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Dean

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joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


				

User ID: 430

Dean

Flairless

15 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 03:59:39 UTC

					

Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!


					

User ID: 430

When activists protest protesting, do they just not show up?

I have a genuine question, because I haven't been able to find a reliable answer:

Is the "blue octopus" actually an anti-Semitic dogwhiste, like, anywhere? Or is this an association that was just invented yesterday to pile on Greta Thunberg?

Not so much Jewish-specific as Jewish-adjacent. The octopus has been a common political cartoon metaphor for malign influence, particularly of strangling and financial and manipulator dynamics, for some times. There's a classic political cartoon regarding Standard Oil from the early 1900s, but it was far from the first. A very cursory google suggests it came in vogue in the 1870s, in Europe as a metaphor for imperialism and in the US as a metaphor for corporate consolidation during the gilded age.

The thing of the octopus metaphor is that it's a single actor with the ability to manipulate or seize many things at the same time, and at an extensive range proportionally far from it's body. In the political cartoon contexts, this is frequently political manipulation and financial influence, and almost always in a malevolent/'strangling' context by a foreign/alien creature... which is a handful of the basic themes of anti-semitic narratives right there.

It's not that there's never been an octopus metaphor related to Jewish influence, but it's not exclusive to it. I wouldn't be surprised that Thunberg was entirely unaware of the overlapping connotations.

That said, I'm in no way familiar with how stuffed octpous is supposed to help with autism, and have no awareness if Thunberg has had it for long, and the chances of it popping up as set-dressing in yet another political stunt is rather low, so... I wouldn't be surprised if someone was aware and wanted it in either.

Ah, I see we're in the 'words are tantemount to literal weaponized physical threats' territory for speach-restraint advocacy now.

Secondly, are you saying that Hiroshima would be justified under just war theory? Because I disagree strongly, there is no way it could be given that nukes are inherently not a weapon that can discriminate against non-combatants and combatants in a city.

You can disagree all you want, but you're conflating proportionality and protection of civilians who are not present on military objectives.

Protection of civilians comes in two main forms: civilians should not be harmed as long as they are not part of/adjacent to valid military objectives, and that disproportionate force should not be used against even valid military objectives. The first has always had the language that a legitimate military objective renders a do-not-target objective into a valid-for-targetting objective, not the other way around (i.e. putting human shields doesn't turn a previously-legitimate target illegitimate), and the second has always been about the scale of expected benefit and, implicitly and relevant to your argument, alternative forms available to achieve it. 'Discriminatory' weapons, in so much that they do exist, are only legally obliged because they allow a means to achieve an effect that makes the alternatives illegitimate. If the means didn't exist, the alternatives wouldn't be excessive to the alternatives.

The international law objection to using nukes against valid military objectives is that you probably don't actuallly need a nuke to neutralize or destroy the miltiary objective, which renders the nuke excessive. If you actually do need the nuke to service the target- or if the alternative means of servicing the target to the same effect are on the same scale or even higher- there's no actual legal barrier from that font.

Hm. I've heard along those lines, but I don't find it convincing. Poland was massively, hugely disproportionately behind Ukraine for the first year of the war, and the spat with Ukraine over Ukrainian farmers was sometimes criticized in 'this benefits Putin' terms, but not as a 'soft on Russia' issue per see.

Really, one of the key points for me as an observor was that the PIS was doing doing relatively well but had a late-election slide, which suggests a typical late-emergence issue that saps support. There's nothing particularly 'soft on Russia' that comes to mind, but the two things that seemed to get the most attention/resonance in external media were the Polish-Ukraine grain dispute- which I've not seen evidence was particularly controversial in Poland- and the Visa scandal- which was a direct blemish on the government.

I wouldn't be surprised if there was an opposition coordinated turnout function that later is revealed to have been particularly impactful, but a lot of the results can be covered by a late-game motivation slump and well-timed late-game scandal. PIS was a fair deal closer to retaining power than is likely to be acknowledged.

