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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

I think it's just incredible that the six justices in the majority looked at the Navy-SEALs-assassinate-a-rival hypothetical and went "yep, sounds right, no liability." Roberts' majority opinion even mentions the President's orders to the armed forces as one of the things that falls under (1).

Tell me you are unfamiliar with American military law without telling me you are unfamiliar with American military law.

This is not new, and not the incredibility you think this is, because distinction between lawful and unlawful orders has already litigated and legislated at length, while your incredibility relies on conflating lawful and unlawful actions as both being under the scope of the President's immunity as described by the Supreme Court. The basic Supreme Court rejoinder to your incredibility could simply be 'the President does not have conclusive or preclusive authority to issue illegal orders, duh,' and then point at the Constitutional chain under which the President can give orders.

The American Constitution provides the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" is allocated to Congress, not the President. The President and Executive Branch works through these parameters, in part, through the Uniform Code of American Military Justice (UCMJ), which is Congressional legislation. The UCMJ in, in turn, sets the requirements of obeying lawful orders, and the contrasting limitation on illegal orders. Lawful orders in turn derive from, well, laws and regulations allowing their issuance/execution/funding, while unlawful orders violate the laws.

There is no authority to the military (or the President) to give illegal orders, because the President's constitutional role is to give orders within the Congressionally-defined rules and regulations for giving lawful orders. Orders contrary to those- the unlawful orders- are outside the scope of the President's constitutional role. If they are outside the scope of office or duties, there is no immunity.

This is the very old 'where does 'following orders' apply as a legal defense?', and the established answer is mundane. Soldiers are obligated to follow lawful orders, and thus legally protected even when those orders result in negative consequences, and are not obligated to follow, and thus not protected if they do follow, unlawful orders. Now take this distinction all the way to the top.

By eliminating the category of unlawful orders outside of the broader category of lawful and unlawful orders the President could give, what you have left (by definition) is the scope of lawful orders within the scope of authorities...

...which is the context of the only reference to the Armed Forces in the opinion, on page 14, in a paragraph listing constitutional authorities.

There are reasons the Opinion Dissents don't appeal to the Armed Forces angle, and among them is that the SEAL Team 6 assassination argument is one only protected under this ruling if SEAL Team 6 assassinations are already legal orders to give.

You might as re-express your incredibility at the shock that the none of the Democratic justices thought to argue that the President should be prosecutable for giving legal orders.

Part of the reason why you didn't hear so much about the negative around the Sinovac is because 'misinformation' is smuggling in the conclusion that criticisms / doubts about the sinovac were, well, disinformation.

The Chinese vaccine did not work. Saying that the 'medical consensus seems to be that Sinovac is somewhat effective at preventing bad outcomes from COVID' is more than a reach given that 'bad outcomes from COVID' includes, well, having COVID as a disruptive medical experience. Sinovac failed on the grounds of what it was aimed to be by the Chinese government at the time, marketed as in the donor propaganda that came with the Chinese donations, and what the Chinese government pressed recipient governments to claim after the fact. Sinovac was not provided on the grounds that it would mitigate the worst bad outcomes from COVID- it was marketed as a vaccine to prevent COVID, on the basis of Chinese generosity and accomplishment.

There's reasons that the Sinovac vaccines largely faded from PRC media publicity campaigns in the international relations spectrum.

Morally, their decisions were not different from bombing Manila.

Except, of course, that bombing Manila doesn't come with the benefit of un-bombing another city.

Whatever you think of its effectiveness, the Chinese vaccines were not as much a shortage product as all the others, and all their issues aside- issues which you are brushing aside- with any such shortages there is a zero-sum trade off where someone not taking the Chinese vaccines meant someone else could. If you want to say the Americans are responsible for ending lives in this context, you also need to give them credit for saving lives that otherwise wouldn't have been saved because- again- the usage of any limited item is zero-sum. You'd even need to address the consumption calculus, as FUD is naturally countered by the FND (fear/necessity/desperation) of the people who do need the vaccine, and are willing to overcome FUD-doubts, and the implications this has for more effective distribution of any vaccine to those who need it.

There's a lot of points one would take with your framing which I'm generally not interested in pursuing as rabit holes that don't necessarily challenge your end-post preference, starting with how framing it as a disinformation campaign is assuming a conclusion, but just the framing of the ethical implications is off, and that's without addressing the other point of information of any information activity, the receptiveness / agency of the target audience.

