Dean
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Oh, I fully agree with 'surprisingly little', and absolutely acknowledge the political divide on the views of the dictatorship. It certainly helps the later that they (a) actually did improve living standards more than North Korean socialism, and (b) actually did give way to democracy. There was definitely a time in the early post-dictatorship period and even into the early 2000s where there was a much rawer nerve of anti-Americanism / 'we are not a colony and will seek reunification our way.'
North Korea squandered that, of course, and I think it's a consequence of American patience at the time that allowed the mainstream South Korean left to accept that the US wasn't so much pro-rightwing-dictator / wasn't trying to treat Korea as a colony.
I say 'significant' because- aside from University backrooms and such- some of that American skepticism does find itself into ROK national politics/policy from time to time. It was much stronger in the sunshine policy period, but recent President Moon who did his efforts with Trump and KJU was himself from the sunshine era, and some of the influences could still shine through in what was considered a priority in the relationship and such. (Like the often-stalled United Nations Command OPCON transfer from the US to the ROK, which goes back and forth be party.)
I'd like to start by saying this isn't intended to be a nit-pick, but rather that you combine a lot of points in a few lines, points I think are worth bringing up separately.
In any case, this article has been making the rounds recently that presents a more pessimistic look at the US-India alliance.
I'd disagree that the article is pessimistic. While the title is pessimistic ('America's Bad Bet on India'), the article is much more measured in a 'don't have unrealistic expectations,' and the author- Ashley J. Tellis- was allegedly one of the key actors in Washington in the Bush years who helped facilitate the nuclear normalization agreement that fundamentally changed the trajectory of US-India relations. I don't think it's fair to say Tellis is pessimistic, or even that the article actually says the US wrongly (badly) invested into the relationship with India, as much as telling people not to be unreasonably euphoric... and I think there's a
India has historically been a friend of Russia, and while that friendship has been slowly melting as Russia kamikazes itself in revanchist furor, there are still several downstream ramifications. First, India has refused to join Western sanctions regimes against Russia and is actually probably the second-largest economic lifeline to Russia after China.
This is a Eurocentric viewpoint on the Western sanctions regime against Russia. Most of the world hasn't joined the Westerns sanctions regime against Russia in the sense the Europeans did. This is one of those times where 'Europe' does not mean 'the international system.' There is no expectation of participation by most of the world, because for most of the world this is a European problem, not their own problem, and their policies tend to be for reasons other than Russia or Europe itself. This goes for the US far eastern allies as well, where there are some substantial parallel interests in play with support to Ukraine- such as the South Koreans getting paid a lot of money for ammo, and the Japanese having a view for shaping the precedents for a Taiwan scenario.
India isn't joining the Western sanctions regime... but India IS aligning with one of the most critical points of the regime, which is the structured energy sanctions to depress the cost- and profits to Russia- of Russian energy exports. India likes this because that means they get to buy below-cost energy. India buying great volumes of Russian is the sanctions working as intended. What India isn't doing is aggressively trying to screen dual-purpose technologies- of which they are a drop in the bucket.
Second, there's a significant amount of anti-US sentiment in India, often portraying the '03 Iraq war as just as bad, or even far worse than what's going on in Ukraine.
There's a significant amount of anti-US sentiment in Europe, who before Ukraine portrayed the '03 Iraq war as reason not to support the US in a Taiwan scenario. There's a significant amount of anti-US sentiment in South Korea, where the Americans are in some circles tied to the rightwing dictatorship and preventing national reunification. There's a significant amount of anti-US sentiment pretty much anywhere in the world, even in the US, where self-flagellation is practically a political sport.
This isn't the sort of thing parties base their pragmatic balance-of-power interests off of either. This would be an obstacle if there were no other topics to consider.
India is a curiously isolationist country. There hasn't been a single invasion going out from India in recorded history, and its generally tried to eschew formal alliances if at all possible.
There also hasn't been a polity known as India for most of recorded history, which makes this a bit of a just-so narrative. India as a unified polity is a consequence of the the British Empire, before which no one had a major maritime empire and the geographic region of India being divided was precisely what enabled the East India Company's divide-and-conquer strategy to work.
In the brief historical span of India being a unified and independent power, much of it was spent not only trying to maintain internal coherency and getting over the legacies of colonialism, in the international context of the Cold War (where it was not a superpower) and the American hyperpolar period. The next period of multipolarity will be the literal first historical opportunity for India to both be a polity to act with agency and have the means to.
