Dean
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Variously accused of being a hilarious insufferable reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal critical theorist Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist NATO-consensus warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man idiosyncratic party-line Fox News boomer. No one yet has guessed a scholar, or multiple people. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
"Pushing back" against the Darwins and the Juliuses never got anyone banned. Losing one's emotional equilibrium and going off on them did. I won't deny there is a failure mode here where someone very good at writing provocative posts that fall within the rules can result in some decent posters losing their shit when they can't take it any longer and getting themselves banned. On the other hand, someone who only does that once or twice doesn't get banned for very long, and Darwin and Julius both eventually got booted long-term. We have never had a great solution for getting rid of bad but effortful posters who poison the discourse without breaking the rules, and I have yet to hear proposals that don't amount to "Ban this hobby horse" or "Just admit that this person is terrible and ban them." (The latter we very occasionally do under the egregiously obnoxious wildcard rule, but every time we do it burns some of the membership's goodwill... remember, there are people who got on our case every time we modded Julius, and some of those people were not Julius's alts.)
I disagree with sentence one, and from that much of the rest. The nature of pushback vis-a-vis disagreement in a metaphor of equilibirum is that pushback is inherently destabilizing, and generally driven by emotional impetus to respond. Just as walking forward is a controlled fall due to off-balancing your center of balance, pushing back is inherently moving one's self due to motivation, and that is what got people increasingly banned as early phases of intellectual-only pushback died with evaporative cooling and bad faith, which led only the emotionally-driven pushback to remain... which, of course, is what is selected against with mod censure.
The crux of Darwin and Julius is that while both 'eventually' got booted long-term, it was only well after bad faith was widely recognized, and also well after repeated toleration by mods explitictly recognizing -bad thing- but also tolerating it. Darwin in particular received multiple warnings that were framed in terms of 'we're going easy on you because of past quality contributions' (selecting for past rather than current conduct) despite blatant trolling, and Julius had a number of sockpuppets for whom the mod response was 'we believe you as a sockpuppet, here's your warning but you can stay.' The actions that were bad were recognized as bad, and ban-worthy, but not banned until they were... and until they were, the punishment for months to years was that it wasn't ban-worthy to conduct the offenses one would be eventually banned for.
I cannot emphasize how much this discredits standards of moderation. You speak of burning membership good will for moderating, but you also burn good will when visibly not moderating by professed standards. This is why legitimacy, not popularity, is the crux of acceptable conduct codes, and why legitimacy depends on consistency, because people can accept unhappy things if viewed as legitimate and not arbitrary.
However, legitimacy derives from culture, and culture is set by the climate that enables it, and the moderator climate has regularly and consistently been that while consistent bad actors may eventually get the boot, the people they provoke into continuing engagement will get the boot much sooner for being the sort of people who would continue engaging well after the evaporative cooling process sets in.
The way to resolve this is not by banning pet topics, but by consistently enforcing the rules... but consistently enforcing the rules is secondary to the mod team's goals of trying to retain / grow membership, which is viewed as being compromised when enforcing rules.
I also do not think ymeshkout can fairly be compared to Darwin or Julius.
That depends on what flaw you think links them, otherwise one might as well say that Darwin and Julius cannot be fairly be compared. The point of two extremely dissimilar people is to weaken comparison to either one of them.
The flaw I refer to is the mix of unchanging hobby horse and bad faith engagement with others that leads to evaporative cooling and the gradual forum disinterest of engaging in any intellectual push-and-pull because there is none to be had except from the more emotionally-driven.
I am saying a large percentage of reports are "non-quality" as you put it - not people genuinely concerned about the tone and quality of arguments here, but simply seeking to punish their enemies.
And I am noting this is entirely expected and typical, without warranting a caveat or special notice. It's exactly what one would expect for any appeals process in a political dispute.
...which goes right back down the Nybbler's critique of the original post argument- that the criticism of pretext in the case of Trump is not people genuinely concerned about the quality of the legal case, but simply seeking to punish their political enemy in some way, which goes to the broader principle of lawfare, which is what the post covered in a condemnatory fashion. As a metaphor, pretty spot on, but probably not your intent.
Both, IMO. He writes long, effortful posts that are hard to take apart on the facts, as you'd expect when debating a lawyer, but he also criticizes Trump a lot, so a lot of people see "Long-winded criticism of Trump" which makes them angry, but they can't really muster a cogent response to explain why the criticism is wrong, but they also notice him taking a few pokes at his interlocutors, which triggers even more rage.
What you call 'can't really muster a cogent response' is what I call 'evaporative cooling,' and is the point of recognizing the Motte's selection bias for people who disagree to disengage from addressing the arguments.
'They can't really muster a cogent response... triggers even more rage' places the onus for lack of good engagement on those still engaging, without noting that they are the primary source still willing to engage. Note that even most of the 'Well, I liked it well enough' posts were in response to people expressing dislike. The current exchange is entirely consistent with controvery attracting more engagement than the underlying thing itself.
The arguments that the lawfare against Trump are primarily pretextual by parties just as guilty or worse of the same sorts of sins is long, extensive, and literally years old at this point. ymeshkout was also a regular part of them, so regular that the old sparring partners have lost interest.
No, I seriously do not think he would get this kind of pushback if he were writing similar posts about how corrupt Joe Biden is. (He'd get some, but not like this where you're trying to make him the new Darwin.)
Alternatively, if he were a non-mod writing the same posts about how corrupt Joe Biden is and the same shots at left-leaning posters, he would get a different and stricter response from the mod group, who has discussed how political balance and forum management considerations shape their response.
