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Soriek  4mo ago (text post)   836 thread views

Transnational Thursdays 29

This is a weekly thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or IR history. I usually start off with coverage of some current events from a mix of countries I follow personally and countries I think the forum lives in or might be interested in. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.

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Venezuela

Venezuela held a referendum last Friday on whether or not to claim sovereignty over the Essequibo region of Guyana. Essequibo is mineral rich, and the exclusive economic zone contains quite a bit of oil, which Guyana has been busily contracting off to multinationals to Venezuela’s frustration.

Venezuela has always considered Essequibo as its own because the region was within its boundaries during the Spanish colonial period, and it has long disputed the border decided by international arbitrators in 1899 when Guyana was still a British colony.

That boundary was decided by arbitrators from Britain, Russia and the United States. The US represented Venezuela on the panel in part because the Venezuelan government had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain.

Venezuelan officials contend that Americans and Europeans conspired to cheat their country out of the land and argue that a 1966 agreement to resolve the dispute effectively nullified the original arbitration.

For reference, this is an area about the size of Greece (as Guardian helpfully points out) and equivalent to straight up two thirds of the territory of Guyana. Claiming the region amounts to essentially promising to invade and conquer most of the nation, so the Guyanese are understandably a little upset that the referendum has been approved. The linked article kind of suggests the >97% vote itself was fraudulent, or at least that observers didn’t see the kind of long lines and busy polling stations that the reported 10.5 million votes would have suggested. Ironically, this seems like the least interesting question to me; the anti-Maduro opposition also recognizes Essequibo as rightful VZL clay so it seems to be an idea with fairly popular support. The real question is: what happens next?

“Furthermore, Venezuelan military officials announced that Venezuela is taking concrete measures to build an airstrip to serve as a ‘logistical support point for the integral development of the Essequibo,’” she said.

The 61,600-square-mile (159,500 sq km) territory borders Brazil, whose defence ministry said earlier this week it has “intensified its defence actions” and boosted its military presence in the region as a result of the dispute.

Maduro is at least acting like he's serious:

Maduro said he would “immediately” proceed “to grant operating licenses for the exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and mines in the entire area of our Essequibo.” He also ordered the creation of local subsidiaries of Venezuelan public companies, including oil giant PDVSA and mining conglomerate Corporación Venezolana de Guayana....

In addition to the announcement regarding the exploitation of resources in Essequibo, Maduro announced Tuesday the creation of a new Comprehensive Defense Operational Zone, Zodi in Spanish, for the disputed strip, similar to the special military commands that conduct operations in different regions of the country.

But is Venezuela really about to invade Guyana? I would guess no, at least not while they have other issues and priorities they’re also focusing on (like becoming less of a regional or international pariah).

Meanwhile, can they even physically act on this? Guyana’s long term strategy in case of Venezuelan invasion has to be as un-invadable as possible, so a long time ago they designated the area on the border as a national park and left it extremely wild and overgrown. This makes traditional overland invasion difficult, so a hypothetical invasion could even require movement through Brazil, which is why Brazil itself is fortifying its own defenses. Lula has restored relations with Maduro, but he isn’t going to aid Venezuela in a hostile overland annexation of a long-time Brazilian ally by force.

So there probably isn’t a ton of will or means to act on this referendum. Most likely this is a way for Maduro to boost support in advance of the election.

And what about that election? In theory America’s lifting of the sanctions are contingent upon Venezuela lifting its ban on opposition leader Maria Machado from running in the election by the end of November. Well, it’s December now and things still look uncertain:

Opposition candidates barred from public office in Venezuela will be able to appear before the country's top tribunal, which will rule on their bans, the country's government and opposition said in a joint statement late on Thursday.

The announcement comes on the day of a United States deadline for the government of President Nicolas Maduro to take steps to remove the bans or risk the renewal of recently relaxed sanctions.

This is vague, but enough of a bone thrown that America isn’t going to reinstate sanctions right away, so it’ll be interesting to see what happens next. On the other hand, the top government prosecutor has suddenly accused several opposition of figures, so this is all somewhat two steps forward, three steps back. Ironically they are accused of trying to undermine the referendum on Guyana, which the opposition supported, and which is a largely amusing accusation given that the near 100% favorability results were quite likely fixed by the government anyway.

