Dean
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Do you really think that Russians, even for a moment, doubt it was the Americans ? It's not a court of law. It was Americans, or some US puppet/satellite did it with american approval.
Evidence needed, particularly for the framing.
Whether the Russians believe it was an American puppet/satellite is irrelevant to whether it was an American puppet/satellite. This presupposes that the framing of puppet/satellite is accurate, which is a model that rejects or diminishes the autonomy of other actors to act without American approval or foreknowledge.
I am not the sort of cultural chauvenist that presumes the Americans are the most important factor in the decision-making of American allies.
That's probably way beyond their competence and sophistication levels. E.g. wasn't NORAD recently caught with its pants down and spent next days flying expensive jets around and shooting down various small spy blimps ?
If air-monitoring is way beyond competence and sophistication, then much more difficult categories to monitor- such as surface-vessel and submarines- are even further beyond, thus furthering the incentive to using them rather than methods where a lower-level of competence would allow detection.
This is trying to have it both ways- that the actors involved are simultaneously incredibly capable but also incompetent.
Apparently, they tracked all these small blimps (there's even a NYT article now - the guy running the program also worked on Chinese stealth aircraft), but weren't paying attention to them because of overly aggressive filtering. Took a good look after civvies photographed the Montana balloon.
This undermines the claim of the inability to track, as it shows that they were tracked, but not acted upon at the time, but upon revisiting the available data were able to identify the at-the-time overlooked data. As a model for the Baltic space, this would support the importance of not having aviation data available for re-looking if you were trying to do a secret operation.
This is the conspiratorial argument trying to have it both ways: the simultaneous claims of hypercompetence beyond realism but incompetence in in select areas as needed to sustain the conspiratorial claims.
The counter-argument/most relevant argument I'd make is that nations can die not only when they lose resources to sustain themselves, but also a desire to.
This really was the crux of the Soviet crack-up. Economically, the Soviet Union was a basketcase, but it was a basketcase that could have held itself together if it wanted to. The post-Soviet states of North Korea, Cuba, or even Russia itself in the causcuses show that a very poor, very dysfunctional state can still hold itself together. Ultimately, suppression is relatively cheap, and rebellion is hard, and barring outside intervention no insurgency in history has thrown out an occupying army without the assistance of another army nearby to assist.
But politically... the deathknell of the Soviet Union wasn't the economy, but the internal sense of political legitimacy. There's a saying that goes along the lines the Soviet leaders wished to be social reformers, thought they were social reformers, pretended to be social reformers, and then finally wished to be social reformers. The ideological justifications and pretenses of the Soviet communist system withered over time in the face of available alternatives, the cyncism of the elites and the populace grew, and over time fewer people were willing to die, or even kill, in the name of authorities viewed as unjust and corrupt and failing. The more the Soviet Union became less a transformational project and more just a corrupt empire of a state, and a state that couldn't even deliver good results, the closer it got to the point where it was unable and unwilling to hold itself together by force.
The issue not just with wokeism in particular, but polarization in general, is that it arguably creates the same dynamics of distrust, disunity, and de-legitimization in the US in what is essentially an ideological state bound by buy-in, not blood-and-soil or religion or other common identities.
Take your pick of post-modernist critiques, but if racism/sexism/-insert-ism is the worst sins of the day, but your political opposition- and by proxy the other half of the country in a two-party system- are the worst sinners of the day and the government is fundamentally build upon, with, and for the worse sins of the era... why continue it, if you can't control it to fix it? If fixing it is even possible, which various critques basically amount to an impossibility? Believe in the good of the commons requires believe that the commons are, in fact, good. But if the commons are not good- and in this case the commons can be shared institutions, norms, or whatever- defecting is rational, even if it comes with long-term penalties. And when defections start occuring, the commons start to crumble.
We already have seen this in various back and forths. The borking of Robert Bork began a practice of practice of blocking / slowwalking judge appointments into the Bush years, which led to the retaliation in the Obama years, which led to the Democrats removing the judicial filibuster, which led to the loss of it to the Supreme Court, where now the organs of the Democratic Party actively discuss and lobby for court-packing or defanging the Supreme Court. The politicization of consolidated national media, which ostensibly strived for neutrality at the start of the era of national news television like CNN but then created ideological conformity that gave first to Fox News for underserved markets, and then to the Trump Russia hoax affair, has not only cratered trust in media in general but driven the development of information silos for much of the American population. Campus free speech issues didn't remain limited to college campuses, but went both up the employment chain and down into primary education, where considerable fractions of both the voting and non-voting publics don't feel safe voicing their own political opinions. The religious right was happy to muster it's social pressure power into politics, and reaped the whirlwind of an equally evangelical zealotry by people who also saw other believers as a problem to be fixed. When everything is political, and you hate your political rivals, you either burn the shared space down to deny it, or you use it against your hated political rivals.
Yes, a state like this can go on for quite some time... but who is going to want to fight and die and kill for it, if it comes to it? Especially if any interested outside party decides to help things along in a material way? And why would they want to? The Soviet Union had plenty of resources to pay for people to kill the people who didn't want to be with them anymore. That wasn't the issue- a desire to was.
Woke theory is just one of the discrediting ideologies that undermines that desire for their to be a shared nation. And without that desire, the US can absolutely fall apart even if it still has resources. It's far from impossible to see something that makes Brexit look like a wise and just solution.
Now, for the record, I don't think it will actually go that far. I view a number of the issues in US politics right now as within the scope of past political disruptions that were survived. There are dynamics that make this unique- namely this is the first major American political realignment since the invention of social media, and things that previously wouldn't have been publicized are now prevalent- but my own view is that between demographic changes, internal migrations, and the cycling of the American elites as part of both, the system is in the process of changing rather than collapsing, and more to the point is doing so in the context where a lot of its major alternatives are going to do worse.
Defense contractors are wildly biased towards veterans. Our hiring is more likely to involve some sort of aggressive patriotism; their scruples are more likely to support selling drones and bombs. Sometimes this even has an advantage of rapport with customers. But this is an end, not a means. It would be a mistake to predict growing evangelism for veterans due to our obvious ideological capture. Likewise, reading DEI reports as a foothold in the culture wars is missing the point. They are a specific form of advertising, and follow the popularity of idpol rather than driving it.
Maybe I misread your intent, but I'd think that the ideological capture of defense contractors and the like by the American military demographics is a basis for expecting future dynamic changes?
The people who entered the US military immediately after 9/11 or during the Iraq Wars are currently reaching their 20-year retirement windows, which is to say the first generations of retired senior-NCOs and field-grade (or even flag) officers whose experience was defined entirely by the Iraq War are in the last few years actually hitting the post-military job markets. From my understanding of the American military-to-civilian pipeline, career retirees tend to immediately go into networked positions of management or influence, brought in by their established networks of veterans and/or for their established credentials in organization management. This is now a significant, experienced, and culturally significant demographic pipeline of people who have more or less been preoccupied with global / outside the American culture bubble contexts for the last two decades. They will be entering upper-levels of governments, business, and even running for office on veteran credentials, against equivalent careerists who operated in entirely different cultural cultivation dynamics.
Well, I saw 'now', but this is just the career officers retiring. They follow the people who left early, and became contractors or consultants or other things. These are people who are already scattered across middle-management. Including, yes, contractors. The senior-level-to-senior-level pipelines would only magnify the influence of those already in the system, I'd think.
I'm not sure where I'm going or what I'd specifically expect, but I'd say that we're still far too early to rule out any sort of demographic/composition impact of the western veteran communities on their corresponding government/military-industrial complexes. In some ways it never stopped, but in other ways we're just starting a process where the people who were at the very bottom of the military totem poles 20 years ago are now just starting to be present and have a cultural impact in... wherever you think Veterans end up most.