Sure, he could survive politicially. Everyone eventually falls from politics, but the key for political power actors remaining in place isn't their innate popularity, but the viability of alternatives. Even failed states continue to survive as long as no one else comes around to actually overthrow them. In Netanyahu's case, the question isn't 'was safety always delivered,' but whether 'was safety delivered more than the alternative,' which is still open for debate. Netanyahu can absolutely point at 'his' failure, and make the case that the alternative politicians would have had worse and more often. It's not like the attack has suddenly made the former left's 'let's make concessions for peace' more viable.

I wonder what all this will amount to.

Cynically, hopefully, or practically?

Cynically, this is the Biden administration setting a trap for Netanyahu, such that if Netanyahu goes forward anyway despite US questions, the US will be able to leverage the 'we told you so' advantage to affect Israeli politics to get rid of Netanyahu once the rally-around-the-flag emotional unity passes. This won't help the situation per see, beyond maybe allowing a new leader change to stop furthering a terrible disaster.

Hopefully, the US sees the situation as a real risk for a moral event horizon and strategic cliff that Israel wouldn't be able to walk back from, and is trying to protect it from itself, and in the process save many Palestinians who would otherwise die.

Practically, the Americans are trying to work through the emotionally-driven reaction phase, and shape the Israeli action such that 'do something' doesn't mean 'do anything,' by pushing the Israelis to confront that many-an-anything can, in fact, be worse than no action at all. Whether this forestalls any action, or shapes it into a more productive action, the objective is to re-introduce long-term thinking back into what has been a major emotional shock reaction.

Since the Americans are uniquely positioned to engage the Israelis from a position of understanding the nature of the culture-shock, but also being able to acknowledge the costs of over-reaction and lack of foresight, here's hoping it works.

(I'm not very hopeful.)

What does this mean? PIS nationalized nominally-Polish companies owned by Germans? Or is it related to the media sales mentioned later?

'Nationalized' isn't technically correct, in that the companies were sold rather than seized, but polandization of media was an established PIS goal partly accomplished in part by using control of the government to ban government entities from buying subscriptions, which undercut the financial viability of a significant number of media outlet. In short- financial viability depended on public purse strings, and so the party in power has power of the purse. (Which is one reason why it's unnecessarily likely to revert to foreign ownership- the same tactic could occur again, and media is even more dependent on state-support than before.)

The media sale was part of the PIS goal of re-polandizing the media, which was a multifaceted fight with both local and foreign interest groups that were actively arranged against the PIS. The role of foreign-owned media in the anti-PIS media sphere was openly acknowledged early on, and often mutually antagonistic. Here is an early 2019 article from DW (a German media company) that's rather frank about the nature of a significant parts of the majority-foreign-owned media sphere being part of the anti-PIS coalition. This is characteristic of the Polish media struggle after PIS came to power in 2016, where the sort of passive 'soft power' German-owned media influence in the earlier 2000s was giving way to more and more overt political influence attempts as part of anti-PIS polish politics.

The breaking point came in late 2020, with the purchase of Polska Press by a Polish state-owned refining company from Verlagsgruppe Passau, the German media company that had been running it since before PIS came in power. Polska Press was a media firm that owned hundreds of local newspapers and websites, including 20 out of Poland’s 24 regional daily newspapers as well as a further 120 regional weeklies. The portfolio of websites were reported to have over 10 million users, and the entire deal enabled access to an estimated 17 million media consumers, when Poland is a country of less than 40 million. Link

If that seems to be a lot, it is. Poland is a country of less than 40 million. But from a media-analysis, and PIS-perspective, the bigger point is that the concentration of ownership already existed.

For all the objections of PIS taking control of the papers, PIS couldn't have taken 20 of 24 regional daily newspapers in a single sale if someone else hadn't exercised collective ownership first, that party had been corporate German since before PIS came to power. While there's always an argument that German media was more neutral and objective and free from government influence, it's not exactly hard to find links between the 2010s German government and German media that enabled the German government to shape corporate media coverage.

It also probably didn't help that anther German media CEO wrote a letter to his Polish media workers calling a PIS politician a loser for opposing Donald Tusk and indicating his intent to apply editorial pressure in his preferred direction. That's the same Axel Springer media group co-owned (and now directly owns) PoliticoEU, one of the primary English-language media groups covering European politics as a direct feeder to the American political-media sphere via it's American cousin, Politico. If you read a media article on how Polish media freedoms were at threat in the later 2010s, there was a non-trivial chance it was either dervied from, or directly from, an Axel Springer outlet.

