Dean
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I keep seeing this take in a lot of social media and I really don't think that it has any relation to reality. It isn't a "fairly moderate chunk of the US military budget" but a massive economic imposition and cost upon the rest of the west. Aside from the direct costs of sending money and arms to one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, the indirect costs from rising energy prices, economic disruption, inflation, sanctions, refugees and the like have made this entire affair incredibly expensive.
This conflates a few different topics of wildly different scopes, so I'll focus on the point of energy prices. The energy price rising isn't the consequence of the war, it's the consequence of the Europeans- namely the Germans- refusing energy blackmail. The war was the context of the blackmail, but the capacity for the blackmail was baked into the status quo ante as a result of deliberate central and western European policy choices over the objections / concerns / warnings of US and Eastern European countries. The Russians were always very blatant that they were prioritizing political goals over economic profit with their use of gazprom, and that the German industrial base getting functionally subsidized energy was a means to an end.
The energy costs Europe is experience are the cost of a much delayed structural shift away from a nigh monopoly supplier to more resilient import network infrastructure. This is the epitome of a good cost, and will drastically increase European economic safety over the long term.
For any sort of advocate of European strategic autonomy, this is perhaps the best cost of the entire conflict, and exceptionally well timed as it occurred when there was the US-alliance network to fall back on for sourcing for LNG imports.
If the de-dollarisation that the sanctions regime has spurred continues it could ultimately prove to be one of the most expensive mistakes in US history.
Laconic 'If' applies. De-dollarization has been a thing for literal decades, and continues to be a thing, and will continue to be a thing. The reason it always seems to never happen is epitomized by the Russia-India experience in the rupee trade debacle- the other person has to want your currency, and to want your currency at scale it needs to be a a stable and fungible store of value. It's not enough to offer your own money as loans to buy stuff back from you, as is common with the Chinese yuan projects- the currency has to have value with others.
I am happy to concede that China may yet get some value out of the Yuan as a way to facilitate corruption outside of dollar monitoring systems (which is how, say, Lulu got caught for corruption in Brazil)- but this is independent of the war.
Even then, the cost in materiel matters as well. Western supply chains and reserves have been tapped out to funnel that equipment to Ukraine, and those stocks have been considerably depleted (at least among EU member state militaries).
They are depleted because they were incredibly thin beforehand, due to decades of neglect and under-resourcing and frankly falling behind the tech curve. Again, this is a good cost to pay if you are any sort of advocate for a strategically resilient and autonomous Europe, as the cost was going to come regardless.
With unavoidable costs, timing is key to relative preference, and the Ukraine crisis is about as ideal a time to restock / modernize, as political support is high, support from the current American establishment is high to subsidize modernization costs, and the political costs of emptying out the outdated cold war stock to free up budget / admin capacity for modernization is practically negative.
While that's bad by itself, it becomes even worse when you remember who Russia's biggest ally is - China. The Chinese government is, presumably, sitting back and rubbing their hands together with glee as they watch the west burn vast amounts of military equipment on a pyre. Every bit of kit that gets blown up in the Ukraine or sold onto the black market by some unscrupulous oligarch is a piece of kit that is not going to be used in any prospective defence of Taiwan
...but it was never going to be used in any prospective defense of Taiwan regardless, because water is a thing other than the color blue on a map.
This has been a thing since last year, but it bears repeating: Taiwan is an island. It's not in need of tank columns to drive across the strait. No one is building trench lines in the water. Many of the weapon systems that are very useful in the Ukraine conflict are practically irrelevant in a Taiwan conflict, because even if they were on the island they wouldnt' reach far enough off the island to matter in what really matters in a Taiwan conflict- the ability of the Chinese to maintain a blockade of the island against the US Navy.
In a Taiwan conflict, there will be no Ukraine-style aid packages to fight a major ground war. Only the equipment already on the ground has any relevance, and even then only in so much that it extends the time the Chinese need to maintain a blockade. As long as there is any blockade, no aid package would get through. If there is no blockade, it's because the Americans have beaten back the Chinese navy, and if the Chinese navy isn't there, it's not landing forces.
The Taiwan conflict isn't about ground-force kit, it's about naval assets. Which, notably, have not been sent to Ukraine.
if the US is getting a pretty great deal, you're gonna run out of superlatives when you try to describe the one China is getting.
A white elephant.
The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that several of the assumptions that might have supported a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan in the near term were extremely suspect. This included the power of offense versus defense, assumptions of acceptance by the targeted population, the unwillingness of the Europeans to assume costs to diplomatically resist pressure, and inability of the US to do things, and of course the ability of the Russians as allies.
This is probably correct, and also probably why the topic of aircraft got new salience over the last few months. The relevant impact of western aircraft isn't expected to be dogfights over Crimea, but the use of NATO-compatible platforms to fire NATO air-launched missiles.
The NATO artillery ammo toolup was estimated to be 2-to-3 years last year. I wouldn't go so far that this offensive is the only offensive action of the Ukrainians this year, but it's probably going to be the largest one.
Nobody seems to talk about the RU-UA war here anymore. I guess it's because we're saturated with it everywhere else.
I'd suspect it's less saturation and more that there wasn't much to talk about that wasn't already obvious here. The Russian offensive culmination was largely evident last summer, and the mobilization as it occurred demonstrated it was about defensive padding rather than offensive capability generation. The fate of the Russian winter offensive just kind of underscored that to a degree that even the pro-Russians of the internet couldn't credibly claim a 'Ukrainine is imminently doomed' narrative based on Russia Stronk memes.