Which may not be numerical or concentrated or influential enough to matter. But I'd totally not be surprised if pro-Veteran evangelism only increases as more people who stuck it out from the start of the War on Terror start the senior leader transitions to private sector.
Yes, but not because of that.
Well that's a shame, because I do criticize the western media for running shakey and often wrong stories on singular anonymous sources. If you do not, that's on you.
I don't think you do understand how journalism works.
The story is the story. If the story has a single source, that's the story. What is a journalist supposed to do in that case? Extort a source? Betray him? If nobody wants to talk, then nobody wants to talk. A journalist reports on what can be reported.
Simple- find corresponding evidence to support the claims. A single person making claims is not news to report, it is rumor-mongering. More importantly, it's a known type of journalistic failure that's prone to confirmation bias where reporters report the things they want to be true in order to impact the world, as opposed to questioning things that might undercut the narrative.
As the author has in the past engaged in conspiracy theory publication, such as the OBL raid, this isn't just a hypothetical concern, but a known weakness.
He has been right since I have been alive, and everything historical I've checked.
This suggests you are either very young, or very modest checking skills, when it comes to Chomsky.
Or do you honestly believe USA went into Iraq to liberate the country and fight terrorism?
I absolutely believe that many American government people who advocated the Iraq War thought they were, in fact liberating the Iraq War. I think they were incompetent and arrogant, but not insincere that they thought that the Iraqis would be better without a tyrannical dictator who suppressed a majority of his own populace.
I have met other people whose frank assessment was that they fully expected radical islamic group attention to re-focus onto Iraq and not on AQ-style projection attacks into the US.
I also find credible that the neocons thought Iraq was but the first step in a broader campaign to topple multiple regimes in the middle east, especially Iran, which was and is a state-supporter of terrorism, and that while incredibly condemnable it was a sincere interest to go after past and present state sponsors of terrorism.
I also believe the USA had many overlapping interests to go into Iraq, in addition to its views on Iraqi liberation and the war on terror plans of the neocons.
You are throwing a smokescreen. You said you haven't met an American in government framing the concern in terms of "threat to western dominance", and I showed you one.
You didn't. Your own quote didn't frame it terms of "threat to western dominance." This is precisely the sort of 'unable to use their own terminology' I accused the article of lacking.
If USA wasn't worried about Russian influence in Europe, why would they want to attack Russia economically?
And this is a shift in claims to a strawman. The claim isn't that the USA wasn't worried about Russian influence in Europe. The claim is that the Americans in the American government don't frame the implications of Russian influence in Europe as "threat to western dominance." Government bureaucracies have their own sub-cultures on how they view and describe the world, but characterizations like "threat to western dominance" are how people outside of, and generally opposed to, the US government frame the US government concern, not how the US government views its own position.
Thus, an alleged highly placed US government person who uses turns of phrases and sub-cultural memes typical of outside critics of the US government lowers the credibility of the claim that they are a highly placed US government person.
I'm not talking about the explosion, I'm talking about your claim about the motive. No mind-reading is necessary to show that USA has always been an enemy of Russia. I can give you many more examples.
And many examples would not support a totality argument, or a how the US government viewed the Russian government. As open for criticism as the Clinton administration was, characterizing its Russian policy as viewing Russia as an enemy is more than a stretch, and even the Bush 2 government had more than a little internal debate on how to approach Putin, hence the criticism of Bush by members of his own party.
How many examples do you need of American bureaucrats interested in hurting Russia do you need? Would 10 do the trick?
The fact that you think 10 examples could represent the totality of American government of perspectives on Russia over thirty years is rather indicative of your lack of understanding of the US government.
Different Administrations over the post-Cold War period had different perceptions and prescriptions for Russia policy. The Clintons thought neoliberal reforms and supporting Yeltsin would help Russia. He may have been wrong- but the failure of neoliberal reforms with Russia is not evidence of ill-will as opposed to part of the general critque of the Clinton-era neoliberalism. Bush II was pre-occupied by the Iraq War, and governed over internal party splits between old-guard Cold Warriors who were suspicious, the religious right which was more interested in domestic items and the war on terror, and the then-nascant base rebellion that would manifest in the Tea Party and later trump that doesn't really care about Russia. Obama tried his own anything-but-his-predecessor, and infamously sent Hillary Clinton for an attempted 'reset' and reframing. Trump was infamously not a NATO-Atlanticist, and both he and his faction of the Republican party regularly accused of being soft on Russia.
Or are you going to dismiss every one of them? Then the claim is falsifiable, isn't it?
The claim is falsifiable because it claims a totality that doesn't exist no matter how many examples are provided, because totalities are disproven by the existence of counter-examples, not proven by supporting examples.
That different people in the US government had different views of how hard (or soft) Russia policy should be, and what is or is not an anti-Russia action, just means there is dispute, not that the people who wanted a hardline were somehow the consensus of the US government.
Thus diminishing the credibility of the source, whose claimed insight into the military operational dynamic is the crux of the article.
False. The article never stated that.
The article sites the source for a number of military operational dynamics that serve as demonstration of both the source's access into the conspiracy and to explain claimed means and requirements of the conspiracy over time.
No. The fallacy applies regardless of how many grounds you have.
This is not true, and is an extension of the fallacy of fallacies.
Yes, because many people are inclined to blame the US no matter who does something.
Hasty generalization fallacy. The fact that many people did that doesn't mean that all people did that, and in particular doesn't mean that I did that.
The fact that you have cited events without causal relationships to the Nord Stream pipeline as evidence of a causal relationship indicates that yes, you did do that.
The fact that you treat the Biden statement is a causal link
Straw man. I never said I treated it as a causal link.
I did not say that you said you treated it as a causal link. I said that you treated it as a causal link. Your stated position on the manner is irrelevant.
That's as far as I go. I'm not going to chase hundreds of week arguments on top of dozens of weak arguments.
Aside from the lack of hundreds, I rather suspect you will, so that you can get the last word once again.
If you wanted to seriously defend your position you would have picked your strongest argument and defend that instead of keeping up this Gish gallop strategy.
The argument- which you once again avoided addressing by this attempted gish-gallop, remains as stated:
The argument remains that in addition to the issues that other people have pointed, it retains the characteristics of being source by someone someone unfamiliar with how governments work and with inconsistent claims of the level of secrecy entailed, of which many examples were raised, which undermines the validity of the single claimed source who is supposed to be a highly placed person in the US government who stated that secrecy was a priority.
Though there is one last thing before I leave you to get the last word once again, just to revist your earlier counter-argument.
It's no surprise that your comment received zero replies. Who would sit down and read the entire thing, think about critically, and then reply. Well, I just did.
Thank you for raising interest in the original posting. The streisand effect says hello, and it has received far more engagement than it would have had you not posted.
No one except the Russians or the Chinese or any other interested polity or activist group, for whom hacking a transponder service would be an amazing amount of smoke that could support the claims that the Americans (or Brits, or whoever) blew up the pipeline. Especially since relevant parties might have their own regional air tracking picture- like, say, a anyone with an air defense network with over-the-horizon radars in the Baltic region- with which to identify the discrepancy.
The point here isn't that tracker sites are 100% accurate pictures of the sky. It's that air tracker sites offer ways to identify various attempts to circumvent air tracking, from turning off transponders during routine flights, comparing different transponder sites to identify discrepancies between sites, or comparing transponder sites with the nation's own air-defense networks to identify a discrepency, which could be noted in post-even analysis. The number of countries with overlapping interests in monitoring the baltic airspace includes NATO, non-NATO, and Russia itself.