Remember that the post-2020 US election Time article "The Secret History of the Shadow Campaign That Saved the 2020 Election"? Somewhere between a victory lap and credit-claiming at a time it was generally thought Trump's political prospects were dead, it was a rare look behind the scenes of retroactively-admitted coordinated political obstruction and shaping efforts.

It was also the article with the memorable distinction of-

They were not rigging the election; they were fortifying it.

Well, the New York Times on Sunday published a more pre-emptive form of democratic fortification: The Resistance to a New Trump Administration Has Already Started.

The article in short is a look at different wings of the Democratic Party apparatus, and steps they are taking in anticipation of a Trump victory to foil the predicted efforts of the 2025 Project. Some of these fears seem a good deal less grounded than others- Trump has been an abortion moderate such that it's hard to see why a Democratic governor would need to stock years of abortion supplies in a state warehouse beyond political theater- but then the article is quite likely a form of political theater. As far as election-year advertising goes, it's both a 'here are all the horrible things that could happen' fear campaign-

If Trump returns to power, he is openly planning to impose radical changes — many with authoritarian overtones. Those plans include using the Justice Department to take revenge on his adversaries; sending federal troops into Democratic cities; carrying out mass deportations; building huge camps to hold immigrant detainees; making it easier to fire civil servants and replace them with loyalists; and expanding and centralizing executive power.

-with the ACLU specifically focusing on four areas of potential lawfare-

That exercise, he said in an interview, led the group to focus on four areas, for which it is drafting potential legal filings. Those areas are Trump’s plans for an unprecedented crackdown on immigrants in the country without legal permission; the potential to further curtail access to abortion; firing civil servants for political reasons; and the possibility that he would use troops to suppress protests.

-but all with a back-edge 'but we thwarted him before and can do it again' of tribal-protection promise.

Interviews with more than 30 officials and leaders of organizations about their plans revealed a combination of acute exhaustion and acute anxiety. Activist groups that spent the four years of Trump’s presidency organizing mass protests and pursuing legal challenges, ultimately helping channel that energy into persuading voters to oust him from power in 2020, are now realizing with great dread that they may have to resist him all over again.

Not necessarily optimistic, but a 'we will fight for you' solidarity / call for support framing.

While there is the occasional (potentially deliberate) amusing word choice in ways that anyone who has used the term the Cathedral might appreciate-

“What Trump and his acolytes are running on is an authoritarian playbook,” said Patrick Gaspard, the CEO of the CAP Action Fund, the political arm of the liberal Center for American Progress think tank. He added, “So now we have to democracy-proof our actual institutions and the values that we share.”

The core strategies include the following, none of which are particularly surprising but which are good to see identified clearly in advance:

-Passing executive actions in the Biden administration before certain timelines so that Trump can't immediately revert them

-Litigation waves to tie things in court, with recruitment of sympathetic plaintiffs with likely standing already occuring

-Implicitly by virtue of the acknowledged past strategies and current participants, more protests

-More explicitly legal preparations to prevent/limit federal intervention in protests

-A national-scale counter-ICE network to disrupt immigration raids

-Pre-emptively doing self-auditing of activist group finances in preparation of politically motivated IRS scrutiny

-Various state-based nullification theory application (such as 'inter-state commerce doesn't apply to FDA if I already have the goods in-state')

-Use of Never-Trump 'ex-Republicans' groups as part of the Democratic network, especially the Principles First organization.

(Principles First was a Never Trump wing of the Republican Party associated with Liz Cheney that started in 2022 during the anti-Trump former Republican establishment's efforts to reassert control / torpedo Trump's post-presidential prospects by cooperating with the Democrat-led impeachment trial. Since then, and her fall from the Republican Party, it's been casting itself as an alternative to CPAC. Interestingly it also works in concert with Ranked Choice voting lobbying. (In the US, ranked choice voting is often, but not always, associated with the Democratic Party, at least in the sense of pushing for it in Red / Purple, but not Blue, states.)

You don’t think Azov’s high status in Ukraine converts new entrants into true believers in the Nazi stuff?

