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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

guesswho is a long-term progressive cultural warrior, and this level of evidence is extremely typical of him.

Poseidon Archer is nothing if not a wishy-washy middle ground. It's the sort of operation that exists to satisfy the impulse to do something, without having the ability to solve- or resolve- the instigating factor(s).

The Houthis endure far more- and far worse- bombardment from the Saudis than the US operation is going to deliver... and the fact that the US is now dropping bombs on Yemen without Saudi help, after compromising relations with the Saudis in no small part over disapproval and pressuring the Saudis to stop, is stark irony. This is precisely the wrong sort of target for a long-range bombardment campaign to try and resolve, if the goal is to render the Houthis unable to continue attacking the naval route... which is already seeing mass and systemic divergences around Africa. That naval traffic flow isn't coming back unless the threat is resolved, and convoys alone won't be enough.

That's not to say that the attempt is all a waste. The Brits at least have done some successful test engagements with novel anti-drone ship systems which may evolve into cost-effective ship defense norms, and the real target of using things like stealth bombers isn't the Houthis the bombs are dropped on, but the Iranians who are having it demonstrated how easily the Americans could drop on them. There's an argument to be made on regional deterrence, and that in part goes back to the analysis that October 7 was an Iranian effort to start a broader intifada, and that it largely failed and everything since has been trying to cope and compensate for not getting the effects they anticipated.

But all the same, it's not going to stop the Houthis any time soon- the public-facing problem- and it's so easy for it to be framed as a failure regardless of outcome that it's hard to see it being counted as a success. Even if no ships are damaged, basic cost-comparisons of the Houthis attack drones/missiles versus ship defense systems can make some awkward cost-benefit propaganda to frame it as a net loss. If ships are damaged, it can be humiliation, and if critical casualties occured, it'd be very easy to see it spinning into a scandal (for putting the sailors in danger, for ineffective air campaigns, for not going after the broadly acknowledged source i.e. Iran). It's an invitation to mission creed, waste, and/or easy adversary propaganda.

At best, maybe it's a politically beneficial stall tactic that lasts for the next few months, while Israel continues to cut through Gaza. But even that may give it too much credit.

As always whenever US military recruitment woes comes up, it's relevant to bring up that something like 80% of new recruits come from a family where someone else has served. The implication of this isn't that the US has a racial demographic recruitment option, but a familial one: that families that once would have encouraged children to join, are no longer doing so / encouraging them not to do so.

Failing to work around this issue makes many of the options presented pretentiously comedic rather than serious, because the audience that needs to be convinced isn't the recruits- it's the already-separated family members who are dissuading recruitment.

Behind a paywall, but one of the better breakdowns of the US recrutiment issues from the WSJ.

Can you try to put in a bit more effort? I don't know why you seem to constantly get away with these pseudo-profound one liners. I'm pretty sure most other users would get modded.

An effort-response would be warranted if your response actually address the point being made. In lieu of that, reasserting that the point still stands is all that is required to a non-rebuttal.

Hlynka's post that you responded to was an assertion of what the state of nature and the consequence thereof is. Your response is a position based on preferable state. This is not a counter, a rebuttal, or even a subversion of Hlynka's position on Hobbes, anymore than a person who prefers not to suffer the consequences of falling off a bicycle without a helmet is countering an assertion that doing so will hurt them, because the position is not an argument based on preference, but on nature of the mechanism and consequence.

In all honesty, it was probably because of the Middle East conflagration going on over the new years that Austin's absence slipped through the cracks.

Austin's surgeries, both the deliberate and the follow-up, coincided with the federal government's end-of-year functional shutdown where employees are expected/encouraged/enabled to maximially disperse to spend the holidays with family. While the upper echelons of the US federal government do maintain a degree of 24/7 operations, it's very much a skeleton crew / 'as needed' sort of deal, and senior executives can more or less accept varying degrees of staffing degradation to let people go for the holidays. The significance of the New Years date of his follow-on surgery isn't just that it's a general holiday, but that the first week in January is always low/partial manning as well, and generally a 'nothing is expected to get done' week as various holiday leave/vacation types are expected to filter back in across the week. People who took New Years instead of Christmas absences, inevitable flight delays/cancellations, etc. The 4 days it took to be widely reported just-so-happened to be the days where general absences are most expected, and thus not the sort of obviously-unusual absence in abstract- especially since Austin's 22DEC absence for medical reasons already primed the defense establishment to operate without him in the direct loop.