It's thus notable that no one is alleging this sort of flight tracker tampering has occurred. Not the Russians- who have the most interest in supporting a claim against the US- but also not the author. The possiblity of website tampering has been raised to dismiss the noted time discrepancy which would undermine the story... but this is introducing a new level of unfalsifiable claims that put the onus on proving a negative (that the websites were not hacked, as opposed to that they were) on skeptics rather than apply occam's razor- that the author is just wrong, and the very flight they claimed supports their claims does not, in fact, support it, casting doubt on other parts of the story by consequence.
Do you even need to hack any websites? Obviously transponders can be turned off, and if I were running a military and wanted to engage in covert ops using planes I'd think that the ability to spoof the transponder output might be a thing that I'd be interested in?
If you're operating in 'how to run a conspiracy' mode, then any routine event that suddenly deviates from norms becomes an indicator of interest when looking back at specific periods of interest. For routine military flights that routinely have their transponders on, suddenly turning them off- or having verifiable mismatches between claimed trackers and other forms of observation- becomes an observable item of interest to anyone who's interested in looking in the data afterwards. To prevent such a discrepancy from occurring during what you know will be a time of interest- such as an alleged command-detonated mine explosion- you'd need to plan on how to affect the public record if you were committed to maintaining a relevant level of secrecy.
There is no evidence or even allegation of such an event occuring- suggesting either a hyper-capable cabal and surprisingly limited Russian attention, or that there wasn't such a manipulation at all- but then, if you were running a military covert operation, there's no reason to use a plane to deliver a sonar device in the first place. You could just use a boat, for a fraction of the cost and detection risk.
You are surely aware of glide bombs and such? There's nothing preventing attaching such to a torpedo to allow high deployment. There were likely parachute systems for torpedo deployment.
This is not only conflating flight profiles, but the navigation implications. The thing about parachute systems is that they're subject to wind drift- which means you're now dropping a torpedo, which can't GPS navigate, to an unknowable GPS grid coordinate, which means that even if you added on blind-navigation systems like gyroscopes that track progression from known points, they wouldn't work because you wouldn't know where you start.
Whereas this problem would be lesser if you flew from a low and slow altitude- to minimize coordinate drift- or just did a non-flight mechanism, like using a boat.
This is really basic capability mismatch that shouldn't be suggested by a senior airforce adviser to the White House.
I was impressed with your criticism, but are you really saying using a submarine, in a very shallow sea the Russians are reportedly monitoring very closely is such a good idea ?
Compared to using an aircraft? Yes. An aircraft is infinitely easier to monitor and track.
Setting aside the the Russian monitoring capability at that part of the baltic is an allegation unsupported by other parts of the narrative (such as the use of a sonar device as a command detonator- this is exactly the sort of signal underwater detection systems would detect), the reason submarines have difficulty in shallower waters is the vulnerability to active sound systems (ie. sonar).
Baltic Sea is very, very shallow. It's really not a place where large submarines, such as those that have torpedoes can be sneaky.
Who on earth told you that, but not the Russians and the NATO countries that have invested in submarine capabilities for the region for decades?
A pipeline is a line. Parking a torpedo next to a pipeline isn't as hard as getting it to a precise destination. Align with the pipeline side, slowly descend, sink ..
Again, this isn't how offensive torpedoes work on a technical level. There is no control system to do this, or the mechanical means to know when it is 'aligned' and 'slowly descend.'
This comes back to not knowing the technical capabilities of what's being involved.
with ironic quotes around 'lost'?
That's the official explanation of why a explosive single use mine clearing ROV ended up lodged under a Nord Stream pipeline.
It got lost during a baltic training exercise and just, through sheer coincidence, ended up under a piece of infrastructure Americans just hate.
If you accept that drift occurred without intent, then it wasn't deliberately placed for the purpose of ending up there, and relying on drift is not credible because there was no plan. Chance events do happen and things that sink do go about the the sea floor until they get stuck. If you reject the premise that it resulted there without deliberate intent, there's no reason to believe it drifted there as opposed to deliberately being placed.
So which is it? You can't have it both ways, that it both drifted and it was deliberate for it to drift exactly there.
What shots would be needed that Poland couldn't call?
If the secrecy of the operation was so important as to hack flight-monitoring websites, why bother with a flight as the delivery mechanism at all?
Set aside that this is inventing new claims that the author didn't make, or that it turns a lack of evidence into evidence of the conspiracy- it still relies on the conspiracy taking a number of needless risks (tampering of websites not being detected, covering all websites, letting there be no observable discrepency to those with their own airspace monitoring) compared to... not using a plane in the first place.
The plane is unnecessary, and requires multiple additional steps not identified by the author, and still doesn't deliver a unique capability required to make the plot work.
@felipec has given a counter-argument here
https://www.themotte.org/post/349/culture-war-roundup-for-the-week/64225?context=8#context
Most importan stories are broken out with singular anonymous sources, and mainstream publications mention a single anonymous source all the time.
And we generally agree mainstream publications are bad in quality, and that a good indication of trash articles is when massive claims rest on singular anonymous sources. Bad practices don't stop being bad practices when they conform to your prejudices.
It wasn't just the Navy, it was remote corner of the Navy.
The statement still applies that there are still reporting requirements and oversight channels.
As if any politician is transparent about their true motives ever. As Noam Chomsky says: the stated motives of the government are never the true motives, therefore you can pretty much disregard the stated motives.
If Noam Chomsky is your guiding star on objectivity or insight into government thinking, you might as well take the government at face value. Likewise, if government motives were never true, you wouldn't be quoting government persons like Condoleezza Rice for motives.
That being said, Condoleezza Rice did pretty much spell it out in 2014:
"But now we need to have tougher sanctions, and I am afraid at some point this is going to probably have to involve oil and gas. The Russian economy is vulnerable. 80% of the Russian exports are in oil, gas and minerals. People say that the Europeans will run out of energy. Well, the Russians will run out of cash before the Europeans run out of energy. And I understand that it is uncomfortable to have an effect on business ties in this way, but this is one of the few instruments that we have. Over the long run, you want to change the structure of energy dependence. You want to depend more on the North American energy platform, the tremendous bounty of oil and gas that we are finding"
The first thing she mentions is the Russian economy was vulnerable, suggesting they did want to attack the Russian economy.
Only if you want to project a specific interpretation of 'attack' to fit a quote approaching a decade ago well outside of the context of an alleged Nordstream attack.
They want to exploit all Russian vulnerabilities. How much spelled out do you need it to be?
Competently. People studying Russian vulnerabilities does not mean they are responsible for any perceived attack on a Russian vulnerability.
This is also where I'll note that this actually is an example of the incredulity fallacy. That you cannot see how others would interpret does not mean that others would not do it differently.
It's clear USA has always been an enemy of Russia.
Not really. Also, consensus building.
Why does the source have to have military insight? He could be part of the CIA, or any number of options.
Thus diminishing the credibility of the source, whose claimed insight into the military operational dynamic is the crux of the article.
The fact that you don't see how something is possible doesn't mean it is impossible. That's an argument from incredulity fallacy.
Only if I was arguing on the basis that I don't see how something is possible, as opposed to arguing on the basis of something not being possible on grounds X, Y, Z.
-The argument about no longer being a covert option because of the Biden Administration's public statements on Nordstream are nonsense.
Is it? The exact moment I saw the clip of Joe Biden saying they would put an end to it after it was blown up I put two and two together, and so did many people.
