Ukraine and the West, and there is a large difference between 'Russia's economy is not failing and will not for years' and 'Russia's economy is doing well and doing better at sustaining the war indefinitely than the west.'
Am I wrong? What am I missing here?
That cause and effect exists?
I'm not sure what you expect to hear. The choice to commit to rebuilding Afghanistan as a democracy rather than the post-war consultation of the tribal elders to return the pre-soviet monarchy weak monarchy was a policy choice. The choice to specifically rebuild Afghanistan as a socially liberal democracy regardless of what the local felt, but then to also not take control of the education system for a generation, was a policy choice. The choice to rebuild Afghanistan as a singular state at all, rather than fracture it into substates that could be it's neighbors problems to influence and sort out, was a policy choice. The choice to withdraw western forces but expect to fly back in to Kabul was a policy choice. Deciding that the guarantee was to fly back in, but abandoning the main military airbase near the capital and limiting yourself to the civilian airport, was a policy choice. Deciding to time the withdrawal to the end of the fighting season, for maximum military and political momentum of the insurgency, for the sake of a symbollic ceremony date was a policy choice.
The way Afghanistan failed was the result of specific policy decisions. Even if you believe that some form of failure was inevitable, the type of failure / the optics of failure / the degree of badness of failure can differ.
Heck, even the strategic consequences of failure can differ. Had the US / western countries tried to double down and surge in support to the Kabul government in fall 2021, that in and of itself could have greatly shifted Western support and approaches to Ukraine, given not only the internal political considerations but other factors like how a re-surge would likely have required access across Russian airspace and provided an exposed vulnerability for Russia to apply coercion to.
I would temper optimism on the power grid comparison. One of the many reasons that the huge allied bombing campaigns were ineffective is that they struggled to hit anything important. With precision weapons, that's a lot easier, and some modern power equipment items are much, much, much harder to rebuild than others.
I might be softly optimistic on resilience- people can put up with a lot, including winter outages- but the issue to fear isn't 'all of Ukraine loses power and can't work,' but rather 'there's (another) Ukrainian exodus out of Ukraine into Europe' if population centers of scale can keep the heat in winter. Even if no one dies, that would be a long term and probably permanent population loss, and the amount who return is always less than the amount who leaves.
In military utility terms, however, if the Russians don't get that sort of demographic impact, then the strikes are likely wasted. Russia's missile utilization rate is gated by it's production rate, which is small enough that a missile at a power node is a missile not hitting a military objective or high-value target. This is how we got Russia spending naval cruise missiles in a land-attack role in the first year- a total waste of capability.
I don't like using ongoing conflicts to judge the competence of leaders because the consequences of actions can take a while to play out. And people always seem to blinders on about the present.
Well, yes. Willfully ignoring the effects of the western powers on the first non-western great power war of the last quarter century while making a lack of effecting great power wars in the last quarter century a basis of criticism would be blinders.
You could have held the same triumph for Afghanistan in the 00s for instance. Some did, and we all know how that ended.
And we also all know that it didn't end due to the nature of the 01 invasion, but on two decades of nation-building failure after the military delivered initial effects, which are different types of issues that shouldn't be conflated (and do not disqualify 01 from meeting your requirements of strategic effect).
Unless you intend to argue that the nature of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan inevitably, inherently led to the 2021 withdrawal dynamic, and that the intervening 20-odd years had no opportunities / ability / responsibility to matter, appealing to 2021 would be an anachronistic way to dismissing 2001 regardless of whether 2001 was done well or wisely or not.
The only question that matter strategically speaking is whether or not the West is in a better position than before this war. Your listings of tactical victories are irrelevant.
You think the US strategic position would be better if the Islamic State was still straddling the Syria-Iraq Border, the Korean Peninsula was either ablaze or rebuilding from a catastrophic war that leveled Seoul and saw the Chinese the only power able to invest in the reconstruction at scale, the Iranians annexing much of Iraq and gain significantly more control and leverage over Gulf oil flows, and the Chinese were attempting direct military coercion of one of the main economic thoroughfares of the world?