The reason why the Red Sea issue likely contributed to obscuring recognition is that the Secretary of Defense is a policy-role, not an operational role, and the Red Sea issue is, well, an operational issue- and one that was already being managed/run at the sub-secretary level before Austin's return to the hospital. The White House has direct military lines of communication for this sort of thing- especially via the Joint Chiefs or the Combatant Commander directly- and so if/as they need theater-specific updates rather than policy updates, they not only could get updates directly from the theater, but likely already were... not least because that was probably how Austin had things set up before his initial surgery, on 22DEC, i.e. right before the Christmas downtime.

If I had to wager what happened, the contingency reporting channels not requiring Secretary of Defense involvement were almost certainly established before the Christmas period so that Secretary Austin wasn't needed to be in the loop, and were part of the skeleton crew's 'normal duty' for the entire Christmas-leave period. Since the procedures were already established, they were simply maintained, and the people doing the maintaining weren't the ones who would normally be reporting SecDef changes in status. Since the situation assessments/daily flows/briefings were still flowing from the DoD via the same non-Austin channels that they would have been during the Christmas period when he was also absent, his continued absence wouldn't have been obvious on either end.

None of this should detract from whether it should have been tracked better, but Austin obviously already released a lot of his staff who normally would have been present/sharing the news over the holidays, and the DoD reporting infrastructure was almost certainly already set up to not require him over the calendar period where he wasn't present.

The regions of Europe that became Christian later were also much, much flatter, had more interior waterways, and in many cases had easier access to the Atlantic Ocean. I.e. factors that support large, contiguous empires, industrialization, and overseas colonization/trade vis-a-vis the Roman Empire's mediterranean core which was functionally centered around coastal enclaves largely isolated from eachother by rough (and expensive to economically develop) terrain. The southern European and Levant states didn't even have a non-Gibralter route to the world's oceans until the world-spanning empires who did have Atlantic ocean access were already established.

Venezuela truly is one of those cases where it's hard to blame anyone for wanting to flee. Mind you, those who could largely did flee awhile ago, so there's some class resentment and I've occasionally heard of undertones of suspicion/contempt (of the 'you were happy to support the Chavistas when we fled, but now you're ruining our reputation' variety), but... yeah. Venezuela's been bad for some time.

On the American-Mexican border, this year the Biden administration implemented a policy intended to allow a stronger/politically-more-viable legal basis for ejecting migrants. In short, they created a remote-asylum application system as part of broader remote-immigration-permit systems. The nominal position is that migrants are to request the migration / asylum remotely from their own country, and then wait for the response of yay/nay. If they attempt to illegally immigrate before their application is complete, their digital-application can be rejected and they can be immediately deported as bad-faith applicants, and if they attempt to apply for asylum at the border without trying the app, they can be sent back to their countries and told to apply via the system.

The premise was somewhat undermined by various Biden exceptions to give various groups special permissions to stay, and the sheer numbers that kept coming after a temporary pause after the number of deportation flights was contrasted to the number of arrivals, and the sanctuary city migrant-bussing fiasco.

South of the American border, a number of different dynamics are taking place, centered primarily on spreading awareness via social media of safe-ish and commercially available migration services that have increased both awareness and perception of safety, sometimes with government facilitation.

Among other things-

-The Darian Gap, the link between Colombia and Panama, has seen functional guide services and entire social media channels and migration-facilitation industries between boats and forest guides and supply traders. The social media awareness of viable routes, legal strategies such as claiming asylum, and analysis/assessments of the US permissiveness of migrants once you reach there, are widespread. As with most businesses, as businesses scale, they compete and improve in pursuit of profit and client-share.

-Local governments in the Darian Gap, Panama, and Costa Rica, being overwhelmed if they try to stop or hinder the flow and at risk of criminal malingering if they just ignore it, have gradually adopted policies of functionally regulating migration flow independent of national level (let alone American) desires. A migrant you stop is your problem; a migrant you charge for a clean hotel room before moving on is a revenue source, and less likely to be working with the cartels against you. Local governments are in some places functionally legalizing/displacing the more harmful criminal types.

-Nicaragua in particular has started a racket of direct migrant shuttle flights from high-migration capitals to Nicaragua. In much the same way of the Belarusian migration crisis bringing Iraqis to the Polish border while the Belarusian government got the money for the 'tour packages,' Nicaragua basically relaxed visa-arrival restrictions and starting flying in planeloads of migrants from countries like Haiti and Cuba, and then gives the migrants a short amount of time to get out of the country starting from halfway up central america. Naturally Ortega makes his cuts, and while the US has pressured some airlines to stop, there's still plenty of money.

-Building on public awareness, the US domestic squabble of the Texas bussing of migrants to sanctuary cities was an international highlight on the, well, 'free reception' on hand if you did arrive in the US and reach a Sanctuary city. When internationally recognizable cities like New York complain that they can't continue to spend thousands of dollars a month per migrant providing food, housing, job permisions, and etc., that's not a problem- that's an advertisement to get it while you can.