The USA wants to do to India what the UK did to the USA, i.e. use a nation with a bigger population to secure a favorable future. But thus far it looks like India has no real appetite to be a global actor. It's refused to join any agreement to help defend Taiwan
And why should it, when not even the US has done so?
The number of treaty allies Taiwan has is 0. The number of international agreements to help defend Taiwain is 0. There's no agreement to join.
This comes off as selective standards no one else is held to... but also no one has proposed. If your standard for India is vocal intent to defend Taiwan, you'll be disappointed by everyone, which says less about everyone and more about the standard.
and instead looks only to counter Chinese influence within its own subcontinent. It's kind of bizarre that a nation with the third largest GDP (by PPP) has minimalistic international aims, but it might be just something about the Indian character.
What major international aims does it need to have? The American-led world order was very conducive to allowing India to develop in peace under its own terms. The security threats are not particularly existential. India doesn't need a navy to go secure vital imports, it doesn't need an empire to provide raw materials, it's primary ideological project of Hindu nationalism is internal rather than missionary, and it's people and politicians can make very real cases that spending attention and resources abroad detracts from very real domestic concerns. India doesn't have a primary international problem that can be 'solved' by being more active- nukes in Pakistan see to that- so why not, beyond appeals to ambition?
India's not, say, the United States, whose international system will be taken apart or changed if it doesn't actively compete. India is generally content with the system for the time being, and changes/attempts by others to change the system now have a good chance of either being in its favor, or offering it a good position to solicit concessions from courting powers.
In any case, it'll most likely take decades before any larger India-US alliance happens, by which point the world will look far different.
Here's I'll conclude by agreeing whole heartedly... and say that's probably the expectation. The US attempts to court India haven't been about immediate-term things like Taiwan, but with a view for long-term balancing, which will exist regardless of what happens with Taiwan.
The point is that Mugabe was more like Carl Schmitt than he was like Hitler.
Well, obviously, but the scope of people who have both the animosity and the means to attempt genocide are very narrow. This is a bar so low the only reason it's not a tripping hazard is the straw.
The point you were challenged on was that you weren't in a position to hear the contrary experiences of others who might have differed from your business partners, who had financial incentives to assure you that you could make good money with/for them.
Many whites, including an extremely racist Australian I know who met him and knew him quite well, think he didn’t hate white people.
You're conflating the individual for the group, which was the same error with your Nazi metaphor. Just as members at the bottom of a faction may not share the vehemence of a faction, but it's still fair to characterize the faction in a way, this is also true for the people at the top of a faction. Leaders may not believe a certain narrative, but can also be comfortable co-existing with it / leveraging the people who do / the general complicity of not challenging an unjust system they partake of.
Mugabe did not act against whites for the entire first 20 years of his presidency.
Aside from not really being relevant to changes over time (Mugabe not having static policies over 30 years implies he had changing opinions, not that he never had certain opinions), the first 20 years of Mugabe's presidency were more or less the American unipolar/western hyper-power period, which included multiple American interventions in Africa, while the last 10 years coincided with both the post-American/western low of the financial crisis and pre-ISIS/post-Iraq... both of which offered opportunity and basis for movements to arise blaming nebulous white-west types as scapegoats.
And I think, by the way, that my theory is borne out in practice. The far right, as linked by OP, believe American blacks - by and large - have a deep and unrelenting hatred for American whites. Do you agree? I don’t.
Am I expected to deny the OP before or after I deny beating my spouse?
I don’t think most black Americans care much at all about American whites. That, and nothing more, was my point.
And your supporting argument of personal experiences in Zimbabwe don't support this point, and was not immune to challenge on grounds of you self-selecting the narratives that would deny an issue if there had been one.
People whose jobs it is to convince white people, or people with many white bosses and coworkers, to invest money in a place are typically not going to tell said white people that their money is more likely to be stolen on account of them being white.
I replied that having done quite a bit of business in Zimbabwe, including with white Zimbabweans who still run many major corporations and are quite prominent in business in Harare, I didn't think that seemed to be the case, and had never noticed much racial animus toward whites by blacks in the country.
...and did they counter-argue the pretty obvious selection bias given your context and who you were working with specifically, i.e. the surviving winners and those who had monetary incentives to put you at ease?