No, I don't. I've seen no evidence that Azov ever had true believers in the Nazi stuff, let alone converted new entrants into it,

I mean, obviously they’re not full bore Nazis. But they do seem to be racist ultranationalists, which is close enough for government work.

That government work being the Russian state-driven propaganda narrative claiming they are full-bore Nazis, and expecting others to go along with it on 'close enough' grounds that are not, in fact, close enough.

There are a lot of racist ultranationalists in the worlds. Equating them with Nazis or would-be-Nazis-if-empowered is a facile understanding of the Nazis as a polity and an ideology.

The counterpoint of this is that the is a Nazi-cosplayer at a table and 10 other people sitting there, then you have a table with 0 Nazis. And if someone comes along and points and shouts 'Nazi', you still have 0 Nazis.

Nazi is as Nazi does, not as Nazi dresses or Nazi-accused. Belief otherwise may be somewhat common sentiment among some people, but these are generally the same people who similarly mis-used 'fascist', and they are just as wrong even if their numbers do allow them to appeal to the bandwagon fallacy.

For reading, I don't have anything specific regarding the Azovs for you on hand, but I would recommend reading into how the oligarchs of Ukraine were involved in the Nova Russia uprising, both in aligning with and against, and how the early 2014 militias were formed / organized / incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces.

I don't fully agree with you on both of those point. Azovs doesn't seem to me a prestige unit since all sources arguing for and against them being "neo-nazi" do agree that they have been a particularly effective unit. On the right wing ideological dilution part, that could very well be true but its hard to determine the effectiveness of it and both Ukraine and Russia have incentives to lie.

Being a particularly effective fighting force is why they are prestigious, despite the infamy. But being a particularly effective unit is not an exceptional status, it is a relative status, and half of all units are above average.

What sets Azovs above and apart from most other above-average units- in additional to much higher media visibility (in part due to Russian efforts)- is that the Azovs have been at some of the more notable front lines where the Russians simultaneously had the most visibility but also showed their limits, which naturally leads to the self-serving deflection narratives of 'we're not bad, they're just good.' That was literally how they first gained notice- their origin is that of a militia formed and fighting before the formal armed forces of Ukraine were able to be reorganized during the Nova Russia campaign (giving Azov rivals of mostly-forgotten militias that didn't stand the test of time) in a conflict that the Russian proxies did so badly in that (giving the Azovs a contextual win) that the Russian army had to intervene (giving their survival it's own victory-against-the-odds narrative).

Consider how the 'modern' Azov's most significant performance was in the Mariupol defense of 2022, when the Russians were forced into a three month siege. For the later in particular, a three month siege of basically March / April / May 24. Standing ground and holding out in a 3-month siege is no joke and deserves the kudos... but it's also shaped by the factor that they had very good reason to believe the Russians would kill them outright (or in a show trial) if they surrendered due to them being used as part of the Russian de-nazification war narrative, and the fact that multi-month sieges were kind of a defining characteristic of the Russian invasion after the first few months, and also that the mariupol offensive was the primary Russian offensive in that part of Summer 22 while most of the rest of the front was static with marginal creeping artillery advances elsewhere. So while the fact that the Azovs fought hard is true and commendable, but it's also relatively normal for units of highly motivated people with good cause to fear surrender, and the dramatic image of defense and hard fighting was... kind of normal across the line in a number of places.

Azov's distinction in the war isn't hard fighting or urban defensive fighting. It's branding while doing that, when most Ukrainian units that did so lack the reputation or international visiblity or the contextual international drama for the times Azov was most visible when Ukraine was still in chaos in 2014, and when the post-Kyiev Russian offensive was still new and uncertain in 2022 and people thought a dedicated Russian offensive in the south could sweep the southern coast. After the Mariupole campaign, most people understood the Russians weren't going to steamroll the south, so units that fought just as hard wouldn't get the same valor / public credit that Azov did because it was expected rather than a surprise for the Russians to struggle so hard for so long.

Does anyone have any credible sources for the current Nazi influence in Ukraine?

No, but then I wouldn't expect to much credible information on something that largely doesn't exist, and I don't know any credible sources that would unironically use the term 'professional Nazi' either.