Okay. Truly only tactical effects.
I find success difficult to argue in terms of stockpiles, economic stability, political stability and diplomatic standing. If I had to pick between the western alliance before or after this war to fight China over Taiwan, I pick before every time.
That would be a very stupid pick, given there was no western alliance to fight China over Taiwan, that multiple European leading states including both France and Germany were not-subtly signaling their disinterested in supporting Taiwan over China, that the Europeans were even more militarily incapable of contributing useful military aid to Taiwan even if they wanted to, and that the European Union was far more vulnerable to Russia-PRC economic lobbies and coercion that would be pressuring them to neutrality vis-a-vis participation with the US.
But okay. You are the Protagoras here.
For all it's overwhelming firepower, the U.S. seems to have very few clean victories in the post-WWII error.
Is this to imply that WW2 was a clean victory?
WW2- which saw the rise of a US-enabled strategic competitor who would dominate not only half of Europe but win China, a shattering of the global order which led to decades of peasant rebellions and revolutionary ideology, a demonstration and rush for weapons of mass destruction, major militarization and social upheaval that resulted from the macroeconomic disruptions?
Is 'clean' a reasonable frame here, or is it an unreasonable standard that's dismissing victories that are very rarely clean even when done by the most competent of people?
Then stop trying to make true things appear untrue by introducing weasel words or dismissing challenges as genuine, Antigoras.
In the answer you hate on grounds of avoiding answering a real question, you had a real answer in Ukraine- a country with no right to be able to resist what a few years ago was believed to be a top-3-in-the world army. This was a war which started in the context of a Russian attempt to push back NATO and deepen Germany energy dependence... which has seen NATO expand and close a previously competitive theater, seen the Europeans execute real and expensive energy transition, and maintain a multi-national coalition of backers by parties that half a decade ago were actively selling arms to the Russians.
Is this to be dismissed because the Americans or Europeans aren't directly involved? Because Russia is not a great power? Because, three years after a three day special military operation, there may be some less-than-maximally-desirable ceasefire conditions for a country that demonstrated the military advantage of American aid against far stronger parties?
Strategic challenges aren't necessarily military threats either, so tying one to the other is begging the conclusion. You may take it for granted that ISIS's caliphate was crushed / the Korean DMZ is boring / that Iran limits itself to asymmetric and proxy groups rather than direct expansion / that the South China Sea remains a place of coast guard disputes rather than gunboat diplomacy, but these are all strategic challenges well beyond the capacity of most states, and these are all places where the status quo is an example of strategic results being achieved. In some of our lives, Iran in living memory had a very real expansionist potential of directly annexing parts of Iraq on co-religionist grounds- and now it's 'just' competing with the US for influence over local politicians.
If 'views this as a good war' is synonymous with 'the Russians maintain that the pre-emptive Ukrainian withdrawal from the Russian-claimed oblasts is the precondition for talks,' sure, but that's more than a little silly.
But would be fair, if you were trying to be unfair. Many appeals for ceasefire are unserious, as demonstrated by your own example. The US has not been brokering ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas literally every week- the US has (and other regional actors have) been going through the kubuki theater of pretending to have ceasefire talks that neither involved party are actually interested in, which everyone involved in knows is not going to deliver, and everyone already knew this before the first dozen times Hamas walked away from one sort of condition or Israel walked away from another.
However, because Hamas claims to be interested in talks, and does not have blatantly non-starter preconditions for said talks, said talks occur even though no one expects anything from them. Russia's conditions for equivalent public talks, however, amount to a Ukrainian withdrawal regardless of the result of the talks.
