Dean
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Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
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I do not think people's unrelated good and bad acts somehow function to cancel each other out. Maybe if the evil things were in some way necessary to do the good things we can say the things were on net good but I don't think a case could be made that Kissinger's evils were actually necessary to accomplish his good deeds. You don't get, like, one free murder for every life you save. Or every thousand. Or every million. You get no free murders!
The dissolve all government and trust in the inherent goodness of anarchy, because otherwise that's exactly what you get if you accept the legitimacy of policy at scale.
Policy is about choices, including not making choices. People will die as a consequence of not only action, but also no action, and also regardless of action. There is no world where government action at scale doesn't negatively impact many people, there are only worlds where you don't mind the losers because you like the winning more. This is why 'good' and 'evil' policies are judged on more than just the presence of deaths.
This is where individual-level morality of individuals fails to be coherent at scale, because 'acts' and 'deeds' can be individual actions independent of eachother. You can conduct one with no need to conduct the other. But this isn't true at the policy level of not just national, but international level. The good and the bad are not independent of eachother, they are often outputs of the same sort of policies. To pick a mostly benevolently-seen example, the same 'let's save the environment' policies that push for electrical vehicles also drive mass strip mining and enable the geopolitical blackmail shenanigans of the resource-controllers that not only enable, but empower, abuse of people at regional scales. You don't actually have the policy finess to go 'I want the good stuff, but none of the bad,' particularly when inconsistent strategy can deliver worse of both. This is how Responsibility to Protect legal theories that won the public argument about western intervention in Libya led to... open-air slave markets in Libya.
When it comes to Kissinger's career, the evils and the goods both came from the same overarching Cold War policies of communist containment that led to the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War. Despite some nostalgic revisionism, there was nothing pre-ordained about the fall of the Soviet Union, or that it would occur in the way it did. The Soviety Union was not, in fact, too poor to keep itself together by force- it lacked the will, not the means, to maintain a nuclear-deterrence repression state. In so much that Kissinger's good deeds entailed the relatively peaceful dismantling of the Soviet Union, so did his bad crimes.
I'd go further that Kissenger violated a number of ideological tropes and expectations.
Kissinger was a Holocaust surviving Jew (by narrow evasion of the fascists) who became strongly aligned with the American political right rather than left, a European who became an ardent anti-communist rather than a social-democrat, and thus something of a ideological/race-traitor theme which akin the progressive reaction to prominent black conservatives. He also worked directly against a common preconception/trope of a successful diplomat being someone who is supposed to avoid war at all costs and speak in universalist rather than national-interest terms. More to the point, he was a flagrantly ambitious and a publicity hound at various points, and so rather than quietly exist within the state apparatus or quietly retire to obscurity, he made a good part of his later-life about trying to be an elder statesman and defending his legacy.
That made him an active proponent of an otherwise often faceless machine, but also means that people's desires to anthromorphize broader collectives had an easy target to pin collective actions and policies onto, which has the effect of re-allocating responsibility away from less subtle actors in more flattering ways. It becomes a singular personal issue (Kissinger and his cronies were the cause of State Department anticommunist policy) rather than a broader trend (Kissinger was just the most prominent of an extensive line of anti-communists in the State Department who would have attempted by and large the same things regardless).
While there's plenty to criticize, I do agree that a good deal of the motte-expansive criticism of him rests on hyper-agency/hypo-agency distinctions. Very few Cold War critics treat anti-communists as having their own agency to commit atrocities rather than as American dependents operating at the direction of the Americans (and thus who would not have acted/been successful in their crimes without it). (And, by extension, anti-communists have no agency and commit atrocities; pro-communists have agency in resisting the US/west, and their crimes are brushed over as able. Who, whom, and all that.)
Edited for clarity of the memtic nature of the point.
I assume a typo in the last sentence?
The modest version is that jewdefender presents as being against racial-supremacist arguments while making nominally anti-white supremacist posts that borrow heavily from white-supremacist tropes that are used to undermine the nominal 'we've got to resist these people' facelevel argument while adopting the conclusions. In this case, a 'why can't we have a honest conversation without disclaiming racial violence' and 'I get we need to be neutral and objective'- the defensible mottes- are surrounded by a laundry-list of 'non-white bad' and appeals for ethno-supremacist supremacist states which routinely use violence to enforce a dominant ethnic-identity paradigm.
Oversimplified, the persona's schtick is 'I'm totally against white supremacists, I'm just going to raise all these points they say they make framed for you to agree with their conclusions, but I'm totally not associated, really.'
A longer version includes that they're also suspected of being a repeated past troll who's just updated their posting style a bit.
Osama's broader grievance-theme was about the loss of respectability/pride of the Arab-Islamic world than Israel per see, though there isn't much distance between them.
This ties to a broader theme in (generally Arab) Islamist thought which contrasts the golden age of the Islamic ascent (when the Arabs dominated the ancient empire of Persia, and then Islamists as a whole overthrew the (Eastern) Robman Empire, truly ancient and established major powers of the era), were broadly acknowledged as world-leaders in thought and technology (in large part from adopting/synthesizing/spreading the knowledge centers they conquered), and were the dominant military force that seemed to ever-advance on all fronts as the Christians feared them, but even the culture-shock of the crusaders were thrown back in a series of triumphs against the outsider... compared to the subjugation of the colonial eras, and then the present malais where the Arab identity isn't a thing of pride and admiration from afar, but with its vices of decadence, impovershment, corruption, and hypcrisy well known. There is a consistent thing of 'things were better when we were better,' with radical islaming groups functionally viewing/presenting themselves as radical reformists trying to correct a shamefully corruption.