-Finally, there has been increasing regional coordination between migration-transit countries on the subject. Some of this has been urged by the US, and some has been about, well, using migration as a way to urge changes in US policy that interest the coordinating powers. Not too long ago, there was a Mexican conference with many of the migration-sources, with one of the resolution points asserting a general right to migrate- implicitly obliging the US to not only accept migrants in general, but actively facilitate safe routes and legal avenues into the US. (Other points included removing the current US legal structure that gives greater asylum weight to people from repressive/anti-US countries, like Cuba.)

Put it together, and migration to the US has become hybrid government-private commercial business, with spreading awareness and perceptions of safety and reliability, with highly public 'win' conditions and regional governments sympathetic to further facilitating it.

I think you're doing a good job representing an unpopular position and your contributions are valuable.

I would disagree. The OP is repeating old arguments and narratives rather than addressing the history or context, simply projects a personal value system and uses rhetorical conflation of positions and strawmen to avoid addressing them.

That said, I think you should delete your last paragraph. Complaining about downvotes just summons more downvotes. And take it from someone who has written such screeds, writing about how you're mad at the motte will just generate worse blowback. If you need to step away, just step away.

Or block people, as they already have been.

Isn't this just a general purpose argument for extending the war forever?

No. It's a specific-person argument relevant to the key decision maker based on past actions and demonstrated intentions.

Algorithm for perpetual war

Opponent is losing: Don't stop now, he's toast. March on to victory. Opponent is winning: Don't negotiate from a state of weakness.

Your algorithm lacks basic considerations such as not reflecting the considerations of what objectives are being pursued, the considerations of Putin that Resolute Raven was referring to, not factoring in the game theory of the nuclear weapons.

It also lacks the characteristic of having been made by the person you are responding to, rendering it a straw man that does not address their actual position.

Honestly, I don't know. Maybe Putin wouldn't accept peace even at the current borders. Maybe he would. Maybe he'd give it all back in exchange for international recognition of Crimea. Why are we afraid to try offering an olive branch?

I don't know- why are you afraid?

May other people aren't afraid, they just deem it an irrational and even harmful olive branch based on the multiple other olive branches Putin was offered that Putin discarded, ignored, or used as weapons in the course of his path to the present.

Which returns to your propensity to ignoring the history of involved actors and repeated iterations of conflicts and compromises as a factor in other people's considerations of how to deal with said actors.

To pick just one related to territorial claims, the history that Putin himself recognized Ukranian territorial integrity before he decided not to, before he said he had no further territorial claims on Ukraine, before he sponsored an uprising he claimed he had nothing to do with, before he launched an armed intervention to secure separatist republics he claimed he had no territorial ambitions on, before he annexed them but claimed he had no territorial goals on the rest of Ukraine, before he declared the annexation of not only territories held but territories never captured, to current highly costly efforts to continue conquering territory not held and never held previously.

I think it's fair to add (4) that domestic American politics has reached a point where Ukraine support is no longer unconditional on the part of the opposition party, but subject to negotiations that are politically painful for the current government to concede and (5) that there are some categories of support that the US could draw from WW3 stockpiles, but refuses to (such as re-mobilization of much of the mothball-ground vehicle storage yards)

Of these, however, the most relevant are (1) (war material mismatch, particularly artillery), which is expected to start reversing in late 24/25, and (3) coalition considerations. One of the under-recognized aspects of the Biden Ukraine-supporting-coalition approach has been how much of it has been centered around involving the Europeans, as opposed to a 'fast but American-alone' approach that risked being both insufficient for the time and also giving the Europeans political pretexts to not get on board with the Ukraine support in earnest.' A particular example was the German tank issue- as frustrating as it was, if the US had delivered 'escalatory' western-armor out of the gate, there was a real and non-trivial chance the Germans would have refused to approve Lepord deliveries from anyone.

That's exactly what we will have if we reach peace right now. Except this state will have more living Ukrainians in it.

It won't, because it won't exist, because you can't reach peace right now.

Among the reasons you won't have peace right now is because the Russians are uninterested in peace right now that results in a European-Ukraine as opposed to maintaining what they know to be untenable and belligerent-unacceptable capitulation terms that would result in a Russia-dominated Ukraine that they know the Ukrainians will not accept.

Which is unsurprising to anyone with a vague awareness of the geopolitical calendar and the logistics of the conflict, because they would already be aware that Putin's predictable windows for a stronger hand in actual negotiations is late next year, after the results of the US presidential election are known, after a fighting year where the Russians are anticipated to have an artillery ammo supply advantage, where it's not clear if Ukraine will have enough for an offensive rather than grinding defense, and where the Russians will have a general year-long opportunity to making propaganda hay of a nominally one-sided conflict even as they are already spinning up various military-posturing dynamics to otherwise further their inevitable-victory narratives to try and have a stronger hands in relevant negotiations late next year than they do this year.