I don't think your argument supports what you think it does. The point of 'the collective hates [X]' isn't that every member of the collective shares the same vibe of the group, an objection which itself would be a form of fallacy, but that the group effects is dominated by those who do. Most ordinary Germans may well not have hated Jews in 1939, but they were also onboard with a regime that absolutely did, hence why so much of German post-war political identity had to confront the 'I wasn't directly involved, and thus not my issue' collective identify in order to rehabilite a collective German political identity.
Likewise, the successful surviving white business men you met who were willing to work amiably with you may not have had significant expeirences with those who shared a regime stance... but the white businessmen were, by definition, the survivors who made accommodations and allies and friendships with/within the regime to protect themselves. The ones who didn't- the ones who would have been dispossesed out of spite- wouldn't still be in business for you to deal with.
Single-Issue Posting: Similarly, we're having trouble with people who want to post about one specific topic. "But wait, Zorba, why is that a problem" well, check out the Foundation:
The purpose of this community is to be a working discussion ground for people who may hold dramatically different beliefs. It is to be a place for people to examine the beliefs of others as well as their own beliefs; it is to be a place where strange or abnormal opinions and ideas can be generated and discussed fairly, with consideration and insight instead of kneejerk responses.
If someone's posting about one subject, repeatedly, over and over, then it isn't really a discussion that's being had, it's prosletyzing. I acknowledge there's some value lost in removing this kind of behavior, but I think there's a lot of value lost in having it; letting the community be dominated by this behavior seems to lead to Bad Outcomes.
For clarity, is this 'posting' is as in starting a topic, 'posting' as in 'turns every topic about their pet topic,' or 'posting' as in 'replies consistently about a topic they are interested in when it comes up, but mostly lurks otherwise'?
There's a spectrum of single-topic interest, and while I assume you mean the more obnoxious one-topic posters who hijack/drone out/etc., that's not quite how the point is framed.
Your contention relies on the Germans requests being unreasonable when you could just as easily say that they weren't.
It would be very easy to say many false things, but they would remain false, hence why not even you claim that the German grivance narrative driving the demands was justified.
Not the least considering Poland could have been much better for it, along with all of Europe, if they had aligned themselves with Germany against communism and what National Socialists recognized as capitalism in the hands of the international jew.
Their reward would have been to be colonized, treated as subhuman, and progressively enslaved and exterminated, as per the policy statements and intentions of the German rieche.
My argument isn't selective about anything.
It is very selective about many things.
I think you should step back and recognize just what narrative is being revised. Hitler could have done things differently, but the obvious case here is that so could everyone else.
This is irrelevant to the reasonableness of other people, as Hitler did NOT do things differently, and people were making decisions based on what he DID do, which was unreasonable by standards both contemporary to now and contemporary to then.
In the context of general WW2 narratives that shovel all blame on Hitler in particular, and to a lesser extent the Treaty of Versailles,
These narratives are false, not least because Stalin had his fair share in allying with Hitler, and the Treaty of Versailles was a red herring that was not a justified grievance for German actions.
there exists an obvious angle of blame that is never talked about lest it draw attention away from the great myths we have created out of Hitler and the holocaust.
There are no great myths of Hitler or the holocaust. There is banality of incompetence and evil, and those who wish to dismiss it away in their mediocrity.
It is far away from the argument, but it's also far more correct. Note that your framing is selectively allocating agency to the Poles and the Brits/Germans to choose in response to the German demands, just as Flynn's framing attributes agency to the American influence driving others decisions, but neither address that the Germans themselves had the agency in not only making unreasonable demands, but also the agency to not make those demands. The dictator is not an immovable fact of nature, for which there is no reasoning and agency only exists with the responder. The dictator is an agent, and has used their agency to posit the demand in the first place.
Avoiding this point- that people are resisting unreasonable German demands- is required to credibly claim that the Poles were unreasonable in not compromising to them, because there is no failure in reason or competence to resist the unreasonable. But the German Nazis were being unreasonable, and the other actors were being reasonable in resisting the unreasonable, and so re-establing the actual originating context- that the Germans were the originating actors and making unreasonable demands- is the more correct point for conveying not the argument, but the actual context the argument is trying to ignore.
I see we've come all the way from 'resistance is futile, Russian strength is overwhelming and their victory inevitable' to 'it's abject proof of weakness you haven't defeated the Russians already.'
There is no guarantee of safety anywhere, but they wouldn't be dependent on Russia's navy or airforce for logistics. Wagner in Africa wouldn't exactly be in high-tempo combat operations needing such a train, there are no logistics trains in Africa, and the Wagner model in Africa is to work through local actors, supporting them in exchange for resource rights (such as mines), which would be a more independent revenue source than MOD.