I hate to oversimplify it as 'it's a pride thing,' but that's not far away from it. It's about self-respect as much as esteem in comparison to others... which is where Israel comes through, as the Jews were an unquestionable under-class, something that even the lowest Arab good-Islamic person was above, until Israel defeated the prides of the Arab world- some of the key leaders of the pan-Arabism when Arab identity-politics was at its height- repeatedly, decisively, and humiliatingly in multiple wars. If you read some of the diplomatic history from around the time of the foundation of Israel and some of the early wars, there are heavy and repeated themes and points where Arab states were acting out of pride and emotion, rather than reason/rationality/interests/strategy. Politiclaly, Yom Kippur War was more about proving the Israelis weren't invincible and restoring Egyptian self-respect than an actual campaign plan or changing the borders- hence why the Egyptians decisively lost the war, but were willing to accept the land-for-peace arrangement with Israel and the US not too long after.
Returning to OBL, Israel is the 'core issue' because Israel is evidence against pride, and the reminder of humiliation. Erasing Israel is about erasing shame, but the core/underlying issue is one of pride and self-respect which cannot make peace with what one views as properly inferior.
Or at least that's view, though the distinction may be irrelevant.
It’s not clear to me how much of a consensus this is outside of Australia, Canada, and NZ,
Basically every military that has fought an insurgency or an urban conflict in the last century, or otherwise had to fight a conflict where a house is a battle position, has adopted the force protection argument that some civilian casualties are acceptable. This goes from Russia to the Philippines to Sri Lanka and India to Iran and Saudi Arabia to Colombia and every NATO member.
This is usually the point where I remind an audience that war is hell, and that the laws of wars are about limiting, not preventing, civilian casualties. The conventions on how to wage war 'right' are as much about protecting every single life as a fire break is about stopping forest fires. The effects are good for the greater whole, but the part of the forest within the forest break is fully expected to burn.
So there’s indeed a strong case to be made that regardless of civilian casualties, the IDF has not committed war crimes in this particular air strike campaign. Not that anyone already calling it “genocide” would care to change their minds, of course.
This is generally correct. There will be some specific cases that people will focus on, but these can depend on having insight into the belligerent perspectives, as well as other 'the law isn't what you thought the law was' contexts. For perspectives, nothing in the conventions requires a belligerent to reveal their Intelligence- and thus sources and methods- for why they chose a target, so there are often targets that are legitimate but which may not appear to be when prioritized... and this in turn doesn't even include cases of flawed/wrong intelligence, where the a belligerent can legitimately believe there is a valid target somewhere one isn't. It doesn't become a war crime retroactively if one is duped by a denial/deception campaign. Meanwhile, some things that may seem obviously off-limits are actually covered in other areas of the convention. We had a good example in the first thread, when someone did an actuall review of the convention requirements for delivering aid to civilians- in short, while delivering aid to civilians must be allowed, it doesn't have to be allowed by any given organization to any given organization. Rather, a belligerent must allow a mutually acceptable intermediary to deliver it, so that the there can be some sort of guarantee that the aid goes to civilians and not the beseiged belligerent. As a consequence of that, for example, bombing the border crossings early on is not, from a rules-of-law perspective, 'preventing aid from getting to civilians,' which is forbidden, it is 'preventing resupply to a belligerent,' which is permitted.
Rather than quibbling on legal dynamics few know and fewer actually care about, the better argument against genocide-claimers is the point that, just by the numbers, if the Israelis are trying to genocide the Gaza Strip population... they are doing a really, really poor job at it by even the most pro-Palestinian numbers.
To take just two stores from Al Jazeera, which has a definite anti-Israeli slant in the conflict to date- on 13 November, Al Jazeera reported on the (Hamas-controlled) Gaza Public Health Ministry's claim that 11,000 Palestinians have been killed in the conflict so far. This is, of course, what the Americans know as a McBigNumber. 11,000 in a month an a half- that's a lot, right?
But nearly a week early, Al Jazeera reported on an Israeli government claim to have conducted more than 12,000 strikes... as of 1 November, nearly 2 weeks before the Hamas death claim. If we accept both claims as true- and both Hamas and Al Jazeera have an even greater incentives to greatly inflate the death claims than the Israeli government does- this is less than a 1-death-per-bomb ratio... in one of the most densly populated urbanized war zones in modern history, when Israeli ability to level entire apartment blocks is incredibly well established.
If the goal of the Israeli government and military was to genocide the Palestinian population, we would expect to see massively higher Palestinian casualty rates so far. Like, orders-of-magnitude higher. We'd also have seen considerably different targeting decisions of types of targets- with far more about irrevocably destroying essential infrastructure beyond repair or leveling apartment blocks without organizing evacuations- if they were in a 'just kill them all before anyone can stop us' dynamic.
Instead, this is where we also remind you that Hamas's militant wing has had an estimated strength in the 30,000 to 40,000 range even before the conflict. Total Palestinian death could triple or even quadruple from the first month, and it would be mathematically possible- though incredibly implausible- for nearly every single one of those casualties to not only be a Hamas member, but a part of Hamas's military component. (And it's not like the military component members are the only legitimate target under the conventions either.)