This isn't a matter of the US government views. It's a matter that the US government isn't the hyperagent, and that the views of the other parties matter as well- and if a party is making unreasonable demands to even have ceasefire talks, let alone demands within the ceasefire talks, the preferences of the US government are not going to bend everyone else to make concessions to the unreasonable party for the sake of ceasefire talks.
Which, going to post you replied to, is the point that realistic talks are far away: the Russian positions are not realistic by the standards of less-silly people.
Okay, I laughed. And if this were Reddit, I'd do a RemindMe 30 years.
Instead, I'll politely disagree that a region with the better part of a millennia of ethno-cultural bad blood and resistance to Chinese ethno-chauvinism is going to see a conversion to being the arms of Chinese power projection on the basis of... a rather unique reading on demographic endurance.
Even the thinness of the US is questionable. What, specifically, is being thinned out here? The naval power that would go to the Pacific in a China war? The armies not swarming into the middle east's latest conflagration, and with minimal use in a China conflict?
There are absolutely limits to what the US military can do... but in a very real sense, the Ukraine War is freeing up large parts of the US military, because one of the main missions of the US Army and Airforce is to fight the Russians in Europe. That's, uh, not necessary as long as the Russians are committed to Ukraine. And depending on how much longer it continues, quite possibly not necessary for several years afterwards, even as the military-industrial expansion justified on grounds of helping Ukraine can be utilized in other ways.
In military-economic terms, Ukraine is a very cost-effective fixing action- something that is the antithesis of an overextension.
I was about to say the Ukraine War, but then you said it had to involve another Great Power.
Cheek aside, this is just categorical gerrymandering. It's a subjective answer which hinges on the conception of a great power is (it would be definitionally impossible for western elites to win a great strategic victory against great powers if all the great powers are on the same team), what a strategic victory entails, and then adding a qualifier of power disparities that basically applies to no one (the Russians / Chinese haven't been in a war against a great power since WW2 either) but is treated as a mark of failure to only some (the lack of a victory over a GP is evidence of western elite failure) even though the same metric could be used as evidence of competence / succession (western elites successfully accomplished goals without needing a direct GP war).
Agreed. If there is a legal status, the government will treat people according to the legal status the government recognizes them as. Not only is that a convenient dodge for what the status 'should' be, it's about the only way for a government to consistently apply said status. If the government did NOT address people by the government-identified status, paradoxes occur.
I'm fairly sure this is what the US military already does, but I'll leave it to any of our posters to vouch for that.
So, anyone have a read on what a realistic ceasefire deal looks like? Does one exist? Is anyone serious mooting one around in the world of think tanks?
'Realistic' by who's standard?
One of the many issues of a ceasefire is that it hinges on people making realistic demands to people who can deliver on them. To date, the Russians haven't indicated either, creating a tangle of un-deliverable expectations to people who can't deliver them.
As a result, non-Russian ceasefire chatter inevitably requires assuming the Russians will selectively drop various declared conditions, with which conditions the Russians will drop changing based on the biases of the speculator.
Ukraine's winning scenarios have run out at this point. The abortive and telegraphed offensive ate up too much time and material for them to win in any conventional sense. Prigozhin might have been the Black Swan they needed, but he pussied out. The Russian economy is showing no signs of collapse. Some point to a Wunderwaffen or to some chart that shows NATO production coming online at a faster pace from 2025 onward, but I doubt that will make a material difference. Ukraine is basically hoping for a Russian collapse as a result of some as-yet-unknown cause, which is not impossible, but not much of a strategy.
That's certainly a take. Alternatively, Ukraine is no more on the edge of collapse than it has been constantly claimed to be since 2022 and in some respects considerably further away, 2024 has been generally unsurprising and consistent with forecasts made in 2023 bar a far greater expansion in Western comfort in Ukrainian weapon use against the Russians, no one who was unsurprised at Russia not collapsing in 2022-2023 was expecting it to collapse in 2024-2025 either, and the Russian manpower strategy is showing its limits even under the 'just pay more' paradigm.