Even if his allegedly 25k-strong PMC can reach Moscow in full strength without leaving 10k as a rear guard, that's not enough to take a city the size of Moscow (or cross the Oka) even if everyone except the FSO decides to sit the fight out.
It doesn't really need to take a city the size of Moscow to work, however. It just needs to take the government- but especially MOD- infrastructure. That wouldn't be enough in a society with high social cohesion- but the Russian state is, deliberately, much more fragile for a lack of popular investment. In lack of that civic society resilience where the state infrastructure is not the institution, Moscow may be a city of 12 million requiring divisions to siege, but the parts that 'matter' are only a fraction of the size, especially if few people actually try to stop you.
And here your question of 'thinks he has allies' could be reframed as 'who else might be behind Wagner's effort.' We discuss this like Prigozin is acting on his own- but Wagner has always been an extension of certain parts of the security state. If Prigozin is not the actor, but the agent, then he may not be so opposed- or have allies in waiting- when he arrives.
I've no personal investment in this point- I think personal interest is enough and let Occam's Razor hold the rest- but given how the Russian state seems to have been surprised by this, 'why didn't the people watching Wagner notice this' could easily be answered by- or suspected to be- 'because the people watching them were in on it.'
The single biggest factor at this point for any defense of Moscow is likely the Moscow mayor-equivallent. Major metropolitan mayors have substantial influence over not only lower security forces, who are key enablers for the state-level agencies under government control, but the sort of agencies that provide disproportionate enabling support.
Look to see if garbage trucks and school buses are called up and used as barricades, or if the government clerks totally unremoved from fighting start filling sandbags as labor.
No. I would say Prig's actions will have either large immediate consequences (days) or very little consequences otherwise. Some internal oligarchy power play is irrelevant.
Yes. Oligarchy power plays are only irrelevant when the oligarchy is irrelevant- but in Russia, these oligarchs and their support networks have been very, very relevant in shaping Russian security policy and how Russia engages with the war both politically and socially. How the oligarchy reshuffles in the course of the Ukrainian war is one of the most significant impacts of the Ukrainian war since it became clear the Russians wouldn't win a conventional military victory.
The sanctioned purging of the hypernationalist / Wagnerite spectrum is not only a narrowing of Putin's own support base, it shapes the dynamic of what public support there is for the war and what peace terms are acceptable by neutering one of the only supportive (and most hardline) segments of Russian society, it shapes the foreign policy priorities of the security establishment, and critically it shapes the potential post-Ukraine and even post-Putin power dynamics.
To pick just one example: despite hiccups, Wagner and the Chechans were relative allies against the MOD, despite their own differences and issues. While Kadyrov would/did/has absolutely prioritize personal loyalty to Putin above any desire to join his ally in mutiny, in different circumstances (i.e. Putin had a heart attack), Kadyrov and Prigozhin could easily have been allies-of-convenience in shaping a post-Putin environment, with dynamics such as advancing eachother's autonomy and devolving Russia to a more warlord-style state. When Wagners' brothers-in-anti-MOD-autonomy are purged, Kadyrov will be isolated- weakening his position- and Shugoi will use the Wagner example as grounds to consolidate MOD control (and expand his own patronage/influence network) over other semi-autonomous oligarch mercenary groups. Such a challenge and change to potential trajectories is the epitome of a relevant consequence.
Wagner is more competent than the regular Russian army but also much smaller and if this turns into an actual civil war he surely gets crushed.
By whom, though?
At this point, this isn't Wagner vs the Russian Army- because the Russian army is literally in, and committed to, Ukraine, in the 90+% range even as the Ukrainian counterattack is (still) a very real thing. (The recent pause was not a culmination, and the majority of collected Ukrainian assets were never committed.) It's not like there's a massive third army behind the Urals waiting to move against someone moving within Russia.
Moreover, the Russian Army is capital-U unreliable at this point, at least from an anti-coup perspective. The rivalries between Wagner and the MOD are at the leader level- but Prigozhin is far more popular than Shugoi, and we have visible evidence of entire military centers letting Wagner not only pass through unopposed, but take over Russian military and government institutional facilities. They are, at best, apathetic, not unquestionably loyal.