Given that the Azov Brigade's primary Nazi-ness was primarily performative, not ideological, and the primary ideological parallel was 'anyone the russians hate who could kill a lot of them had something going for them' rather than 'uber-racist genocidal anti-semetic state-supremacist nationalist with a desire to conquer Europe and colonize the east,' I'm also unclear what you think a 'trained, professional Nazi brigade' entails. Fashion-conscious parades? Cosplay with vigor? Casual drives through the Ardennes?

The neo-nazi accusation is about as old as the Russian incursion into Ukraine, which is to say 2014 and attempted at the Nova Russia uprising that fizzled into the Separatists, and has been the go-to accusation for the Russian propaganda aparatus for a decade now. It's about as well founded as it ever was. The Azovs were Nazis in much the same way that Satanists are worshippers of evil- it was (and to a degree still is) a form of unrepentant defiance by identifying with your hated outgroup's nominal worst fear / hated foe, rather than with what otherwise might be presented as a cultural sibling.

At the end of the day, the Azovs were one of a large number of private and oligarch-sponsored militias groups that rose during the chaos of Russia's attempted nova russia uprising. They weren't particularly nazi, unless you conflate all right-wing politics with nazi, and the only thing particularly notable about them aside from their wearing accusations like a badge of honor was a relatively high valor and willingness to keep fighting, which is why they were notably effective, and one of the reasons the Russians have fixated on them in particular.

That Azov formation is long dead. Between the post-2015 reorganization of the oligarchic controlled militias into the national military with replacements of key leaders, the normal military manning cycles, and the extremely high attrition during the Mariupole campaign in 2022, very little of the original formation remains, and the formation itself has been expanded and thus flooded so even pre-war composition would be flooded by outsiders, i.e. diluting the characteristics of the precursor personnel.

Unless you believe that nazism is a magical mind-virus that converts by insinuation and proximity, there's no particular Nazi influence in the Azov Brigade. The Azovs are basically a quote-unquote 'prestige' unit that people want to join because it is prestigious, and it is prestigious does much the same thing as any other, but with better (or, if you prefer, notorious) PR.

In the short term, no, but in the longer term a low turnout means increased risk in the next election, which drives prioritization and strategy.

The nature of low turnout is that the lower it is, the less stable it is for the incumbent, because ever-smaller groups of interested voters can be decisive in upturning it if they either switch or even just re-enter the voting ranks next election. As voter participation can be volatile, this means that it's relatively easy for sudden surges of voter engagement to turn against an incumbent. As a result, politicians would rather win with low engagement than lose, but what they really want is higher voter turnout of their base, to be more resilient, and a failure of turnout on their end means- even if victorious this time- that things need to change.

Personally, I'd consider this an advantage of voluntary over mandatory voting systems. In mandatory voting systems, there's considerably less volatility as there's a lot less sway in overriding existing factionalism / voter commitment to past votes. (People are less likely to vote against something / someone they've already voted for, and such.) While whether volatility is itself good or bad is questionable, in my view it's an important part of being able to actually challenge incumbents, and incumbents have enough built-in advantages that challenges to them on irregular voter sentiment sways is a good thing.

You might have heard it, but it was certainly being said. No less than Joe Biden stumped that a Romney Administration would see African-Americans in chains in what was a pretty obvious slavery allusion to a mostly black audience.

Mainstream Democratic-aligned narratives in the period was that a Romney victory would be dystopian disaster. The nature of the dystopia varied by the message and audience- it could be a corporatist, religious extremist, but bigotry was an expected component, to the point that 'binders full of women' became a proof of sexism he would bring into government.

Yea, the Federal Minister of Defense has made a proposal to that point, but I wouldn't count on it going anywhere. I's the kind of thing that gets shot down regularly.

I'd agree on conscription passing as a standing policy per see, but I wouldn't be surprised if the infrastructure behind it is renovated.

Nor, frankly, would I be surprised if in the next few years Germany and a number of other European countries look to the migrant population as a potential military manpower fix, in a service-for-residence sort of way. There is increasing reporting that Russia is turning towards not only trying to solicit foreign volunteers on the basis of promising jobs, but coercing foreign students and workers in Russia to fight by threatening to not extend visas and such.

For Russia, that's eating the seed-corn for what the normal purpose of such study programs are for (to educate and shape a more sympathetic technical/potential future elites) by deterring as high-class potential visitors, but for Europe deterring illegal migrants would be a domestic political win in and of itself.