Yes, because many people are inclined to blame the US no matter who does something. The fact that you treat the Biden statement is a causal link is precisely the dynamic why it would work as a covert operation by anyone else- because, in lack of evidence, people will project.
And also because your response is irrelevant to how covert operations are categorized, which is the argument you are responding to- that the person claiming to be a government source is mis-using a government term in ways that it does not actually mean.
But if everyone already suspects the USA did it--as it happened--then the secret would be much harder to keep, because people will not stop investigating--as it happened.
If everyone already suspects the USA did it, it would be much easier for someone else to pull off a covert operation.
The more eyes, the harder to hide. How is that not obvious?
It is obvious. Hence why the lack of verifiable evidence despite all the eyes significantly undermines the claims of the story, as do some of the factual inaccuracies.
Also, argument by incredulity again.
Your desire to not see the obvious seems like motivated reasoning from you.
I'm sure it would seem so to someone operating from motivated reasoning.
Once again this is a fallacy. The fact that you find something comedic doesn't imply that it didn't happen.
This, again, assumes the characterization is the argument, as opposed to the other points.
It was explained that it wasn't necessary, but it would facilitate the operation. Plain and simple.
Counter-productive and against the earlier limitations that prioritized secrecy.
You can be secretive or you can facilitate with more actors, but you can't use both arguments simultaneously.
Events unfold that way many times, so what? Things happen and plans change. That happens all the time.
So do conspiracy theories, which regularly rely on inconsistent timelines to create context from unrelated events and then ignore related relevant context that inconveniences the theory.
The author of this article is a past conspiracy theorist. This is a matter of record, and does shape the level of scrutiny their reliance on various techniques might imply.
-The argument on Russian mine-detection technology is getting into the military spy-fiction, and not the good kind.
Argument from incredulity fallacy.
No, argument that the author doesn't know what he's talking about, and is bad at inventing capabilities.
"This isn't the first part of the article to do this, but it's reocurring enough to note, especially since the 1970s Church hearings drove very significant changes in the American intelligence community... changes that are being implicitly covered over by the appeal to the 70s for narrative continuity."
It wasn't the intelligence community who ordered this, it was the neocon administration. The hatred for Russia runs deep, as anyone familiar with Victoria Nuland knows.
I'll leave in my original text here in quotes just to emphasize that this is neither a counter-argument for the quote or relevant to what the quote was pointing at.
So? You just pick an aircraft that is going to travel that route anyway for whatever reason.
Then the aircraft's presence isn't a secret, which means it's proximity at the time of command detonation wouldn't be a secret, which defeats the purpose of a secret operation secretly placing explosives.
The theory simultaneously requires the US government to care about secrecy to go to exceptional lengths to maintain it, and not caring about it.
All told, I do not find it credible, and would lower my judgement of someone who found it compelling.
I find all your arguments weak and relying precisely on what you accuse Seymour Hersh of doing: preying on the laziness of the reader. Many of your arguments boil down to "I don't see how this is possible", as if you were an semi-omniscient being.
Strangely, no. Now, admittedly, it might look that way if you cut out the supporting arguments, but this is the sort of removal of context typical in conspiracy thinking.
You may not see how X is possible, but I do. So what?
Not much. You'll continue being wrong for the wrong reasons, continue to discredit your general position in the contrast, and continue to undermine your favored associates by contagion of ferverently pushing a weak conspiracy theory as stronger than the evidence supports. By contrast, I'll get a wry amusement.
It's also a clear Gish gallop strategy: overwhelming an interlocutor with as many arguments as possible, without regard for accuracy or strength of the arguments.
When there are many weak elements in an article that demonstrate a trend, the volume is the point.
Also, irony.
It's no surprise that your comment received zero replies.
Certainly. I wrote it days after the initial posting, when it was no longer in the automatically expanded part of the browser, when new sub-topics had already buried it.
Thanks to your re-post trying to put it back on visibility, some might actually be curious enough to follow a link. No promises, since you were buried pretty quickly.
Who would sit down and read the entire thing, think about critically, and then reply. Well, I just did.
Yes, well no. You certainly did reply. If it weren't for you also re-posting this, I wouldn't have a reason to link to it either.
If you are trying to analyze this critically and actually give the article a fair shot, I would pick a single argument against it, your strongest argument, and defend it at depth, not throw dozens which in my opinion are weak.
The argument remains that in addition to the issues that other people have pointed, it retains the characteristics of being source by someone someone unfamiliar with how governments work and with inconsistent claims of the level of secrecy entailed, of which many examples were raised, which undermines the validity of the single claimed source who is supposed to be a highly placed person in the US government who stated that secrecy was a priority.
Solid criticism, however, if you bend the terminology a little, 'bombing' the pipeline from a high flying plane would've been possible,
This is what I meant by the writing being written for people who don't actually understand what's being discussed.
Bombing the pipeline is not possible from a high-flying plane, because when you drop an object out of a high-flying plane and it hits the water at terminal velocity, it crumples. This is flawed on a conceptual level, like proposing a small child 'aim for the water' when jumping out of a plane without a parachute because water is softer than land. At terminal velocities, hitting water is like hitting concrete.
This is the entire reason that the aviation aircraft for anti-submarine warfare are low and slow... and typically dropping things off with parachute, such as sonar pods. But the advantage of aircraft in these situation is their speed on getting to an area to drop items, not their precision. If you're not in a time-sensitive context, such as a pre-meditated emplacement, there's zero advantage to not just dropping something off the side of a boat.
although perhaps risky because who knows how good the resolution of air traffic and air defense radars in the area is.
Plenty of people. This is the primary naval / aerial conflict zone of a Russia-NATO baltic scenario. The presumption of air monitoring has itself been a regular argument by those who insisted the US must be responsible by virtue of anyone else would have been detected, and is a primary reason why a boat-based mission has been the most probable form of any deliberate sabotage.
US recently developed air-deployable versions of the mk 48 torpedo. These glide down to just above the surface and then launch a homing torpedo that could just get 'lost' and accidentaly spoon itself against a pipeline like that mine-clearing charge they found cosied up against Nord Stream in 2015 or so.
As a deliberate means of targetting the pipeline, with ironic quotes around 'lost'? No, because that's not how these things work on a technical level. This is in the 'making stuff up that sounds plausible to those who don't know better' territory.
Homing torpedoes do not home by magic, they home off of sound- specifically ship or submarine sound profiles- whereas the inactive nordstream wouldn't even had the sound of moving gas. The mk 48, according to wiki, does have wire-guidance capabilities, but this isn't usable with aircraft due to the line breaks. There is no GPS navigation like can be done to guide drones to specific grid coordinates because GPS does not work underwater. There are ways for sound-based navigation underwater... but the mk 48 isn't designed for that sort of navigation, and the thing about sound-based navigation underwater is that anyone can hear it, and yet no one has alleged it in this context. Even as parts of this conspiracy are based around the presence of russian underwater surveillance systems, ie acoustic sensors. Additionally, for a deliberately placed device to 'cosie' itself up to the pipeline, it needs underwater maneuver capabilities beyond forward guidance. Torpedoes are generally good at moving forward, and not very well known for moving sidewise and backwards.
And- to return to why it's really, really stupid- there's no need for the airforce to deliver a mk 48 by air. The mk 48 is a submarine-launched torpedo. Even if you invented all the technical solutions, if you were going to try and torpedo the nordstream, you could just send a submarine to deliver it instead. You could use wires for for guiding the torpedo, you could use the submarine's own navigation systems to get close to the target, you wouldn't need to risk any sort of air or surface-monitoring, and there would be no need to alert any foreign partner that you were doing an operation near the nordstream pipeline or bring in people to the conspiracy.