My initial bias was that Russia would score a quick victory. Then, influenced by my American media diet, I thought that the Russian economy would collapse and that the Ukraine counteroffensive, backed by advanced American weapons, would be effective.

Admitting a susceptibility to propaganda narratives for nearly the entire duration of the conflict isn't the defense of your reading between the lines that you think it is.

By contrast, the sort of people who recognized the logistical limitations of western artillery ammo were also the people predicting a long drawn out conflict (guerilla or west of the Dneiper), had no pretensions that the Russian economy would collapse, and warned against dramatic territorial expectation-metrics for the offensive.

When that didn't pan on I questioned my assumptions.

You adopted new, and in the current case old, propaganda narratives.

Reading the comments here, I believe that I have arrived at a more realistic stance than most people, who think things like reconquering Crimea are on the table still.

Your belief is irrelevant to your lack of realism, assuming that by realism you are alluding to an accurate understanding of reality of the conflict.

I hope there is a cease fire because I don't think the war is winnable by Ukraine without unacceptable costs from the U.S. Confidence level: 80%.

False appeals to probability are common in pseudo-rationalist posturing, but it only betrays a lack of understanding of what other people consider unacceptable, and acceptable, costs.

You are (allegedly) a utilitarian. Trading real costs for theoretical units of value (utils) is the core conceit of utilitarianism as a model.

That's the problem isn't it? How do value these fuzzy future utils that rest on things like predictions of future actions of dictators?

It's not a problem if you are not actually a utilitarian, but are adopting a utilitarian persona for gravitas while disclaiming the central conceit of considering abstract and future value considerations.

In such a case, the feigned confusion is an appeal to authority, in much the same way the classic 'I don't understand how one could disagree' is an appeal to the unstated reasonable-informed observer rather than an admission of personal limitation.

My prejudice is to take a "greedy algorithm" approach. Let's take the utils right in front of our face before hypothetical future utils (which might even be negative utils!). If you know finance, then think of it like a present value calculation with a high discount rate.

Your prejudice is a poor model for international conflicts in general, and Russia and Putin in particular, who neither collectively or individually follow your preferred paradigm.

Models that are not used by, not followed by, and do not predict the decisions or actions of others are useless for understanding others.

People are FAR too confidence about the future.

Clearly.

Also. Please don't be a jerk, especially to people who are making an effort to argue an unpopular opinion.

Still yawning. Repeating the latest iterations of a nearly two-year old propaganda narrative with even shoddier justifications is not a commendable effort to argue an unpopular opinion. It's simply repeating the latest iterations of a nearly two-year propaganda narrative without acknowledging or dealing with why the opinion earned it's unpopularity. In other words, trite.

I don’t think the war is actually winnable in any near future. And this brings up a lot of potential problems.

First of all, we’re draining resources fighting this war by proxy. Not just the weapons, but fuel, and aid. We don’t have infinite oil reserves to keep Russian oil off the market for the next ten years.

Good news- the Western oil sanctions are not intended to keep Russian oil off the global market, nor do they.

Rather, the Western oil sanctions are intended to undercut Russian profit margins, which is why Russia spent much of the last year functionally subsidizing lower energy prices by selling greater volumes at the lower prices.

Russian and Ukrainian grain was very important to stabilize grain prices globally, that’s not happening because Russia is embargoed

Russia's gain (and fertilizer) is not embargoed on the global market.

and Ukraine is too busy fighting to plant. We can probably do it for a couple of years, but once we get to the place of fighting by proxy for ten years, these kinds of problems are going to get worse.

Good if bitter news on this- the global food situation will get better, not worse, as the Ukrainian war goes on, as global producers have more time to adopt to alternative fertilizer sources, which was the most significant loss. The supply chain loss has already occured in irreversible fashions do the destruction of relevant parts of the Ukrainian fertilizer industry that were located in the industrial east in the opening phases. The fertilizer-chain disruption costs are already built in, and would not revert even if the war ended before the next planting season.

Add to it the loss of the Pakistani rice crops in Asia from last year's flooding, and the food-supply disruption has already occured, while the rebalancing is already starting and will increase over time.

Second, it’s a distraction from other problems. China wants Taiwan. And if we’re distracted by Ukraine, taking Taiwan becomes much easier. I don’t see us trying to have a two front proxy war with both China and Russia. We don’t have the weapons or materials to support both.

Good news again- the weapons and material from any potential Ukraine patron are fundamentally different from those that might be used to support Taiwan, by virtue that Ukraine is a conventional ground war and Taiwan is a naval war.