This is the crux of the issue when in the past conduct concessions are made to people on the basis of overall political composition of the forum- everything starts to be seen as pretextual, by all parties.
I think this is a very fair critique, and specifically the point of recognizing the effect of his charisma and tour model. He is, at the end, in the business of convincing you to either buy his book, pay him to show up and talk, or both. Having that sort of overriding interest doesn't make everything he says suspect, but as you say it needs to be digested.
I asked before but I'll try again and hopefully get a more helpful answer: what information, context, link, source, claim, assertion, citation, whatever, etc. do you believe is missing from my post above?
This would be an example of you not accurately reflecting previous engagements, as the previous engagements precede your post above, and so obviously and temporally did not address it, and insinuating they did is the sort of mis-representation you stand accused of conducting on a regular basis.
I know this isn't the first time you respond with this line, but nevertheless it continues to be an amazing and revealing response. You keep claiming that I'm ignoring/denying feedback, but man oh man it would be so much easier for both of us if you just actually respond with this fictitious feedback I'm apparently ignoring instead of wasting your time thinking up increasingly creative ways of dodging the question.
I reject the request because you continue to act in bad faith and lie about other people's positions and past engagements for the sake of your current arguments.
You and I both know that you saved the very post where I detailed when I first wrote you off on grounds of character, because you have repeatedly linked to it since the migration while bemoaning that you have never been given feedback. You and I also both know that the same post was preceeded in the same post thread by object-level feedback of argument noting specific cases in context that you were doing what you were accused of. We both know you have been previously reminded of this, just as we both know that you will, in the future, claim that you have never been responded to and that claims of previous feedback that you yourself have linked to was fictitious.
See you on the next rotation buddy <3
Try not to conduct any more miscarriages of justice until then.
You're not wrong, but if we modded everyone who flays dead horses, we'd have a lot fewer regulars.
I'm not precisely sure what drives 'if we modded this' comes from, because to the best of my knowledge neither myself or the Nybbler have called for mod-hat moderation of it. I cannot speak for @The_Nybbler, but I know I did not report the post.
(I like his posts because he explains law stuff in a lawyerly way, even if he is a bit cute sometimes when specifically criticizing Trump. But his theory that Trump is engaging in lawfare as a fundraising project does not seem unreasonable to me.)
It's certainly an argument... but it also runs into the general point of 'and this is not new or unique to Trump,' which comes back, as many things do, to whether Trump is uniquely bad, or if Trump is getting unique censure for things that go on as a matter of course. Lawfare and fundraising is an incredibly well established practice in a diversity of forms, from non-governmental agencies like the ACLU running literal solicitation campaigns to continue legal activity broadly seen as ideologically partisan now adays to government-entangled ones such as the Obama-era practice of offering corporate settlement offers that resulted in corporations giving money to non-profits or interest groups aligned with the party of government that was taking the corporations to court. There is an entire spectrum, and entire genres of fundraising solicitation emails of '[important thing] is at court- we need YOUR money NOW!'
Which, of course, brings back to the point of distinction of when someone is accused of pretext. 'I know it when I see it' is not a credible standard when highly subjective, and 'this is a Serious Thing' is not a credible claim when contextual examples of lawfare are available that were not held to similar standards. Selective appeals or enforcement of standards are related to the concept of anarcho-tyrrany precisely because the choice to enforce them is generally pretextual. When a general category of action is widespread, the choice to enforce sanction can simultaneously be 'valid' (there is a broken rule) and pretextual (the broken rule is not the reason the sanction is being enforced).
This also describes many other regular posters on the Motte (and @ymeskhout much less so than many others I could name), and yet strangely receive far less pushback, and even provoke resentful carping when they push it too far and get modded.
What's strange about it?
The well established climate currated by the mods here is that not pushing back against many sorts of posters is a survival strategy, as the sorts of posters who would push back strenuously against the Darwins or Julius's of the motte were also the ones more likely to be banned than the Darwins or Julius's of the Motte. When moderates have open commentary on calibrating mod action based on political composition of forum, or accuse censored posters of ban-worthy tresspasses while simultaneously not doing so, it creates a pretty clear climate of what is more or less acceptable, and 'more pushback' is often the less acceptable path for long-term motte posters if they want to remain long-term motte posters. This is an old and well established failure state of the Motte, where bad posters both poison the culture and get the mods to ban better posters reacting against them, but this has been defended in the past an acceptable cost for the target goal of the Motte to not punish what people say, but how they say it.
But it is still a basic punitive incentive structure as enforced by the mod team, and as a consequence pushback that does occur will exist within other contextual boundaries- such as the acceptable areas of criticism such as treatment of other posters, or when it exists within the space allowed by the social dynamics of when a mod is involved. These social dynamics involved when mods don't want to be involved in moderating either other mods (internal group dynamics of people who do/have worked together for common causes, a desire to privately raise concerns out of public view) or when mods don't want to get involved in the personal non-mod disputes of a mod and other conflicts (public optic dynamics of not wanting to present mod solidarity). This creates greater conflict space- an overton window if you prefer- for more pushback to people who act within the ven diagram overlap of 'takes condemnable swipes at other posters' and 'is a mod.'
In so much as this is a problem for the broader motte space, the solution is to reduce the ven diagram overlap.
Most reports we see are 100% partisan and can be summarized as "A person I don't like said something I don't like."