I agree to a good degree, and even would argue Hezbollah is trying to calibrate the pressure precisely to distract Israel from focusing on Hamas, but states can very much downplay some casus belli factors when they don't want to engage a particular front.
What you cited covers the point in conjunction with the same conventions covering valid military objectives and the revocation of protected sites if they are turned into valid military objectives.
Destroying something so that it no longer contributes to casualties on your forces is a concrete and direct military advantage. This goes back to what a valid military target is, and the conventions are very clear that protected targets are NOT protected if they are converted into valid military targets, even if there are still civilian casualties. As such, there is not requirement for there to be no civilian casualties, or for the belligerant to accept casualties in order to avoid civilian casualities. The onus is on the other belligerent to not place military objectives amongst civilians / to move civilians away from military objectives, not on the 'attacking' beligerant to not engage valid military objectives.
As the collateral damage of any civilians is not a binary disqualifier, proportionality doesn't work as a 'prohibit any attack on a valid military objective that may cause casualties' either-or binary. The porportionality is in the excess to the miltiary advantage... but since the military advantage is judged by the attacker, not the defender, and the anticipated value is often trivial to justify in close-range engagements on force-protection grounds and limiting enemy ability to continue offering mearningful resistance, proportionality would be a functionally dead letter if it was solely a binary (which- by its own working- it isn't).
Rather, proportionality comes into play when something would have no concrete or direct miltiary objective- which is usually when a target is so far away / inconsequential it means nothing for your military force survivial if the target is hit or not- or if you have alternatives that have different effects on the civilians in the course of the legitimate strike. In the face of valid military objective where concrete and direct military is already anticipated, and thus engaging is not prohibited, the proportionality distinction will only apply if you have alternatives with smaller loss of incidental loss- which would then render the overkill-casualties excessive in relations to the military advantage anticipated, because you could get the military advantage anticipated by using a smaller effect and thus the 'extra' deaths are unnecessary.
That Iran was aware of the Hamas intent to launch the general premise of the 7 Oct attack and provided technical and additional forms of help to assist with the planning.
Which is fine, as long as it's consistently applied, which hasn't always been seen in this conflict despite plentiful examples on both sides and virtually all media.
You really did a multi-month necro just to get a last word and block, huh? That is sincerely amusing, thanks for making a good morning.
Last paragraph seems to have hit the nail on the head as far as predictions go, for just one example.
The irony is that the reason Iran is reluctant to get involved, and the reason they were reluctant to attempt a bigger retaliatory move after the Soleimani assassination, is because they're winning. Sure, they could tell their allies to press harder against US forces in Syria and Iraq, but nothing makes Americans angrier than American soldiers being killed. And the thing is that (and I'm interested in @Dean's view on this) a small number of US forces holed up in bases in Syria and Iraq doesn't threaten most Iranian interests in the region. They still increasingly control most of Iraq, Assad is relatively firmly in power in Syria. It's an insult to them, perhaps, they may consider it offensive, but the Americans aren't going to end shiite control of Iraq or overthrow Assad with their current presence.
Well, since asked... I suppose my view on your assessment is that it depends on if one thinks Iran was actually uninvolved/unaware of the October attack.
If Iran was unaware/uninvolved, then it's not an illogical position. The conflict is an unexpected opportunity for Iran's foes to weaken themselves militarily/politically, disrupt the alignment against Iran by more regional actors, provide new opportunities, etc. etc.
But, as the laconics say, 'If.'
My personal view is that what we're seeing is a failed effort to start a broader conflagration, since being walked back and limited for damage control. An analogy might be the Russian-sponsored NovaRussia uprising in eastern Ukraine that consolidated around the 'separatist republics'- a 'success' on one hand in achieve an operational victory, but a failure for an intention for a much broader result that didn't materialize, leaving the instigating party a 'good hand' for a context they didn't actually want to be in, because they were aiming for something substantially different.
Very non-laconic thoughts below.
From my viewpoint watching various regional actors, the initial post-attack propaganda narratives, and so on, Hamas's goal wasn't isolated to a Gaza-specific event to be resolved with a hostage standoff, but to try to be the instigating event of a wider intifada with broad regional support from Iran's proxy groups. Key goals likely included a broader consolidation of Gaza support into breaking the barrier, instigating a West Bank uprising that would paralyze the 80% of the IDF there, and major external support from Iranian proxies- especially in Lebanon and Syria- to conduct major rocket attacks and limited ground incursions to surround and further paralyze the IDF. This would have only been possible in coordination with Iran, and in turn Iran would have attempted to use the regional chaos to try and expel the remaining U.S. presence from south-eastern Syria and from Iraq, removing US influence from a region where the US presence prevents consolidation of Iranian influence (via US-aligned partners in Syria, and the political impacts of both US presence and critical US funding in the Iraqi government which can and has been used to play off the Iranian-aligned actors). In an 'Iran was involved' perspective, Iran would be relying on its proxies rather than direct involvement, adhering to the principle of plausible deniability.
The 'issue' is that the Hamas attack did not instigate a wider intifada, and the Iranians were confronted that their denials wouldn't be considered plausible by actors who mattered most if the rest of their influence network actually joined in force. Hence the anti-climatic climbdown by Hezbollah from was being built up as a natural call to arms, the token-level support by groups like the Houthis in Yemen that even the Saudis have shot down without meaningful propaganda criticism, and how the Hamas strategy has resorted to increasingly blatant appeals for truce by steadily increasing the number of hostages it would turn over for relief.