Axel Springer, completely unrelated, owned a number of Polish media interests in the 2010s that may or may not have been subject to polish-ownership risk.

Put it all together: in the mid-2010s as PIS campaigned to power, the media environment was a majority foreign-owned, especially German owned, with prominent German media actors already indicating a not-so-secret hostility to the incoming party. PIS declared it's intent to re-Polandize Polish media, the German-owned media fought back to preserve their ownership. Arguably, they lost. PIS may have lost this election, but only after a political generation and a general dismantling of the German media empire in Poland.

I appreciate the writeup.

You're welcome.

In culture war-ish political shifts from Eastern Europe, Poland's opposition looks to have overcome the PIS, meaning that the sometimes notorious Euro-skeptic right-wing government will likely be replaced by a more EU-phile coalition.

While the PIS won the most votes of any single party, with around 36.6% of the vote, this was less than the last election's 43.6%, and there seems to be a lack of coalition partners to reach the 50%. This was a fatal slide, which while having many contributing factors followed a major scandal in which corruption in selling Visas greatly undermined one of the PIS's key policy points- immigration- while validating accusations of corruption. While there will be some pro-forma opportunities for PIS to try and form a government, in practice leaves the likely next government to be an opposition-left coalition, which will likely be led by former prime minister (and former European Council president) Donald Tusk, who leadership in Poland was what paved the road for PIS to rise to power about 8 years ago.

Such a result will likely be greeted as a relief and good news for the European Union elites, and especially for Germany and Merkel, who Tusk was a reliable partner for. Tusk is about as much a Eurocrat as one can have, and has long been a leading voice in European circles shaping anti-PIS narratives as he tried to get back into Polish politics in the name of countering democratic-backsliding.

With a EU-phile government in Warsaw, this means some policies are likely to change. However, the nature of changes are likely to fall short of a 'the opposite of anything PIS did,' due to dynamics of PIS both doing some genuinely popular things which required 50-stalins criticisms, and for the nature of changing paradigms. Some of the dynamics that led to PIS criticism- such as the nationalization of hyper-majority German-owned Polish majority- aren't as likely to be reversed and re-sold once to the same companies once a shakey three-party coalition mostly united by being anti-PIS. Some things will be reversed, some will be kept, and some things will just be paralyzed due to coalition politics. That said, the European power centers- especially Brussels and Germany- can likely expect a more compliant Polish government for the next few years while Germany and France make a major push for power centralization in exchange for EU enlargement.

Various policy changes to look for movements on might include-

EU-centralization: This is one area where EU policy changes may see or enable significant shifts. One of the PIS's claims to notoriety was its functional political partnership with Hungary to block EU-level efforts to punish/exclude/potentially even suspend voting rights of recaltrant states. While condemned as part of anti-democratic badness, this had a major functional effect of blocking attempts at EU centralization that could sideline and selectively punish bad, or just unpopular, states. Tusk, as a EUrocrat, is almost certainly to step back from watering down issues targeting Hungary, but whether this will translate into a broader centralization momentum is less clear. The Germans and French have shifted from a current-EU-model of centralization (where individual states would be able to punished and lose veto rights- something Tusk might have gone along with) to now proposing a multi-speed-Europe model in exchange for expansion, which has far more serious implications, and which Tusk has opposed in the past (for potential reasons to broad for here).

Judiciary: This will likely be the quickest / easiest reversal, to EU applomb. The Polish judiciary followed a judges-select-the-next-judges, not appointment by the elected party akin to the German or US, and attempts to change that was strongly condemned by the EU (for whom the Polish Judiciary was seen as reliably deferential, despite corrupt origins from the post-communist transition). PIS paid regular political costs, and Tusk will drop that at the first chance while likely trying to prune if not purge the influence of PIS-associated judges (which will not be subject to significant EU-level criticsm)

LGBTQ+WE: This is one where the government line will likely align with the EU consensus of embracing the rhetoric and enabling/encouraging advocacy groups to set up social networks in Poland that were previously resisted. While over action will likely be less than full-throated supported, this was a PIS culture war point that the anti-PIS coalition will likely reverse for internal and external support reasons, though it will easily be a function that plays more to elite interests and foreign legitimization from EU allies than widespread domestic support.