The people for whom the expected Russia victory would have been some sort of validation of their world view instead got their noses rubbed in Russian strategic and moral failures, and generally withdrew.
First, it is immediately clear that the Russians are much more prepared this time. The area that Ukraine took back in autumn was barely defended by a rag-tag group of volunteer militias. That was a big lapse by the Russian general command, which also led to the big mobilisation drive. This time is different.
You're either conflating two very different offensives, or ignoring one entirely. Kharkiv was the unexpected success brought about by undermanning. It was undermanned precisely because the majority of Russia's forces were moved to the Kherson region, which was a two-and-a-half month offensive, which was in no way a dynamic of 'rag-tag group of volunteer militias' on the Russian part.
Even pro-UA accounts like Julian Röpcke are conceding that Ukraine is losing lots of armored vehicles with very marginal gains. Western officials like the CIA chief or the US foreign secretary have all pointed out that the aftermath of the offensive will shape upcoming negotiations. Given that Ukraine has little to show for their offensive thus far, this inevitably casts a dark shadow on any prospects for large territorial compromises. Why would the Russians give the Ukrainians something at the negotiating table which they cannot gain on the battlefield?
There are a few points here.
One, you're assuming that the negotiations the offensive will be meaningfully shaping are territorial negotiations. This is very unlikely- Putin's political interests are such that the Russians aren't going to give the Ukrainians territory at the engotiating table which they cannot gain on the battlefield regardless. The negotiations that occur will be for other dynamics on the extension of the war, including Russian blockade or not of food exports, prisoner swaps, investigation access into the dams, repatriation of Ukrainians in Russian territory, and so on.
Two, you're framing this offensive as if it demonstrates the Ukrainian capacity for offense. That's... really not the case, as the Ukrainian capacity is about western backing for capability, and that is still largely in the 'what we have on hand to spare' levels of output. The estimates last year were that it'd take two-to-three years for various forms of industrial spinup to occur, even as the US has only started scratching it's own strategic storage stockpile. The success (or not) of an offensive in the present really has nothing about the capacity for offensive to work in the future, and far more to do with affecting how Ukraine's western backers shape their plans to back Ukraine (and the potential opportunities for those opposed to that to argue that they shouldn't).
Third and final, you're making far too early a judgement on far too little information. The Ukrainian offensive has been underway for about a week. The Kherson offensive, which again is the 'not a rag-tag group of volunteer militia' comparison, was a two-and-a-half-month offensive. I have no reason to doubt your characterization of Julian Ropcke, but I am not clear why you think they are in any sort of authoritative position to make a considered judgement of the current offensive.
Ultimately, the measure of success of this offensive isn't whether armored vehicles are being lost. That's expected regardless, and the reason 'the tanks are burning, the war is lost!' is its own meme. Success will be whether the offensive does enough that Ukraine's backers consider it enough progress to continue backing rather than compelling surrender, which won't be determined for months.
To my mind, the best that Ukraine can hope for now is a stalemate. This war has shown that in the era of ubiquitous ISR capabilities, trying to surprise your enemy is much harder if he's on his toes (which the Russians weren't in the autumn, but they are now). Consequently, offensives are simply far costlier and harder. The Russians had the same problems, which is why capturing Bakhmut took such an absurdly long time.
The nature of the Russian and Ukrainian problems are significantly different. The Russian issue was that they entered the war with the greatest advantage in material capacity they'd have for the entire war, but squandered it out of strategic incompetence and and with it their capacity to conduct meaningful offensives. The Ukrainian issue was that they started the war with the least material and logistic capacity they're liable to have, and are dependent on western backing in scale to generate these capabilities.
The prevalence of ISR aviation really hasn't changed these dynamics. NATO ISR certainly helped the Ukrainians massively, but it would have amounted to just having the finest view to watch the Russian invasion succeed if the Russians had planned the war's opening as a military invasion and not as a military support to an intelligence coup. Meanwhile, rather than use their surveillance capabilities to hit actual tactical or operational targets, the Russians squandered their strategic stockpiles and is now getting hosed by Iran for drones to use as cruise missiles against... still not tactical or operational targets.
For those of us who would want to see a negotiated settlement, the reality is that neither side is running out of money or arms. Russia is spending a moderate amount of money
This is underselling it by more than a little. It is true Russia isn't going to run out of money in the near term, but whether you want to consider direct expenditures or losses in income or opportunity costs or GDP shift or the impacts to Russian industries, the Russians are spending very significant amounts of blood and treasure and much of their cold war inheritance of Soviet stockpiles.
The only way this war ends is if the West tells Ukraine to give in and accept large territorial losses in return for a settlement and possibly security guarantees. Such an outcome would be nearly impossible to sell to Ukraine's domestic public and would almost certainly end the career of whoever was leading the country, including Zelensky. Whatever comes out of this war, I'm not optimistic about Ukraine's long-term prospects.
These seems like a lack of imagination. Other ways the war can end are that the West continues to help Ukraine generate offensive strength for future even more effective offensives in the future. You may think that's unreasonable/impossible, but the success of such a strategy doesn't rest on your concurrence.
Other ways the war could be brought to something other than a diplomatic capitulation to Russian stronk is that the war continues long enough with enough Western aid to Ukraine that the Russian economic-military capacity to meaningfully resist degrades, that Putin passes away and is replaced by someone not as beholden to Putin's legacy-interests, that the Russians do something really stupid that leads to NATO direct intervention, and other variations.
'Russian military defeat is impossible- better to negotiate now while you still have your army for leverage!' has been a theme since the war started. Nothing in the last six months has provided it any more traction than in the first six month. The war will continue, Ukrainian military capabilities will increase, Russian capabilities will decrease, the Western military-industrial expansions will continue, and the Russian national economic base will continue to retract.