But that would make too much sense and would ruin the conspiracy... for the sort of people who understand why the proposal doesn't make sense. Hence the point of the article being written for people who wouldn't know when it was talking nonsense.
Well, this seems relevant to copy-paste.
https://www.themotte.org/post/349/culture-war-roundup-for-the-week/63475?context=8#context
Overall, not impressed or compelled by the claims. People have already noted the singular anonymous source claiming, in an era where anonymous sourcing has been as disreputable as ever, but there are other elements that raise eyebrows.
-The claim it was done by the pure navy, as opposed to special forces, to avoid Congressional oversight really suggests someone who is not familiar with the other forms of oversight- and security vulnerabilities- of American military branches. There's a reason that the US black projects generally don't operate from the conventional forces, but in separate elements.
-The mind-reading/framing of motives is projection, or at least certainly not how the western military-security types would view items. I've yet to meet an American in a serious position of government responsibility who frames concerns over Nordstream in terms as abstract as 'threat to western dominance,' as opposed to the more concrete concerns of 'energy blackmail' or 'gas turnoffs.' This is arguing by connotation and pejorative rather than actual positions. If this is the author, that's on him, but if it's from the source, that's indicative.
-The discussion on the German political situation in May 21 is missing some rather significant context- such as the points that Merkel had just retired and there was a multi-month German political paralysis as the government formation negotiations were ongoing, the Russian military buildup adjacent to Ukraine had already started, the Belarusian migration crisis and Russian gas supply slowdown was already starting. The last three are generally now seen as pre-invasion shaping efforts by the Russian government before the invasion- which we know that the Biden administration was aware / observing in 2021. Instead of 'making a concession he knows will be invalidated', however, the author frames the motive as Biden's internal political floundering to war-criticisms.
-The 'planning' meeting that rests solely on the anonymous source is, ahem, silly. Just reverse the sentence order of the paragraph to see how so-
The CIA argued that whatever was done, it would have to be covert. Everyone involved understood the stakes. “This is not kiddie stuff,” the source said. If the attack were traceable to the United States, “It’s an act of war.” - The Navy proposed using a newly commissioned submarine to assault the pipeline directly. The Air Force discussed dropping bombs with delayed fuses that could be set off remotely.
The proposed plans, as described, don't pass muster in the context of their own paragraph, let alone broader realism. For one, submarines don't "assault". That's the sort of language of someone larping military insight. Similarly, the airforce plan of 'bombs with delayed fuses' makes no sense. Aircraft are incredibly visible, so you'd be guaranteeing a record trail, and either the aircraft would have to bomb land-based targets- which is to say, where timed fuse bombs would be found by the Germans in Germany- or a sea target. Now, this may surprise, but dropping bombs from a bomber entails the bomb hitting with terminal velocity. When very small things hit very big bodies of water at very high speeds, they do not penetrate and then become precision submersibles, they go splat.
This is something deserving of /r/credibledefense, but not credibility inspiring.
-The argument about no longer being a covert option because of the Biden Administration's public statements on Nordstream are nonsense.
"According to the source, some of the senior officials of the CIA determined that blowing up the pipeline “no longer could be considered a covert option because the President just announced that we knew how to do it.”"
This is a red flag for credibility. Covert options aren't covert because you have a known capability, but rather the secrecy. When we read declassified / released examples of covert operations, they almost always involve known capabilities of the actors. It's the who/when/if they are actually doing it that's the secret item. This objection is just about the one part that wouldn't matter, precisely because the Navy diving programs are openly acknoweldged capabilities.
-The whole Norway angle is just comedic. The narrative flops between the need for operational and legal secrecy as needed, without actually explaining why informing the Norwegians is necessary to carry out the operation... except to tell the Americans, who have been reviewing the problem for months, where to hit the pipe. The operational simultaneously needs to be secret, but also incredibly expansive in people and organizations involved.
-The timeline is also all over the place. Biden is alleged to have committed to planning the attack on the pipeline as a result of domestic political pressure before the war, but with target selection only occuring in March after engagement with a foreign nation, with the exact timing being... one of the most observed military maneuverings in the region for the year. Except, now with an even later bomb-on-command requirement, late in the process... which indicates they didn't have a time intended to blow it up originally, even as they were engaging the Norwegians to place it.
And- despite all the effort in creating a command-detonated timing... no reason for the timing is apparent. The article tries to go with a citation to imply it had to be done eventually, but there's a roughly 3 month gap between the alleged emplacement and alleged trigger.
-The argument on Russian mine-detection technology is getting into the military spy-fiction, and not the good kind. Tom Clancy was at least good at not just hand-waving technology. You don't get to just allege that the Russians built an entire undersea surveillance network along the Nordstream pipeline to justify the Norwegians as the only people who can counteract it with their inherent anti-Russian traits.
-The regular appeals to the 1970s is less relevant and more argument by historical innuendo. This is a normal element of conspiracy building, to break down temporal relevance and start building connections between unconnected things while also obscuring temporal and contextual relevant information. This isn't the first part of the article to do this, but it's reocurring enough to note, especially since the 1970s Church hearings drove very significant changes in the American intelligence community... changes that are being implicitly covered over by the appeal to the 70s for narrative continuity.
-The air-dropped sonar bouy is yet another red flag. You could get a better engineer to discuss the dynamics of sound propagation through water, but the real item is the fixation on dropping it out of an aircraft.
There is literally no reason to use an aircraft to drop a sonar bouy if you're trying to have a secret signal. Aircraft are easily observable on a number of sensors or by regional naval traffic. Even if your broadcast device weren't detected by any/all systems in the broader area at the moment it signals- and remember the Norwegians are being involved on the basis of a Russian surveillance system for underwater threats, ie. sound-based detection- the aircraft flight for recote detoation would be easily observable...
...and unnecessary, because you could just sail a boat and drop it over the edge. Boats are far, far harder to monitor for unusual activity than aircraft.
I could go on, but that's kind of enough. There are a number of things in this story that are meant to sound vaguely informed and insightful, but with a pretty clear lack of understanding of the material or the alternatives. The way this is written, this is less written by someone who actually knows how governments work and reads far more like being written for the sort of people who don't.
Really, it's targeting ignorance with a hope of shaping your views without remembering how they were shaped. It hopes you don't remember that it's all based on a single anonymous source, that no motivation is provided for the source providing all this information, that you won't remember the argument by connotations in rhetorical lines not used by the people it claims to reflect the positions of, that you won't dwell on the communication role/purpose of the various time-skips in the narrative, or the omissions of 2021 and awkward time gaps, the mechanical alternative methods, and so on.
Someone else can validate that the last part was written before your post, and was not written with you in mind.
All told, I do not find it credible, and would lower my judgement of someone who found it compelling.
Overall, not impressed or compelled by the claims. People have already noted the singular anonymous source claiming, in an era where anonymous sourcing has been as disreputable as ever, but there are other elements that raise eyebrows.
-The claim it was done by the pure navy, as opposed to special forces, to avoid Congressional oversight really suggests someone who is not familiar with the other forms of oversight- and security vulnerabilities- of American military branches. There's a reason that the US black projects generally don't operate from the conventional forces, but in separate elements.
-The mind-reading/framing of motives is projection, or at least certainly not how the western military-security types would view items. I've yet to meet an American in a serious position of government responsibility who frames concerns over Nordstream in terms as abstract as 'threat to western dominance,' as opposed to the more concrete concerns of 'energy blackmail' or 'gas turnoffs.' This is arguing by connotation and pejorative rather than actual positions. If this is the author, that's on him, but if it's from the source, that's indicative.