As a result, absent some collapse of the Ukrainian nation-state (possibly some sort of mass exodus from a power grid collapse, as seems to be a reoccuring Russian point in the witners), the Ukrainians remain on track to continue the many-year process of attriting the Russian's Soviet Inheritance that serves as the military-economic center of gravity of Russia's ability to field larger armies and pose a strategic offensive threat.
Russia's odds of winning much more than what they have so far seem longer still. They're hoping Ukraine just gives up, but that might be longer odds than a Russian collapse, as Ukrainian psychopathic nationalism seems more systemic rather than oriented around a single individual.
Russia's strategy is not that Ukraine gives up, it is that the Americans stop supporting the Ukrainians and push the Europeans to stop supporting the Ukrainians until the Ukrainian state lacks the economic and military capacity to resist.
Calling Ukrainian nationalism pschopathic seems rather shallow as a pejorative goes, particularly given the lack of equivalent for Russia despite Russia' various policies in the war to date.
Neither side is going to win the kind of victory that will make good their losses. So how is a ceasefire outlined that will deliver a lasting peace?
Lasting ceasefires hinge on some combination of a belief in the other party's intentions, and an evaluation of their capabilities. Due to Putin's lack of credibility, a ceasefire acceptable to the Ukrainians and Europeans will be built on Russia's loss of long-term capabilities vis-a-vis the Europeans, who both want Russia to lose the Soviet inheritance and to build their own military production capability so that post-war Russia can't out-arm them.
This is not the structure Putin has in mind at this time, however- Putin almost certainly believes the Americans are the hyperagent whose decision will be decisive, that the Soviet stocks are so indefinite that they are functionally infinite, that if he can de facto control the de jure territory of the separatists oblasts then he can compel western parties to accept the Russian annexation of those regions, and that as part of a peace deal Russia can economically re-connect with Europe and end the various sanction regimes / get back the frozen war chest assets.
This is unlikely to happen, but Putin is also a strategic procrastinator, and absent a critical disaster is likely to keep delaying any decision on EU-acceptable concessions in hopes that one more election cycle in the US / Germany / EU may do the trick.
As a result, the war will likely continue for years more, easily beyond 2026. Putin is likely to try for some sort of negotiations in 2025 with the new US president regardless who wins. It will probably fail due to the difference in the politically acceptable positions between what Putin is willing to offer and what the US/west would be able to legislatively deliver, but he will then hold out hope that the 2026 mid-terms might shape the US president's position. It would be the end of the 2026 campaign season before the results were realized, and by 2027 the prospects of the next cycles will offer the next excuse to procrastinate.
In terms of who is winning the war of attrition I have to confess I am going off vibes mostly. I'll refrain from making specific predictions given that people far more knowledgeable than me have made such fools of themselves trying. The propaganda efforts on both sides are real which makes real information tough to obtain.
I've noted in the past, and will again, that attritional vibes has been the Russian information strategy for this year, both because this has been their year of maximum relative advantage and because of the impact vibes could have on the multiple major Ukraine-backer elections this year (EU already, US next).
As was noted last year, 2024 was going to be a year of relative Russian advantage due to its earlier (late '22) commitment to arms production expansion, while the US/EU expansions were later to be started and so have been expected to start paying out / scaling the production more next year. This mattered most in terms of artillery munitions and soviet stockpile reactivations. Not only was the relative production difference going to be greatest this year, allowing a greater ratio of fires at a time when shell-hunger has been the limiting factor on both sides as they are more or less limited to rates of production + foreign purchases, but the relative quality difference is as good as it was going to be due to the Soviet reactivations / DPRK imports going to worse and worse average quality levels. Drones aside, much of the Russian war machine has been devolving to a Soviet-era machine, while Western aid production / deliveries have a relative qualitative edge that has been increasing due to that. This works well enough when you can afford a more-or-less volunteer manning base, but it has limits- limits that were becoming more obvious over the year.