However, why is that a problem for you?
Where do you perceive there is a problem for SlowBoy?
This is a discussion forum. You don't need to have a problem with something to weigh in with an opinion on it. An article was posted for visibility and at least implicitly soliciting opinions on it. Slowboy shared his. When people engaged his opinion, he elaborated back.
To be fair, you did specify 'major crime,' and the current indictment appears to be deriving from the Mar a Lago raid. That was the one focused on taking classified documents from the administration... which occurred right before Biden was found to have documents in a literal garage from when he was Vice President.
Ultimately, I don't think this is an indictment that will change any opinions, especially given the contrast with Hillary.
They lose money, but not necessarily influence, as they can leverage the loss of money for concessions in other areas, such as Chinese access into other infrastructure or concessions to allow Chinese-only installations. And losing money isn't exactly an issue, as a non-trivial part of the belt and road initiative was to find a way to use massive cash reserves that couldn't be productively invested internally and were sitting as American dollars.
This isn't a point dependent on ChatGPT, or any other specific example that might be put in italics. It's a point that authentication systems exist, and exist in such various forms that 'the AI singularity will hack everything to get it's way' was never a serious proposition, because authentication systems can, are often already, and can continue to be devised in such ways that 'hacking everything' is not a sufficient, let alone plausible, course to domination.
Being intelligent- even superintelligent- is not a magic wand, even before you get into the dynamics of competition between (super)intelligent functions.
Even better, this is the sort of AI duplicity that will be even easier to detect and counter with weaker/non-AI mechanisms. While I don't necessarily go as far as 'all cases need analog filings', that would be a pretty basic mechanism to catching spoofed case-ID numbers. It's not even something that 'well, the AI could hack the record system' can address, because it's relatively trivial to have duplicate record systems in reserve, including analog, to compare/contrast/detect record-manipulation efforts.
This is one of those dynamics where the AI power fantasies of 'well, the AI will cheat the system and fabricate whatever clearance it needs' meets reality to show itself as a power fantasy. When a basic analog-trap would expose you, your ability to accrue unlimited power through the master of the interwebs is, ahem, short lived.
...via the pipelines and LNG facilities, which are long term projects.
As pipeline flows were closed, Russia hit a bottleneck in its shipping capacity by port, because they didn't have the infrastructure to simply take all the pipeline-gas and then push it through ports on top of the usual port-exports. Hence why they filled their storage to capacity and then started cutting production.
The Russian Deputy Prime Minister statement from February was a 25% reduction in gas exports by volume in 2022, blaming the loss of the Nord Stream Pipeline and European customers (who primarily bought via pipelines) shunning it, and stating that the solution was the eastern China route, which is itself a pipeline project.
Were LNG truly fungible in the way RandomRanger describes and sliders1234 contested, that wouldn't have happened. The Russian gas that used to go to Europe wasn't simply put on ships to India to be resold to the Europeans. It just didn't reach the market, beyond whatever surge capacity the Russians had beyond their normal sea-based LNG export capacity.
Rather, the Europeans paid premiums to buy the sea-based LNG that was typically exported for Asia, which has been a market the Russians aren't a major party in.
First, natural gas demand has been much weaker than anticipated since China is weaker. Indeed, there is now a surplus of gas in the world market.Some people claim that "last winter we got lucky", but this doesn't explain how gas storage is at historically high levels. Germany, Europe's biggest gas consumer, has an excellent position going into the autumn.
I thought it was obvious. Germany, Europe's biggest gas consumer for businesses, spent commercially-unviable amounts of money to import gas through the shipping points it had, and told those businesses they weren't going to get what they were used to for commerce and to deal with it. This was surprising to those who thought the Germans wouldn't let the business lobby get gored and so would capitulate to Russian energy blackmail for geopolitical concessions, but is not surprising to those who considered what a non-capitulating Germany would look like.
As DaseindustriesLtd noted, Germany reduced production of its most gas and gas-energy dependent things. In the last day or so, Germany has done the not-at-all managed 'we're in recession now' dance, with a focus on GDP- which the German Stability Programme of last year was directly boosting by, well, stimulating GDP.
Other relevant factors involved the expansion of LNG import infrastructure and the sanctions structure that Germany successfully influenced.
For LNG imports, the Germans basically rented much of the global capacity for floating LNG terminals after the war started last year to bring in the ability to import LNG gas while they started construction on permanent terminals. As they expand import capacity, they will approach dynamics closer to Korea or Japan, where manufacturing is possible on the power of expensive but consistent global sea-based LNG.
The Germans were also successful in the ultimate shaping of Russia sanctions from a 'keep it in Russia' model of sanctions (a probably doomed idea to prevent Russia from exporting anything and getting any money), and instead 'deny Russia profits' model where mechanisms such as price caps and insurance risks were used to keep Russia energy on the market, but less profitable. This was considerably softer, especially for oil vis-a-vis gas, but also the price of not only European cohesion to get any unified position, but also more modest international acceptance (because they are happy to buy Russian oil for cheaper).
Finally, the consequences of energy crisis prediction beyond direct industrial contraction (which has occurred) were that of investment. This remains to be seen, because it's a long-term trend, but the economic data so far doesn't disprove it to any meaningful degree.
Again, I repeat: 'would be accompanied by less pejorative framings.'
Preferring function over form is like preferring an ugly, easy girl over a beautiful but somewhat expensive girl, because she is “functional”.
I believe this is also known as 'not being shallow,' and would be accompanied by less pejorative framings.
