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Gillitrut

Reading from the golden book under bright red stars

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joined 2022 September 06 14:49:23 UTC

				

User ID: 863

Gillitrut

Reading from the golden book under bright red stars

1 follower   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 06 14:49:23 UTC

					

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User ID: 863

I mean, maybe I'm the weird one but I don't think being hypothetically willing to do certain things is worth much compared to actually doing things. Would I kill a stranger to protect my wife? Sure. Do I think I will ever have to actually do that? Almost certainly not. Does that fact, like, oblige some gratitude or something on my wife's part? Create some responsibility to me? I don't think so. If it were a thing I actually had done, especially more than once, I would think differently but I don't think my hypothetical willingness generates much of an obligation on the part of others.

There's a CHH substack post that gets at a pretty similar theme (if anyone knows how to un-paywall substack articles let me know): You'll Kill Marauders, But Will You Change a Diaper?

The gist is that a lot of men seem to envision being a husband or father as entailing a lot of willingness to do violence and their contribution to these roles as being that willingness. This is, however, not a practical description of what is required to be a husband or father in a developed country. It's not to say that willingness is bad, but it is not something that is likely to be very useful.

But anyway, I think there are quite a few modern-day men who imagine fatherhood in all its glory, but are mostly imagining being a lord from Game of Thrones. In 2025, fatherhood means picking a kid up from school, buying a new backpack, and signing them up for swimming classes. I get that some men won’t do that, but even in the most trad households, fatherhood is remarkably light on the killing or even “protecting.” Yes, it’s good in theory for a man to be capable of protecting his family, but your average man will never be in a situation where he has to do that, whereas he will be in many situations where he has to attend his teenager’s terrible improv show or similar.
In fact, if your ultimate goal is keeping your children safe (and I think that’s a good goal) the most important dangers to avoid are things that fail to scratch the itch for grandiose violence. This includes things like carseat safety, pool safety, and social media. That’s not to say it’s useless to know how to take down a potential aggressor on the street (I’ve written before about the fact that unhinged stranger aggression in cities isn’t something to ignore) but in all likelihood, the biggest dangers to your children will be boring things: cars, pools, unsecured firearms, and mental illness leading to self-harm. No swords required!

There was also some reporting by Punchbowl claiming other Republican members may resign as well. The House is currently 219-213 in favor of Republicans. With Democrats expected to win 2 upcoming special elections for currently empty seats and Republicans expected to win an upcoming special election for a currently filled seat. With those results and down MTG the House would stand at 218-215. Republicans would only be able to afford to lose one vote on any legislation and four resignations would give Democrats the majority.

Has this objection been used before? Conversely, have previous administrations gotten away with repeated interim positions?

The opinion talks a little about the history. Pre-1986 there was no mechanism for the Attorney General to appoint USAs at all. Between 1986 and 2006 it seems there were a couple times the Attorney General re-appointed someone, but no one challenged it. In 2006 Congress abolished (c)(2) and (d) altogether. Then in 2007 it brought them back.

I seem to recall Trump I having a lot of trouble filling similar positions. Trump II has done a much better job on that front, so I’m a little surprised that they left the goal open. With control of the Senate, Republicans had to have the option, right?

For Halligan, specifically, I think there were timing issues. Siebert resigned on 9/19 and the statute of limitations for Comey's charges would be up on 9/30. So that's ~7 business days to get Halligan confirmed in the Senate and secure an indictment. Halligan was ultimately appointed the 22nd and the indictment was docketed on the 25th.

For the others, part of the problem is that the way they've made them "Acting" officials under the FVRA means they can't go ask the Senate for confirmation. The FVRA generally prohibits the nominee for a position from also serving as an "Acting" official in the role they are nominee for, subject to some exemptions that don't apply here.

New updates in the Comey and James cases. Both indictments dismissed because Lindsey Halligan was not lawfully appointed as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia and so all her actions as such are void and without effect. Comey and James opinions. Though the two are substantially identical, having both been authored by the same judge. These dismissals are without prejudice meaning the government can try and secure further indictments. Although, in Comey's case this faces some additional hurdles since the statute of limitations for his offense expired several days after the first indictment against him was secured.

Note that a similar dispute is playing out in New Jersey with respect to the appointment of Alina Habba as United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey and in Nevada with respect to Sigal Chattah's appointment as United States Attorney for the District of Nevada. These cases are a little more complicated than Halligan's due to implications of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act but they arose due to circumstances like what Halligan is facing now.

At the heart of these disputes is 28 USC 546 which provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the Attorney General may appoint a United States attorney for the district in which the office of United States attorney is vacant.
(b) The Attorney General shall not appoint as United States attorney a person to whose appointment by the President to that office the Senate refused to give advice and consent.
(c) A person appointed as United States attorney under this section may serve until the earlier of—

(1) the qualification of a United States attorney for such district appointed by the President under section 541 of this title; or
(2) the expiration of 120 days after appointment by the Attorney General under this section.

(d) If an appointment expires under subsection (c)(2), the district court for such district may appoint a United States attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled. The order of appointment by the court shall be filed with the clerk of the court.

The dispute is principally about whether the Attorney General is permitted to make successive 120-day appointments or whether the Attorney General gets a single 120-day appointment and then when that expires the District Court makes the appointment as to who shall be United States Attorney. In Halligan's case Erik Siebert had already been appointed for 120 days earlier this year and was appointed by the district court upon expiration of that appointment. He then resigned under pressure to prosecute James and Comey, whereupon Bondi purported to appoint Halligan under 28 USC 546. Naturally, the court finds that Attorney General Bondi has had her 120 day appointment and so authority to appoint a new USA for EDVA lies with the district court.