The limits of Russian capacity weren't just in the devolution to the point of using unarmored vehicles (down to golfcarts) in motorized rushes, but also in the manpower situation. While more attention was on the Ukrainian shortage, which was due to the Ukrainians putting off a hard decision to expand conscription, the Russian manpower solution's limitations were shown earlier this month- not only are the new recruit bonus costs rising higher in higher in Russia, indicating not meeting the recruitment goals, but the numbers they do have are for a relatively narrow front, while stripping others to very low amounts, hence why Kursk could happen.
None of these mean Russia can't fight, or continue fighting for some time, but rather that the rate of expenditures has been unsustainable (in terms of 'can't keep up the 2024 tempo for 2025')... but that doesn't matter if you don't need to, and you don't need to if you can leverage a relative advantage into peace on your terms (or at least of maximum advantage). Using golf carts in attempts to take the Donbas in 2024 makes sense if you need to get it done in 2024 in particular.
Putin's 2024 strategy has been with the US election in mind, and the 2024/early 2025 strategy will be for the sake of trying to approach negotiations in 2025, after the new US administration, which he hopes will be Trump, who he hopes will give a better deal. The current Russian budget structure already forecasts a massive drop in war spending for 2026 and beyond, and while that in and of itself is a signal rather than a requirement, it's not a coincidence that the signal is timed to when western munitions production is expected to be out-scaling Russian.
I will say this. Now that the war has gone on for 30 months, we can infer from the Lindy Principle that it is unlikely to come to a quick resolution.
I'll note this has also been by design of Putin, who early on in the war made the decision to claim a legal annexation of more oblasts than he controlled while also tying war resolution to broader European security architecture and release of Russian money seized early in the war, and has only made proposals that amount to turning the conflict into a frozen conflict even though the Ukrainian body politic understands the potential for a fourth continuation war down the road. Some of these were done to consolidate internal Russian system buy-in to the war, some have been for the notiational purpose of the conflict, and some of these expectations on the west, but the so-what is that there are a number of actors with vetos over various demands, and no single party that can deliver them... which isn't a secret, but neither is Putin's consistent bias to believing that the US is such an actor who can deliver all that.
Donald Trump was the result of a genuine grassroots movement. The Republican establishment very much did not want him around, but simply got run over.
Amusingly enough, I had a discussion with someone earlier today on that, on the theme / note that Trump has toppled a number of prominent political dynasties over the last decade. We spent a good minute trying to recall whether he'd upset more Republican or Democratic dynastic arrangements.
Iran can already actually fight Israel. It's been waging a bombardment campaign by proxy for the better part of a year now.
Iran can go nuclear without Russia needing to assist. Nuclear weapons don't change Iran's limitations.
Iran does not have the capacity to conquer the middle east with or without nuclear weapons, with or without the US in the region.
Russia's war in Ukraine is substantially facilitated by arms imports from Iran and ties it maintains with various Gulf Arab states to facilitate gold-transactions and other sanctions-evasion mechanisms, both of which would go away if Iran got into a major regional war.
Hidetaka Miyazaki, the game developer known for Dark Souls / Blood Borne / Elden Ring, not Hayao Miyazaki, the movie director of Studio Ghibli fame.
Sure, but we're not talking about whose cultural paradigm is exerting itself. We're talking about which baseball team is better.
No, the OP is talking about which cultural paradigm is better. Hence why it is Eastern vs Western media while trying to characterize the products as culturally eastern even when only their production or publishing is, and not Eastern-made Western media versus Western-made Western media.
Sure stature is subjective. Popularity isn't, but stature isn't just popularity, it's reputation. In any case, the games you're talking about aren't the same genre, and one doesn't need to gerrymander a soulslike genre to do so. I was actually thinking of 3rd person action open world RPG for Elden Ring, and 3rd person crazy stylish action game for DMC. Again, for either, I can't think of any Western made games of the same genre that come even close.