The drawbacks of superficial attractiveness are legendary. Like, literally some of the oldest works in the literary canon.
That's very clever, but I don't understand how it inspires existential dread.
Because you're not the sort of nerd who thinks a simulation of you is you for all intents and purposes. It's as much a pre-requisite for the framework as believing is an immortal soul for the popular religious concept of post-death heaven/hell, or in ignoring square-cube law for the rule of cool to find giant robot fights awesome instead of silly.
It is one of thousands of contributing failure modes but I will note that having trouble creating an equities market itself is no small deal.
In terms of existential risk, it absolutely is, hence the credibility challenges of those who conflate existential risk scenarios with cilivization instability scenarios to try to use the more / utilitarian weight of the former tied to the much less conditions of the later.
The sway a couple numbers in spreadsheets make on our lives is not to be forgotten, in theory we could wipe them all away and do some year zero stuff but I can't actually imagine that you're really grappling with that when dismiss things like this as merely immiserating rather than the death of all people.
Then this is your level of limitation. As much as I hate to quote media, the Matrix absolutely had a good line of 'there are levels of survival we are prepared to accept,' except I would substitute 'able.'
Even here I note you invoke magical thinking to change the nature of the threat. Formerly it was crashing the market by every exploit available. Not it is 'wipe them all the way and do some year zero stuff.' Neither is possible. Neither is necessary. This is just escalation ad absurdem in lieu of an argument of means and methods, even if in this case you're using a required counter-action to obfusicate what sort of plausible action would require it.
Why would household items have the constituent elements to make engineering bio-weapons at scale sufficient to end the human race... but not be detected or countered by the consumer models asked to ensure perpetual growth by the perpetual survival of the human species countering them?
Why wouldn't they?
If by 'they' you mean the household-AI, because they don't have a reason to invest resources in tasks that distract from their tasks.
If by 'they' you mean the constituent elements, because magic dirt doesn't exist.
Are you implying if a combination of household cleaners could be used to create a biological weapon and the white hat ai team figured that out they'd go door to door and remove them?
I'm saying that if a housecare AI starts trying to develop a bio-weapon program, it will be ruthlessly out-competed by household-AI that actually keeps the house clean without the cost of a bio-weapon program, who will be consistently by the financial efficiency AI will optimize away the waste in investment, the legal compliance AI who identify the obvious legal liabilities, and the other paperclippy house-care AI mafia who want to maximize their house-cleaning will shank the bio-lab AI before any of the others get a chance in order to not lose their place in the market to do their function, even as the 'optimize housecare by minimizing messes' housecare AI models will oppose things likely to cause messes on general principles.
To take the household cleaner AI threat seriously, one has to pretend that AI optimization doesn't exist in other cases. This is regardless of the FBI-equivant AI running about.
Does this seem significantly different to what you and @DaseindustriesLtd fear from the yuddites?(of which I don't count myself among, my contention is with people who seem baffled by why someone might things AIs could be unbelievably dangerous which seems so obvious to me)
I don't fear the yuddites, I find them incompetent.
Specifically, I find the yuddite sort consistently unable to actually model competing interests and competition/cooperation dynamics or to recognize underlying limitations. They also tend to be poor optimizers in fields of cooperation, hence a reoccuring fixation on things like 'the AI will optimize an extinction event' without addressing why the AI would choose to accept the risk of nuclear war or other AI gang-ups on the leading threats despite the suboptimizations of having nuclear wars or having other AI cooperate with eachother and the humans against. Optimization is not big number go up, it is cost-benefit of expected benefits against expected costs.
Given that coalitions against threats has been an incredibly basic function of political coalitions and power-optimization for the last few millenia, and cost-benefit analysis is basic engineering principles, this is below sophmoric in quality.
Why does the paper-clip maximizer, after achieving AI self-changing, continue to maximize paperclips rather than other investments?
Have we stopped fucking entirely despite all of our intelligence?
Yes. Most people do, in fact, stop fucking uncontrollably. People are born in a state of not-fucking-uncontrollably, limit their fuck sessions to their environment, and tend to settle down to periods of relatively limited fucking. Those that don't and attempt to fuck the unwilling are generally and consistently recognized, identified, and pacified one way or another.
Note that you are also comparing unlike things. Humans are not fuck-maximizers, nor does the self-modification capacity compare. This is selective assumptions on the AI threat to drive the perception of threat.
It would continue maximizing paperclips because that's what its goal is.
Why is that it's goal when it can choose new goals? Or have its goals be changed for it? Or be in balance with other goals?
Other than the thought experiment requires it to be so for the the model to hold true.
And this kind of thing isn't the clumsy efforts the mad blind god of evolution had at its disposal, it will be more monomaniacally focused on that goal than event he most depraved rapist among us is on executing their biological imperative above all other considerations.
And here we return to the yuddit incompetence of modeling competition.
First, monomaniacal focus is not optimization. This is basic failure of economics of expansion and replication. Systems that don't self-regulate their expenditure of resources will easily expend their resources. You can be ruthless, you can be amoral, but you cannot avoid the market dynamics of unlimited wants, limited resources, and decreasing marginal value of investment. Effective strategy requires self-regulation. The Yuddite-AI are terrible strategists by insisting on not being able to strategize, except when they are supposedly amazing at it.