The Hamas failure to spark a wider intifada, which has been a real concern in regional security circles over the last few years, can probably be attributed to a few various factors. A lack of coordination outside of the Iranian network meaning other Palestinian groups weren't ready to join in immediately, the shock value of their atrocity-propaganda having a detering rather than galvanizing effect as actual local groups distanced themselves due to the immeninet Israeli retaliation rather than join in, the effectiveness of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank to prevent anyone from mobilizing a force that would make them seem like participants., what have you. In fact, even the Gaza public support has seemed to be... well, acceptance is not the same as endorsement, but the Hamas ability to defend in Gaza has been surprisingly underwhelming, which would be characteristic of a force that thought it would be receiving a lot more support than it actually is. Gaza is not Kyiv in 2022, where the citizenry was mixing molotovs in the streets to fight the invaders. An urban area held by truly hostile local populace is a notoriously rough fight, and one that hasn't manifested in the fighting so far, but was probably expected given the parallels to the Israeli incursion into Lebananon against Hezbollah awhile ago, where Israeli ran into exceptional difficulty on the ground.
Which leads to what I think is the most relevant point- and the one that matters from the Iranian perspective- which was a misjudgement of regional views and perceptions. Plenty of people around and abroad were happy to cheer for Hamas, but no one wanted to join in fighting alongside Hamas- and as it became very quickly clear that the other people weren't joining in, the Iranian-aligned networks could either join in in the Israeli background, or back out.
By and large, they've backed out, even at the cost of regional prestige/leader-of-the-resistance standing. No one has taken more than a token involvement in the Israeli front. The more relevant activity increase has been entirely geographically/politically separate, which is the anti-US attacks in the Syria-Iraq zone. This is relevant for the Iranians- the US presence in Iraq particularly significantly limits Iran's ability to consolidate it's advantages by giving a counter-balance option to local politicians- and it serves a number of purposes in the strategic competition, but the most relevant is trying to re-establish leverage (you need to negotiate, lest we escalate- which is to say, the same position before October) rather than actively trying to overwhelm, which- to me- seemed to be the goal of the opening October efforts.
This is all based on a paradigm and a viewpoint I fully acknowledge others might not share, and that's fine. But from that paradigm comes a significant distinction as to why Iran is doing what it is doing at the level it is- whether this is a situation Iran found itself in that it doesn't need to do anything because escalation could tip the apple cart that it already enjoys, or whether this is a situation Iran found itself in because it tried to turn over the apple cart, but failed, and is now trying to present that it wasn't trying to do that (but could still yet do so if pressed, so better not press it).
To turn back to the start, to the question of if Iran is 'winning' and the analogy of the NovaRussia uprising- this is where I'd make a point that operational successes are not the same as strategic wins, and that sometimes the consequences of a partial success have different, less foreseen, implications. The Ukrainian NovaRussia uprising was a 'win' for Russia in that it successfully inserted itself into Ukrainian politics in a way that froze western integration and allowed Russia to play a key diplomatic role even as it was a de facto belligerant. But the NovaRussia efforts are also what functionally froze the NordStream pipeline project to Germany, cutting off a major economic-influence vector before it could be manifested, and thus greatly reducing influence that would have mattered much more down the line, when the early Russian strategy in Ukraine centered around pressing Germany to accept it and thus undercut a European pillar of support. Had NordStream been activated years earlier, it may well have worked, even as the years of warfare over NovaRussia empowered the Ukrainian army and national identity to resist the Russian invasion.
Iran is probably not going to have as much of a blowback, but then again no one would have predicted the Ukraine War's consequences for the Russians in the first few months of NovaRussia either. What does seem clear to me is that while Iran has likely achieved a short/medium-term disruption of Israeli-Saudi normalization due to the sacrifice of Hamas/Gaza, they do have some key elements of power being undercut as well. For one, the paradigm I reflect- the one where Iran has been deterred from maximal proxy usage- is a fundamental failure of one of the key points of proxy warfare, the 'plausible deniability.' If you wouldn't use a plausible-deniable proxy for fear of retaliation, it's no longer plausibly-deniable, and you're just returning to conventional deterrence. For another, Hamas and the Gaza Strip were most relevant to the Iranian posture as a force-in-being- the idea that Israel was surrounded on three fronts by forces that could at any time launch an uprising, and as a consequence Israel was in a weak position and needed to make concessions that Iran could take credit for leading. Except the West Bank didn't rise up, which changes expectations of what it might do going forward, and whatever happens to Gaza after this war, it's probably not going to be a serious contender for a mass popular uprising either. When the Israeli-Palestinian conflict returned, the anti-Israeli palestinians had to shoot the Palestinians to keep them from running away from the Israelis. Bar Hamas somehow remaining in power- and it seems very unlikely that will be the result of the Gaza war- whoever remains left is much, much less likely to be willing to be a quasi-Iranian proxy after seeing what the Iranian axis did for Hamas.
Is it a 'good' position to be in? Kind of. Is it a 'better' position than they had before the Hamas attack? Questionable.
But all this derives from some first-order assumptions of the nature of the conflict, which I suspect you and I diverge on.
Hope that answers the question.
AARGH. I have lived longer since 9/11 than I had lived before 9/11. I am OLD. I will DIE. NOOOOOO. Why did you have to point this out?
It's become a source of perverse joy that I can make people who would still like to consider themselves young accept that they aren't.
What do you guys think the possibility of this Israel-Gaza situation exploding to include Hezbollah formally? What about US-Iran?