The United Kingdom

More updates on ex-Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s plan to deport migrants to Rwanda, temporarily frozen by Britain’s Supreme Court (is it weird that the court was founded in 2009 and can overturn major legislative decisions? It seems weird from the outside, even though that’s what a Supreme Court is supposed to do after all). The deal is apparently back on because Britain and Rwanda have now signed a formal agreement (which apparently overrules court decisions). The deal was overseen by James Cleverly, Suella Braverman’s replacement as Home Secretary:

Under the new treaty, signed by British Home Secretary (interior minister) James Cleverly and which replaces a non-binding memorandum of understanding, Britain said Rwanda would not expel asylum seekers to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened - one of the court's major concerns.

There will also be a monitoring committee to enable individuals to lodge confidential complaints directly to them, and a new appeal body made up of judges from around the world.

Cleverly said he expected migrants to be heading to Rwanda in the coming months because the treaty addressed all the issues raised by the Supreme Court..

However, many lawyers and charities said it was unlikely that deportation flights could start before an election expected next year. The opposition Labour Party, which has a double-digit lead in the polls, plans to ditch the Rwanda policy if it wins.

Under the plan agreed last year, Britain intends to send thousands of asylum seekers who arrived on its shores without permission to Rwanda to deter migrants making the dangerous journey across the Channel from Europe in small boats.

In return, Rwanda has received an initial payment of 140 million pounds ($180 million) with the promise of more money to fund the accommodation and care of any deported individuals.

The British parliament has now attempted to rush through a bill saying this is all well and good under the European Court of Human Rights. However, Robert Jenrick, the Immigration Minister, has actually suddenly resigned, apparently because he feels the legislation doesn't go far enough.

The legislation unveiled by the government on Wednesday did not take the UK out of the treaty, but did have a vital caveat attached to it. On the first page of the bill, UK Home Secretary James Cleverley said he could not guarantee that the legislation was “compatible with the Convention rights.”

The bill also disapplies certain sections of the UK Human Rights Act, a staple piece of legislation which incorporated the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic UK law. Another clause stipulates that the bill is sovereign and its validity is unaffected by key international law instruments including the ECHR and the Refugee Convention.

The Supreme Court was created by Tony Blair to take over from the original last court of appeal, which was essentially parliament itself. Specifically, the court was staffed by the Law Lords, who were part of the House of Lords and therefore associated with legislation). Ostensibly because it was inappropriate to have the highest court of appeal be part of the government.

To let my prejudices take over, it was a classic piece of Blairism in that it was constitutional change for the sake of change. He had an obsession with being 'modern', so he made hamfisted changes to the country in ways that now can't be stopped - making the Bank of England independent, devolving government in Scotland, Wales and NI, the creation of hate crimes and 'protected characteristics', mass immigration, and trying to splice Napoleonic European rights law into British Common Law. The last of those is responsible for the majority of problems, as it destroys the load-bearing principle that Parliament is sovereign and pretty much all of our constitution with it. This is creating all the problems re: immigration.

"Giving a title to a court that includes the adjective ‘supreme’ – and putting no higher domestic judicatory above it – might be thought to be, at the very least, a temptation to judicial overreach."

https://policyexchange.org.uk/blogs/the-difference-leaving-the-house-of-lords-has-made/

The British parliament has now attempted to rush through a bill saying this is all well and good under the European Court of Human Rights. However, Robert Jenrick, the Immigration Minister, has actually suddenly resigned, apparently because he feels the legislation doesn't go far enough.

There is an increasingly strong suspicion that Rishi Sunak is pro-immigration but has to be publicly against it, so he's pushing 'solutions' that he knows will get tied up in legal appeal until after the election. Certainly, he's dead-set against actually reducing our commitments to international human rights law, which is what Jenrick is advocating, and it's not realistically possible to do anything about immigration without doing so.

“The stakes for the country are too high for us not to pursue the stronger protections required to end the merry-go-round of legal challenges which risk paralysing the scheme and negating its intended deterrent,” Jenrick said in his resignation letter.

is it weird that the court was founded in 2009 and can overturn major legislative decisions? It seems weird from the outside, even though that’s what a Supreme Court is supposed to do after all

Well, if you have new institutions then they will tend to do what they were designed to do. Maybe it is surprising for you that they managed to actually create new major institution rather than having forever gridlock (not saying that this court was a good idea, I am not fan of alternative judiciary parliament but have no great alternative ideas either)?

The Supreme Court contributes to gridlock - it exists to frustrate legislation, not make it.

In theory. In practice supreme courts/constitutional courts often engage in de facto legislation by creative interpretation.