I imagine most non-quality post reports would be summarizable as 'A person I don't like said something I don't like' whether it was partisan or not. Most internet fights seeking higher sanction against another are not between people who like eachother fighting over how much they like eacother.
Both sides(tm) do this, but because of the increasingly skewed nature of the Motte, the majority is directed at people like ymeskhout expressing left-wing viewpoints.
Is ymsekhout being criticized for expressing left-wing viewpoints, or is ymeskhout being criticized for his character in how he responded to a very minor barb about how his own post could be viewed from a non left-wing viewpoint?
Can I? Sure. Will I? A waste of time when you are involved, given your pattern of conduct which has been noted repeatedly over the years even if you have also repeatedly denied the feedback. Improving your character to have fewer petty swipes at your other posters would be a start.
Germany isn't reticent to send Leopards because the Ukrainians are losing, they're reluctant to send them because they don't have very many and their politics is incredibly fucked up around military matters, for understandable historical reasons.
I'm nor particularly persuaded by German appeals to history on this. It hasn't stopped the large-scale export of German arms in general, or the export of other German arms to Ukraine, or the historical point that one of the biggest victims of German aggression in WW2 was the Ukrainians themselves. Appealing to history is more often a pretext to some other interest, the question being what.
The three that come to mind for me are Scholz seeking domestic/western concessions, maintaining Russian energy imports as long as possible as a way to gain time before a total energy cutoff, or a desire to keep the Americans from benefiting from a general European military-recapitalization in tanks, which would happen if everyone's German tanks were sent to Ukraine. No one of these has to be dominant, as all are mutually reinforcing.
For the first, seeking a concession, there is something to be said that Scholz is in a poor position internally and approving arms exports is a tool in his tool kit for internal political compromises. The better part of a year later, it's clear that the much-vaunted German turning point has been mostly wasted and wanting for the last year. The Defense Minister was uninterested in military reform, it's not clear the Ministry is capable of it, and it remains to be seen if the new Defense Minister wants to do it as well, or if he'll go through the motions but happily slow-walk while making the right noises. What people do miss is that slow-walking can serve multiple purposes- it can be a way to frustrate things you don't want to happen, or to solicit concessions in exchange for speeding up. If Scholz approves tank transfers in general, he's unable to gain concessions- domestic or external- in exchange for doing so going forward. Call this the 'is seeking a bribe' option- and what the 'bribe' is could be anything, from American concessions on the Inflation Reduction Act industrial subsidies that Germany can't match, to coalition partner concessions improving Scholz's internal political stability.
For the second, for all the media hub-up of sanctions on Russia, it's very easy to miss that Europe continues to import quite a bit of energy from Russia, and that Germany's expenses with the winter energy crunch could still get much, much worse. In this framing, Germany is blocking tanks in order to keep Russian energy exports coming to Germany / Europe, rather than a more severe restriction. On one hand this is a concession to energy blackmail, but in another this is a time-buying strategy in order to continue to establish alternative energy export infrastructure. The longer the final Russian cutoff can be prevented, the better, and a German perspective could well be that tanks are unnecessary to more or less sustain the current position, which is preferable to a swing towards Ukraine that cuts into German energy before all/more infrastructure import infrastructure comes online.
Finally, the third is a military industrial complex interest objection. Basically, military budgets are rarely consistent across years, but come in waves as militaries inject new capital into their armies via new purchases/modifications, or entire re-capitalizations of existing forces. These recapitalizations are really lucrative if you can sell to it due to the nearly guaranteed follow-on contracts for decades after. This was more or less achieved by Germany during the cold war / post cold war, selling the Leopard tank to Europe. To a lesser degree it's also a benefit of the 'ring swap' agreements, where Germany agreed to send German vehicles to Eastern European countries to backfill the Warsaw Pact surplus they sent to Ukraine. The Germans would be getting new service/maintenance contract customers over the long haul... unless, of course, these are in turn sent to Ukraine, leaving the donor states truly empty and needing recapitalization to get new tanks.
The issue for German arms industry is that they're not in a place to support an expansion of tank production and arms sales to compete for major tank recapitalization. The German industry isn't enough to maintain Germany's own tank fleets, let alone replace everyone else's. If everyone were to give up their Leopards, Germany would both lose the current Leopard support contracts, and lose out on the replacement contracts. In the short term, the only credible immediate replacement for Europe would be Abrams tanks from stockpiles, and the Americans have already been sweeping the European air force recapitalization efforts with the F-35. If the Americans brought out Abrams from stockpiles not for Ukraine, but to back-fill the Europeans who give their Leopards to Ukraine, that would be a long-term loss of German contracts and defense-industry influence.
In this final reading, Scholz's reluctance to send tanks is a more French-style nativist industrial self-interest of 'buy (German) European.' The reason for Germany to not only not send it's own tanks, but not signal that it will approve other people sending their German tanks, is to ensure that German tanks remain on the books in European inventories. If the German tanks disappear in Ukraine, there's a very strong chance that many established German tank partners will not replace them with German kit, but with American surplus Abrams, which could be procured cheaper and faster from American refurbishment than entirely new German tanks at a time when Germany's own tank force needs recapitalization. And if the Americans get in the European tank market, then it will be very, very hard to get them out, as the Abrams themselves could be updated for who knows how long, and political dynamics of Ukraine have made American defense ties stronger than the pre-war appeals of Strategic Autonomy => Buy French/German European kit.
This view would also partly explain the reported German demand that the Americans send Abrams into Ukraine in exchange for the German permission for others to send Leopards. The point is less the Abrams effectiveness, but rather to keep the American refurbishment committed to supplying Ukraine, rather than displacing Leopards in European countries, giving the German arms industry and government time to try and preserve more of the European tank market market share.