Ukraine: There's very likely to be little substantive change on this. The biggest change is likely to be if there's a change in the distribution of arms vs other aid, which will reflect the military-industrial and rearmament policy more than a desire to aid Ukraine itself. While PIS did have election-rheotric and some disputes with Ukraine, I wouldn't expect the new coalition to substantially different on the conflict points (no Ukraine food dumping on politically significant farmers), and some of the criticisms of PIS on the Ukraine front came as much from a 50-Stalins direction as anything else.

Rearmament: Since Ukraine started, the PIS went on a major armament buying spree to modernize and bulk up the Polish military. Part of this was to free up older platforms to pass on to Ukrainians, while others were about establishing Poland as a military leader in Europe. Pre-election criticism focused on cost, and so reigning in would be natural (which could in turn mean less direct arms transfers in the future). The real interest will be what is cancelled versus what is changed, as various EU-power centers were more opposed that Poland was buying from outside the EU- especially US and US-alllied suppliers- rather than rearming itself. This will likely be a more case-by-case basis as PIS already had the ability to start some contracts that may have clauses making it less feasible to back out and transfer. It would be a major surprise, and reversal, if new-Poland renenges on the Korea tank contracts and goes for a German option.

Military-Industrial Policy: An outset of the Ukraine and Rearmament policies, PIS was establishing relationships and efforts to make Poland an autonomous arms center who could compete with French and German armament industries both inside the EU market and without. This had a dynamic of countering the EU strategic autonomy efforts (which are largely synonymous with French and German led arms projects), so there may be EU-advocated efforts to reign in the potential competition as a part of the rearmament restraint and Ukraine aid reallocation. Look for if South Korea's tank deal is radically restructured, as that was not only a rearmament program but also a lead-in to joint R&D for Polish military production capacity.

Media: One of PIS's condemned policies was its functional de-Germanification of Polish media. During the post-Cold War period and the early 2000s, part of Germany state-encouraged economic policy was the expansion of German economic interests, especially media interests, in the post-Soviet east. This led to a major centralization of Polish media by German corporations, who weren't adverse to leveraging corporate influence for political influence and themes, including shaping editorial lines on Polish politics. Tusk was a beneficiary of this as part of his German political alliances, given the nature of German government-corporate media relations which can be characterized at times as 'cozy,' but when the PIS took power they compelled foreign-owned media concentrations to sell, which is how the PIS gained outsized media influence that the opposition decried as state propaganda. Despite PIS now losing hold of that, I suspect that there will be no explicit German re-sell/reversal: rather, the Polish media landscape will likely be re-coopted by the new ruling coalition, just with different political interests in charge, or the new government will attempt to compel re-sell, but with an eye for more pro-EU rather than German-specific interests, to try and re-establish a dominant pro-EU media sphere but do so in a way a future-PIS government can't reverse as easily.

Immigration: This is likely to be one area where PIS broke the EU-phile paradigm, and Tusk and the anti-PIS quietly maintain continuity as a whole. While Tusk was a committed EU-phile and ally of Merkel, PIS made extremely good political hay from its anti-immigration stance, even getting the grudging German acquiesence when it was used in the 2021 Belarusian-instigated refugee crisis, where PIS preventing migrants from requesting asylum served as one of the only shields preventing an otherwise easy movement from Belarus-thru-Poland-to-Germany during the German government formation process. Given the EU-wide changes to immigration, and especially Germany's, while Tusk may entertain some token-level redistribution support, this will be a topic they step very gingerly around, not least because letting in immigrants corruptly was a key point of what brought PIS down, and could easily do them in again in turn.

There's more to be guessed at, of course, and I don't claim any special insight, but overall I'd expect by next year Poland-EU relationships to be on a fundamentally different tenor, but not at all what they were before PIS took control. Expect a lot of whom and who sort of 'it was really bad when PIS did it, not so much an issue now' tenor as conflicts occur, but one where Tusk and his EU allies try to make longer-term systemic efforts to prevent PIS from returning and cement a pro-EU coalition for as long as possible, but doing so knowing there's very shakey footing that could see them quickly fall and a PIS-coalition return.