Finland & China

Not two countries I thought I would be listing side by side, but Finland has been conducting its investigation into the early October incident that ruptured the gas pipeline between them and Estonia and the telecom wires between them and Sweden. Unfortunately for international stability, they seem to be pointing the finger at China.

An investigation by Finnish authorities identified as the main suspect Chinese container ship Newnew Polar Bear, which is believed to have dragged its anchor across the Baltic Sea seabed, cutting through the cables and gas lines. The anchor — which weighs 6,000 kilograms — was retrieved a few meters from the site of the damage.

Finland and Estonia have since been in touch with Chinese authorities seeking their cooperation with the investigation. The Baltic Times reported earlier this week that the two European countries have asked to send representatives to Beijing to investigate the vessel, which is currently en route to a Chinese port.

Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur expressed similar sentiment in an interview with Swedish public broadcaster SVT last month, saying the captain of the ship surely "understood that there was something wrong" after dragging an anchor for over 180 kilometers.

Coming more than a year after the Nord Stream gas pipelines connecting Russia to Germany were damaged by several explosions, the Balticconnector incident raises more concerns over the safety of undersea critical infrastructure and possible measures to protect them from external sabotage. No culprit has been identified for the Nord Stream attack despite an international investigation.

I’ll leave that last sentence hanging just to remind everyone how much weirdness there has been about figuring out who is to blame in all this (the west seems the most likely to have benefited from Nord Strom; pretty unclear who benefits here).

Being a sailor myself, it pains me to admit that the most plausible explanation is that the skipper of the Newnew Polar Bear did, surely, understand something was wrong--but hoped it was no big deal, and no one would notice. In fact, finding an anchor that was dragged for nearly 200 klicks on the floor, just "a few meters" from the damaged cables and gas lines makes it just to easy for me to know exactly what a Newnew Polar Bear sailor felt like after two or three hours on the deck crew trying to get the anchor hauled up when the XO shouts over the 1MC, "Fuck the anchor, we're about to hit an seabed pipeline--cut the chain NOW!"

They almost made it.

So much for the Skipper's dream of commanding the more prestigious ship, Oldold Polar Bear.

You have a point, although it's still negligent to wait until the last second.

I mean Finland is only once removed from China border wise

the west seems the most likely to have benefited from Nord Strom

from its existence or damage?

(answer strongly depends on how much you are scared by Russian influence on Europe and how much you value cheap energy)

Better yet, split the west into Europe and America, and ask who benefits from the destruction of European industry and the generation of a new dependence on liquefied natural gas.

destruction of European industry

Also here you have two factors: via high energy prices (OK, partial destruction) and via stupid not needed war in central Europe (yes, chance is tiny and effects are tiny, but still that would be fuckup on such scale that even tiny changes are significant)

You mean, the chance that the war spreads into Poland, Germany etc?

Yes. But Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania would be far more likely as start.

(not claiming that either is likely or feasible short term, within decade but on longer scale war is a risk)

US & Philippines

This is essentially just a much a China issue as the previous post. Philippines for the past decade has somewhat waffled between leaning towards China or the US, especially under Duterte, the President who has done the most to emphasize the brutality of the American colonial administration of the nation. However, the past few years have seen the Philiipines leaning decisively back towards the US, especially as China grows more aggressive in the disputed territories of the South China Sea (we should really call that something else, shouldn’t we?) The US has even openly committed to defending the Philippines if they are attacked, a statement of such commitment towards a conflict that could very easily happen, even by accident, that even some hawkish anti-China folks swallowed a little nervously when they heard it.

The United States renewed a warning Monday that it would defend the Philippines in case of an armed attack under a 1951 treaty, after Chinese ships blocked and collided with two Filipino vessels off a contested shoal in the South China Sea…

"The Philippine government views the latest aggression by China as a blatant violation of international law," Teodoro said. "China has no legal right or authority to conduct law enforcement operations in our territorial waters and in our exclusive economic zone."...

"The United States stands with our Philippine allies in the face of the People's Republic of China coast guard and maritime militia's dangerous and unlawful actions obstructing an October 22 Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal," the U.S. State Department said in a statement issued by its embassy in Manila.

It blamed the dangerous maneuvers by China's ships for the collisions and added that they "violated international law by intentionally interfering with the Philippine vessels' exercise of high seas freedom of navigation."