Finally finally, there's also the black-comedy take that Scholz is actually a secretly brilliant and cold-blooded manipulator who wants to extend the war, seeking to both maximize the damage to Russia and use the European energy crisis to disrupt less stable/subsidized economies in Europe, increasing Germany's relevant power within the union. In this read, Scholz is the most ruthless pro-American prime minister in ages, deliberatly sabotaging the political viability of the German pro-Russia/anti-American movement, and otherwise trying to get the American more and even over-committed to helping Ukraine, so as to prevent the Americans from working too hard against China as Germany tries to use the opportunity to make favorable engagements with China to maximize the German position further.
This one is a bit silly, but it would explain a number of German slow-walkings, as a form of perpetuating the war and driving other actors, including the US, Poland, and Russia, to over-commit resources to German relative advantage.
Certainly not. They were a major producer, but there are other sources including the United States, and US production ramped up after the annexation of Crimea.
They may be thinking of neon specifically. IIRC, pre-2022 Ukraine exported half of the world's industrial-grade neon.
Poland and other countries have ordered HIMARS already in 2018 but still haven't gotten deliveries. Why do you think America has outsourced significant parts of F-35 production to friendly countries? It no longer has the domestic capacity to fully manufacture the plane at scale. It isn't only Europe which has cut back massively on military production. Equipment has gotten more expensive and fewer units are built, along with lower investment in manufacturing more generally.
...which is, of course, why the F-35 program is developed in a way that expands European military production, lowers the cost per unit such that a fifth-generation multi-role fighter is competitive on cost grounds with fourth-generation European staples, allowing larger and higher quality air forces than otherwise supportable while also crowding out a number of competitors to such a point that the closest European alternative, are talking delivery dates in the late 2030s to 2040s.
Set aside that the United States ran an entirely separate and exclusive fifth-generation air-superiority program to completion in parallel. The F-35 alone has been structured in a way to ensure that involved parties are buying into an American fighter programs and so will continue to align their defense policies with the US for as long as they want to maintain the F-35s they have bought and built. It also, by virtue of serving as a common platform, expands the capacity for cross-servicing and loaning as parts of coalitions and alliance burden-sharing, meaning that partners across Europe, Asia, and in the Middle East can surge capacity hardware to eachother in case of crisis, without having to establish entirely new training programs or logistic trains, greatly expanding the speed and flexibility of alliance-level response coordination. The interoperability savings are a significant advantage that directly addresses one of the current observed difficulties of the Ukraine war, of the trainup to foreign equipment.
'The F-35 is built with partner assistance because the US is weak' is trying to invent a sin out of a virtue. The F-35 is built in foreign countries so that they will buy it, and in doing so create economies of scale that benefit not only all participants, but swept the European airforce recapitalization market of the late 2010s and so far going forward in the 2020s. The F-35 program has been one of the most ambitious defense industry programs since the Ford super-carriers, and more importantly has become one of the most successful aviation projects of the last half century in terms of international scope and expanding production of a new air fighter.
No, you don't, but the pettiness is not beneath you. Hence why you being called out.
This mistakes my contention. The contention is not that a position doesn't change and this should be banned- the contention is that the position is re-raised regularly without regard or even accurate reflection of previous engagements, and with poor conduct towards other in the process.
Ways to avoid this include not misrepresenting people's current positions, not mis-representing previous engagements, and not making one's hobby-horse a top level post with regular slights towards other posters.
Not particularly, but it's considerably less one-note and lacking. Your posting is unexceptional, but you intend to insult fewer people and ignore fewer prior discussions than when you fixate on Trump unprompted.
If you meant your writing on a technical level, I find it generally poorly structured and lacking in content, conflating a lot of words with good word choice and links for sufficient sourcing. The arguments are often too reliant on insinuation by word connotation in lieu of supporting arguments, and generally lacking in the ability to anticipate or address counter arguments completely or factor in contextually relevant history while relying on narrative momentum for an emotional climax. It's passable verboseness, and I am certainly a sucker for long-winded arguments, but also leads to basic failures like overly long intros that fail the principles of effective written communication, or speaking around past and still standing counter-arguments.
And I say this as someone who is naturally prone to comma splicing and writing essays on my hobbies, and who writes more the groggier she is.
Where would Russia go if Ukraine fell this year?
This year? Home to lick it's wounds. The strategic defeat to Russia is already in place, due to Domino Theory warnings last year shaping last year's western support last year to Ukraine to the point that Ukraine tore the juggular out of Russia's offensive warfare capability. Russia has lost as many tanks/planes/precision munitions/ammo reserves because of the policy responses of the people who took domino theory seriously.
In the future? That depends on the context of how the conflict ends. Quite possibly back into Ukraine.
Finland is part of the EU which has a common defence clause which in turn would automatically drag in NATO since most of the EU is also part of NATO.
This is incorrect. NATO does not automatically drag in all members to any other member's conflicts, and the EU common defense clause does not invoke NATO assets or resources, not least because many key NATO countries are not part of the EU. This is the crux of the argument about European Strategic autonomy being duplicative and at the expense of NATO- the resources, and the burden for supplying them, are not shared by design.
While the Americans would very likely support an EU defense, it is far less clear that they would support activation of NATO into direct combat operations... not least because a failure in Ukraine will likely be a consequence of the very European leading countries who would be trying to involve the US having pressured/compelled a cessation of aid to Ukraine. My guess is that the Americans would provide intelligence, but otherwise work through the European belligerants and sell munitions and equipment to those like Germany who refused to supply the Ukrainians.