The answer is, of course, the various internal security forces... but these are largely local, and tend not to have the things like armor and artillery and coordinated airpower. With the armor and artillery, well, committed, you're looking more at the equivalent of American SWAT teams trying to learn to call in the air force.
None of this means that Wagner won't fail/is impossible to win, but this isn't likely to have a crushing overmatch with a climatic battle, because there's no unified conventional force to wage that climatic battle due to local availability and trust that they wouldn't just join Wanger.
What this is likely to look like is a militia-vs-militia-level fighting, which the Russian Security Forces will likely win in the defense, but a counter-attack will be extremely problematic in the inverse. The power- and assets- have to come from somewhere, and it's not readily apparent whom and from where.
That Wagner is unlikely to succeed in a coup is not the same thing as not producing any consequences (doing anything). The threat of Prigozhin's rebellion isn't in the likely doomed attempt- it's in the second and third order effects of the purges to follow not just against Wagner, but Wagner's allies, and the apathetic sorts of bystanders who didn't oppose them with fervency.
Prigozhin and Wagner aren't politically significant in the sense that 'Prigozhin thought he was a real boss.' Prigozhin is well aware, hence why he went on his antics for publicity, and targetting his feud of the MOD bosses, and the instigation event being Shugoi's alleged attempts to both administratively dismantle Wagner's independence (Soldier contract demands) and potential bombing. Prigozhin likely isn't under delusions that he's 'a real boss'- he's likely under very clear understanding that he was targetted and doomed, and is deciding to go down fighting.
Prigozhin and Wagner are politically significant in that they are representative/rallying points for a key contingent of what you might call 'the non-state nationalism.' Wagner is... I hate to use vague terms live 'Avatar' or 'totem,' but symbollic of the idea of a Russian strength that's not simply the state. Signalling support for Wagner was a way to show your support for Russia as a good nationalist even if you opposed/detested/thought Shugoi and the MOD were incompetent/wrong/ruinous. Being pro-Wagner was a form of acceptable criticism of the regime by people who were fellow travelers. It was a nexus through which anti-Shugoi factions could persist and loosely coordinate.
When Shugoi wins- and I agree that he's likely to win this- he is not going to stop at just Wagner leaders. He's going to go after their allies, which includes not only other disaffected oligarchs (it's own risk to the system if/when a class of greedy opportunists opportunistically move against eachother to take eachother's stuff), but their support networks as well, which includes their media/social presence spheres. And in that, what was previously swarths of officially tolerated opinions- and criticisms- will no longer be tolerated, but officially suppressible.
What this will mean is up for debate, but the reason Wagner was a totem of alternative nationalists was that they didn't want to support the existing national symbol of strength- the MOD-military- in the first place. Removing the alternative doesn't mean people will transfer their favor to the persons/institutions that did so... and is likely to be suppressing them either actively or with open suspicion. Dismantling parts of the oligarchy doesn't mean that only the traitorous parts are subject to being targetted- or that only the traitors will resist and fly back.
This is an event that, even in failure, will change how the war-supporting base view the government fighting the war, and how the oligarchs move against eachother. Either would be significant on their own, and this is before Putin's typical insecurities drive further responses against either group.
This is likely closer to the mark than not. To build on this, the Russian MOD had reportedly been trying to compel Wagner forces in Ukraine to sign enlistment contracts, ie. become normal Russian military soldiers and dismantle Wagner's (and thus Prigozhin's) parallel command structure and organizational autonomy.
Basically, Prigozhin ran Wagner as a semi-independent militia, and his hated rival tried to revoke his independence before allegedly bombing him.
I don't think this even qualifies as an argument that needs refuting. This loss of energy was understood to be a consequence of military engagement and so because it was a known consequence it doesn't matter?
Incorrect. The point is not that it doesn't matter- the point is that the causal mechanism is different. Being a result of energy blackmail as opposed to war is a meaningful distinction because the energy cutoffs could occur in non-war contexts as well- as the eastern Europeans had previously experienced in the 2010s, but which Germany dismissed on arguments that Russia had been a consistent supplier to them so the warnings of the Americans were baseless.
The economic problems and energy supply issues caused by provoking hostilities with your main supplier of fossil fuels are in fact caused by provoking hostilities by your main supplier of fossil fuels!
The Europeans did not provoke hostilities, unless you consider the pre-Maidan support by European and especially German economic interests in supporting pro-European Ukrainian groups a form of provocoation.