Reuters offers a bit of a retrospective on how the two countries became close again:

Manila-based political analyst Julio Amador III described the U.S. outreach as “unprecedented love-bombing” aimed at resetting the U.S.-Philippines relationship. Marcos’ predecessor, the populist firebrand Rodrigo Duterte, was openly hostile to the United States and attempted to bring his country closer to communist China during his six-year term.

There is urgency to the U.S. charm offensive: America needs Manila squarely in its camp as tensions with China rise in the Asia-Pacific.

The Philippines, Taiwan’s neighbor to the south, would be an indispensable staging point for the U.S. military to aid Taipei in the event of a Chinese attack, military analysts say.

The State Department also cited a 2016 arbitration ruling that invalidated China's expansive claims to the South China Sea on historical grounds, including in Second Thomas Shoal.

Washington lays no claims to the disputed sea but has deployed forces to patrol the waters to promote freedom of navigation and overflight — moves that have angered Beijing, which has warned the U.S. to stop meddling in what it says is a purely Asian dispute.

El Salvador

A few weeks ago @Dean wrote a detailed writeup of how Nayib Bukele plans to technically qualify for another term in office. The long story short is that the constitution doesn’t explicitly ban candidates from having multiple terms, it just bans them from succeeding themselves, so he’s going to step down, be replaced temporarily by a puppet, then run again. Poof, voila, it’s all under the law.

Congress has now formally granted Bukele a six month leave of absence. Not exactly exhausting himself in proving critics wrong that his replacement will be a puppet, the new President is literally just his secretary. Congratulations to Claudia Juana Rodríguez de Guevara, the first woman President of El Salvador.

It kinda raises the question: what’s the point of all this? Why go through the motions of a very low effort, transparent, by-the-letter-of-the-law power grab? With a reliable supermajority of senators voting for this, would they really draw the line at just amending the constitution to let him hold another term? All the cool autocrats have done it.

It kinda raises the question: what’s the point of all this? Why go through the motions [...] ?

Because Claudia Juana Rodríguez de Guevara heard from Dmitry Medvedev that fake president comes with a great health plan? I bet fake presidents get platinum plans with zero deductible on like five dollar a month premiums.

Bukele isn't seeking abnormal domination of a national political sphere- he could absolutely be an oligarchic power behind the throne and rule through others if he wanted to. My read is that Bukele basically aspires to be a 'normal' national leader by 'normal' international standards, where being re-elected when you have 80+% public approval is a natural sequence, not a scandal.

A somewhat longer but still short version is that Bukele doesn't consider himself an autocrat, or desiring to be an autocrat in the model of the more malign actors in latin america, but seeking 'normal' political longevity that is utterly uncontroversial in other countries. Re-election is not a particularly controversial thing in 'normal' democracies, and certainly many more politicians have gotten re-elected on a lot less public achievements than Bukele, but few considered, say, Angela Merkel an authoritarian-by-default for seeking considerably more than a Honduran president's time in power. This is where we note that many of the relevant executives in the hemisphere are not only incumbents, but incumbents with far greater corruption or authoritarian bonafides than Bukele is accused of in El Salvador, but they are considered normal / respectable / legitimate. Just in the immediate neighborhood, to the north elements of Guatemala are trying to basically overturn the results of the last election by targetting the president elect, to the east Honduras is ruled by a political dynasty where the power behind the throne is a former president who was removed from office at the order of the country's supreme court, and to the south is, well, Nicaragua. And that's without going further north- where the US is in a two-incumbent election cycle, and further south Brazil is ruled by a re-elected elder statesman who was complicit in one of the largest corruption scandals in hemispheric history.

Bukele can't simply rewrite the constitution because that particular part of the constitution is unmodifiable, and building a new constitution isn't so simple. Letter-of-the-law is simpler. But there's also an element that there's no real indication that Bukele wants to overturn the general constitutional order, as much as chafes at this particular bit.

This is harder to describe eloquently, but part of central american politics is chaffing at the double standards and paternalizing by larger and outside powers. Sometimes that's eachother, sometimes that's the US, it's the typical small-polity-vs-larger-polity mismash. Here, the small-inner identiy is El Salvador, one of the only countries to ban self-succession, and the bigger-outer is every democracy that permits re-election. Having all the hemisphere's major and acknowledged/respected democracies be on board with re-elections for successful/popular leaders, but it being forbidden to El Salvador, can be a grating sort of cultural chauvenism and paternalizing (and paternalism was absolutely a part of that part of the Constitution). There's basically a 'real / normal countries get to do this, but you can't be trusted with it' dynamic, which is going to be frustrating to a country that, well, feels paternalized and bullied by larger neighbors enough that it once went to war over an ugly football game (and a heck of a lot of context of discriminatory / geopolitical abuse).