Moreover, this all assumes that UA's population would be passive which isn't at all my assumption.
This comes down to 'what does Ukraine falling mean?' The linked source falls into the general theme of Russia Stronk propaganda that relies not only only a view of Russian cultural cohesion, but an assumption that the West, but especially Ukraine, are lacking in it. This derives from the Kremlin view that Ukraine is not a 'real country,' with what that means for the population indication to resist.
But this is where we get to the point of underlying assumptions contaminating the topic question. If there is a restive Ukrainian population to be filtered, there is a Ukrainian nation trying to resist. If the Ukrainian nation tries to resist, the only place a Ukrainian nation-state will not exist are the places where Russia is occupying. But Russia is not able to penetrate and occupy Ukraine, due initially to a lack of logistical capacity but now a lack of advanced warfare maneuver capability that has since been attrited. Attrition does not mean the Russians will wipe away the last Ukrainian defenders and there is nothing less- an attrition of Ukrainian capabilities means the Ukrainians start conserving ammo and start trading space for time to receive new supplies and generate new forces for defensive positions to fall back into.
Which means, well, Ukraine is not fallen, especially as the westerners can always supply more ammo. Which they've been doing for nearly a year now, with no signs of being unable to continue. Which defeats the starting assumption that Ukraine is falling.
If Russia were to win on the battlefield, they'd have to deal with a restive and deeply hostile population and perhaps even insurgencies. Hence my skepticism that winning the UA war is somehow a geopolitical necessity of titanic proportions, which is what the narrative coming from Western capitals and large parts of the media would have us believe.
This makes no sense on a structural level. There is no such thing as a 'geopolitical necessity of titanic proportions,' there are geopolitical dynamics that people might assign titanic weight to. That is a position completely unremoved from your skepticism- your skepticism is not a requirement for the emotional weight other people put onto it.
Nor is there any obvious division here. The way Ukraine would have a meaningful insurgency is if someone supplies insurgency weapons. These insurgency weapons will, for reasons of geography and interests, come from NATO neighbors. But if these NATO neighbors are willing to supply munitions to Ukraine for an insurgency, they could also supply munitions for Ukraine to continue fighting conventionally.
It's not somehow more in NATO's interest to fund a neighborhood insurgency than having a major Russian buildup on their borders nominally there to resist the insurgency they are supplying to keep the Russians occupied.
It's absence. Not liking Trump is fine. Regularly and consistently making top-level comments about it with poor conduct towards the posters you are a moderator for is not. The dead horse doesn't become less dead if there's more of it to beat, especially when the complaint is about the stench.
I think you significantly over-estimate how much the international system cares about northern europe. There is certainly an argument that Western Europe would have cared far more, but this would have been far more due to the dynamics of Finland being a European Union member but not a NATO member. Were Germany and France unwilling to help a non-NATO EU member- or worse, try but fail- all pretense of strategic autonomy from the US in favor of the EU would have been shattered.
It's hard to say how such a campaign would have gone- 'how' the Russians have a hypothetical win in Ukraine to embolden/allow them to try such a thing matters- but for all the very real good things that can be said about Finland, it remains a country of less than 6 million, compared to Ukraine's 40 million, with only one strategically relevant invasion corridor along the south. A much greater size disparity, in a much smaller space where Russian artillery really could pay to its strengths, in the midst of a regional crisis as the European interests disagree over how to relate to Russia after a dominant success in Ukraine...
Too many variables to make a strong claim, but 'the international community would not stand for it!' isn't one I'd bet on.
I don't think anyone has had a spotless record in this war. US intelligence got the invasion right but then publicly claimed that Kiev was in danger of falling 'within days'. How did that pan out?
Pretty well.
The US intelligence assessment that Kiev was in danger of falling led to Western policy changes that including flooding the Ukrainians with man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry that could be widely and rapidly distributed to both formal and informal forces with minimal training, and with far less risk of being intercepted/destroyed by local Russian air/artillery capabilities than conventional weapon systems. These asymmetric capabilities thus allowed Ukrainian irregulars to greatly slow and even stop Russian mechanized forces, allowing Ukrainian artillery to do decisive damage while mitigating key Russian strengths that- had there been a lack of anti-armor and anti-air capability- could have been far more successful.
This is a classic case of an intelligence assessment driving the policy changes that change the underlying assumptions that drive the intelligence assessment. That is the entire point of investing in intelligence as a national capability- not so that someone will tell you what will occur if you try policy X, but what will occur if you DON'T try to change a situation. And this doesn't even get to the dynamics of publicizing intelligence to drive public support for policy to achieve results supported by not-publicized intelligence.
But the facts speak their own language: if Ukraine was doing well, they wouldn't need to ask for NATO materiel when the same NATO countries no longer have "easy" choices available to them, such as mothbolled ex-Soviet stuff.
Why not? No one aside from you claimed at the time, before aid or during aid or after aid deliveries, that the amount of aid delivered was expected to be enough for Ukraine to wage the rest of the war successfully. Key categories of aid- especially munitions- being insufficient has been a reoccuring point of discussion since the start of the war.
Ukraine doing well due to receiving an influx of expendable resources establishes a correlation of doing well with getting expendable resources. Asking for [Type NATO] expendable resources as [Type Soviet] expendable resources is exactly what you would expect if doing well is a result of expendable resource delivery.