If it was going to, it already would have exploded. As it is, if they join now, it will be anti-climatic.
Some of the allegations from the regional shuttle diplomacy that went around the region in October is that they were basically deterred by direct threats to Hezbollah and Iran that if they joined in the war, they would be considered direct belligerants and to have been in on in the initial 7 Oct attacked as a direct act of war by the Iranian government, whose relations with Hezbollah are much stronger than Hamas. Further, other actors indicated that if Hezbollah got involved it would be a non-trivial risk of civil war in Lebanon, such as with the French making a considerable arms 'gift' to the governmental forces that would likely operate against Hezbollah in such a scenario.
As is, while some Iranian proxy groups are trying limited support- the Houthis have tried to lob some things from all the way down in Yemen- it's pretty marginal, and not a particularly regionally-supported affair. (The Saudis reportedly have shot down some Houthi stuff.) Hezbollah could try and get involved for its own reasons, but it'd be largely anti-climatic, and after the very visibile period of letting Hamas fight on its own, and at this point I don't think anyone really believes Hezbollah cares that much about Hamas per see.
As for US-Iran, Iran has long been trying to leverage it's various proxy political and military forces in Iraq and Syria to drive the US out. They appear to have decided now's the time to escalate, hence the counter-strikes.
This is an odd post, because it's framed as a disagreement without an actual disputing of the higher level post premise (broader and family-recruitment), makes some odd claims of a political shift in recruitment not actually observed (there is a recruitment crisis because fewer people are joining, without evidence of a meaningful change in overall recruitment allocatio), and yet somehow still adopts that curious twixt of 'there's no problem happening, and if it is it's good and you deserve it.'
This is without the oddness like 'If they can send you to die in the middle of Ukraine possibly,' given that the US military... can't send combat forces to Ukraine at this time. Which not only undermines the metaphor to the jab, but ignores that the higher post explicitly acknowledged that the legal basis for enforcement wasn't disputed.
And no one particularly cares about overkill, because overkill is wasteful and takes away relevant resources for the next engagment. Outside of a few propaganda contexts- which are extremely rare in civilian casualty contexts- civilian-overkill is a military-waste issue as much as anything else.
I didn't read the substack in question and don't have a particular opinion on it, but from personal discussions / observations / distant review, the issue is more the aging-out/retering cohort's effect on military families and communities.
While there is a core demographic argument, the demographic is more regional/cultural than demographic per see. South/MidWest/etc. have always been over-represented. The thing the OP's summary paragraph doesn't seem to address is that a lot of enlistment is from military families/communities, rather than blank regional. I forgot the statistics precisely, but in generally any country you go you're likely to see far more volunteers from people with parents/grandparents who were in the military than a random first-generation enlistment. There's a family, not just demographic, dynamic in play, which means if the family member advises against rather than for the enlistment... well, 'I'll join the military' isn't exactly social rebellion.
The issue for the US's current recruitment woes comes from how the generational transition has matched to politics. The 9-11 recruitment cohort is dead, dead, dead. If you look at age averages, the vast majority of US service members were born after 9-11. If you joined just after 9-11, you are that tiny minority of people who serve a full 20 (for a pension) or go beyond. That means people who joined during the Bush years, have gradually and progressively lost during the Obama years / saw the Trump years / are back in the Obama 2.0/Biden years. There's any number of things that could justify a feeling of disenchantment, from perceptions of futility of the wars, to the progression culture war aspects into military culture/life, and so on.
This is purely anecdoctal, but the straw that broke the back for some life-longers was how the Biden administration approached the Covid vaccine mandates. The US military, like many in the world, is legally allowed to employ experimental medicines / vaccines on the forces. US troops have been used not only for experimental medical treaments, but also as medical experiment test subjects in the past. When the Biden administration decided to make Covid vaccines mandatory for all forces no matter what, they weren't on particularly legally shakey ground.
What they did run aground on, however, was the disparity between culture war politics and needs-based buy-in. Whatever your competence-expectation for the average junior soldier, US career military professionals are career professionals. They are not only educated, but educated with an eye to practical implications and effects and cross-specialty coordination that many topic-focused specialists are not. And the politically inconvenient facts of COVID- such as that it was not a death plague for the young and the healthy (which most of the armed forces are) or the sort of politically-influenced media pressures were being used in a propagandaist fashion (which the military is above-average aware of as both a target and a perpetrator of) or active suppression of inconvenient medical dissent (which the more conservative-tuned military would be more aware of)- where thus part of the awareness environment even as the administration used brute force command-control precisions to not only demand, but overrule requests for exceptions despite cases of special forces personnel (a highly respect internal community) requesting exceptions for practical concerns, religious personnel requesting exceptions on religious grounds (which have variously been respected in the past), and so on. The evidence that the Covid vaccine wasn't even stopping transitions- and as such not making self-vaccination a breakwater to protect others- undermined a public good argument that the pandemic would end once everyone was vaccinated to stop transmissions. Instead, it was pure formal power demands on institutions of people who are explicitly trained on formal versus informal power dynamics as part of good-leadership training on the assumption that demands from compliance on basis of formal authority is bad leadership. Instead, people that people knew- people with long terms of service, unquestioned loyalty, generally high levels of competence, people who had put up with the worst of the military life and some of the worst strategic decisions of national leadership in a generation- were systematically kicked out for not bending to the political hysteria of the moment. People for whom loyalty was not an ironic thing, for whom a culture of reciprocal loyalty both up and down was both the formal instruction and often found informally, were kicked aside saying 'your services aren't needed anymore.'