Without knowing what sort of metrics you're using to make the claim of stature or genre, and with you dismissing popularity, I can't think of any way to disprove the position at all, or to prove it in the first place.
DMC is high-stature based on... what? Helping establish a niche sub-genre that most players don't care about? Elden Ring's stature water point, at least, was based on its immediate release popularity- but a non-trivial part of that just-release hype was popularity benefiting from the advertising emphasizing Game of Thrones as a bridge for the non-Soulsborne, and the player base dropped precipitously when most of those non-Soulsbourne dropped. Is Stature supposed to piggy back on the initial popularity, but not enduring popularity?
What does this category 'Stature' mean beyond 'I respect it, and I think a lot of other people do too' versus 'I don't respect it, and so it doesn't matter how many others do'?
Or, to put it another way- why, besides snobery, should I be more impressed by the DMC franchise (30 million sales worldwide) than the Civilization (40 million worldwide franchise sales) or Call of Duty (425 million copies, 100 million active monthly players in 2023)?
It's not like there's lack of established western franchises that meet your broad categories. Far Cry, Assassin's Creed, Red Dead, and Grand Theft Auto are all open world action games of note, some with far more RPG credentials that Elden Ring which is JRPG in the mechanical build sense rather than story-changes-according-to-actions RPG. Depending on what you mean by 'stylish' action games, Helldivers, God of War, Fortnight, Gears of War, or even Doom. Call of Duty has been a spectacle shooter for over a decade at this point- is that not stylish because it relies on gunplay and grenades and setpieces rather than melee combos and stylized cutscenes?
Well, no. This is where we go back to rhetorical gerrymandering, and using winnowing language to remove comparisons. Elden Ring and SWTOR are both open world RPGs, but one is action with 'press X to act' parkour gameplay and a non-linear narrative delivery structure, and one is MMO with 'press hotkey to act' non-parkour to activate with at least 9 novel-scale storylines, ranging from hero's journey to revenge journey to a spy thriller. Both are open-world RPGs with considerable quality, but only one is dismissed by adding yet another qualifier.
And that's when the qualifier is clear. Helldivers and DMC are not the same sort of stylish action games, but they are both action games with an emphasis on style. However, the lack of a western equivalent to DMC specifically is evidence of failure, while the eastern equivalent to Helldivers 2's brand of dystopian-parody sci-fi team-killing we're-the-baddies co-op chaos is...?
If the argument just wants to be that certain sub-genres are dominated by non-western countries, sure. That's banaly true, and can even be narrowed down to 'certain sub-genres are dominated by specific non-western companies.' No one of note outside of Koei is making Dynasty Warrior successes. But it's equally true that there are sub-genres dominated by western companies, and arguing over the stature just turns into a 'my luxury playtime toy is higher class than your crass and low-class luxury playtime toy.'
Kinda / no / not really what I was alluding to.
All of the endings reflect the generational change, death of the gods influence, and the birth of the new world without the old gods influence, but one shaped by the influence of the free hero who serves as the transition. In Gotterdammerung, it's the power of Siegfried and Brunnhilde's redemptive love that breaks the curse and gives the new world a redemptive motif to end the play, but in Elden Ring the nature of the next world is left to the various ending themes / focuses, none of which are love.
As for the characterization of Ranni, disagreement on multiple fronts. Ranni is not a freedom-and-rebellion protagonist.