At any rate, trying to handicap the chances of UA victory wasn't the primary aim of my OP, but rather to question the assumption that victory in this conflict for the pro-NATO side is of such titantic importance that the media and the political class would have us believe. As I outlined in my OP, Russia is unlikely to be a long-term winner even in the event of battlefield victory and Ukraine's importance has also been grossly overstated.
You relied heavily upon a propaganda fluff piece author whose thesis has been claimed for most of the war despite all operational developments to the contrary, and you didn't even identify specific claims of gross overstatement.
You done goofed on the central and ancillary points of your argument. 'For the sake of argument, what if we assume the Russian propagandists are right' is not a particularly interesting or compelling argument when the reasons why the Russian propagandists are wrong is also applying to other areas of the discussion.
It's less about general criticism, and more that this is ymeskhout's specific hobby horse that has been flayed for years at this point, and regularly comes with standards called for against Trump that were not followed or applied (in general or by ymeskhout personally) on the lawfare against Trump. As with other pet topics, it repeats old themes to the point of evaporative cooling, which then leverage's ymeskhout's bad habit of dismissing/forgetting/claiming prior engagements on points either didn't occur or have been dismissed, for lack of an engaged opposition to engage otherwise.
As far as Trump-related lawfare goes, ymeskhout's a partisan and an old one at this point. At this point I only pay attention when he starts being petty towards people calling him out, like how this time he edited-in a callout- against The_Nybbler and then edited it out after being called out for it.
@The_Nybbler believes that my post was pretextual, in other words that I was falsely claiming to write a post about the US legal system as a way to conceal my hidden purpose of criticizing Trump.
Strangely, @The_Nybbler did not say that you were falsely claiming to write a post about the US legal citizen as a way to conceal your hidden purpose of criticizing Trump.
We can tell this because on reviewing what @The_Nybbler wrote, which you quoted, which was-
Or, for instance, when someone writes a long comment purporting to be about the US legal system, but is really just a vehicle to take a shot at Trump.
...which does not say you were falsely claiming to write a post about the US legal system, or that you were doing so as a way to conceal a hidden purpose, or that your purpose of critizing Trump was hidden. In fact, key framing words such as 'falsely' and 'hidden' do not appear, which the key word 'vehicle' as a metaphor in the context of a criticism of pretext is removed, thus creating substantive change of position from what Nybbler wrote and what you claim he said.
This would politely be called strawmanning, except that strawmanning is a device when engaging in an argument with someone, but you aren't engaging with Nybbler, you are deliberately re-characterizing what Nybbler said in conveyence to external audience.
Which would politely be called 'lying about what someone said to someone else.' Which is a reoccuring feature of yours.
I maintain that my real purpose was always from the beginning to write a post criticizing Trump, but given how long my intro about the US legal system was, I can understand why someone might potentially be mislead. Since I can't add a title to the comment I added a content warning to more explicitly signal what the post was about. What would you alternatively suggest for me to do to address The_Nybbler's concerns?
Delete the post, apologize for poor writing quality, and apologize to @The_Nybbler for poor conduct.
Edit: And I see he has edited back out the troll he had edited in, but no apology in the post. Typical and meeting expectations, I suppose.
(This is actually why Peter Zeihan predicted Russian imperialism by 2022 - because he thought it would be the point of demographic no return - in one of his surprisingly nakedly correct bombastic predictions. He...makes a lot of them)
Peter Zeihan is interesting to me. I enjoy watching him, but very much from a 'where can I poke holes in the argument, and what is left.'
There are a number of things I'd give him high marks for, but also a plethora of areas where I go 'but this specific prediction does not follow from the supporting argument.' I'd tend to call him directionally correct, and strongest at the macro-level where he's a bit more forward leaning/seeing than a lot of contemporary wisdom, but weaker when he goes from theory into actual policy impact. There are things where he's absolutely grounded- Peter was identifying the policy paralysis/failure implications of the Chinese COVID response before the public breakdown of Chinese COVID policy- but there are places he misses the boat, either for not recognizing other pre-requisite factors (piracy is not going to instantly pop up to cripple global naval trade; a failure of the Chinese economic model does not mean a collapse of the Chinese state). Sometimes these are part of his bombastic showmanship- the man's job at this point is to shock you into paying attention to his underlying points- and parts are more general analytic failures.
I'd put him in the category of 'you need to be able to support wheat from chaff', but once you do Peter is interesting because he's comfortable bucking the conventional consensus and saying the parts out loud that leading conventional wisdom in the future. Over the last decade it's been interest as a number of things Peter has been saying when they were controversial are uncontroversial now. It's not that he's alone in saying them- the future implications of demographic trends has hardly been a secret- but he's rare in being consistent, public, and most important making specific predictions (some nations will make 'now or never' policies before demographic issues) and translating broad knowledge into actionable advice (demographics + regions at most risk for instability -> specific industrial relevance). He has enough expert/rare knowledge it identify specific indicators or specific disruptions- the Ukraine war's impact to neon production to chips is an example- and a willingness to share perceptions that aren't typically held/propogated by the prestige/establishment media (a recent video on the prospect of nuclear breakout by American allies- not a common media topic).
He's not always right, but he's consistently enjoyable with genuine insights often enough to be worth paying attention, if only to try and define why you disagree with his arguments.
Airpower in the sense of aircraft? Yes. Airpower in the sense of precision munitions? No.