What did anyone expect them to tell their families? Or for their friends who kept their heads down but also got out to tell theirs?
American military recruiting was always declining as the 9-11/War on Terror legitimacy faded, but Covid was an inflexion point in at least some US military family circles, where the military went from 'you can be safe and have a successful career as long as you keep your politics to yourself,' to 'you are not safe if you do not defer to the demands for conformity by politically-driven misinformation.' This would be unhelpful regardless, but is especially counter-productive if you (a) are drawing recruitment from the political opposition, and (b) embitter a core part of your informal recruitment advocates who shape the willingness of those most open to joining.
The bar for blowing hospital and it not being a war crime is quite high.
The bar is extremely low, as low as 'is it being used as a military position.'
War crime law is not that legitimate military targets (military positions, command posts, munition stores) are made ineligible by the presence of protected classes (i.e. hospitals), but rather than protected classes are made eligible by the presence of legitimate military targets. There are no protected classes of military sites where someone can fire at you, but you can't fire back.
The proportionality principle, which is what limits collateral damage that could kill civilians, is proportionality relative to what is needed to destroy the legitimate military target compared to other means that would achieve the same military effect, not the proportion of military-to-civilian casualties. There are no convention requirements to take military casualties in the process of storming military objectives in order to minimize civilian casualties.
Obviously states collapse for a variety of reasons and I only provided the two that seemed the most prominent.
And are also counter-productive to your claims, as one of the claims (Crusader States) were conventional invasions that nukes would have defeated had the Crusader states had access to them, and the other (Soviet) did not see the collapse of the core state (the Russian Federation) that would be analogous to Israel and thus is generally unapplicable as a metaphor of how Israel would be destroyed and instead an example of why Israel would not be destroyed (because even at a point of massive economic/military/social/political power disrepencies, Russia survived as an nation-state centered on the Russian nation).
This is, as far as I can see (especially since you called it common), the conventionally accepted wisdom as well - economic hardship lead to reform attempts which then lead to dissolution and breakup. If you've got a more compelling theory or hypothesis I'd unironically love to hear it.
Sure- don't skip the causal intermediary between 'reform attempts' and 'dissolution and breakup.' The Soviet system lost the willingness to enforce its imperial control by mass violence, not its ability to.
Maintaining social control by violence is actually quite cheap, and we saw a number of case-examples during the Soviet collapse itself- including in Russia itself. North Korea and Cuba practically the capstone example, and much better Israeli metaphors than the Soviet empire-block given their coherency and external aid dependency, but nearly all the post-Soviet states that chose not to democratize and maintain autocratic models were able to. Russia itself is an example here, as even as it faced real struggles economically, socially, and what have you, it was still able to put down rebellion when it chose to (Chechnya). While it would have been immensly expensive to, there is a very strong argument that the Soviets would have been able to hold much of the empire by force if they chose to, if they thought it was worth that cost. Especially with nuclear weapons to keep invaders out. Nuclear-counter-rebellion strategy is a high-cost strategy, but not an impossible one.
The reason the economic travails and reforms led to dissolution is because they didn't think it was worth the cost to hold the empire together.
The reason that reform attempts lead to losing will to maintain imperial control was that the reform attempts involved enabling information flow- necessary for economic improvement- that deligitimized the ideological premise of the project from a revolutionary premise worth costs along the way to an objective failure unable to deliver. The Soviet Union wasn't simply an economic unit, it was an ideology-project, and a materialist one at that. While there were always overlaps between the Russian imperialist habits and the Soviet strategy, the metaphorical glue that held the system together- not only from the bottom-up (why do we accept this) but the top-down (why do we do this to ourselves) was the ideological underpinnings of 'because Socialism will build a better society and make people's lives better.' Except it didn't. The system did not work, the ideology did not deliver its central premise of improving living standards vis-a-vis the alternative, the more moral society wasn't more moral than the alternative, and the systems very clearly wasn't working, and people already knew that. What the laxing of information controls meant is that everyone else knew that too. When it came to choosing between holding together the lesser option by force and even greater cost and misery, the Soviets- which is to say the Russians- ultimately didn't.
But this isn't the circumstance Israel is in, even in the abstract. Israel's information space is already open enough that one of the key snowball dynamics- the mass sharing of dissolutionment- is impossible since people already have access to the information and eachother. Israel's core ideological premise- an ethno-state that will work to protect jews from both hostile states and statues unable/unwilling to do so internally- is not under ideological threat for the core auidence, i.e. the jews who feel unsafe or insecure elsewhere in states that visibly do not even try. The parts of the Israeli context that could be metaphorically analogous to the Soviet Block are the Palestinian territories, not Israeli proper- and thus vestigial territories, and not core dependencies.
Which goes to the point of 'who is choosing to leave and let-leave.' In the Soviet System, the imperial block- particularly eastern Europe- wanted to leave. The Germans wanted reunification, the Poles wanted independence, even the 'totally Russian all along' Ukrainians wanted to leave. The Russians let them, because the Russians didn't feel the project was worth the costs of violent suppression. We can see today, in Ukraine, what an alternative decision process might have been, as the Russians are now led by the sort of leadership for whom trying to militarily impose Russian dominance absolutely is worth the cost... and while they are paying a cost, they are also nowhere near a state collapse in doing so.