If China is in range of the sort of ground combat systems being provided to Ukraine, it has already achieved the localized naval superiority to manage a landing of its invasion force, and thus has the naval capacity to keep the arms shipments of land-systems from reaching Taiwan to affect the conflict.

Third, I don’t think we can keep interest on the home front for continuing to support Ukraine with billions a year.

Compared to routine expenditures by the west without political pushback, public disinterest is a reason why Ukrainian aid will continue, not a reason it will falter.

It’s western propaganda that Russia wouldn’t negotiate with Ukraine,

The Western position has never been that Russia wouldn't negotiated with Ukraine. The Western propaganda has been that the Russian negotiating position with Ukraine has never been sincere or particularly serious, given that even pre-war Russian positions amounted to a capitulation of the sovereign ability of Ukraine to run its own foreign policy.

Note that being propaganda does not mean one cannot derive from the truth, which in this case can be compared to various Russia negotiating positions related to Ukraine.

or that Ukrainian culture would be damaged by Russia. There’s no evidence for it. There’s plenty evidence of the exact opposite.

This is, of course, why the Russian pre-war narratives centered around the falseness of Ukrainian identity vis-a-vis their membership as part of the Russian culture, the inadverdently released pre-written victory propaganda celebrated the re-consolidation of the Ukrainian territory into the Russian cultural sphere, the first winter of the war attempted to trigger a mass diaspora and broad depopulation of Ukraine's main remaining population centers via the attempt to target the essential civilian electrical grid, and why occupation-administration's education system is set up to re-educate Ukrainian children into Russians... or at least the youth who weren't kidnapped and scattered across the Russian adoption system without records for future tracking or recovery.

What will be left of Ukraine after Russia and the West are done with their proxy war?

A nation-state centered around Ukrainians, generally democratic and politically European, rather than a subject-state or administrative unit centered around Russians ruled by autocratic collaborators.

It's hard to get good numbers as both Russia and Ukraine lie about everything. But it feels that Ukraine is exhausted and will soon lose this war. My heuristic for this is reading between the lines of the news.

Yawn. You could read that interpretation since the very start of the conflict, given it's been one of the most prevalent propaganda narratives the whole time.

Your confirmation bias will continue to be well fed for the next year, as was predicted nearly half a year ago by the people who recognized the logistical limitations of the western artillery ammo shortage and production-mobilization lagging behind the Russians.

Every optimistic story about Ukraine's war effort in the last year has failed to bear fruit.

Only if you selectively choose the optimistic stories you remember, just as your numbers arguments only bear fruit if you selectively recall your numbers.

I have to ask, at this point, why does the West still support Ukraine?

Because they like its perseverance more than they like Putin's.

There are multiple angles to this, ranging from the domestic political rewards of supporting Ukraine versus costs for wanting rapprochement with Russia, international angles of posturing withing various international organizations and forums, ideological views of various elites, security considerations for military establishments, economic incentives for politically-justifiable retoolings or expansions of military-industrial complexes, and so on.

There's also the point that Putin's kind of a dick, who tried to blackmail and then crash the European economy in the opening year of the war with energy cutoffs that have triggered long-term and painful economic shifts in the European industrial economy. Revenge and retaliation as a form of future-deterrence also play a role.

Yes, it's very convenient that Ukraine is willing to destroy itself to hurt Russia. But, as a utilitarian, I am very skeptical of the benefits of "grand strategy" type decisions like this. The world is complicated. If we let Putin have the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine will he then demand the Polish-speaking parts of Poland? No. It's not like this war has been a resounding success. Furthermore, he could die tomorrow.

The war has been an abject disaster for the Russian state because the Ukrainian nation fought back, with western support, and did so despite obvious and predictable great cost. The deterrence model you appeal to only applies on behalf of the costs already imposed, and threatened to continue to be imposed, which your proposed compromise undercuts by indicating that resistance is neither indefinite or desired by yourself.

Moreover, Putin both started the war with war goals far beyond the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine (hence the attempt at a coup de main centered on Kyiv), and retains war goals far beyond the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine (which, notably, have never voted for association with Russia except when supervised by Russian military forces).

But the deaths suffered by Ukrainian conscripts (and yes Russian conscripts too) are very real. We are trading the deaths of real people for theoretical future benefits.

You are (allegedly) a utilitarian. Trading real costs for theoretical units of value (utils) is the core conceit of utilitarianism as a model.

And we are destroying an entire country in the process.

'We' are not, unless you are speaking in association with the Russians invading Ukraine. The moral, ethical, and legal responsibility for the Ukraine War, the Ukraine War's continuation, and the Ukraine war's future costs are on Putin, who made the destruction of the Ukrainian national identity a core premise of his war from the start.