So far there have been no tangible, substantial changes that I am aware of. 100 billion € were provided to the military as a special fund, but I'm not aware of anything that would have come of it. Given our MoD's reputation for rampant grift and wastefulness, money alone will probably not fix anything.

Forgive the hour-long video, but Perun did a video on the institutional challenges facing the hundred billion fund two years ago, which is always good if you want to be depressed.

Well, the Germans are allegedly relooking conscription, so there is the prospect of light and motorized infantry.

A significant wing of the Democratic party with media allies has committed to a deligitimization campaign of the Supreme Court, specifically targetting Republican justices. Tactically this is to pressure the justicies to recuse themselves from specific cases, more broadly an attempt to scandalize them into resigning in general so that they can be replaced by more compliant partisans, and even more broadly delegitimize Supreme Court rulings against the Democratic partisan interests and build support for future potential court packing schemes.

That Russia sees this as a rope to tug as well is evidenced in their OWN information operations that have worked on YOU: we have too much to lose by resisting Russia so we just need to stop and they'll stop being dicks.

For the record, Ranger's position / self-identification on this forum is that he's an Australian, and he's often unfamiliar enough with European geopolitical dynamics that it's worth believing in. It doesn't change your point on information operation susceptibility- he's based thesis on China on personal anecdotes and social media- but the Russian interests / investments / money angle is bit over-leveraged in Australia.

Also, a little less cussing, please. One of the points of the forum is that you can have any position you'd like, as long as you can manage to do it politely, and a failure of the later is far more important than the position you are for (or against).

You might prefer this earlier version. It offers no real world examples.

The issue isn't the presence of real-world examples. The issue is that the argument leads to an absurd conclusion, which undermines any reason to give faith to the constructed argument.

Notice the problem with earlier version: it is too abstract. It gives the reader no reason to care. Of course we care deeply, but to get specific is to bog down due to the high emotion of those specific cases.

The issue of any version is that it's poorly constructed and doesn't support its own conclusions against the necessary context of what the metaphor is designed to allude to, which is the American alliance system, especially NATO.

And then what? The traditional language of "defensive alliance" will automatically derail the discussion because it elides the vital distinction between chaining alliances and isolating alliances.

There is no vital distinction. Your framing is an arbitrary framework based on pejoratives and assumed conclusions without support, as support requires context and the metaphor breaks down if forced to address the context of the NATO alliance structure, which includes things such as nuclear weapons that invalidate swaths of the argument.

Awkward and forced NATO metaphors aside- you really don't get to argue on theory or practice if you ignore the role of nuclear deterrence in everyone's decisionmaking there-

Obviously my fine distinction has contemporary resonances, but after World War Three reduces Europe and America to radioactive rubble, the run up to World War Four will involve China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia.

...what?

As in- what world war with contemporary resonance reduces Europe and America to radioactive rubble, but not China? Is this supposed to be a Russia-only conflict? If not, who is the coalition to make it a world war? If Russia and China are in WW3 together, why do three nuclear armed powers not also nuke China when they are being reduced to radioactive rubble?

So I find myself constantly waffling between the expectation that we'll see a new industrial revolution as AI tech creates a productivity boom (before it kills us all or whatever), and the expectation that the entire global economy will slowly tear apart at the seams and we see the return to lower tech levels out of necessity. How can I fine tune my prediction when the outcomes are so divergent in nature?

By recognizing that even if the global economy tears itself apart, there are parts of it that will not only survive, but relatively thrive as islands of relatively stability. Deglobalization is to some degree inevitable- it's already occuring and even accelerating in many contexts, and macro trends suggest further- and as things deglobalize, producers and investments will shift. Investment flows go first where it will be safe, then where it will grow, and the regions that are relatively safely will get injections to grow further. The industries that support hi-technology development will be disrupted, not just destroyed, and then they will relocate.

When they relocate, they will generally consolidate along new lines production less prone to disruption. That is most likely to be the American alliance system as a market-driven model with the most access to the pre-deglobalization market connections, and a PRC state-driven model brute forced with state spending along with its generally mercantilist model.

And more importantly, how can I arrange my financial bets so as to hedge against the major downsides of either outcome?

Diversification is nearly always the safer option, but if you wanted to minimize risk you wouldn't be framing it as financial bets.