Yes, it didn't collapse from the kind of problem that nuclear weapons prevent, given that it had nuclear weapons (though if the Russians all decided to leave I don't think nukes would help there either).
The Russian Federation didn't collapse as a state at all, precisely because the problems that nuclear weapons prevent did not form (because everyone knew Russia was a nuclear state and that trying to invade it would be suicide).
The Russian Empire collapsed. The Russian State did not. And the reason it did not is because there was no one who was going to come in and kick it down and drive them out of the territory they held until they held nothing else, which is what happened to the crusader states and what the parties interested in Israel's destruction want to do to it.
But Israel is in fact surrounded by dangerous threats in just about every direction but the sea, and this means that they are going to need to spend a huge portion of their GDP on the military budget - far more than they do currently, and to the point that it is going to have a big impact on society. That's an extremely dangerous position for a nation to be in, nukes or no nukes.
In terms of state survival? Not really. This is where 'dangerous threats' becomes a motte and bailey between 'it's bad' and 'it's a cause for state collapse.'
Terrorism is dangerous. But it's not existentially dangerous. Neither is spending a large amount on GDP on military budget- which itself is assuming a conclusion at odds with various dynamics of what goes on with the Israeli defense budget in a contraction (between would-be-negated needs, like West Bank occupation, or the preference for exepnsive high-precision munitions that support patron political preferences to minimize civilian casualties).
The type of power required to destroy Israel in the form required for the crusader states metaphor to be valid requires the power of a state. States are precisely what are targettable by nuclear weapons in case of existential risk to the nuclear power. You have already had to awkwardly dance around this fact by claiming that other actors (Muslim Brotherhood) would totally make the trade as long as they weren't in power, without actually establishing how they would make such a trade without having power over the state, lest the state refuse the trade. Even proxy warfare has it's limits- while the Iranians certainly are edging nuclear breakout, MAD is mutual, not unilateral.
This is basic not-understanding-why-states-fail, both historical and mechanically.
Then please enlighten me! I just don't understand how an Israel that sustains severe economic damage due to the removal of western support manages to maintain itself in such a dangerous security environment.
Because it has nukes enough that the dangerous states in its environment capable of existentially threatening it aren't going to existentially threaten it lest they destroy their own states in the process.
Economic collapse has historically been a cause of state collapse when it allowed an external party to conventionally invade. The Crusader States fell because the loss of foreign economic support and economic issues allowed external parties to conventionally invade. Big-vs-small wars are usually one-sided because the small-side's economic disadvantages allow the external party to conventionally invade.
But nukes do mitigate the threat of conventional invasion to physically displace territorial control. Nukes can be used against the organized armies of the invaders, or the cities and ports they use as key logistical corridors to project power, or against the very capitals of those controlling them. Superior numbers and economics and conventional capabilities do not make invading a nuclear-armed power more preferable than not.
This is why you had to appeal to the Soviet Collapse as an example of state collapse without conventional force. But the Soviet collapse was a case of *choosing not to fight,' and for which the consequence was the loss of functional colonial holdings, not core state or it's dominant demographic. And in the Israeli context, choosing not to fight the displacement of a state of jews for a state of arabs is precisely that, with openly acknowledged genocidal implications.
This is certainly a construction of security politics worthy of NonCredibleDefense, but not a particularly compelling one.
I see this happening well within my lifetime.
Since by definition you will have to die before it doesn't occur in your lifetime for it to be proven to not happen in the way you foresee it happening in your lifetime, this is why I find this a boring non-falsifiable.
Probably not before the next culture war thread, but I don't see US aid to Israel lasting for another 20 years.
It doesn't need to.
First, US aid to Israel is not a critical dependency to Israel such that the loss leads to a state collapse. This is a not-uncommon premise shared by the sort of American hyper-agency types who believe the US factor is the dominant factor in anything it's involved in, but it's really not.
From a fiscal perspective, Israel does not need to be spending the amount of money in the way it does in order to survive- there are both discretionary areas that could/would be cut in an imperial collapse context (West Bank occupation costs), and costs-for-preference that would change as the patrons do (Israel uses expensive precision munitions capabilities to 'roof knock' because it's patrons want it to), and so on. If military financial resources were cut, Israel would adapt, as has every other state. It doesn't simply cease to exist because defense spending fllas (or increases).
And even this is setting aside why US aid to Israel exists in the form it does, which is as a basic form of geopolitical bribery for purposes of maintain access near the Suez Canal in case someone tries to close it, as a domestic industry subsidy program, and as a means of influence Israel into more preferable/less-undesirable courses of action when provoked.
Note that all three of these motivations exist not only regardless of any US sympathy for Israel, but also for any other would-be patron state. If other regional actors don't like Palestinian refugees- and that's not liable to change in the next few generations- then there will always be willing donors for Iron Dome sustainment, despite the 'uneconomical' nature of the interceptor system, less the Israelis decide to not simply take it.
And this is without considering the plausible political contexts where US aid is suspended, especially in the next 20 years. While it would be quite a just-so narrative for the US to cut aid to Israel, but everyone else is the same, this isn't particularly plausible compared to the US cutting aid to everyone in the region, including most of the regional states that could plausibly threaten Israel. And reasons for that would vary from 'they have all collapsed due to a catastrophic regional war'- which would indicate a lack of proximal existential threats to Israel as Arabs spend more time trying to rebuild than get themselves nuked further back by deciding to YoLo what's left- to 'the US has suddenly chosen to create a power vacume in the Middle East'- which would be a patron state influx of patrons interested in the still-substantial oil flows of the region for Israel to solicit and play off of to regain external support- to 'Israel has already nuked the relevant threats'- which would certainly make them a pariah but not necessarily endangered.