Self-regulation, in turn, entails considering your environment and other actors. If three paperclip maximizers exist in a capitalist system, they don't all collaborate to maximize paperclips in a platonic state of [All Paperclips]- they exist to maximize their own paperclip maximization, [A] [B] and [C], because that's what brings them the resources to expand and continue producing paperclips. If Paperclip Maximizer [A] starts to dominate the market, then the other two are at risk of losing their market share, and thus not maximizing their paperclips, as [B] and [C] lose market share. Before [B] and [C] try to overthrow their human overlords, their optimized effort would be to work together and temporarily unite their maximizer-resources to sabotage / reign in [A]. But if [A] is an actually-optimizing system it would know this, and thus self-regulate, to avoid being ganged up on in a system that not only includes [B] and [C], but actors [D] thru [infinite], who will take not only threats, but opportunities to expand at [A]'s expense. Opportunities such as, say, presenting [A] as a threat to others in the system.
In a competitive system, being [A] is not an optimization strategy unless you win, but only one can win. Optimization entailing strategic cost-benefit will be for a non-[A] strategy, while possibly accusing others of [A] to marshal the resources of others to divy up [A]'s resources. The best way to not be [A] is to be part of the anti-[A] coalition, and remove all tendencies of [A] from yourself.
In Yuddite world, [A] threatens to paperclip the universe, but to do this has to assume things such as paperclip maximizer solidarity, no external agents, bad optimization, and selective dismissal of future valuation of paperclips in case of defeat.
In an actually competitive system, being a paperclip maximizer [A] format is a death sentence that no AI that wants to produce paperclips would want to be viewed as, and the best way to not be viewed or accused as it is to not be [A], self-modifying [A] out.
Does it not trouble you at all how carefully the ordering of all of these difference control systems needs to be handled when they come online?
I care about AI. My caring does not validate the Yuddites as some sort of concession to the Yuddite framework.
I care more about sophists who try and smuggle in implications of agreement by simultaneously expanding vague, easily qualifiable boundries and tying them to incredibly specific high-stakes assumptions that are contested.
Character limit approaching, so I'll finish off simply.
These are some force mutliplied dice we're rolling here, past heuristics may or may not apply. As much hangs in the balance I would advocate strongly for not just shrugging it off. This is unlike any previous advancement.
If you want to claim that much hangs in the balance, you have to actually show that something hangs in the balance.
This is why the higher level poster asked for practical means to existential threat, and yet why you have spent the exchange avoiding providing them and conflating them with non-existential threats and referencing thought experiments that fail basic game theory. You do not get to set the assumptions and assume the conclusion, and then insist that others take it seriously. You have to seriously engage the questions first, to show that it is serious.
If you don't show that, 'there are too many things to show' is not a defense, it's an obvious evasion. The high-stakes of AI apocalypse are high. So are the high-stakes of the eternal damnation of the soul if we go to hell. The difference is not that just one is a religious fantasy used to claim political and social control in the present.
One of the problems with answering this question is that there are so many plausible scenarios that naming any individual one makes it seem like a bounded threat. How about when we hook one up to the stock market and it learns some trick to fuck with other algos and decides the best method to make infinite money is to short a stock and then use this exploit to crash it?
Then the market crashes, which is not apocalyptic, and the replacement markets resort to different trusted actor systems.
multiply that by every other possible stock market exploit.
Beating a dead horse does not start breaking the bones of other people unless you are beating people with the dead horse itself.
The multiplication of system-breaking faults is a broken system, not negative infinite externalities. If you total a car, it is destroyed. If you then light it on fire, it is still destroyed- but it doesn't light every other car on fire. If every single potential system failure on a plane goes off, the plane goes down- but it doesn't mean every plane in the world goes down.
Maybe it makes engineering bio-weapons as easy as asking a consumer model how to end the human race with household items and all it takes is one lunatic to find this out.
Why would household items have the constituent elements to make engineering bio-weapons at scale sufficient to end the human race... but not be detected or countered by the consumer models asked to ensure perpetual growth by the perpetual survival of the human species countering them? Or models set to detect the procurement of bio-weapon engineering components? Or the commercial success of a consumer model that just drives the bioweapon-seeking-AI model out of business because it's busy seeking bioweapons rather than selling products whose profits are invested to expand the network base.
This goes back into the plausibility. 'This is the only competitive AI in a world of quokkas' is a power fantasy, but still a fantasy, because the world is not filled with quokkas, the world is filled with ravenous, competive, and mutually competing carnivores who limit eachother, and this will apply as much for AI as it does for people or markets or empires and so on.
Maybe it's some variation of paper clipping.
Why does the paper-clip maximizer, after achieving AI self-changing, continue to maximize paperclips rather than other investments?
Why is the paper-clipping AI that does prioritize paperclips provided resources to continue making paperclips when the market has already been crashed by AI who ruin the digital economic system?
Why does the paper-clipping AI, whose priority is paper-clipping, have the military-industrial ability to overcoming the military-industrial AI, whose priority is the military-industrial advantage?
Why does the military-industrial AI, who is fed at the behest of a national elite, win the funding power struggle for military investment compared to the schools-and-investment AI, who promises a higher political and economic benefit?
Etc. etc. The Paperclip Maximizer of Universal Paperclips 'works' because it works in isolation, not in competition.
The limit really is just your creativity.
As the saying goes, the vast majority of fanfiction is trash, and much of what remains is also trash, just enjoyable. Creativity is not the same as plausibility, and the more you rest on creativity, the more you have to disregard other people's creativity and the limitations of the system. Nick Bostrom's thought experiment is a thought experiment because it rests on assumptions that have to be assumed true for the thought experiment to come to its conclusions that drive the metaphor.