That may be the conclusion HRW wants you to have, but it's not the conclusion born from HRW itself, which expounds on some of the key points in what you quoted.

To start, taking into account the risk to civilians does not mean not letting harm befall civilians as a direct result of your actions. To quote-

The laws of war also protect civilian objects, which are defined as anything not considered a legitimate military objective. Prohibited are direct attacks against civilian objects, such as homes and apartments, places of worship, hospitals and other medical facilities, schools, and cultural monuments. Civilian objects become subject to legitimate attack when they become military objectives; that is, when they are making an effective contribution to military action and their destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage, subject to the rules of proportionality. This would include the presence of members of armed groups or military forces in what are normally civilian objects. Where there is doubt about the nature of an object, it must be presumed to be civilian.

This is what more or less damns Gaza from a Geneva convention laws-of-war prospect. Because Hamas has extremely well established practices of conducting military activities out of civilian objects, and has been running them as the civil authority, the dual-use nature of many Hamas locations doesn't preclude them from being valid military objectives, because dual-use infrastructure that provides an effective contribution to the military action, such that their destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military objective, are categorically legitimate military objectives no matter how many civilians are there. The Geneva convention rules of wars are categorical, not metric- there is no 'if you affect this many civilians, you automatically are illegal' standard.

Further, of the three categories- destruction, capture, and neutralization- you aren't obliged to pursue one over the other, especially if it's beyond your capacity. In the Gaza Strip in particular, where direct capture would be immensly difficult or even impossible, destruction (bombing) or neutralization (power networks) are valid means to target military objectives... which goes back to if they are military objectives, which goes to the presence of providing an effective contribution to the opposing party's miltiary actions. It's a qualify-in system based on threat activities, not a qualify-out system based on civilian proximity.

Which brings in the point of proportionality, which does limit attacks against valid military objectives. Despite how it's often used, proportionality doesn't relate to a 'fair' fight, or by being proportional to the other side's capabilities, or even the size of the weapon itself. To quote again-

An attack on an otherwise legitimate military target is prohibited if it would violate the principle of proportionality. Disproportionate attacks are those that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.

Which comes down to the person who judges what 'excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack' is. Since most military attacks in this context have previous obvious military utility- or else the human shield users wouldn't be bothering to put human shields around them- proportionality has far more to do with 'what tool you use,' in a 'don't go bigger than you need to sense,' than 'would you have an advantage,' which was already addressed at the 'are they making an effective contribution to military action' premise and can be as easy to justify as 'the advantage is the increased survival of our forces.' Proportionality in practice is about what effect you actually need to do that, i.e. how much damage do you need to do along the way.

If you can reliably kill a target with a smaller measure, excessive would be using a needlessly bigger option. However, this depends on you actually having the means to do so. Using dumb artillery instead of precision munitions would be excessive if you have the precision munitions to use, since the dumb munitions can be expected to cause incidental loss of life/damage that would be avoidable from the same advantage by a different means. However, using artillery instead of, say, a squad of snipers would not necessarily be excessive, since the advantage anticipated from the artillery could be considerably more than the advantage anticipated from the snipers when things like survival of the force are considered.

This comes to questioning the advantage incurred... but the conventions consistently leave this to the parties involved, based on what they (think they) know at the time. The more legalistic followers will tend to have things like ROE checklists for engaging certain targets, which they use to point at after the fact, but there's no actual prescribed process.

To bring this back to the question of 'if someone is using human shields,' it would depend on what they are using human shields for, and if you had a reliable means for getting the same advantage by a means less likely to kill them, but the answer by the caveats and exceptions conceeded by HRW is a easily-justifiable 'yes.'

If the human-shield user is making an effective contribution to the military action, to the point that their destruction would offer a definite military advantage, then they cease to be civilian objects and become military objectives.

Attacking military objectives is limited by the principle of proportionality.

Proportionality is scoped by the military advantage incurred by engaging the target.

The advantage engaged by the party is determined by the perspective and judgement of the engaging party.

The party's judgement would be based on what the human-shield user is actually doing, and the expected result.

Excessive comes into play when the expected results are contrasted with the benefit and the alternative means to get it.