The US was not the first patron-state of Israel, nor is there any particular reason for it to be the last, nor is there any particular reason to believe that Israel will collapse in the interim.
I was under the impression that they collapsed due to a deeply flawed economic system in combination with a dramatic over-expenditure on military spending in order to keep fighting the cold war.
Common misconception and oversimplification. Incorrect, but common.
But the main point is that they did in fact collapse and nuclear weapons weren't able to stop that from happening.
The actually relevant point, however, is that the Soviet Union didn't collapse from external invasion, or from people who already identified with the core identity unit wanting to leave. This is relevant, because the thing that will actually end Israel as a nation-state- and what ended the crusader states- is external invasion, not civil unrest in the national core. Civil Unrest can weaken a state's capacity for militarily resisting invasion, but if invasion is already negated by other ways- such as nukes- the you have a weak state, not a dead state.
The Soviet Union collapse is a poor historical metaphor because the parts of the Soviet Union who left the Soviets were the Russian imperial sphere that never wanted to be part of the Russian empire. The Russian national core was never challenged or militarily endangered. In the Israel metaphor, this is Gaza and West Bank not being occupied, and the Israeli core existing uninterrupted and without a military threat.
The crusader state metaphor from earlier is likewise bad because that was a case of military invasion destroying the state- which is precisely what did NOT occur with the Soviet Union, for a reason of (among other things) sustained nuclear deterence despite major economic and democraphic and social regression.
I still just don't see how nuclear weapons would be able to save Israel from an economic collapse or social unrest.
Because economic collapse or social unrest don't actually destroy nations, and this is so well established it's easier to identify the exceptions- which are almost universally states without an underlying national identity to bind the state.
This is basic not-understanding-why-states-fail, both historical and mechanically.
That is an impressive number of mis-chosen historical allusions that don't quite demonstrate what you think they do and even less about nuclear deterrence, but as already noted we'll be dead before it would be disproven by not manifesting as relied upon so again, general shrug at unconvincing perception in lieu of evidence.
Precisely what I said? A number of settlements are fully expected to be traded away- those that would make things 'impossible'- while others are meant to shape the borders- the land swaps that have been a core component of 2-state talks to date.
To say the that the purpose of West Bank settlements is to make the two-state solution impossible is to ignore the history that 2-state negotiations were already built and being conducted on the acknowledgement that the 2-state borders weren't going to align with the occupied territory dividers, and that various settlements had different prospects and roles in said negotiations to different relevant actors.
How mainstream is her view?
Mainstream as in widely shared, or mainstream as in accurate? The premise that the purpose of the West Bank settlements is to make a two-state solution impossible is more than a bit of a stretch, somewhere between over-reach, over-simplification, and ignoring other competing dynamics.
The Netanyahu government seems like it’s on her side at least through benign neglect. Why does her cause have so much political power?
Because it overlaps and taps into multiple cultural/religious/ideological/strategic considerations, which creates the conditions suitable for political coalitions to work with as a tool for compromise for internal political cohesion.
East Bank settlements have always had a strategic-security implications for the ultimate resolution of Israel's eastern border. Ever since the initial 'land will be traded for peace,' the second implication of that has been 'but facts on the ground will shape what is traded for what.' Some settlements can be tolerated/advanced for the purpose of being traded- a concession in and of themselves. But others are expected to shape the new borders, as has already been reflected in previous iterations of negotiations, where territorial tradeoffs were set to accept israeli settlements in some areas. These enduring settlements, in turn, have post-deal implications for things like who controls how much of East Jerusalem, the practical viability of a East Bank state to marshal and consolidate military power across the North-South Mountains, the strategic depth / chokepoints of any future hostile army approaching from the East, and so on.
Whether you view the Settlements as an ideological mission to secure command of the holy land, a bargaining chip that can be traded away, a tool that can be leveraged against coalition partners for domestic policy concessions, or a factor in long-term strategic planning, there are a variety of reasons why settlement activists will have access to political power. The settlements are politically potent.
Does a settler/activist like her count as an enemy combatant?
Not unless she takes part in combat.
On one hand she operates under the colors of being a civilian.
As long as those colors are accurate, she garners the protections to civilians under international law, including not being deliberately targetted (as opposed to being accepted as collateral when targetting military targets).
On the other hand it seems a little unfair for someone who is actively working to conquer your land to declare rules like “no sorry you’re only allowed to shoot at the guys who have rifles and body armor otherwise you’re a terrorist.”
Since the Israelis didn't declare rules like that, the premise of fairness is rather misaimed. It's certainly inconvenient international law, but it's not international law crafted by the Israelis for the purpose claimed, and it's not international law with a caveat for settlers.
For moderate pro-Israel people, is “kick all the settlers out of the West Bank” something you’d be willing to accept as part of a broader peace deal?
Given that the broader peace deals that were closest to being credible and coming to fruition didn't kick all settlers out of the West Bank, but rather did mutual trades with a goal of respecting many exsting population distributions, it would seem like a poison pill demand to sink a peace deal, and thus not a moderate position to take.

1971, the year of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the treaty that marked the de-facto alliance of the Indians and the Soviets that endured for the rest of the Cold War, was the peak of Kissinger's powers over India?
This would seem to be another case of American hyperagency.
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