With that in mind, there's something of a zeitgeist that not only has Bukele been a turning point in El Salvador into a 'normal' country in the sense of being safe enough that it's no longer exceptionally dangerous, but that a re-election of Bukele is a turning point in El Salvador being a 'normal' democracy. Normal democracies have safe streets. Normal democracies have notable public libraries (like the one the Chinese just delivered on for Bukele). Normal democracies also get to fudge and bend the rules of their own rules and constitutions from time to time, whether it's courts inventing new requirements or standards in the absence of clear text, or ignoring plain reading of politically inconvenient text- especially if it can be done to the letter of the law, and with the support of the people.

Bukele doesn't seem particularly interested in running an autocratic one-party state (though that may well be because he doesn't need to at this time). He does, however, seem consistently interested in running a normal democracy. It just so happens that the constitution of the democracy he's in was more concerned about the recent Cold War experiences than in enabling a normal democracy.

That's what I'm asking though, if they don't like the constitution / don't feel like it allows them to be a "normal" democracy, why not just amend it? The single term thing isn't some American imposition or Cold War measure, they've had that rule across their constitutions since the 19th century, in large part because they've had a consistent issue with executives trying to overstay their welcome.

In general where you say "normal democracy" you would be better served saying "nice country". Guatemala is nothing like a normal democracy, as I've covered closely here, and isn't a reasonable comparison of normalcy. Carefully skirting laws put in place by your people to prevent powerful executives, fighting gang violence by suspending traditional rule of law or freedom of the press, having the military threaten lawmakers who disagree with you, etc, may make El Salvador a "nicer country" from some people's perspectives, but it's a stretch to say it makes them a more normal democracy.

Amending that part of the Constitution has a 'it is everyone's obligation to have an armed revolt.' Hence, letter-of-the-law observence.

For your second paragraph, I'd disagree with your characterization on multiple grounds.

Skirting laws to prevent powerful executives is incredibly normal across democratic systems the world over- it's practically a joke that modern uncontestedly democratic leaders have more formal and informal tools of power than all but the most totalitarian of leaders of old. Fighting gang violence by changing the balance of civil liberties and prosecution is incredibly normal. Having a living history of tensions between the military and civilian government is absolutely normal. These may not be desirable from the perspectives of democracies with already established and comfortable status quos (typically status quos of empowered multi-term executives, low crime, established informal political elite-media alignment, and long times since military-civil disagreement), but they're absolutely normal across the global and last century's experiences of many states that are now considered democracies, particularly those that have faced extreme domestic violence issues (such as insurgencies) in the last century.

Why go through the motions of a very low effort, transparent, by-the-letter-of-the-law power grab? With a reliable supermajority of senators voting for this, would they really draw the line at just amending the constitution to let him hold another term?

presumably doing this is harder

It kinda raises the question: what’s the point of all this? Why go through the motions of a very low effort, transparent, by-the-letter-of-the-law power grab?

Less paperwork this way? Whatever the reason, it does my rules-lawyering heart good to see someone manage it on a national scale.

Netherlands

Negotiations on the Dutch government appear to still be stalled:

The official appointed to investigate possible coalitions after the Dutch election won by Geert Wilders ' far-right Party for Freedom said Friday he needs more time because of reluctance by potential partners to join Wilders in a government…

The delay comes after two key parties backed away from joining a coalition with Wilders. The new leader of the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) of outgoing prime minister Mark Rutte has said she will not join a coalition led by Wilders, but would offer it support in parliament.

Pieter Omtzigt, the leader of another potential coalition partner, New Social Contract, told Plasterk he was not yet ready to discuss forming a coalition with Wilders.

Similar to Spain and Poland, I will likely continue to provide updates here until the chips have fallen. Previous posts on the Dutch election can be found here and here.

I will likely continue to provide updates here until the chips have fallen.

Keep in mind that the previous formation period lasted over nine months. There probably won't be exciting news every week.

Previous posts on the Dutch election can be found here and here.

You seem to be missing your links here.

Thanks, fixed

Peru

Last week I covered Peruvian President Dina Boularte being accused by the Attorney General of human rights abuses. For a point of comparison or precedent, I brought up former President Alberto Fujimori (father of opposition leader Keiko Fujimori) who is currently serving a 25 year sentence for human rights abuses in the same prison as ex-President Castillo. Ironically, this last week the top Peruvian constitutional court ruled to restore a previous Presidential pardon for Fujimori.