If there's no other way to neutralize the valid military objective, but doing so would garner a concrete advantage, the human shields are not a legal obstacle to taking out the group to get the military objective they're surrounding.

Can anybody tell me about the validity of the claims that Islamic Palestinians have occupied this region for thousands of years?

Given that the average human lifespan is about two magnitudes lower than thousands of years, any person who is claiming continuous existence or continuity of experiences longer than they were alive is probably stretching a point and then some.

Like given a random family currently living in Gaza, when did they likely migrate there? 1000 years ago? It was there a more recent migration of people?

The more recent migration of random families on the Gaza strip was in 1948. In the longer term, the Levant has been invaded / conquered / settled / assimilated / conquered again so many times that demographics don't trace so linearly so nicely.

Oh, hey, the person who missed the point of the post they quoted is still jousting at a strawman without demonstrating awareness of what they were quoting the second time. Imagine that.

Par for course, perhaps, but underwhelming as usual.

Yawn. While it's interesting you think this is a rebuttal to what you think you quoted, it's not a rebuttal to what was actually written.

Perhaps thermobaric weapons as a more definitive solution? Pressure wave kills everyone in the tunnel complex.

Thermobaric weapons work by dispersing an aerosal cloud, and then igniting it to create both an explosion and the more important pressure wave that can do internal damage to the victims. This is good against 'shallow' fortifications (bunkers), because the aerosal can be all around the position and create the vacuume, but it's typically bad against 'deep' fortification, where the aerosal doesn't disperse particularly far into the complex/cave/etc.

It can be done, but at the entrance it's not particularly better than collapsing a known entrance, and deeper down it's not better than just pumping in something like non-lethal tear gas.

Sadly one of the more relevant analysis of the conflict and what does / does not actually amount to a war crimes. Blockades are nasty, even within the scopes of what are permissible, and that's when the restrictions do apply. However, Geneva convention restrictions are themselves often conditional, and restrictions do fall away quite often when given context, because as you say- they were written by people who understood the risk of loopholes, and were quite prepared to wage war in the face of those seeking to exploit them.

Spooks do spooky things, is that really a controversial statement?

When it's used as a magic wand for conspiracy theories? Sure. Usually, even. Most conspiracy theories are controversial.

Would it really be surprising that some Israeli spooks would have PR campaigns ready for the next Hamas attack? Do you also believe that journalists were frantically scrambling to come up with their articles and biography, etc the day Elizabeth II passed?

What occurred over the weekend wasn't merely 'a PR campaign,' largely because it wasn't actually the Israelis driving it. The primary drivers of engagement were the perpetrators and their supporters social media channels, which were in turn picked up, signal boosted, and dissimenated by social media dynamics the Israelis have never demonstrated functional control of.

We saw what Israeli-affiliated and associated government media were trying to do over the weekend. It had very little to do with the viral news cycle that saw the unexpectedly overly successful pro-Hamas people egregiously overstep their local political pieties.

Different mission types help with this. In Vietnam, entire platoons / companies / battalions would go out on missions and move through significant areas with minimal communications without returning to base. The echelon leader would generally be with them in person for the purpose of maintaining control of the unit, or else they were limited to radios and maps. In the Iraq/Afghan Wars, the Americans didn't do that sort of mission type as much, as the goal was counter-insurgency rather than patrol, monitoring technology meant command and control was often best where the Commander could visualize the troops rather than visually see them. Plus, the unit would regularly return back to a more secure base at the end of their day, which is where the visualization tools would be secured, etc. etc.

It's not that officers didn't go out on missions, it's more that it depended on what type of unit and what type of mission. The types of units where Platoon Leaders are more likely to join in are also the sort of units with more arms and teeth... which are not the sort that insurgents generally prefer to target.

That must be a lot of consent forms in each neighborhood every July. How do you handle it when they don't agree to your rockets coming down on their property?

I'm thinking not so much of the atrocity-porn (although much of that is not exactly certain either); more of the sorts of things reported breathlessly in Western media with minimal (or fabricated) evidence -- like those guys on the island, various twitter 'ghost of kiev'-y stuff, others that I can't think of at the moment. Those had a definite info-ops feel to me -- hard to say whether amateur or pro ofc. Some of the things I am hearing now have a similar feel, is all.