If you want to bet, then bet on the west, specifically the North American market. Its political problems are not unique, its security threats relatively marginal, its demographic problems are fundamentally distinct from the depopulation trends of its primary strategic rivals, and its strategic rivals are far more limited than they are often perceived, which is the classical consequence of deliberate propaganda states. It's also likely to be one of the primary beneficiaries of the upcoming deglobalization.

This is a commonly overlooked distinction, and good on you for remembering it. That conceptual space of [Having an Ambition] is often what overlaps with [Ideology], as the nature of having a goal to work towards often depends on not only the interests behind the person, but the entire framework that leads them to the conclusion that the objective is worth focusing on above more 'reasonable' things, which is also what gets them critical enablers / associates who empower this. This [Ideology] could be religious or secular, but it serves as a framework for consolidating the [Having an Ambition], as well as a legitimization and cooperation-enabling framework to enable action.

'Actually effective' is the load-bearing term here, because the effect of using a nuclear weapon in the current era isn't actually the degree of damage, but the nature. Fat Man and Little Boy were not 'actually effective' nukes by the standards which make extremely precise timing and more complex systems important to effectiveness. Fat Man and Little Boy were small, inefficient, and wasteful. They were also effective politically, which is what matters, and which is what will matter for the effects that a ground-based rather than air-burst nuclear weapon is going for.

The maximum effectiveness of the bomb on a technical efficiency ground (explosiveness per amount of material) is secondary to the scary nuke factor success and the geopolitical implications that would be the target motive. Even nuclear 'fizzle' explosions would be considered historic successes, despite being a tiny fraction of the potential of an 'actually effective' bomb. The value of the nuclear demonstration is the fact that it is nuclear, that the target wasn't able to stop you, and that no one knows if you can do so again.

No one's going to get hit with a 12% technical effectiveness nuclear detonation and go 'ha, those losers couldn't even do the trigger detonations better!'

There's also another avenue-

4. The nuclear states basically fedpost-spam the potential supplier and customer networks, so that no one know who wants to buy knows who a possible actual 'legitimate' supplier is and no one who could sell one knows who a 'legitimate' buyer is.

There are absolutely terrorist and extremist groups with high interest in WMDs and WMD-substitutes (we had the Tokyo nerve gas attacks, for one, but the field of bioterrorism is basically just weaponizing natural epidemics). However, the groups that have interest in obtaining nukes are not the same as the groups that have access to nukes, and so all you really need to do is break the chain of commerce between the client (the person who wants the bomb) and the supplier (the smuggler).

This can be done pretty effectively by just stirring doubt and distrust on both sides, especially as both sides are in a psuedo-prisoner's dilemma where both need to be hidden from the eyes of the government authorities to work. A terrorist group / proxy needs to believe they're not being approached by an agent of the government, but runs into the issue that the local government and the local nuclear handlers probably share the same appearance/accent/cultural mannerisms (because a corrupt supplier is part of the government). In reverse, the corrupt supplier needs to believe that not only is their potential contact not a member of the government as well (or an ally of their government), but that the sale won't reveal their otherwise hidden network. Both parties will be 'better off' if they can trust eachother and make the deal, but each also has major payoff incentives to 'defect' and not engage, for fear of revealing themselves.

This is why the more credible loose-nuke risks come in contexts of state collapse (where the state is no longer in a position to monitor/maintain control deterence), widespread corruption (where the ability of the state to monitor is compromised by the state's agents being routinely bribed), but especially black markets (where a standing economic exchange system exists absent, and despite, state efforts). These are the cases where there's more credibility on the suppliers as having access, and more trust on the buyers to getting away with it, and more reason for both to believe the other actor isn't part of the state.

Haven't all the easily-deployed-by-third-parties nuclear weapons been decommissioned?

All nuclear weapons, once obtained, are easily deployed by third parties.

A nuclear weapon is basically the payload (the bomb) and the delivery system (the missile), but the bomb itself is very easily deployable by third parties. For example, a B61 nuclear bomb, the primary gravity nuclear bomb maintained for NATO purposes, is less than 12 feet long and (~3.53 m) long, and weighs only 700 pounds (320 kg). This could easily fit inside a basic cargo truck or shipping container, especially if you cut off the unnecessary parts of the casing.