-The discussion on the German political situation in May 21 is missing some rather significant context- such as the points that Merkel had just retired and there was a multi-month German political paralysis as the government formation negotiations were ongoing, the Russian military buildup adjacent to Ukraine had already started, the Belarusian migration crisis and Russian gas supply slowdown was already starting. The last three are generally now seen as pre-invasion shaping efforts by the Russian government before the invasion- which we know that the Biden administration was aware / observing in 2021. Instead of 'making a concession he knows will be invalidated', however, the author frames the motive as Biden's internal political floundering to war-criticisms.
-The 'planning' meeting that rests solely on the anonymous source is, ahem, silly. Just reverse the sentence order of the paragraph to see how so-
The CIA argued that whatever was done, it would have to be covert. Everyone involved understood the stakes. “This is not kiddie stuff,” the source said. If the attack were traceable to the United States, “It’s an act of war.” - The Navy proposed using a newly commissioned submarine to assault the pipeline directly. The Air Force discussed dropping bombs with delayed fuses that could be set off remotely.
The proposed plans, as described, don't pass muster in the context of their own paragraph, let alone broader realism. For one, submarines don't "assault". That's the sort of language of someone larping military insight. Similarly, the airforce plan of 'bombs with delayed fuses' makes no sense. Aircraft are incredibly visible, so you'd be guaranteeing a record trail, and either the aircraft would have to bomb land-based targets- which is to say, where timed fuse bombs would be found by the Germans in Germany- or a sea target. Now, this may surprise, but dropping bombs from a bomber entails the bomb hitting with terminal velocity. When very small things hit very big bodies of water at very high speeds, they do not penetrate and then become precision submersibles, they go splat.
This is something deserving of /r/credibledefense, but not credibility inspiring.
-The argument about no longer being a covert option because of the Biden Administration's public statements on Nordstream are nonsense.
"According to the source, some of the senior officials of the CIA determined that blowing up the pipeline “no longer could be considered a covert option because the President just announced that we knew how to do it.”"
This is a red flag for credibility. Covert options aren't covert because you have a known capability, but rather the secrecy. When we read declassified / released examples of covert operations, they almost always involve known capabilities of the actors. It's the who/when/if they are actually doing it that's the secret item. This objection is just about the one part that wouldn't matter, precisely because the Navy diving programs are openly acknoweldged capabilities.
-The whole Norway angle is just comedic. The narrative flops between the need for operational and legal secrecy as needed, without actually explaining why informing the Norwegians is necessary to carry out the operation... except to tell the Americans, who have been reviewing the problem for months, where to hit the pipe. The operational simultaneously needs to be secret, but also incredibly expansive in people and organizations involved.
-The timeline is also all over the place. Biden is alleged to have committed to planning the attack on the pipeline as a result of domestic political pressure before the war, but with target selection only occuring in March after engagement with a foreign nation, with the exact timing being... one of the most observed military maneuverings in the region for the year. Except, now with an even later bomb-on-command requirement, late in the process... which indicates they didn't have a time intended to blow it up originally, even as they were engaging the Norwegians to place it.
And- despite all the effort in creating a command-detonated timing... no reason for the timing is apparent. The article tries to go with a citation to imply it had to be done eventually, but there's a roughly 3 month gap between the alleged emplacement and alleged trigger.
-The argument on Russian mine-detection technology is getting into the military spy-fiction, and not the good kind. Tom Clancy was at least good at not just hand-waving technology. You don't get to just allege that the Russians built an entire undersea surveillance network along the Nordstream pipeline to justify the Norwegians as the only people who can counteract it with their inherent anti-Russian traits.
-The regular appeals to the 1970s is less relevant and more argument by historical innuendo. This is a normal element of conspiracy building, to break down temporal relevance and start building connections between unconnected things while also obscuring temporal and contextual relevant information. This isn't the first part of the article to do this, but it's reocurring enough to note, especially since the 1970s Church hearings drove very significant changes in the American intelligence community... changes that are being implicitly covered over by the appeal to the 70s for narrative continuity.
-The air-dropped sonar bouy is yet another red flag. You could get a better engineer to discuss the dynamics of sound propagation through water, but the real item is the fixation on dropping it out of an aircraft.
There is literally no reason to use an aircraft to drop a sonar bouy if you're trying to have a secret signal. Aircraft are easily observable on a number of sensors or by regional naval traffic. Even if your broadcast device weren't detected by any/all systems in the broader area at the moment it signals- and remember the Norwegians are being involved on the basis of a Russian surveillance system for underwater threats, ie. sound-based detection- the aircraft flight for recote detoation would be easily observable...
...and unnecessary, because you could just sail a boat and drop it over the edge. Boats are far, far harder to monitor for unusual activity than aircraft.
I could go on, but that's kind of enough. There are a number of things in this story that are meant to sound vaguely informed and insightful, but with a pretty clear lack of understanding of the material or the alternatives. The way this is written, this is less written by someone who actually knows how governments work and reads far more like being written for the sort of people who don't.
Really, it's targeting ignorance with a hope of shaping your views without remembering how they were shaped. It hopes you don't remember that it's all based on a single anonymous source, that no motivation is provided for the source providing all this information, that you won't remember the argument by connotations in rhetorical lines not used by the people it claims to reflect the positions of, that you won't dwell on the communication role/purpose of the various time-skips in the narrative, or the omissions of 2021 and awkward time gaps, the mechanical alternative methods, and so on.
All told, I do not find it credible, and would lower my judgement of someone who found it compelling.
Care to elaborate for the non-Flesch readers amoung us?
Restricting ourselves to people with access to sufficient ressources to pull off such an operation: who and for what reason? The non state actors with sufficient ressources that I know of don't seem to me like they would benefit.
This restriction doesn't meaningfully narrow it down, since every power in the geographic neighborhood and many outside would qualify. It's not like boats and diving equipment and explosives are the sole scope of a superpower.
For motive, there can many multiple and even overlapping motivations, both externally oriented (geopolitical advantage) and internal (domestic political maneuverings). Simply hoping to have the Americans be blamed would be a motive.
This doesn't read as a strong condemnation to me.
That is because it is not a condemnation, and suggests to me that you are mis-interpreting the position.
As @Harlequin5942 stated, I am not condemning. I maintain the EU made Brexit more painful than it had to be. Making things more painful than necessary is only a condemnation if you believe the point of geopolitics and diplomatic negotiations with allies is to minimize harm to all parties involved.
In so much as I condemn the EU's handling of Brexit, it is on grounds of competence in pursuit of what I view was their desired results of the negotiation strategy.
That is unless ones survival is contingent upon winning AND there is no question that you do in actuality have the ability to win the war.
But there is always question whether you do, in actuality, have the ability to win the war. You may think there is no question, but then you go into the war not choosing to win the war vis-a-vis choosing to fail, but simply believing failure is impossible.
Which is the crux of what it means to choose victory- no one 'chooses' victory, as if it were an alternative to choosing failure, because no one chooses to fail by preference.
What determines the military success is Russia's risk aversion towards escalation, and if put in a situation, where Putin thinks that it is worth it for HIMSELF that Russia should risk escalation by making the choice to win (which they obviously can), the the entire world is at risk.
Not really. If Putin is not risk-adverse, and escalates to the point of NATO intervention (or nuclear retaliation), the military success is lost regardless of what Putin thinks. Likewise, what Putin thinks is irrelevant to what the rest of the critical actors believe must be done regardless of what Putin thinks. Putin can, of course, claim to be a madman who Really Might Do It, but (a) Putin has a long established history that undermines the credibility of this claim, and (b) the nuclear deterrence modeling that Madman theory relies on has a pretty direct answer to this strategy- which is not to concede to the madman.