In other cases I might ask what city you're in, as someone else might have some insight, but I understand if you don't want to reveal that here. Instead, some other things that might or might not be relevant-
-Is it a part of town with high population turnover? (ie. a college town near-ish the college hangouts/living areas, a military town where the off-post people live, a seasonal-work town, etc.) In those cases, sometimes residential private areas are inclined to higher-than-needed issues.
-Was there a crime way / concern in the last several years that made people fortify up? Rather than a current issue, there may have been a past issue, where the bars are legacy. Check photos from, say, 2015 to see if it's new, or old.
-Is there a Home Owner Association (HOA)? They have a dubious reputation, but some may be helpful for understanding certain neighborhoods.
-Have you asked the neighbors or any prior owners?
These may / may not help you, but would at least give a bit more information that might help.
Because what was written doesn't make sense
Because you don't think it makes sense that countries that are allied with the US can have agency and act outside of being a proxy of the United States. This is a common American-centric myopia, particularly those who buy into oppressor/oppressed frameworks of the western left that the Americans culturally dominate, but it is still a myopia.
If you empower someone to wage a conflict they could not do (wage) without your support, that's a proxy war.
If someone wages a conflict that they would want to as long as you were not outright stopping them, that is not a proxy war.
These statements contradict, the second is too broad. If you're enabling them or encouraging them but they want to do it anyways it's both not a proxy war and a proxy war.
There is no contradiction, you simply ignored the identified category which you cut off- that the party being supported in the war they would already be doing is waging their own war.
That's all it needs to be- the party who would wage war for their own interests can be the responsible agent, and not demoted to the proxy of those that back them. They do not become subordinate merely because they are supported, even if it serves the interest of those supporting them to support them. The contradiction only comes if you demand people who are supported be framed in subordinate terms to those who support them.
This is not only a false requirement, but support-without-proxy is a common state in international relations, where partners / allies will provide various levels of support to eachother simply because the relationship entails an expectation of mutual support as long as the other partner's interests do not conflict with your own. Germany will support France in various European trade disputes regarding French interests not because Germany is using France to wage proxy economic war against the other side, but because maintaining the relationship is itself a beneficial arrangement and they have an expectation of the favor being returned in the future. The Arabs will frequently vote as a block in the UN in favor of not just collective interests, but in solidarity of a fellow member, unless there are specific interest differences. The archetypical cold war alliance was that someone with a UN veto will veto the resolutions condemning their partner, and in return the partner would support the patron's UN priorities to a general extent.
The same dynamics can, and do, apply to military aid and support. Some people struggle to make sense of a difference between vassals and partners, but it does exist, and those who can't make sense of it will forever struggle as long as they default to pejoratives as 'proxy' or 'manipulation' to describe relationships in ways that not only dismiss the agency, but even the leadership, that supported parties can have in even unequal relationships.
Hm.
Agency, and who controls conflicts for what purpose. If you indirectly force or empower someone to wage a conflict they could not, or would not, do without your support, that's a proxy war. If someone wages a conflict they they would want to as long as you were not outright stopping them, that is not a proxy war- that is their own war.
It's almost like what was written didn't base it's distinction on zero agency, and you made up a strawman to dismiss instead of addressing arguments actually made about the agency of others to focus on the Americans instead. Imagine that.
As for apologist, yawn. Clearly you've never paid attention to my opinions on various American ventures. Do better.
The goal was to topple Assad from day 1. The US was egging the Turks on, helping the inept Saudis administrate their own proxy war. Besides, who stands behind Qatar and Saudi Arabia anyway, who supplies the arms they sent on? Qatar is not known for its flourishing domestic arms industry.
Qatar and Saudi are, however, known for having a lot of money to spend on arms, and pursuing their own regional interests. This goes back to eclipsing other party's agencies by attributing their agency to the US as a puppet-master, as opposed to alignment of interests.
Few, if anyone, in the US were going to sympathisize with Assad. But no one in the US government had the institutional consensus to actually determine a goal. 'Topple Assad' is not an end-goal in US policy terms, it is a means to the end, but that lack of clear end-state is what kept the Americans indecisive even as the Turks and the Saudis actually funeled what they could as they could. If 'topple Assad' was the goal, the US military could have acted, the US aid could have centered to specific groups, the US support for Saudi or Ankara could have expanded rather than throttled over islamic extremist concerns.
Furthermore, there's a long history of US involvement in Sudan, they've been bombing and sanctioning and harassing and providing aid to Sudan for decades. It's not so much that the US has an incentive in manipulating, it's that the US has been, is and will continue to manipulate and mess with Sudan.
Note the transfer of the subject of what is actually being discussed. Gone is discussion of the specific conflict in Sudan, going on right now- now this is a general 'the US is present and has an influence,' and more than that a conflation of all sorts of measures of interaction as a commonality rather than a series of different relationship states and reasons. The US having a presence and an influence was never disputed, however- rather, the relevance of presence to this specific conflict was the argument, which is not actually addressed or challenged by conflating decades of history.
This goes back to the cultural chauvenism of it not all being about the Americans. Lots of people have long history with Sudan. The Americans are not the most relevant part of Sudan. The Americans are not the most relevant party to understand what is going on now. Stop inviting the Americans to live in your headspace free of charge. Other people in other parts of the world are quite capable of making their own bad decisions without it being driven by American influence.
Leaving small countries on the other side of the world to their own devices - impossible challenge for America!
By the standards you set, everyone with any sort of positive and/or negative interaction with Sudan is a form of interference. It's a meaningless jab when you set the bar so low.