Sure. And the proper response to that feeling is not to dismiss everything as having zero credibility.

That propaganda exists, and will exist in short or even immediate order in any context, doesn't mean that the counter-propaganda measure is to dismiss all things as zero-crediblity propaganda. That is the point of many propaganda strategies. Trying to get the audience to disengage, refuse to consider real facts, and be apathetic is not a failure state, it is the desired state for propaganda aimed at undermining resistance to emotionally objectionable things. Spreading around claims of other things with enough falses to trigger non-tailored doubt is a very easy way to do that.

That was the Hamas objective. You don't have a Daesh-style atrocity self-publicity campaign without wanting to escalate.

Assuming the Israeli war-hawk objective is to turn Gaza into a parking lot, they share this objective with Hamas. (and I think have more professional propagandists on staff)

If you tried to formulate this into an actual claim, it would implicitly require that the Israeli government was not, in fact, humiliated and caught off guard by one of the largest disasters in their history, but in fact knew about it well enough to have prepared entire sophisticated tailored IO campaigns in advance with the ability to launch within hours of attack... but not actually stopped the attack. The enemy was not successful while the government failed- the government was actually in control, but it's just evil!

While this will no doubt be a theory for some time, it's little more than 9-11 Trutherism with a tinge of zionism.

This is exactly what I am talking about. It devolves into a silly and extremely dishonest game of definitions.

Well, yes, using pejoratives with different meanings as motte-and-baily arguments is silly and dishonest. This is part of why the pro-Palestinians regularly shoot their cause in the foot by rhetorical over-reach.

You asked how someone could disagree with a pejorative using direct and honest argument. The most direct and honest argument is that the pejorative you use doesn't mean what you think it means if you think it accurately applies.

If you don't think it accurately applies, the charge of silly dishonesty may indeed apply, but not from the people point to word meaning.

See, it is not an open prison, it is just a double whammy tight "land border" with a "blockade" on the sea side. Just like what Canada and the US have!

This, however, would be dishonest, because this was not the point made. The point made wasn't Gaza and the other examples were alike- the point was that the reason they were not alike isn't the nature of the land boundary, but the sea boundary. There was even a specific word describing it that you seem disinclined to use.

Blockade. Which is a shame to neglect, because blockades are recognized as acts of war for a reason. Blockades can be tied to many ruinous impacts, acts of aggression, indiscriminate impacts, and so on. Not a nice word, blockade.

But... it doesn't work as well as the claim as 'prison', because it doesn't have the same connotations of total control of the individual that the word 'prison' does. Even as an act of war, a war is a conflict between two sides, which implicitly acknowledges mutual agency and even potentially appropriateness, whereas prisons can be argued to be unilateral impositions at no-fault of the subjected faction. If Israel is running a prison, the argument can be made that imprisonment is unjust, doesn't follow the principles of justice, and the entire project illegitimate. If Israel is acknowledged as running a blockade, the argument context shifts to having to explain why, which may end up conceding that the conditions that are acknowledged as occasionally justifying blockades- terrible as they are- apply.

So, of course, the pro-Palestinian narratives ignore the blockade, unless needed to be acknowledged in technical terms to maintain the prison metaphor.

So Israel forced those people (who aren't usually actually from Gaza, but typically from areas south of what is now Israel, and have families all over Israel and West Bank) to emigrate to refugee camps in Gaza.

The Arabs lost a war they intended to have existential stakes for the Israelis, yes. Multiple wars, even.

This does not make it a prison. It establishes it as a refugee camp.

And then made their exit illegal and dependent on rarely obtained "permits" that they can get for sustained good behavior.

The Gazans continued such attempts at war that uncontrolled access would have obvious and natural follow-on effects for continuing and expanding the war-potential, yes. There was a point where Gaza would- accurately- be described as occupied.

This does not make it a prison. This made it an occupation state, as long as the occupiers remain in place. Which stopped not-quite two decades ago.

And also convinced Egypt through a combination of US bribery and regime self-interest arguments, to do the same.

The Palestinians really mucked it up here, yes. Basic asymmetric conflict theory is to maintain your patron-networks and support zones without making yourself more trouble than you're worth. The Palestinians failed, both in their chosen alignments and in not enforcing displine on their movement / tolerating autonomous actors who threatened their backers. Making it in your mutually-hating neighbors' self-interest to cooperate against you is a terrible own-goal. (Or would it be dark-humor as own-gaol?)