Madman ploys are based on the assumption that, when faced with a madman, nash equilibrium rewards conceeding to the madman. But if the madman can be appeased by concessions, he's a rational actor, and thus not a madman. Whereas if he's a genuine madman, no concession can be rationally predicted to result in a stable nash equilibrium, because the candidate is, well, a madman. A madman bluff will not actually do a madman-only action even if denied, while a madman might do a madman-only action even if conceeded.
In such a context, game theory shifts from risk avoidance- the conceit of nuclear deterrence- to damage mitigation- which is to minimize the potential harm the madman can do.
You're still not addressing what flanking is supposed to provide.
Russia could shutdown exports to China during say a Taiwan conflict. That seems like a big deal.
Why would it seem like a big deal to anyone familiar with global trade?
If the commodities are fungible on the global supply level, a commodity cutoff would have no effect, because China would just buy from someone else. Since the Chinese economic system is centered on the south and eastern coasts, not overland, they already are dependent on maritime exports, which are the easiest to change suppliers of on the global market due to how cheap ocean travel is. The most significant Russian commodities of note, even in the Russia-China are allied scenario, are overwhelmingly fungible items that it doesn't matter who buys or sells them specifically.
If the commodities are NOT fungible, then China has less ability to adapt suppliers... but so do the Russians, who of course are taking it to the chin, because they can't just re-sell it as well. This does apply to some things, like the Russia-China natural gas pipeline, but this is notably a pipeline that was only built by Putin at a significant export loss for geopolitical purposes of an alliance, and even then it's not actually a critical cutoff to the Chinese economy. There are no current non-fungible commodities the Russian market provides China that are critical requirements for the Chinese economy.
Either way, you're either not having an effect, or not having a critical effect, due to the nature of the global market.
And this is if a cut-off occurs at all during a Taiwan conflict, vis-a-vis pressing the US to accept a fait accompli and getting back to trade as normal, or not actually cutting off at all and daring the Americans to do anything about it, which would be quite possible in the name of Strategic Autonomy like the Germans and French have already been pursuing.
So any china war machine would have no way of supplying itself with Russia not exporting and the US controlling the seas. That’s a big deal.
Why would anyone familiar with the Chinese war machine or American pacific strategy think it's a big deal?
A Taiwan conflict isn't going to be based on long-term economic production, but on immediate available resources and stockpiles measured in many cases in months to years. The Chinese strategy would remain a fait accompli, not a global war of attrition.
Nor are the Americans going to launch a blockade of China in a sudden conflict. Not only will they not have the buildup to marshal support in the leadup given the likely nature of a Chinese attempt as a sudden action, but enforcing it would require a willingness for interceptions- actual casus belli interceptions of ships in international waters- with numerous neutral and even allied countries.
And that's assuming Russia doesn't maintain economic ties with China during a conflict in the same way that the Germans and Italians are maintaining economic ties to Russia in the current Ukraine war.
Obviously part of an alliance would be Russia no longer interfering with US foreign policy. That’s what allies do.
Why would anyone familiar with contemporary or historic international relations think that?
I mean I disagree with your view of the alliance.
And I maintain I have a better position on this topic than you.
Russia Can offer the US a lot. It flanks China.
And why do you think that benefits the US? What, exactly, do you think it enables the US to do beyond the privilege of placing US forces in more advantageous range of the chinese military? Is the US military supposed to invade nuclear Beijing from the north, across a logistics train through Siberia and the Mongolian steppe? Have a pitched defense of Vladivostok, a position that must only be defended because Russia is a party on the American side?
We offer them economic development or atleast the elite get rich selling us commodities.
This does not require an alliance. This happened despite being geopolitical adversaries. This still happens despite the Ukrainian conflict, where russian commodities are among the categories of NOT sanctioned items.
In fact, this is the primary reason for a divergence of interests. The russian commodities are functionally fungible in the global market. The biggest consumer of Russian commodities in a US-Russia alliance would be China, because that's how the American world order trade system works. The Russian interest wouldn't be in selling to the Americans, but to whoever would pay most, and global commodity prices are driven by China, giving Russia an incentive to keep selling- and keep the US from coming into conflict with China. This would decrease the credibility of the alliance as a Chinese deterrent, because Russia would have economic AND security reasons not to let the US come into conflict with China, upto and including political, informationally, economically, and diplomatically sabotaging the US in any buildup and coalition-building for a China containment.
This is a case of 'don't buy a cow when you get the milk for free,' except in this case the cow is selling the milk to everyone regardless of whether you buy or not, and has an incentive to unionize against you if you cut off the biggest milk market.
Toxic internal dynamics are either Russia interfering in US foreign relations or US exporting you need to say you love gays. Both can be handled.
If Russia interferes with the US foreign relations with other US allies, it is a zero-sum alliance dynamic with other US alliance opportunities and interests. This can only be handled by losing value in other alliances... many of which are higher in value, economic and depth of cooperation, than what Russia is being described as offering in this scenario, even as an alliance with Russia undermines the interest in other parties to maintain an alliance with the US. All parties that were using the US to hedge against Russia will continue to have Russian concerns, and be in search of other parties to assist them...
...such as China, the nominal target of this alliance, introducing new influence vectors not present when the alliance members are already against any Russian alliance group.
And three I already said Russia offers the west the ability to surround China.
You already said this, but repeatedly failed to actually identify what advantage this is supposed to provide that's not outweighed the cost of having to provide security guarantees to all the territory surrounding china.
A major American alliance advantage against China is that it does not have a land-border to be steamrolled across by weight of numbers and internal lines of communication. This forces China to militarily compete in the sea, a major American advantage, and via the global commons, where US-European (sans Russia) have extensive advantages in established markets and alliances, which would be undermined by a major US-European rebalance of alliances due to triangulation in response to a US-Russia alliance. Meanwhile, in purely campaign terms, allying with Russia gives China an obvious target, and gives the US an obligation to defend an unfavorable position, in exchange for... for...
The opportunity to try and fail to convince the Europeans to conscript citizens and send them across the Siberian railroad to fight on the far-eastern front? An even stronger European coalition that would prefer the US take a loss to China on Taiwan or other topics to preserve even stronger European trade relations with China? Market-access to Russian commodities that we know would be sold on the global market even if the US and Russia were at all-but-war? Triangulation of European security politics against the US-Russia axis?
Geopolitics is not a tactical RPG where flanking gives +20% to damage or accuracy. Unless you intend to fight a land war in asia, there's no particular advantage in adjacent territory to your foe, and quite a few risks.
If Brexit is painful, it is because the British public made the demand that it be so - repeatedly. The EU has done remarkably little to make Brexit 'painful',
Well, besides refusing to consider ultimately-accepted Irish border inspection measures for several years, selective laxening of migrant enforcement across the channel, coordinated media campaigns, grouping in various European projects the British were already paying members of that don't require EU membership to renegotiation as part of the broader trade deal negotiations, immediate objection on safety grounds of standards that were still in alignment at arbitrary cutoff dates, and deliberate demands for politically unviable demands that led to the collapse of the entire pro-EU British establishment when they tried to actually deliver a Brexit-in-name-only but which were dropped afterwards.