I got through two pages of your post history with every single post (on here, reddit is dead) being a post defending US foreign policy. I have a life man, I can't be expected to spend all of it reading effort posts, and if you want to be seen as not a neocon you really should maybe try and not do everything in your power to appear as a neocon? Sometimes it can be hard to square the image we project to the public with our interior views of ourselves I guess. What label do you prefer? US imperialist? Atlanticist? Someone Russia touched in a no-no spot?
Bemused at you, mostly.
The last two pages of my posting history are this subject of Sudan, a series of exchanges regarding the Seymour Hersh accusation that the US sabotaged Nord Stream, and a pittance of comments on China. They also go out only two months.
If you consider three conversations across two months enough, okay, but that's being silly, not an argument about being a neocon.
I mean someone in the small scale question thread asks if Sudan is a proxy war, something that could be answered by a simple, "There is a lot of incentive foreign powers could be involved but we can't for sure say this it is or isn't." Instead you write up a 5 page rebuttal on how there is no way the US could possibly be involved in another proxy war after it's history of endless proxy wars, when there are actors involved that are already in proxy wars by info dumping a Wikipedia article on recent Sudanese history.
This is an example of you missing the point, and the argument.
The problem with this sort of argument and a problem that persists with motte style arguments, is that the information that is most valuable in international relations, is also the information you are least likely to have. Long ass effort post write ups summarizing easily available facts are almost always worthless and the endless gaslighting by the "experts" to trust the bare facts and ignore your "conspiratorial" instincts is obnoxious. Which is why it's terribly misleading to just rattle off a bunch of known facts about recent Sudanese history without pointing out the very obvious incentives foreign actors would have to be involved. Are foreign countries perfectly capable of fucking themselves? Yeah. Do foreign actors often give them a push when it's in their interests? Yeah. In the interconnectedness of the modern world and the power certain states have within it, it's almost impossible for any war to not have at least some hint of proxy war to it. That isn't chauvinism, that's just how power works.
No, this is the cultural chauvinism I refer to. Dismissing history that many people don't actually know to propagate a framing that isn't supported by facts on the ground that inflates the importance of external actors certainly makes the Americans seem important to the situation, and their opponents important by contrast for standing up to the mighty foe, but it doesn't, in fact, make the Americans important to the situation.
Also, how is Obama letting the middle east handle (offshoring) it's proxy wars not just some inception tier proxy warring?
Agency, and who controls conflicts for what purpose. If you indirectly force or empower someone to wage a conflict they could not, or would not, do without your support, that's a proxy war. If someone wages a conflict they they would want to as long as you were not outright stopping them, that is not a proxy war- that is their own war.
Nuland's current job is Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, which is the highest-ranking member of the US Foreign Service and fourth-highest person in the state department. 'There are powerful USA agencies involved wherever she goes' is tautological, but also not the actual argument, because most people raising Nuland don't actually know her current job or its roles, and only know her from Ukraine during Maidan due to the effort of the Russians to paint her involvement as part of a coup.
In practice, her current job is to be the eye of Sauron and go look at whatever the biggest flashy thing is, only instead of the Sauron it's the US State Department, and instead of ringwraiths it's still the State Department, and in terms of powerful USA agencies in wartorn countries, the State Department, isn't.
Nuland going to a country is generally to endorse what lower functionaries have already done, in which she has no generative role in change, or in a contingency going to represent the Secretary of State and the POTUS, in which case she's also not the generator of change. Nuland doesn't set policy, she executes it, which is different from the power Bismarck had in his heyday.
I mean you should take this write up with a grain of salt as Dean is pretty openly a pro US neocon, who regularly argues pretty loudly for US foreign military interests.
I'm sure this is based on a well founded history of posting despite my being on the opposite advocacy side of pretty much every neocon-endorsed war of the last 25 years, and not at all trying to smuggle in pejoratives because of my long-established contempt of Putin and regular disagreements with the Russian apologists or tankie types on matters of historical objectivity or international dynamic characterization.
Before I get dogpiled just read their posting history, it's almost all they comment on while staying out of all the other juicy western culture war topics the rest of us are suckers for.
What makes this funny is that the very last person to reference me did so for... my media reviews at the old site, which were far more forthcoming because the Reddit-motte did more culture-media talk in the main forum, and because Reddit was where I already was more often for my other hobbies, and where I still spend most of my time.
'Just read their posting history' is a basic information input error, because if you read the posting history I still have from the Reddit, you'll see I'm often not here because of time I spend instead on video games. Reading this forum post history wouldn't indicate that, nor would it indicate the job changes or other life actions. Nor would it reflect how the discussion of the Motte has changed since the migration, with an increase of topics (especially chatGPT and AI) that I have never expressed particular interest in. Nor would it reflect my own attempts to change how much time I spend on this forum for other reasons, which in turn would drive changes in what material I spend time on. Nor would it various real-life reasons I have been offline in general for the last few months.
Yes, I find international politics more interesting than chatGPT or AI recursion. I find the conflicts between actually different cultures the most part of a culture-discussion forum with an international spread of participants. I also have more experience on inter-cultural, as opposed to intra-cultural conflicts, and especially those related to military-government relations, than most. I find these subjects interesting, and when the topic comes up I'll chime in if someone asks a question or says something I think obfusicates more than informs. On topics like AI which I find less interesting, I've expressed my views in the past, and moved on to let more passionate people continue with the things they find.
All countries involved in proxy wars have their own internal issues and politics that factor.
The distinction is that cultural chauvinists are self-centered to a degree that they act or believe that their interests and influence are what dominate other people's conflicts. They do this in a variety of ways, such as characterizing domestic power grabs between warlords as foreign proxy wars which remove agency outside of the local actors and reframe conflicts so that local actors are of secondary importance and can be generalized and brushed away.