Since the early days of the war, air defense on both sides of the conflict has kept airpower to a minimum. The threat of surface-to-air missiles has kept aircraft flying low, which is one reason why so many man-portable weapons got kills in the opening weeks/months. Since then, helicopters and fixed-wing have stayed behind the lines and supported as a rocket/missile firing platform. This means they still exist in good numbers, but aren't being risked.
However, a key capability is the capacity for precision fires. Airpower is incredibly effective when it can put a bomb/rocket/missile onto a target in ways that ground forces or artillery can't. Here, the Russians have attrited themselves pretty heavily. It's not that the Russians were ever an American-style smart-bomb air power- the Russian doctrine is expecting to steadily lose the air war against American air power- and so the Russian focus is more on presision rockets / missiles that can do the key targetting fast and early enough to let the ground forces advance.
In this respect, the Russians have shown signs of severely depleting their stockpiles. This is very normal, but we're talking 'hundreds per week in the opening weeks, versus dozens produced per month.' The Russians have implicitly shot through many of their stockpiles, as things such as anti-ship cruise missiles have been used in ground-attack roles for non-tactical targets. Even the entire Ukrainian energy infrastructure attacks late last year are indicative of depletion- that sort of goal was not only a considerable sink of resources, but resources that were presumably bet on being more successful at delivering strategic results than being used tactically.
Between expenditures and such, Russia has lost many of its long-range precision fires... including those carried by aircraft. While the platforms are still there, and certainly have more munitions to load, Russia has largely 'shot its load' in terms of precision air power systems that can be used safely, and while more fires will come these will lack the intensity and disrupting effect of the early-war period.
Ukraine has little value from an economic standpoint. When you look at the amount that Ukraine produces, you'll see it's very little. Wheat for example: 20 million tons at $300/ton or just $6 billion/year. That's about 3% of the world supply or about 1% of the yearly revenue of Wal-Mart. If Ukraine production in all categories went to zero overnight, the market would barely even notice.
...what?
Ukraine produces about 33 million tons of wheat, which is a bit over 4% of global production, but it exports about 19million tons, which is 9% of global exports. Taking nearly 10% of wheat exports off the global market is not 'market would barely even notice,' it's 'arab spring food riots,' because most of the most volatile countries in the world are not food self-sufficient.
Similar deal with other crops. Ukraine only produces about 3.5% of global corn, but what it does produce is 12% of the global export market. You're looking at even larger fractions of other items- 17% barley, 20% rapeseed, and around 50% of global export share of sunflower meal and oil. These are non-trivial shared of the global food market.
https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf
This gets even worse when one considers the Pakistan flooding, which has wiped off a considerable share of the global export rice market off the market for this year.
The Big Serge has a good overview of the RU-UA war. The TL;DR is that Ukraine has burned through multiple iterations of armaments and is now reduced to begging for active NATO matériel, hence Germany's reticence to send Leopards.
...what?
Ukrainian ammo shortage has been the story of Ukrainian requests for aid since the very start of the war, when Zelensky memorably asked for ammo, not a ride. The entire early war Western response was focused on trying to get Warsaw Pact equipment and ammo to Ukraine in the near term to enable to keep fighting for the long-term effort of an eventual shift to NATO-produced material. These efforts were why Europe did 'ring swaps' of having various countries give their Warsaw Pact gear to Ukraine in exchange for getting NATO surplus. This also came with the obvious point that, because NATO does not produce Warsaw Pact material, would have to gradually train up the Ukrainians to western equipment in order to sustain a meaningful war effort.
This has been a very long-running item since the initial 'will the Ukrainians last another month' phase of the war passed. This is not new, nor have the Ukrainians been 'reduced to begging' for active NATO systems. Transitioning to NATO equipment has been the point for months now.
There's certainly plenty that could be said about Germany's reticence, but it's not because Ukraine is begging from a position of weakness. Germany is reluctant because Ukraine is asking from a position of strength, and if it got the tanks it was asking for the German government position is that it's afraid the German tanks would be enabling Ukraine to beat the Russians so badly the Russians might escalate. Take the German position with a graint of salt, but it's nowhere near a position that Ukraine has burned through everything, it's a fear of the Ukrainians doing even better.
As for this overview being 'good'...
A very cursory look at this account is that 'The Big Serge' was one of the 'there is no Russian panic' sort of accounts during the Kharkiv offensive last September, which is memorable for just how paniced the Russians were and how much war material they abandoned to the Ukrainians. On 9 September, this person was writing how Ukraine could not and would not make meaningful progress towards operational objectives towards Izyum. This was after the Ukrainian breakthrough had begun, and two days before the Russians announced a formal withdrawal from Kharkiv oblast.
This was after a six-month retrospective piece which characterized the Russians as fighting an 'intelligent' war, typical revisionism of the scope and objective of the Russian advance on Kyiv at the start of the war, right down to the 'it was a feint, bro' narrative, and of course the 'Europe's economy is going to crash this winter' predictions. These were accompanied by predictions that the 'rest' of the Ukrainian capabilities were in the process of being attrited to the point that static defense would no longer be possible, and Western support would dry up in the near future... as of half a year ago. Ukraine would have no hope of waging a successful offensive, and of course "Ukraine cannot achieve strategic objectives - all they can do is trade the lives of their men for temporary tactical successes that can be spun into wins by their propaganda arm."
This writer has not, shall we say, had a good run of analyzing the war so far, or for staying clear of the pro-Russian propaganda tropes in the course of resisting pro-Ukrainian ones.
Serge's prediction that Ukraine will lose the war "gradually, then suddenly" seems plausible given Russia's attrition strategy.
...what?