As a project to actually keep Britain in the European orbit, as was initially attempted by trying to offer an exceptional number of 'you can change your mind' avenues and the May BINO terms while heightening the prospects of departure with numerous techhniques, the EU position was a bumbling failure of trying to not-lose one of their most significant strategic-relevance contributors, and ended up in the impressive result of starting with a Parliamentary practical-majority of Remainers to negotiate with at the start changing to a hard-Brexit wave. As a secondary effort to try and keep the EU together, it was a decent success, albeit missing the obvious third order effects for how Euroskeptical states would adjust policy on the expectation of staying in the EU.
and any pain the Brits suffer is somewhere between an unforced error and a deliberate choice. The EU very much could have done more to put on the screws, and didn't.
That there were options the EU could have done and didn't does not mean that they weren't also options that the Europeans didn't have to do, but did.
The obvious consequences of leaving the EU market are not, in fact, some shadowy Franco-German plot to hurt those who leave.
Of course not. It was just formal policy by various European leaders to show that exiting the EU would hurt anyone more than staying in, while taking multiple efforts to undermine confidence in the departed member's business environment, maintaining various European Union media campaigns continuing cultivate Brexit messaging themes years after macro-economic trends surpassed it, and post-Brexit attempts by the German and French governments to try to centralize power in European institutions they collectively dominated in the absence of British obstruction.
Things do not need to be shadowy plots to be confluence of interests between parties. 'Soft Brexit' was never going to be an option due to interests, not technical impossiblity.
Hardly. Militarily indefensible, economically more interested in entangling than curtailing, and politically more interested in getting the Americans out of Europe than in being on the American side of a US-China fight. Russia would be a bigger France than France in trying to subvert the European pillar of the Atlanticist alliance in the name of 'strategic autonomy' of Europe from the US, except with even less interest in, well, the things the US and France actually agree and care about.
There are bad alliances where the ally costs more than they could possibly offer, there are bad alliances that have toxic internal dynamics, and there are bad alliances where one has nothing to offer the other. A post-Soviet US-Russia alliance would have been all three.
It means the Germans and the French successfully incentivized Orban to wreck the EU from the inside rather than leave it in a parting way of vision.
The 'you could always tank your economy and leave the EU if you wanted to' links two competing interests- not-tanking the EU, and leaving the EU. If not-tanking the economy trumps, it doesn't mean you like the EU, it just means you dislike it less than tanking your economy. You can absolutely recognize that you are dependent on something you don't like- it's not some paradox, and is a common point when you can't change circumstances you would have avoided or changed if you could have without
What this means in practical terms, however, is that if you can't leave the current environment you don't like- and the French and Germans made a very deliberate policy choice of making Brexit, and implicitly any other exit, as painful as possible- then you have no reason not to reshape it from the inside. The EU ceased to be credibly based on a common commitment to liberal values after Brexit, when a country significantly more liberal than much of Europe left, and the primary objections to it's departer- and examples made of it- were economic in nature.
Confirmation bias is a hell of a drug, but no, the transcript does not suggest a timeframe of implementation after a coup, it suggests a timeframe during which Yanukovych is still in power, hence the transcript saying-
"The problem is going to be Tyahnybok [Oleh Tyahnybok, the other opposition leader] and his guys and I'm sure that's part of what [President Viktor] Yanukovych is calculating on all this."
...when talking about members who could provide for a viable inclusion into government, as opposed to people to be outside... of a government still including Yanukovych, who's involvement is still be considered later on.
"Pyatt: No, exactly. And I think we've got to do something to make it stick together because you can be pretty sure that if it does start to gain altitude, that the Russians will be working behind the scenes to try to torpedo it. And again the fact that this is out there right now, I'm still trying to figure out in my mind why Yanukovych (garbled) that. In the meantime there's a Party of Regions faction meeting going on right now and I'm sure there's a lively argument going on in that group at this point. But anyway we could land jelly side up on this one if we move fast. So let me work on Klitschko and if you can just keep... we want to try to get somebody with an international personality to come out here and help to midwife this thing. The other issue is some kind of outreach to Yanukovych but we probably regroup on that tomorrow as we see how things start to fall into place."
This is not a discussion of a coup for the violent overthrow of government, of maneuvering fighters and identifying security forces to flip to force the government to retreat. This is discussion of the then-contemporary offer of Yanukovych to bring opposition members into the government, which was recognized at the time as a possible lure to try and sow division within the opposition ranks by encouraging infighting over access. The americans are discussing who could be viable in the government versus who should be kept out from a position of personality conflicts, but their worry is not security forces or a crackdown if exposed- it's that if a viable offer is too slow, behind-the-scenes manipulations by not-the-state-being-'couped will torpedo a formation.
Moreover, the timeframe of concern in the discussion isn't weeks forward, which in history is after the fall of government, but is in immediate context and concurrent to an undecided Party of Regions faction meeting- Yanukovych's party- where 'lively argument' reflects nonconsensus before the internal defections that came later when interior ministry started shooting in earnest. The transcript is still engaging in how Yanukovych will be continued to reached out to- not written off or replaced.

The 'evidence' in this report is a series of claim made by an alleged anonymous source with access. Moreover, the claims of the anonymous source are unsupported by corroborating evidence (hence the reliance on argument by narrative), and contradicted by available evidence (flight data that doesn't match the claimed trigger mechanism).
This now begs what you think is a hallucation, as well as what specific information you think was verified versus what wasn't.
Repeating the claim from a position of motivated reasoning neither makes it motivated reasoning or disarms the stated basis of skepticism.
No, you could certainly identify your age and the depth of your checking to Chomsky's more contentious claims which have been critiqued over time.
Misuse of converse fallacy.
Still misuse. The criticism was a characterization. Your rebuttal was that it was false as you never claimed the characterization. The rebuttal to your rebuttal is that it was never claimed you claimed the characterization. This is not a converse error fallacy, this is basic strawman fallacy being rejected.
I am quite correct that you lack hundreds, and remain vindicated in my expectation that you will continue to strive for the last word despite multiple claims you are done.
I note you are also still on the same subthread, and expect you to continue to do so for reasons of predictability and ego.
No, I'm well aware you're not addressing them, but my viewpoint is that you're abandoning weak positions that your deflections could not resolve.
True. This is and remains my argument.
I have made my argument on multiple points. Whether you accept it as established is irrelevant.
All of my arguments were not restricted to the military, nor did your addressing actually resolve or mitigate the criticism. 'Address' does not mean 'defeated,' and you have consistently dropped threads that remained contested, even if you claim to do so because they are weak.
With access to covert operations planning at the White House level for black operations specifically designed to avoid oversight? Very, very, very, very few, and only at high levels of the US government where alleged meetings were taking place with people who constitute highly placed members of the current administration.
This, again, is indicative of someone who doesn't understand the workings of the US government.
Hiding is only one of the causes of the streisand effect. Trying to otherwise draw attention away from information is another form. By placing your particular rebuttal well below the current topic of the day- below the fold in American media parlance- even as you created a new subthread, you engaged in a way to minimize attention to standing counter-arguments.
However, your attempt to re-raise the topic in a different space, and let the previous thread die in obscurity with your rebuttal as the last word in any future review, only drew more attention to the counter-argument... even though you attempted to use a lack of attention as a basis of criticism in the lower thread.
That argument seems to be a little humorous in retrospect, given the unmasked voting ratios in periods where anyone likely read it, but the obvious argument on appeal to the majority is obvious, even as it would be wrong here.
However, as we're sufficiently meta here to note that the scope of discussion is narrowing, and I've made clear my perception of why, I'll let any future reviewers make their judgement as to who is correct. You can have the last word if it will help you feel better, but this exchange has drawn it's expected pattern, and I doubt you'll find any vindication in being predicted.
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