First-generation nuclear weapons (like the WW2 era weapons) were bulkier, but even the Little Boy used in Hiroshima was 'only' 9,700 lbs. That's not even a capacity cargo container track.

In short, if you can get the bomb, and get the bomb to a shipping container, you can deploy a nuclear weapon. If you can then get that shipping container contents onto a ship (or even just a boat), you can deploy it to any major port in the world.

There aren't backpack nukes with 4 digit arming codes written on the side in crayon any more.

You don't need the default arming codes to make use of a nuclear weapon. The idea that nuclear weapons become innert without the right code is basically Holywood and security theater.

All an arming code for a nuclear is, is the software password to use the pre-installed software. However, the nuclear weapon is fundamentally an analog device of 'conventional explosive to move catalyst to trigger nuclear chain reaction', and the software doesn't actually do anything past the triggering the conventional explosive point. (Rather, the software is about when the conventional explosive triggers, often by being tied to sensors for airmovement and altitidue that a ground-based device doesn't care about.) The bomb goes boom when the internal trigger explosion is triggered, regardless of what software is used or if any software is used. The 'you need the right password or the bomb goes innert' is really just the conventional-explosive trigger-control software borking itself and needing to be replaced. The bomb itself is still 'fine', the UI panel just isn't working.

Non-state actors, or even state actors who steal another side's bomb, just need to replace the software control system for the initial trigger, and controlled demolitions are an extremely basic technology in the civil engineering sector around the world. There are bomb designs where a jurry-rig trigger software may be less efficient- such as an implosion device that's not quite synchronous- but this isn't 'you don't get an explosion,' but rather 'the explosion is smaller than it could have been, but is still a nuclear explosion.' And land-based devices were always going to be smaller just due to being based on the land rather than airburst.

In short, all the arming code system really means for a loose nuke is that there's a period of time between when a deployable nuke is captured, and when it can be armed and trigger via replacement software. That could be days or weeks... but depending on how the nuke is obtained, it could be days or weeks before the state knows to start looking, or where, by which point a shipping container can possibly be on another continent.

What are people's guesses for when the first nuclear weapon (since WWII) will be fired?

None of the above. The most likely nuclear weapon use is- and remains- a loose nuke scenario in which a nuclear weapon is stolen from a nuclear power, and used by a second or even third party.

Ultimately, nuclear weapons are very, very expensive, both in the development sense and the utilization sense, and revealed preference by all the major nuclear powers is a preference to endure non-existential attacks and even lose wars rather than use them, even when the threat of counter-use isn't present. As a weapon system, their primary use is in existential defense against invasion, and as the only actors with the ability to existentially threaten by invasion are states, there's very little actual interest in using.

The actors who get around the cost-aversion are those actors who don't care about surviving as a state.

In the historical context, I suspect your thesis (as I perceive it) is largely overstated, and gives the American / Monroe Doctrine undue credit for much more banal causes for Latin American socialist theory credence.

At the end of the day, while Communism as a theory started as an urbanized worker ideology that believed it could/would only occur in developed industrial countries, communism as a practiced revolutionary ideology was primarily an agrarian peasant-based force, and often garnering the most support when focused on land reforms and relations between tenet farmers - landowners rather than factor workers - capitalists. While Communist themes / vibes of being tied to heavy industry were part of the early marxist theory and the Soviet Union's approach to industrialization, the general framework was agrarian peasant revolution -> revolutionary victory -> then industrialization. The agrarian angle was the dominant focus from the Soviet revolution, to the Maoist, to the Asian uprisings such as Vietnamese and in Latin American as well.

While there are overlaps with the American history in Latin America- the plantation corporations most notoriously- at the end of the day the latin american peasant-elite relations were due to local conditions and the post-colonial/independence political patronage systems, not the American involvement during the Monroe Doctrine. The American latin american sphere of influence worked through the pre-existing political structures, rather than creating and enforcing them, and while the Americans were the associated 'capitalist outsider', their actual role in the lived experiences was interchangeable (and, in various places, interchanged). Local elites wanted the investments (and bribes) no matter who provided, and outsiders wanted the fruits of exploitation for non-ideological reasons.