Why not go to the bargaining table and end this cruel and pointless war?

Because Putin continues to maintain maximalist war goals of in yet another continuation war against Ukraine, with stated and demonstrated objectives of waging a war of national destruction against the Ukrainian nation to subordinate them on revanchist grounds that apply to multiple other partners and allies of the broader Western coalition.

War is always cruel. War doesn't become pointless simply because you don't agree with the point.

Modest correction: the Attorney General did not announce the nullification of the election, the Attorney General asked the electoral court to nullify the election, which the court has not done (yet).

You are correct in that this is the anti-Arrevelo establishment attempting a coup, but I'd disagree that it doesn't involve flailing. This is not the first time by any means that the prosecutor's office has tried to invalidate the election, and while the Government already targeted the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (4 of whom are in exile), it has virtually no regional or extra-regional public backing, including from the US (which sanctioned a few hundred influential Guatemalans over the weekend).

Amending that part of the Constitution has a 'it is everyone's obligation to have an armed revolt.' Hence, letter-of-the-law observence.

For your second paragraph, I'd disagree with your characterization on multiple grounds.

Skirting laws to prevent powerful executives is incredibly normal across democratic systems the world over- it's practically a joke that modern uncontestedly democratic leaders have more formal and informal tools of power than all but the most totalitarian of leaders of old. Fighting gang violence by changing the balance of civil liberties and prosecution is incredibly normal. Having a living history of tensions between the military and civilian government is absolutely normal. These may not be desirable from the perspectives of democracies with already established and comfortable status quos (typically status quos of empowered multi-term executives, low crime, established informal political elite-media alignment, and long times since military-civil disagreement), but they're absolutely normal across the global and last century's experiences of many states that are now considered democracies, particularly those that have faced extreme domestic violence issues (such as insurgencies) in the last century.

Bukele isn't seeking abnormal domination of a national political sphere- he could absolutely be an oligarchic power behind the throne and rule through others if he wanted to. My read is that Bukele basically aspires to be a 'normal' national leader by 'normal' international standards, where being re-elected when you have 80+% public approval is a natural sequence, not a scandal.

A somewhat longer but still short version is that Bukele doesn't consider himself an autocrat, or desiring to be an autocrat in the model of the more malign actors in latin america, but seeking 'normal' political longevity that is utterly uncontroversial in other countries. Re-election is not a particularly controversial thing in 'normal' democracies, and certainly many more politicians have gotten re-elected on a lot less public achievements than Bukele, but few considered, say, Angela Merkel an authoritarian-by-default for seeking considerably more than a Honduran president's time in power. This is where we note that many of the relevant executives in the hemisphere are not only incumbents, but incumbents with far greater corruption or authoritarian bonafides than Bukele is accused of in El Salvador, but they are considered normal / respectable / legitimate. Just in the immediate neighborhood, to the north elements of Guatemala are trying to basically overturn the results of the last election by targetting the president elect, to the east Honduras is ruled by a political dynasty where the power behind the throne is a former president who was removed from office at the order of the country's supreme court, and to the south is, well, Nicaragua. And that's without going further north- where the US is in a two-incumbent election cycle, and further south Brazil is ruled by a re-elected elder statesman who was complicit in one of the largest corruption scandals in hemispheric history.

Bukele can't simply rewrite the constitution because that particular part of the constitution is unmodifiable, and building a new constitution isn't so simple. Letter-of-the-law is simpler. But there's also an element that there's no real indication that Bukele wants to overturn the general constitutional order, as much as chafes at this particular bit.

This is harder to describe eloquently, but part of central american politics is chaffing at the double standards and paternalizing by larger and outside powers. Sometimes that's eachother, sometimes that's the US, it's the typical small-polity-vs-larger-polity mismash. Here, the small-inner identiy is El Salvador, one of the only countries to ban self-succession, and the bigger-outer is every democracy that permits re-election. Having all the hemisphere's major and acknowledged/respected democracies be on board with re-elections for successful/popular leaders, but it being forbidden to El Salvador, can be a grating sort of cultural chauvenism and paternalizing (and paternalism was absolutely a part of that part of the Constitution). There's basically a 'real / normal countries get to do this, but you can't be trusted with it' dynamic, which is going to be frustrating to a country that, well, feels paternalized and bullied by larger neighbors enough that it once went to war over an ugly football game (and a heck of a lot of context of discriminatory / geopolitical abuse).

With that in mind, there's something of a zeitgeist that not only has Bukele been a turning point in El Salvador into a 'normal' country in the sense of being safe enough that it's no longer exceptionally dangerous, but that a re-election of Bukele is a turning point in El Salvador being a 'normal' democracy. Normal democracies have safe streets. Normal democracies have notable public libraries (like the one the Chinese just delivered on for Bukele). Normal democracies also get to fudge and bend the rules of their own rules and constitutions from time to time, whether it's courts inventing new requirements or standards in the absence of clear text, or ignoring plain reading of politically inconvenient text- especially if it can be done to the letter of the law, and with the support of the people.