Serge's prediction has been that a Ukrainian attritional collapse would be happening any month now for over six months now, which is another way of saying that he's been saying it for over half the war now. Notably, Serge was claiming this before one of the largest Ukrainian resource infusions of the war at Kharkiv, as well as the successful Ukrainian attrition campaign at Kherson.
The Russian attrition strategy for months now hasn't been meaningfully based on attriting the Ukrainians at a military level, but the western support at an economic-warfare level. This was the crux of both the Ukranian power grid attacks- which, you might note, have decreased in effectiveness and frequency- but also the gamble on European winter energy. The gamble for some time has been that the Europeans would have to capitulate and seek concessions based on the winter energy crunch.
This has not, shall we say, turned out as the Russians or pro-Russians like Serge were predicting in the summer and fall. European energy is rough, and the long-term impacts will be considerable, but there's a reason that questions of aid focus more on whether Republicans will be sufficiently overwhelmingly supportive in general to avoid embarassing trips rather than the capacity of Europeans to keep funding.
I keep hearing hysterical rhetoric that the West must win this war or... something something bad. It reminds me of the flawed 'domino theory' that was used to justify the Vietnam intervention. While I don't think NATO will ever proceed towards direct intervention á la Vietnam, I can't help but think that too many of the West's elites have trapped themselves rhetorically where Ukraine's importance is overblown for political reasons (so as to overcome domestic opposition towards sending arms) and it has now become established canon in a way that is difficult to dislodge.
Appeals to the flawed domino theory tend not to address the fact that when Vietnam fell, there were successive communist successes in the region of SE Asia. Not just South Vietnam, but also Laos and Combodia did fall. If you want to analogize Russia and Ukraine to the Domino Theory historical results, it absolutely would imply that Russia keep going, and/or that other countries will seek nuclear breakout capability, whichever your historical metaphor target is.
His argument has a few parts but the major thrust of it is that there is no better alternative--when everything is tallied up the MSM is far more truthful than competitors like Breitbart, Rush Limbaugh, Alex Berenson, etc.
Yes? And? So what?
This is not an argument that the media is honest or good. This is an argument that the media is more honest and better, but without making the case that it's good enough. This matters, because in a great number of things 'better' is not 'good enough'- a runner with only one broken leg, only an ounce of sewage in a bottle of win, a teacher who usually wears a condom when tutoring a student one-on-one. These may all be things that are strictly preferable to alternatives, but that does not mean that a lack of alternatives means any are acceptable, or not worse than going without.
To quote the article-
The problem with taking a nihilistic posture towards the MSM is that there’s nothing to replace it with. If someone spends all their time complaining about capitalism without making the case for a realistic alternative, what they’re advocating for is chaos, or more likely, socialism, which is much worse. Likewise, simply trying to discredit the media when it’s in many ways the only means we have to acquire accurate information about the world should be understood as advocating for making society dumber.
To which one might as well respond- and where are you going to start describing what's the problem with nihilism?
Setting aside that the Hanania doesn't identify how society is actually being made smarter by the current media, he also doesn't identify what society being 'dumber' even means. He raises the spectre of nebulous chaos as bad not because chaos is bad, but because of what the effects of chaos can do to a healthy society... but if the society is already sick or insane- and Hanania pre-emptively concedes that the other side has 'lost their mind' on extremely fundamental issues on social composition- this doesn't actually mean it's getting worse. 'Not having any words left to describe Queer Studies or much of bioethics' is not a loss when the the superfulousness of words to describe them is already bringing about the bioethics of queer studies to the applause of the media that is being defended.
If the consequences of a dumber society with no common media environment are different than the consequences of the current media environment, that doesn't mean it's worse. Hanania presupposes that everyone accepts the current dynamics as good enough and that an alternative is worse. While this is a fundamentally status quo bias that's understandable for how Hanania himself has personally benefited, it makes no such appeal to those who have not, or who have been harmed, or who see their long-term interests of the trajectory as being threatened by the very institutions supporting positions Hanania himself calls crazy.
Yes, a lack of common shared vision of the world will create a low cohesive society. This is not the same as making the case for why people should commit to a cohesive society that disagrees with them on a fundamentally cultural level.
As with Scott's attempt awhile ago, this falls into the trap of 'we must have something common and good to all believe in.' Hanania frames it as a resistance to nihilism, but it's really not. This is just the rationalist tendency to want other people to support social cohesion for its common good effects, without grasping on how dynamics like social cohesion come about. People do not subscribe to common beliefs because social cohesion enables good things- social cohesion comes about when people subscribe to common beliefs, which define what good things are. Appealing to people to submit their view of what is good for the sake of maintaining the benefits of social cohesion is fundamentally missing the cause and the effect.
Hanania wants people to separate the insanity he admits is fully present in the system. The system is broadly comfortable and profitable for him. It is not broadly comfortable or profitable for others, who he makes no case are being well served by the current institutions that 'only lie a little', and the fact that the lack of a superior alternative will make the lack of a single information sphere less comfortable for a lot of people is not, in fact, a compelling reason for others to defer to the established institutions who see them as the problem.
Curious what you all think.
I think he's self-centered and blind to his own mediocrity. No one so self-flattering of their own IQ should be making so many basic mistakes of argument, history, or social cohesion.

The question has been answered for years. You used to post the link quite regularly to where I did, until it was pointed out you were skipping the parts that pointed out examples that drove the conclusion.
The effort is entirely commensurate with my assessment of your good faith and character, which you have only lived up to in the years since.
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