-Fundamentally, Elden Ring's player-experienced plot is a mystery plot (what happened / why did Marika break the ring), not a rebellion plot. The belief that Marika / Ranni are in some form of rebellion and trying to free the world from the greater will is broader fan theory deriving from failing to recognize the mystery plot, which deliberately structures the internal acts of the games (guided primarily by the accessible lore in difficulty eras) to encourage a belief that Marika (and Ranni's) motivations are in opposition to the Outer Gods, which are introduced as mid-game concepts as part of the forces tearing apart the world. They aren't- Marika's intent to destroy the Elden Ring is later revealed to have been long-premeditated even before her conquests were complete (the exiling of the Tarnished, the fire giant plot to destroy the tree), while Ranni never actually acknowledges any outer god or the Greater Will (who is never categorized as an elder god either, but which players tried to impose due to thinking the 'outer' meant 'from outer space').
-The reason the plot is not a rebellion plot against the Greater Will is that there's fundamentally nothing to rebel against- the Greater Will has no presence or political role / influence, and there is no enforcement scheme on how the Elden Ring is used. The fan theory that Marika and Ranni were in rebellion against it was a fan/cultural dynamic of trying to fill the mystery of the mystery plot, by projecting a western-expectation of a rebellion-against-god plot when there's no indications in game the rebels and god ever interacted or even coexisted.
The Greater Will being an absent god, and having not been present for longer than any of the even deific character cast have been alive, is part of the plot twists to the early game's narrative encouraging the players to doubt the Two Fingers, who claim to be prophets of the Greater Will, and encouraging a conflict-driven understanding of the various gods of the setting. The early game narration/guiding characters implies/claims that the Greater Will wants things to be a certain way, and presents the Two Fingers as beings of influence and insight, but this is a lie. Not only does critical-path lore reveal the Fingers are not and have not been in contact with the Greater Will for who knows how long, to the degree that they attribute multiple actions of Marika to the Greater Will, but the plot twist at the end of Farum Azula is that not only was Marika not the first 'god' of the Ring, but that there is no set order from the ring- Marika meddled with the composition from the start, but the nature of the Ring and Order has evolved considerably from the era of Dragons of pre-history. There is no 'Greater Will approved' order, or pressure to comply with a specific form of the Elden Ring, there is simply a metaphysical order responding to those who press their will.
(In the non-critical path, further lore reveals the Two Fingers weren't even that important. Rather than being important and influential figures in Marika's Religion, with Marika being some intermediary-pope subservient to the Greater Will, it's discoverable that the Two Finger lore is literal heresy, that Marika came to power by beating up their previously recognized Empyrean the Gloam-Eyed Queen (which is to say she was not appointed, she seized by conquest against their previous interests), and that the Greater Will's last action in the setting was in the pre-history. While the early-game Two Fingers try to present Marika as an errant intermediary, Marika's Golden Order was a god-queen cult which treated her as the only relevant god, not a subordinate. The fan theory that the Golden Order made Marika do things she didn't want at the behest of the Greater Will was always a fan theory- she was a genocidal warlord whose character trait was ambition.)
-Ranni is also not in a rebellion quest or reluctantly picking up the ring because she is purposefully advancing her predestined potential as an Empyrean in what amounts to a greek irony of running into the prophesy she seeks to avoid. Ranni's claimed rebellion is both a case of the irony of exact words- her Two Fingers said she was an Empyrean who could succeed Marika, not that she would (just as there were two other candidates of the same generation who could)- but also a dramatic irony that most of the player base missed despite the majority of Ranni's plotline being the unblocking and fulfillment of her fated destiny.