Bukele doesn't seem particularly interested in running an autocratic one-party state (though that may well be because he doesn't need to at this time). He does, however, seem consistently interested in running a normal democracy. It just so happens that the constitution of the democracy he's in was more concerned about the recent Cold War experiences than in enabling a normal democracy.

I am honestly surprised (and was honestly curious).

Of course I will still shame,

Have you ever successfully shamed someone in this forum into changing their position?

At some point the "experts" in the federal government are going to say "do X" and Florida or some other red-coded state is going to reply "Nah" and in that moment we will find out who's really doomed.

I mean, there are multiple examples across US history to pick from when ideologically-slanted policies depend on not just the passive acceptance, but active support, of the political opposition. Whether you want to pick returning runaway slaves, banning alcohol, faith in the foreign policy/federal aparatus, the war on drugs, migration, and many other things, the answer is typically a failure of top-down management. You can have a certain degree of success top-down if you can create a fait accompli, but if you need active cooperation, well you need active cooperation, and the easiest form of resistance is apathy, let alone active subversion (such as the Sanctuary cities).

It doesn't really 'doom' any of the parties involved, as much as their party-policies until political actors within start changing to adapt to such realities on the ground.

Yawn. No improvement in your argument, or your approach to arguments already made, or your demonstrated understanding of arguments you are responding to.

And also no surprise for that. Never missing an opportunity, and all that.

What, the consequences of illegally and secretly invading or bombing neutral countries finally caught up to the President and Congress spat the dummy, demanding total withdrawal?

Not really, no. Cambodia was not particularly relevant to the American political opinion or actors involved at the time. This isn't exactly some social secret either- there still exists public opinion polling and records of remarks and interviews from the period that you could look at if you cared to.

This is more of a demonstration of your lack of awareness of relevant subject matter.

Nixon and Kissinger were playing their own game, haughtily excluding everyone else from their plans and then turn around with a shocked expression when they got the rug pulled out from under them.

Simply because you believe the framing you subscribe to should be the one others subscribe to does not make it so. It does, however, make you wrong when trying to characterize the reasons that actually held influence to those others.

Expanding the war into Cambodia was a direct cause of much of Nixon and Kissinger's political woes, it went squarely against his electoral promises to withdraw and scale down the war. It caused considerable public anger and distrust, including in Congress. The duo's loss-management skills were poor, especially since fighting in Cambodia didn't change the outcome.

This would be demonstration two...

And what was the fruit of the Paris Accords?

Exactly what was described in the answer you ignored but dismissed as they didn't seem relevant or important to you. Which would be demonstration three....

That's a big war, albeit not a world war.

Absolutes that seem big to people with smaller frames of reference are not the same as big things in absolute terms. A seventh is a considerable and non-trivial fraction, but it is not a big fraction.

America losing a big Vietnam war as opposed to a small Vietnam war surely helped the Soviets in the Cold War.

Since the Soviets subsequently lost the Cold War to the results of the post-drawdown reorientation of the US, that would surely be an uninformed conclusion, even without the fallacious attempt to assume a conclusion that doesn't even hold.

You completely misunderstood my point,

I understood your point, it was simply characteristic of you and unsubtly trying to ignore previous points to make a jab.

I don't see how I'm stupidly deriding American competence when they made the exact same mistake again in Afghanistan,

You are stupidly deriding because you are demonstrating a considerable lack of intelligence, awareness, or understanding of the things you deride.

Such as here. This line, and the paragraph that was clipped, is its own example. It does not take some sort of uncommon insight to identify multidues of differences- and things to critique- between Vietnam and Afghanistan from political, social, diplomatic, economic, military, opposition, local regional, and many other relevant factors. Breezing past them for a not-partiuclarly-well-constructed historical metaphor to force a commonality on topics you have stronger opinions than knowledge about is quite characteristic of you, but also a stupid form of derision.

What's the quote about repeating the same thing again and expecting a different outcome?

You never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

OK, so in pursuit of negotiating leverage over North Vietnam he oversaw the carpet-bombing and wrecking of Cambodia. Is that better?

It is considerably more honest to not ignore context, reason, and the utilitarian considerations at play for the decision makers making decisions, yes. It might even be relevant to note the targets, which were not, in fact, distributed across all of Cambodia.

One in no way needs to believe such reasons are sufficient for them to be relevant, of course. But critiques of amorality are not strengthened when ignoring reasons.