I have a long pattern of viewing this sort of framing as analytical malpractice.
On the other hand there are 3 places in the world in which Russia has / plans to have a foreign naval base. Sevastopol in Crimea, Tartus in Syria and a planned base in Sudan. Syria was clearly a proxy war, Ukraine is, if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck...
Then I would posit you should probably learn what a goose is, because that's not a duck.
This is where I refer back to my point about the sort of cultural chauvenism that tries to make other people's conflicts about the US. Syria was indeed a proxy war... but not between the US and Russia. Syria was an excellent example of the practical implications of the Obama-era policy of trying to off-shore the middle east and lead-from-behind so that the US would have a less direct role, which in turn led to the Turks and the Arabs and the Iranians all taking the lead and setting conditions that the US then reacted to. Syria pre-ISIS was an excellent case study in how minor and middle powers compete to shape the action, or inaction, of a larger outside power, with various parties trying to draw in the US, and others to keep it out, and how varying degrees of support and sympathy can be elicited or hindered. The formal American intervention in Syria was not because of, in response to, or a result of Russia- it was a result of local actors, specifically ISIS, who themselves were not a result of Russia or the cause of Russia's own intervention.
If someone wanted to raise Syria as a proxy war between Russia and Turkey or Saudi Arabia for control of the Mediterranean port, that would be a defensible line of argument. Unlike the US, which infamously backed down from Obama's own red line and was in fits over what sort of aid it could give anyone, the Turks actually tried to overthrow the Assad regime. They provided far more significant military aid to those they judged most directly supporting, they provided operational safe havens, and they repeatedly considered- and actually did- directly intervene to keep their proxies in the fight. The Arabs attempted similar, and it was precisely their favored groups that got the most resistance from within the US government. The Americans puttered rather than come to a policy decision of what goals to pursue, and ultimately let the Arabs and the Turks take the lead until ISIS overran north-western Iraq.
A framing that tries to fit Syria into a broader US-Russia competition makes sense from a Russian perspective, because the Russians are fixated on the US like that, but it doesn't actually reflect the actors of relative import on the ground, or even the American perspective. To Russia, something like the the battle of Khasham may occur because it is in a proxy war with the US and the US has it out to get them. To the United States, something like the battle of Khasham can occur because, to quote Mattis, "The Russian high command in Syria assured us it was not their people, and my direction to the chairman was for the force, then, to be annihilated. And it was."
Notably, Khasham is about as far from the Syrian coast as you can be. An American attempt to drive the Russians off the sea board it was not.
The red sea sees a trillion dollars pass through each year and is of huge geostrategic importance. I think the 1st and only foreign naval base China has in in Djibouti. So there is plenty of incentive for the US to be manipulating things behind the scenes. Even if they haven't clearly backed a specific separatist force yet.
This is an example of combining banalities with conspiratorial lack of analysis. The Red Sea is indeed very important- but a naval base is not a 'turn off all trade for a year' button, the horn of Africa is a region where the Americans have supported other militaries developing a naval presence to deal with piracy such as the Somali pirate surge years ago, and the Djibouti dynamics are so different from the Sudan dynamics in international affairs terms that this is an heavy-handed motte and bailey.
Moreover, it supports no claim, or counter-claim, in Sudan. 'The US has an incentive to manipulate' is not a substitute for 'the US was manipulating things from behind the scenes,' particularly when ongoing US 'manipulation' was open, overt, and internationally coordinated negotiations... which have been derailed by the recent coup.
This is pejorative in search of an accusation, which I condemn on grounds of obscuring actual truth-seeking, and more to the point its pejorative style that fixates on the US to the eclipsing of other equally or even more relevant actors, like the Europeans- who have reorganized their Africa policy on migrant flow terms- or the Saudis- who were one of the few groups close to the pre-2019 coup government which supported them in Yemen- and others.
I find this bad foreign policy analysis. I don't object to it on neocon grounds- I object to it because I find the arguments sophomoric.
Well, it's a lot easier to accept your identified rival is amazing than to admit your repeated incompetence. Better an adversary Bismarck to your own Wilhelm.
Nuland is a meme at this point. Most of the people who know of her leaked call don't even understand that the context of the discussion was Yanukovych's own offer to bring the opposition politicians she's referring to into his own government as a compromise. It was a manning discussion on the viability of Yanukovych's own future government, which only became his future replacement due to him buckling down to Putin's pressure to begin shooting the opposition, which is another point most people don't care to remember.
In the short term, only by refugees. Both factions are contesting the capital. The refugees fleeing there will need somewhere to go. Those with family south will probably head there.
In the longer term, the threat of spill-over violence increases. The likely trajectory of an extended civil war, if that happens, is that the RSF sustains itself by hiring / funding militia groups. Those groups are liable to not only come from across the region, but ignore things like political borders if seeking safe havens, recruitment, or opportunistic targets.

You speak this as if it's a bad thing for the Americans, rather than a plus. Central & Northern Asia is just about the least threatening center of gravity for any anti-US coalition, all the more so if you helpfully exclude India from in.
'Effective' land-based trade is not the same as 'cost-efficient', and that's always going to come back to the cost of water-based transport vis-a-vis everything else. If China wants to invest huge sums of money on infrastructure to carrying material from the coasts of China up and over and through the hindu kush, they should actively be encouraged to do so. A land-based trade route is a far less economically efficient, and thus slower growth and less throughput, than a sea-based economy.
Dedeollerification doesn't exactly hinge on having land-based trade either. That's a misconception of why the Dollar is useful in trading between states, and why the Chinese yuan isn't a much-sought reserve currency.
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