This isn't happening and Europe is currently undergoing serious economic problems as a result of the lack of fossil fuels. This could indeed be qualified as shift to an import network infrastructure, but the idea that this makes the continent more resilient is farcical. The huge costs associated with importing LNG from the US rather than a pipeline from Russia have no compensating factors, and will continue to act as a drag/tax on the economy as a whole due to the massively important role played by fossil fuels in modern economies. There is going to be less energy, it will be less reliably sourced and it will cost more - this will have a ripple effect through the rest of the economy, and again, I do not think that this is a cost worth paying for the goal of making sure that Kiev can continue to shower the breakaway regions with artillery fire.
That said, the flagrant violation of the sanctions has also contributed - Europe is still using Russian fossil fuels, they're just paying India a premium to do so, and the US doesn't have the stones/capability to sanction India and China. Actually going through with the economic threats and sanctions in a real and serious way, as opposed to paying them lip-service and paying someone else so you can ignore them, would impose such a disastrous political cost that the leaders who did so would be removed from power in short order.
You can't have it both ways: either the Europeans lack fossile fuels, or the Europeans are still using Russian fossile fuels. Choose one argument and stick to it.
Further disagreements on framing include-
-The US isn't the primary supplier of LNG on the markets, it was the Arabs (who the Europeans bought much of the gas that normally went to Asia, especially China)
-The ability for sea-based LNG imports is what makes the energy import more reliable, as it avoids critical dependencies on any particular provider due to maritime LNG's fungible nature
-The fact that the LNG import terminals are actually importing LNG, while the Russians actually did shut down the gas pipelines on pretext, belies the reliability difference
-The German economic difficulties were a market distortion result of the Russians functionally subsidizing the pre-war German energy market for the purpose of the blackmail setup, which was raised
-The Europeans are paying a premium in a technical sense, not a global market sense, where their price for the Russian products benefits from the price caps
-You continue to misunderstand the design purpose of the sanctions, and chest-thumping bravado is not a superior alternative
Recent events and sanctions have given that process rocket-skates and supercharged it. De-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before the war, and the sanctions regime that was imposed upon Russia has contributed to that. You're right when you talk about the problems associated with not using the current global reserve currency, but the problems associated with staying on the dollar are starting to match or even exceed them.
This is repeating the same claim, not a counter-argument with any falsifiable new claims. The use of non-dollars for transactions is not a new thing. The reasons it is not an at-scale thing over time is due to the dynamics of reserve currency, and the functions which drive reserve currency usage have not changed. Until they do, 'de-dollarization is proceeding far more quickly than it was before' is synonymous with 'the Russians are sanctioned from the dollar, and are trying to make a virtue of a weakness they've been lobbying to have reversed.'
I agree that European militaries were largely jokes, but the supply chain and logistical issues that this affair has exposed are not minor and will take considerable time and investment to fix. Ammunition factories can't be built overnight. Of course, if you're an advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe you'd have to advocate for getting them out from under the thumb of the USA so this entire affair is meaningless anyway.
Setting aside that Europe is not under the US's thumb, it remains better to identify and start fixing logistical issues before they are needed in another crisis. Either the European logistical issue is not an issue for whatever role they might have in a Taiwan crisis- in which case earlier forced awareness is only going to improve the position- or the European logistical issue were insufficient for a Taiwan crisis- in which avoiding the issue (by avoiding the Ukraine crisis) would have been worse, as any Chinese effort willing to take the risk on an assumption of European strength would have been more likely to succeed as the Taiwanese and Americans might have been assuming a level of support not there.
I'm taking the Rand corporation's word for it - they're as fanatically pro US empire as it is possible to be, and even they are saying that the engagement in Ukraine is tying up resources which could be used in the conflict with China, which is far more important (source: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html ). Most serious pieces I have seen discussing this topic claim that the conflict is drawing away resources which could be used in China.
This may be a retreat to a bailey, but it's still a bailey to the original claim of which types of resources matter between conflicts. Your RAND article does not claim the weapon kits and systems being sent to Ukraine are the resources that matter in a China conflict, nor does it address the point on how the cost-value of these resources that were already paid for implies costs in the current era.
Setting aside RAND's own contested history and accuracies, the article's claims regarding China (which is mentioned all of 8 times) center around whether Russia is 'completely' subordinated to it by the end. It makes no claim that the Russian level of support to China in a Taiwan conflict has or would change, not least because it doesn't actually identify the sort of resources / support that would be provided, let alone what would change.