Nixon and Kissinger sought, eventually and after much unnecessary bloodshed, to Vietnamize the conflict. They did not want to pull out

They absolutely wanted to pull out.

Nixon ran on a platform to pull out. Both Nixon and Kissinger were willing to incur significant political costs previous Presidents did not to establish the conditions for how to pull out. Nixon and Kissinger were literally the driving forces for the January 1973 Paris agreements which led to the American pull out.

and have the South Vietnamese get crushed after so much effort had been put in to prop them up.

They did not want South Vietnam to get crushed, but they were absolutely willing to accept the risk of it being lost, because- notably- they were not Domino Theorists, and thus did not believe any defeat would be catastrophic everywhere, and didn't consider Vietnam or the Indo-China border area a vital interest worth pouring the level of resources into.

Kissinger and Nixon thought of Vietnam as a distraction from the bigger and more important issues and areas relevant to strategic competition. Managing a loss in Vietnam was preferable to trying to 'win' Vietnam because 'winning' Vietnam meant being more likely to 'lose' the Cold War.

He wanted US allies to do more of the heavy lifting, sure. But he didn't want to lose.

By your implied conditions of losing, he did. They just would have disputed it was an actual American loss in a meaningful sense of win-lose, as opposed to taking the preferable loss of a lose-lose.

Nixon and Kissinger did not get what they wanted, they doubled down on a bad gamble that, predictably, failed. A recurring issue for US statecraft, that.

Careful, Ranger. Your typical competence on when trying to snidely deride American competence is showing.

Nixon and Kissinger did get the crux of what they wanted: they forced forward negotiations for how the US would get out of Vietnam, got out of Vietnam, recovered the POWs, established a framework for allowing the US to re-intervene if North Vietnam broke the Paris accord, and a few other incidentals that history has generally forgotten. They didn't get everything that they wanted- and some of that it is due to facts beyond the control of American statecraft, by the design of the American state- but no one ever does, and insisting a failing to achieve some things is equivalent to an overall failure is incompetent analysis, particularly when lacking the context behind failings.

The policy choices that let the South Vietnamese get crushed as it did, most notably the cutting off aid that the South Vietnamese government had been dependent and the refusal of the US to re-intervene when North Vietnam broke the Paris accords and began its conventional invasion, were not Nixon-Kissinger policies, and occurred independently of the Cambodia policy. The cut-off of aid was a result of the American Congress throttling the budget, against the wishes of the politically-dead Nixon (who was at the tail end of Watergate), and for a host and variety of reasons of which Cambodia was not particularly salient or relevant to.

How did losing a big Vietnam War put the US on course to achieve its foreign policy objectives or peacefully dissolve the Soviet Union?

This is the not particularly complex concept of reallocation of resources. Unless you think the US was somehow gaining more ability to fight the Soviet Union across the globe by fighting a big war in Vietnam, not-fighting a big war in Vietnam gave the US government big-war resources to use elsewhere.

Which, in fact, we know happened. Just from the military component, once freed from Vietnam responsibilities the post-Vietnam military subsequently went onto a number of deliberate reforms and paradigm shifts that took the US from the 'they couldn't beat peasants guerilla fighters in a jungle' reputation to 'they defeated a million-man Soviet-style army with more casualties to friendly fire than enemy fire' in less than 20 years- and thus part of the psychological setup of perceived and actual inferiority that undermined the willingness of the Soviets to violently resist the separatists and dissolution of the Soviet empire-state. Meanwhile, back to the 70s, the reallocation for forces / focus from Vietnam allowed the US to re-balance in other areas including Korea (where the North Koreans had been trying to use the US preoccupation with Vietnam to attempt it's own insurgency-uprising), Europe (where nearly a seventh of the American military that was the critical assumption of NATO was tied down in Vietnam), the Middle East (where american logistical networks no longer pre-occupied supporting Vietnam played a significant role in the Yom Kipper resupply efforts), and elsewhere.

The benefit of resource reallocation only holds, of course, if you consider Vietnam a 'big' war in the first place. At its height, the US military presence in Vietnam was only about half a million active-duty service members.

But Kissinger just straightforwardly bombed and wrecked Cambodia.

There was considerably more to it than that, so this would be a reductionist rather than accurate summation of the reasons involved.

If your thesis is that anti-communist containment was a global good that should be pursued despite a few megadeaths,

That is not the thesis, no.

then doing what he did in South East Asia was actually really bad since it hurt the anti-communist agenda, tarred it with the sting of defeat, led to the Ford/Carter years of pullback and consolidation.

Pullback and consolidation is a considerable part of what Nixon-Kisenger were trying to do, seeking to create the conditions for, and saw as a key point in the anti-communist containment vis-a-vis a position of unsustainable overreach.

This is not the counter-argument you think it is.