Ranni is initially presented as a youth-novel protagonist fighting for her free will, but her entire supporting cast are subversions of belief in free will. Her mage advisor wants to turn her into a literal puppet, and is part of a court/class conspiracy to seize power from the royal family via mind-control magic. The royal family in question- her mother Rennala- not only came to power via implicit use of mind-control magic, but may have been under the effects herself at Ranni's conception, as Rannala goes from meeting a cosmic entity to a meteoric rise to scholar-queen, to warrior-queen, to suddenly and madly (but explainable via the same sort of betwitching and enchanting effects associated with her rise to power) falling in love with the masculine-form of the god of the Golden Order for a marriage union that produces a prophesy child (Ranni) and other children who play key roles in subverting the golden order. Well before then, though, Ranni's childhood caretaker is a conspiracy theorist who wears the equivalent of tin foil to prevent the absent-god from reading his thoughts while advancing a multi-generational moleman conspiracy initiated by a dead civilization to put Ranni in place for her destiny to usurp the Elden Ring. Ranni's foster-brother/champion, a being of unbreakable loyalty, is falsely accused of being a mind-controlled tool/assassin despite untold thousands of years of Ranni being in a murder-feud with the alleged controller), and is put down in the midst of him stopping an assassination attempt on Ranni's life. Ranni herself is a literal prophesy child of a star-prophesy civilization who advances at the indirect aid of the ambiguous-god-thing of the Moons, which in Elden Ring are actual entities who manipulate fates and who actually intervene in mortal affairs.
Ranni is the culmination of a underground celestial-worshipping dead civilization's plot to seize control of the Elden Ring... a plot she is an active (if maybe not aware) participant of, from her murder of her half-brother and helping instigate the civil war to her character plot's requirement to re-start her destiny by freeing the stars that were unable to advance her destiny.
Ranni isn't a parody or a deconstruction of free will, but she certainly isn't an agent of it either.
-Ranni's era doesn't remove the influence or the problems of the elden ring, she masks it's still-present effect.
Ranni's order is still a metaphysical order of the elden ring, complete with elden lord consort to the ring-vessel-god, and even in it's setup it is explicitly a transitionary (thousand-year) experience, as fitting the elden mythic cycle of gods. While Ranni presents it as preferable- that it would be better if people couldn't see / feel / touch / believe in the order- that's just a different narrative justification to Miquella's pitch for an era of compassion, and it doesn't change that the order is still there. Ranni's order isn't distant as in proximally far away from other people, it's distant in the sense that it's out of touch, invisible and out of reach, until one day it will be again (the 'return' of the voyage, the inevitable metaphysical turning of the eras that is Miyazaki-worldbuilding and Elden Ring backstory). While this is a great thematic parallel to the Greater Will- another absent entity, and a fulfillment of the Elden Ring/golden order's metaphysical mechanics of regression and causality as Ranni aligns / retunrs closer to the state of the Greater Will (regression)- it's just the turning of the cycle.
Ranni's absence also doesn't 'free' the Lands Between either, since the controlling (and malevolent) factors burdening the Lands Between aren't the applied influence of the Ring, but the actors that exist regardless. This is the explicitly controlling entities now elevated by Ranni (the fate-controlling stars and moons), but also the outer gods like the Scarlett Rot and Formless Mother, and also the ambitious sorts of genocidal warlords and would-be tyrants who would try to conquer and dominate and enforce their will. There is no reformation of the human condition by hiding the Elden Ring, because the Elden Ring was not the cause of the human condition. It is still a cycle where a murderous woman claims the power of god and does what she wants, never really indicating an awareness or interest in resolving problems.
Unsurprisingly, the authors of Game of Thrones and Dark Souls did not write a young adult novel protagonist whose love-interest plot would save the setting.

I don't disagree with the take on who geopolitically benefits, but I'm to this day still surprised by how many of those developments described occurred over US opposition rather than as a result of US design.
If the NATO-expansionist wings had had their way, if there was a Ukraine War in the first place, it would be one with the US lives being lost in great numbers.
If the American warnings of the dangers of Russian energy dependence had been heeded, Europe could have built the LNG import terminals years or even decades in advance and had long-term stable contracts from globally distributed providers rather than relying on the US and American-influencable allies to surge export capacity to unanticipated demand.
If the American pivot from Europea and the Middle East to Asia had gone forth as desired, the Europeans would likely have disengaged to prioritize economic interests over a conflict they had no military capacity to contribute to, allowing Russia a premium opportunity to divide the European-American alliance at a time fewer and fewer Americans saw a moral remain invested.
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