Regardless, this (still) does not make it a prison. This makes it diplomatically isolated from its neighbors.

And also destroyed their only airport and closed down the sea access as well because it is totally not a prison, see, they are just not allowed to leave.

And here we go back to that there's a word for this that isn't prison: the word is blockade.

At no point in the summarization of several decades did you describe what- in any other context- would be recognized as not-a-prison. What you described was a refugee camp from the losing side of a war, that was subjected to an occupation state, which lost it's external patrons and made itself a security threat to all its neighbors, and which after being released from occupatation continued to allow violence until it was instead blockading.

None of this is nice. None of this is beneficient. But it is a much more honest and direct point than claiming the Gazans have been imprisoned.

The fact that there were extra steps and justifications to Gaza becoming an open air prison, doesn't change the fact that it is now an open air prison.

The point that it is not an open-air prison is what makes the claim a pejorative rather than a fact.

It might not be fallacious, but it is reductive. No group in America has a habit of firing rockets at random buildings. Such is the privilege of our safe, Western existence.

In the spirit of levity to counterbalance the grimm topics...

Don't you all do that every fourth of July?

The Ukraine experience should teach us to treat this kind of inflammatory unverified story as having more or less zero credibility -- I'm quite sure Israel is not lacking in the information warfare department.

This seems odd, as the Ukrainian experience was that there was indeed quite a bit of well documented mass crimes, some visible from orbit. While there were certainly exaggerations, the number and degree of validated incidents would lead to far more than zero credibility.

Now, if you said the Russian experience in Ukraine, that might have the meaning you seem to mean, since the Russian atrocity propaganda before and early on were far more contrived in many high-profile cases, but that doesn't seem to be what you meant.

The apparent true facts are bad enough -- the smell of propaganda is concerning as gestures in the direction of whipping up support for a very brutal response.

Well, of course. That was the Hamas objective. You don't have a Daesh-style atrocity self-publicity campaign without wanting to escalate.

I would agree with this statement and I am curious how someone can disagree with it using honest direct arguments.

Prisons generally aren't defined in terms of ruining your border-crossing relations with your neighbors.

The Gaza Strip's land borders are closed because Hamas has been historically unable or unwilling to manage its relations with its only two proximal neighbors. For Israel, well, it should be obvious. For Egypt, this is partly due to ideological deviations, especially Hamas's and other related group's relations to either radical theological movements that likewise threatened the more secular dictatorships, or had too-close relations with other Palestinian groups who caused infamous troubles for others who let them in (i.e. Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait). Another part for Egypt is that consequences of a war, beyond losing money, include dealing with unwanted costs as ever since the Sinai return any scattering of the Gazans into the desert now means their desert, and their problem, and that Palestinian's reputation for countries that let them in is, well, earned. Given that the easiest way to limit the war potential of two million Gazans is to throttle the inputs that get in, the Palestinian policy has maneuvered Gaza into a position that it's in both their neighbor's interests to close the border.

But closing land borders itself is not a prison, because land borders are not obliged or even required to be there in the first place. A prison is not simply 'the neighbors won't let me in,' or even 'I can't walk across the border.' South Korea is not a prison just because it's a de facto island bordered by North Korea. Canada is not a prison if the border with the US shuts down. Landlocked countries may be economically dependent on others for maritime access, but they don't become prisons if others refuse. Islands are even less so, even though they have no land borders.

It's not the land dynamic that defines the Gaza Strip circumstances, it's the sea access. And there's a considerably different, albeit less pejorative, description of that: blockade.

I am familiar with some science fiction weapons that could meaningfully achieve that, but nothing in Israel's inventory that would be reasonably be used as that effect.

What are the chances that this leads to Israel attacking Iran?

What is an attack on Iran supposed to do, besides a generally cathartic moment?

No, I doubt this will lead to anything overt, at least not until the Gaza Strip siege concludes. I'd expect Israel to take a long-form asymmetric conflict approach for revenge. Fewer F-16s on long-strike missions, and more drone assassinations on IRGC and others.