The point remains: the types of resources matter. The types that the Europeans are investing into Ukraine are not the type that would matter in a near-term Taiwan scenario. Unless you believe that the resources / economic costs would have been directly substituted into a maritime naval buildup, these are not costs with a Taiwan-relevant opportunity cost, because the Europeans were never a credible military factor in a Taiwan conflict.
Moreover, the idea that this materiel is irrelevant because Taiwan will get blockaded is also meaningless, given that hostilities haven't actually started yet and that equipment could be sent there before they do anyway. Anti-air defences and artillery are absolutely the sort of military equipment that could be useful, and those have definitely been showing up in Ukraine.
But they wouldn't send significant amounts in advance, for the same reason they didn't go to Ukraine in advance despite Ukraine actually being at far more direct and recent threat: a mix of limitations, their economic interests, and the strategic interests of key European leaders uninterested in being involved in the situation and trying to minimize exposure.
This is an argument that assumes a generosity of the Europeans that didn't exist in their own neighborhood. More to the point, this assumes that they would have been more generous in the face of an uncontested Russian invasion on their borders, rather than finding the advance of Russians in their neighborhood a compelling reason to keep their air defense systems defending themselves, and thus tying down potential resources to Taiwan in a functional strategic fixing action.
The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that several of the assumptions that might have supported a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the near term were extremely suspect.
I think you're wrong but I don't think that there can be an actual resolution of this with words - so instead I'm going to offer a bet. My position is that Russia is absolutely capable as an ally, that western nations are not willing to shoulder the burdens required to prevent the rise of a multipolar world and the US is in fact incapable of achieving their goals. The US failed in Iraq, is failing in Syria, failed in Afghanistan and failed in Vietnam. The recent history of the US empire's military adventurism has been a long litany of defeats, and I see no reason for that to change. If you disagree, I'll give you a chance to put some money on the table - I'm willing to throw 200 USD in monero into escrow for a bet that Ukraine will not retake Crimea and the breakaway republics by the time hostilities cease.
I'll disagree, without betting. Setting aside that it's a poorly structured list in measurable and general claims, I don't bet in general.
I will always think of the places where liqour stores were essential business, but churches and religious services were not.
Would or wouldn't?
I'm fairly sure Sarker's point was that the point of relative spending favors the US.
As I recall, part of the theorizing was that it was because turbine halls were harder to knock out (easier to protect with static / overlapping defenses), and partly because of the theory that it was a deliberate attempt to make Ukraine deplete it's anti-air missile stocks on the missiles.
The Russian missile campaign was really a pretty rapid turn to a one-way UAV campaign, and some of those could get stopped with literal nets. Those would damage a building without knocking out what was inside.
I think I may not have been clear / been on a tangential point. As a clarification of my previous point, not a rebuttal to this point:
My intended point was that if the Chinese cannot prevent the American carriers from operating on the east side of the coast, or the south, or the north, they do not control the western Straight, because the carriers are still able to do their job of launching planes to target invasion vessels with anti-ship missiles. My assessment is that the Chinese generally believe preventing this is a requirement to go ahead with the invasion in any sort of enduring scenario (ie. anything other than an immediate 'run to the ports and rush over' attempt at a fait accompli). This is why the Chinese anti-access / area-denial weapons, such as the vaunted anti-carrier ballistic missile or threats to guam, are so much further outside the range of the straight itself: they need to be to keep the carriers from operating off the east coast of Taiwan, or long-range bombers from taking off in range to cause unacceptable amounts of trouble.
If the Carrier groups are operating off the east, then these systems have already failed. If these systems have failed, the Chinese won't be attempting to launch more landing craft. If the systems succeeded, then the carriers are not there, and the ability to execute the blockade is maintained. Thus, the general importance is on the ability to maintain the blockade, as a failure to be able to do so means that carrier groups are active in the immediate area, which pre-empts the landing flotilla.
In comparison to the west though?
Kind of irrelevant to whether Russia is spending moderately to its means. Russia can be profligate, and extremely poor compared to its opponents. This is classic relative and absolute value mixing.
Generous report suggest Russia's spending up to 3% of its GDP on this invasion or around $67b/year.
Generous to Russia, I suppose. Less generous ones go to 5% or more. Russia was already spending an estimated 3.7% of its GDP on the military before the invasion, one of these are really reflective of the extent of economic burden because these are off course just what's counted as military spending, and not domestic economic spending or the effects of sanctions or economic impacts or the spending to address those impacts. Consider how the reported $300b in frozen assets caught at the start of the war- how you categorize that one alone is a question, but that's almost four and a half years of that nominal 3% GDP, and even that doesnt' factor in the recession.