This structural dynamic matters to the appeal of socialism in Latin America because the structural incentive occurs regardless of the Monroe Doctrine. While the Monroe Doctrine makes the most common outsider the American Yankee, the absence of it just substitutes another outsider willing to make deals with the elites who run the land system, and the revolutionary appeal is based on the land system abuses, not the outsider it's done in service of.

The Monroe Doctrine absolutely had longer-term blowback, and it made the US a natural/obvious outside foe for various pan-Latin American groups to use as a unifying against, but that's a geopolitical foil consequence, not an economic theory consequence. Revolutionary socialist influence are popular in Latin America because large agrarian populations were suppressed and exploited by local elite patronage networks selling their labors to outside producers, and those sales and the system that kept them going would have continued regardless of the Monroe Doctrine.

(And, arguably, been worse had Latin America been more up for colonial exploitation more akin to Africa, but that's a not particularly relevant alternative.)

I agree that other countries have some agency, but there is a long history of US-backed regime change in Latin America. That can have chilling effects on any government that wants to do something the US won't like.

On a historical front, your long history of US-backed regime change is predominately the Cold War, when Latin America underwent a number of civil wars, with coups and attempted coups by various factions. If there is to be a chilling effect here, it would be because everything is chilling, not because the Americans are uniquely so.

More to the point, your list is anachronistic. There's a reason that only two cited events are after 1980, with one of them being the Panama invasion against a person who had functionally couped the Panamanian government, and the other being that time when the modern Venezuelan government ousted its own opposition-led legislature (which did not, in fact, involve a coup). This is neither a particularly long history, except by the short-history paradigm of Americans, nor is it particularly recent history, and the parts that are recent don't particularly mesh with the narrative of the past history. It does, however, miss all the other sorts of oustings / coups / palace maneuverings, which would be relevant to determine how much of something is a relatively important factor versus not.

On the agency-front, your framing is demonstrating the issue Nybbler was raising. Simply calling something like the Cold War military coups US-backed regime change is a framing device to re-characterize what would normally just be recognized as a internal government coup- which Latin America has had a history of without American involvement. While it fits a narrative, since it can imply that the coup governments wouldn't have occurred / wouldn't have been successful / wouldn't have done as they did without the Americans, this obscures rather than addresses the point that the post-WW2 Latin America had a number of civil wars and active insurgencies going on, for reasons the Americans were not responsible for, and that the Latin American governments have had a history of government instability- i.e. regime change- both before and after the American moment.

While Latin American nationalism, especially of the leftist slant, does like to rally against the Yankees, it doesn't really address that large parts of Latin American countries were willing to kill eachother, and that willingness or ability didn't come from the Americans.

The United States may have a much more "hands off" form of imperialism, but it is historically willing and able to turn a country into a basket case if it furthers its economic interests. This limits the live options available to countries in Latin America, even if they still have agency within that limited set of options.

This cultural chauvenism denies due credit to all the Latin Americans, who have a long and well established historical and contemporary records of turning regional countries into breadbaskets basket cases in further of personal or ideological interests, without needing the assistance of the Americans to do so and often in direct opposition to the yankees.

Down with Yankee-centricism! Give the Latinos their credit!

Or at least, that's what it seems like to me?

Pretty much. Or at least, it's a very reasonable understanding. Your bounded distrust filter seems healthy.

All I'd additionally add is the reminder is that there are many, many forms (and reasons) of non-compliance/active subversion of a state, such that it can be anti-value to conflate groups and rationals too aggressively lest you start implying/believing that all groups conduct [worst act of subversion A] for [worst rational D] when really groups doing [subversion A] are doing so for [less malign rational C] and groups with [worst rational D] are reasonly only doing [marginal acts of subversion B]. If there's a reason to be hesitant about the NYT piece, it's in this conflation risk.

As for what you do about different groups, that depends on the groups and the nature of the subversion and the nature of your democratic checks and balances. Military groups in particular, however, can generally be cracked down on with military law, as a refusal to abide by lawful orders is anathema to the principles of civilian control of the military when said lawful orders are derived from civilian leadership-set policies. Others parts, however, may be prosecued on criminal lines, or may not be criminal at all- the ability to challenge the state is inherent to an actual democracy.

But ultimately, a lot of government is based on deference to the government from the bottom up, not top-down control. Non-compliance and apathy, let alone active disagreement or opposition, routinely subvert government attempts at policy implementation.