Fujimori was President from 1990 to 2000, following a highly populist leader named Alan Garcia1 who ran the country into hyperinflation. Fujimori preceded to liberalize the economy and sent Peru into “Fuji-shock,” a period of short term pain followed by greater stability. The arc is somewhat similar to Pinochet’s neolibreal overhaul following Allende’s populism, inviting the pejorative nickname “El Chinochet,” which apparently Fujimori himself wasn’t so mad about it.

The other similarity between the two leaders was their uncompromising approach to left wing anti-government forces, which in Peru were much more serious than Chile. Aside from the economy, the big issue of the time was El Sendero Luminoso, the Shining Path, a Maoist terrorist group that had been fighting the government for a decade by the 90s (there is an interesting conversation to be had about how much time and money China sunk into spreading its ideology in Africa with little success, only for copycat movements to appear in places like Peru that they never even reached out to). Fujimori addressed this in straightforward fashion by forming death squads and granting them amnesty for human rights abuses, as well as commissioning the armed forces to massacre and mass sterilize Peru’s indigenous population (The Shining Path leadership were European-Peruvians who in theory wanted to draw their membership from the impoverished indigenous Peruvians, but in practice spent more time killing them). Ultimately things caught up with him and he was convicted for directly ordering one of these massacres, as well as for embezzlement.

A later President, Kuczynski Godard, pardoned Fujimori after Fujimori’s son Kenji helped him slide through impeachment hearings over his involvement in the infamous Operation Car Wash scandal that sent Brazilian President Lula to prison. It was pretty nakedly political and the courts reversed it.

So needless to say overturning the ruling now and releasing him from prison is a controversial move. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has protested the decision and urged Peru not to release him, and within a couple days the courts reversed their move and said that he will remain in prison. The decision appears to be reversed again and yesterday Fujimori was officially released from prison. It should still be said that Fujimori is like 85 and probably doesn’t have much longer left anyway, so the main impact of this decision is symbolic. However, the intermediate ruling has unfortunately hit the family twice as hard, and Keiko Fujimori will now be forced to face charges for her role in…also Operation Car Wash.

1Ironically Garcia came back to power in 2006 and oversaw a period of consistent economic growth. He later killed himself after being implicated in, you guessed it, Operation car Wash. If you are wondering if there are any Peruvian politicians who weren’t involved in the scandal, you are not alone.

Spain

Last week I reported on Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez finally securing another term through allying with the Catalan independence party Junts by offering amnesty for their illegal referendum. This is an unpopular move even among left wing voters and he may come to regret the alliance very soon. Puigemont, leader of Junts, has already threatened to withdraw his support and offer it to the conservatives if Sanchez does not take steps towards Catalan independence.

Speaking to Brussels Playbook on the sidelines of the POLITICO 28 gala dinner on Tuesday night, Puigdemont said his seven Junts MPs, who struck a deal to prop up Sánchez’s government earlier this month in exchange for an amnesty for everyone involved in the failed 2017 Catalan independence referendum, would be open to working with the conservative Popular Party (PP) to depose Sánchez mid-term.

Junts would consider a motion of no confidence in Sánchez’s government if it could agree with the PP on an independent prime minister to replace the Socialist, said Puigdemont, “But for that, the PP must make a step toward us … they cannot keep treating me like a terrorist.” The Popular Party won the most votes in Spain’s July election, but could not form a government.

Asked about Puigdemont’s comments on Wednesday, Popular Party leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo appeared reticent about any potential tie-up, telling Spanish media he could not “accept” Junts’ “conditions” because “they are illegal and go against the constitution and the equality of Spaniards.”

Is this a serious threat? The center right PP would only be able to hold a majority, even with Junts, if they worked with the far right Vox, a nationalist party literally created as a backlash to the Catalan independence referendum. Vox was so desparate to unseat the socialists that they promised to support a PP government even if they didn’t get any ministerial posts, but working together with their sworn enemy is surely a bridge too far (and presumably the same is true for Junts voters as well). So no, likely there is no actual coalition that could form a government, but things could be forced to another election, where the left wing parties would do worse, ironically partially because they’re kowtowing to Catalan demands at all. Sanchez’ rule is and will likely continue to be a very unstable one (and I do imagine he will probably hold onto power, only weakly so).

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