The chain of corruption in Russia's MI complex is mirrored in the west by what we've rebranded as "Cost Disease", so even primarily donating old materiel is comparatively expensive for us. The US alone has sent more than $100b though it's difficult to get a true yearly run rate from the mix of western support and UKR itself.
It is hard, but it's also falling into the absolute versus relative and the category breakdown trap of economic versus military aid... and how military aid is even calculated. Namely, that military aid is as much a posturing show, which frequently doesn't accept that the costs of equipment were already paid for. The cost of sending $1 million in equipment built 10/20 years isn't $1 million to the current year budget, it's the cost of inspection and shipping. Hence why from a budgetary perspective, giving the Ukrainians material due to be decomissioned out of old age is actually a cost saving measure, as otherwise the government would be paying money to dispose of old material which they get to claim at full replacement price regardless of whether they spend any money on actually replacing it.
All procurement systems have their issues, but the they are not all the same, and 'mirrored' mayhaps a poor word suggesting equivalence in sale and impact.
The wallop from sanctions never arrived either, far from it.
I will disagree, partly because the sort of measures the Russians have taken on the domestic economic front certainly don't suggest there was no impact, but rather that substantial intervention was needed to mitigate and obfusicate it in the short term, but also because the people reading what the sanctions would do knew it wasn't a 'wallop' strategy in the first place, but an 'anaconda' strategy mixed with an allied-transition strategy.
To take one well known example of energy exports: the goal of the energy sanctions weren't to keep Russia from exporting anything, or even to cut all of Europe off, but to reduce Russian profits will doing so in a way that kept the western coalition together and developing alternative import infrastructure. Last year people derided this because of the first year spike in Russian energy profits from the summer price increases that covered early volume decline. Low and behold, those grounds of objection have shifted as the European price cap continues to hold, even as the Russians willingly make some reportedly pretty one-sided deals with countries like India within those contexts for what they can get.
I was (and still am) excited about Ukraine's performance in this conflict, but I don't think they have time on their side. The longer this goes on the worse for them.
Very strong disagree. The Russian military is consistently downgrading in its capabilities as the Ukrainians are being increased, and the economic fundamentals between Russia and the NATO-West continue to grow in the favor of those backing Ukraine. The costs of supporting the Ukrainians remain well within the European's financial and political capacity to maintain.
The primary issue remains whether specific patrons in the pro-Ukraine coalition will be willing to continue support, or try to undermine support, and for that I maintain something I posted in the opening months of the war: among the losers of this conflict has been the pro-Russia lobbies across Europe, as the domestic and coalition political dynamics make pro-Russia groups easy targets and just being seen as pro-Russia a political kryptonight.
'Fit in' isn't the same as 'different from,' which seems a bit of a motte and bailey. Who, specifically, is like Hylenka in nature and style, including his defining experiences that he regularly admits to, his personality and style, and his willingness to be direct to the point of offense?
Hlynka's never claimed to be a unique opinion, to my knowledge.
It's not the particular coastline, but the ability to deny support from American carrier groups. Sailing between the continent and the island is a flex, but it's ultimately not where the carrier groups that could shut down an invasion would be.
Hlynka needs to feel he's somehow different from the rest of us.
Would you even disagree with that?

It's times like this I read one of your posts, see two possible readings from connotation/insinuation, and then wonder which of them was intended as both can make sense with what follows. In this case it's 'what is India supposed to achieve (for the US interest)' or 'what is India supposed to achieve (for its own interest)', either of which would fit fine in what follows.
(This isn't a critique, just a note that it's something that causes me to regularly re-read your posts to try and understand your intent.)
In this case, I don't disagree with your general thrust. I doubt the Americans pushing for Indian ties think of it in those terms / to those exact effects- I'm not sure the American establishment is as bullish on the economics of computing as much as the military-competition sense- but the point of 'what if China doesn't invade Taiwan?' is valid. More than valid, even, as the question can also be framed outside of the context of Taiwain entirely. Win Taiwan, lose Taiwan, the American logic for wanting to leverage India against China exists regardless.
And, of course, the desire to leverage the US against China can equally exist from their perspective. Never do for free what someone else is willing to pay you, so to speak. If India believes itself already in competition with China, why not seek to profit from the Americans?
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