Primaprimaprima
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User ID: 342
You create a woman that women want to be, and men don't want her
Speak for yourself, I want a woman who can knock me unconscious.
like the heroine actually had the power to solve all the problems in her if only she realised her own worth
Evolutionarily speaking, a woman's worth is largely dependent on immutable physical characteristics (modulo things like plastic surgery), so these sorts of stories tend to psychologically resonate with women. They don't have to go wrest their value from the external world like men do.
I once asked my mother why so many Hallmark movies copy the "It's a Wonderful Life" plot where a woman makes a life-altering wish, gets transported to another timeline, and then realizes she doesn't like it and has to find a way back. She responded, "oh, the movie is telling you that actually everything is great for you already, and you're just too stupid to realize it!"
or there was a solution that involves using emotional intelligence and likeableness to dissuade the villain from his villainous ways instead of defeating him
That one strikes me as perfectly reasonable and not necessarily anticlimactic...
Right, there's the classic "I don't know who the woman was, but I can tell you that she wasn't my mother!"
But my dreams (insofar as I can remember them anyway) are rarely even complex enough to have much of a "telling". I was walking down a street in my neighborhood. Bam that's it that's the dream. Rather uninteresting! (I suppose even that little bit is still a "telling" though.)
You can probably endlessly subject all of this to Freudian psychoanalysis, but I don't care for it.
Funny enough, dream analysis has always been the least interesting aspect of psychoanalysis to me. Probably because I rarely have them, and when I do, their "meaning" is always quite manifest and apparent -- there's a clear causal relationship between what I'm dreaming about and something I was thinking about recently, or something I experienced at some point.
Although, I am curious on a meta-level if this says anything about me...
Ah, I was asking more about the symbolic meaning of the narrative -- the coming technological dystopia, the alienation from our humanity, a sense of impending irrevocable loss, etc. How often do you consciously ruminate on those sorts of things?
Everything I feel towards my wife feels somehow muted, or turned down.
We can certainly say that this is one of the general effects of AI integration, yes.
How well does this dream correspond to conscious, waking thoughts that you've experienced previously? Is the narrative of this dream a familiar line of thought to you, or did you experience it as something new?
It appears that enough people have already reported your comments here that they’ve ended up in the report queue, which is very unfortunate. Those are clearly ideologically motivated reports; nothing you’ve said here is in violation of the rules.
Your presence here is highly valued, so I do hope that you feel encouraged to post here more often. You’re not the only Trump-critical poster here, so your arguments would find some support.
If we grant that the cultural right is "winning" right now
They’re not. All you’re seeing is a “10 steps forward, 2 steps back” kind of situation.
I don't really know where you're then getting this notion that we can draw any conclusion from what she says to how theoretical objects are thought up for use in scientific scenarios.
It was the idea that occurred to me while reading the text, so I just went with it!
I fully admit I'm engaged in a "motivated" reading. I'm more concerned with trying to extract a coherent philosophical idea from the text rather than with reconstructing Irigaray's exact mental state. But I don't think my interpretation is baseless either.
Backing up to give more context:
What is left uninterpreted in the economy of fluids—the resistances brought to bear upon solids, for example—is in the end given over to God. Overlooking the properties of real fluids—internal frictions, pressures, movements, and so on, that is, their specific dynamics—leads to giving the real back to God, as only the idealizable characteristics of fluids are included in their mathematicization.
Or again: considerations of pure mathematics have precluded the analysis of fluids except in terms of laminated planes, solenoid movements (of a current privileging the relation to an axis), spring-points, well-points, whirlwind-points, which have only an approximate relation to reality. Leaving some remainder. Up to infinity: the center of these “movements” corresponding to zero supposes in them an infinite speed, which is physically unacceptable. Certainly these “theoretical” fluids have enabled the technical—also mathematical—form of analysis to progress, while losing a certain relationship to the reality of bodies in the process.
What consequences does this have for “science” and psychoanalytic practice?
Roughly: Science can't just give a direct description of every single microdetail of reality. It has to "symbolize" things -- create simplified and idealized theoretical models. These models are inevitably attached to linguistic imagery.
And if anyone objects that the question, put this way, relies too heavily on metaphors, it is easy to reply that the question in fact impugns the privilege granted to metaphor (a quasi solid) over metonymy (which is much more closely allied to fluids).
Honestly not entirely sure what this part means. I assume that she's saying that solid imagery is more metaphorical, and fluid imagery is more metonymic, and her questioning here is impugning the privilege that the current imagery of physics grants to solids over fluids.
Or—suspending the status of truth accorded to these essentially metalinguistic “categories” and “dichotomous oppositions” — to reply that in any event all language is (also) metaphorical,+ and that, by denying this, language fails to recognize the “‘subject” of the unconscious and precludes inquiry into the subjection, still in force, of that subject to a symbolization that grants precedence to solids.
They key part is really the line at the end, "the subjection, still in force, of that subject to a symbolization that grants precedence to solids". The current "symbolization" of physics grants precedence to solids. But she's implying that that could change. We could imagine an alternative symbolization that grants precedence to fluids instead (without changing the content of the underlying physics).
it's likely because it is a simpler concept to do math with, than fluid cows.
Again the suggestion is that the imagery could change without changing the math.
Solid objects are already a lot more "fluid" than they might initially appear. See for example The Problem of the Many. It's not too hard to imagine an alternative conceptual landscape where we view the world of macro objects as being fundamentally populated by fluids, with "solids" being an exotic deviation from the fluid norm, if they even exist at all.
I am not a “Rationalist” and my habits are very much my own.
I approach every text with the level of respect it deserves. Nothing more, nothing less.
But I can't appreciate when the same people (let alone the humanities professors) try to wrap themself in the flag (diploma?) and cry out that they are the only reason we aren't all living in pit toilets and dying of diphtheria.
I mean, what do you want them to say instead?
They're literally not allowed to say "yes, we are going to take your tax dollars to fund this work because it is intrinsically valuable, and our ability to carry on with this work is more important than your ability to eat at Chipotle for the 5th time this week or whatever else you were going to do with that extra $20". They think that, but they're not allowed to say it. It's not in the Overton window, it wouldn't be egalitarian, it wouldn't be democratic, etc. So they have to lie about "practical benefits" to the grant managers, and ultimately to themselves.
As an aside, Irigaray is someone I have mentioned to progressives in private discussion, and asked them to answer for her. The response I get is universally that that her fluid mechanics quote is crazy, and it doesn't really represent the feminist or progressive movements.
I went and read the "The 'Mechanics' of Fluids" chapter in Irigaray's This Sex Which Is Not One to make sure I wasn't misrepresenting her. I believe that it can be steelmanned (or at least, one thread of thought within it can be steelmanned).
The critical passage seems to be this:
[...] Certainly these “theoretical” fluids have enabled the technical—also mathematical—form of analysis to progress, while losing a certain relationship to the reality of bodies in the process.
What consequences does this have for “science” and psychoanalytic practice?
And if anyone objects that the question, put this way, relies too heavily on metaphors, it is easy to reply that the question in fact impugns the privilege granted to metaphor (a quasi solid) over metonymy (which is much more closely allied to fluids). Or—suspending the status of truth accorded to these essentially metalinguistic “categories” and “dichotomous oppositions” — to reply that in any event all language is (also) metaphorical, and that, by denying this, language fails to recognize the “‘subject” of the unconscious and precludes inquiry into the subjection, still in force, of that subject to a symbolization that grants precedence to solids.
It is philosophically contentious whether anything like a "solid object" even exists at all. Arguably, our fundamental ontological presuppositions are not given to us, but are instead the result of choices we make (or, perhaps, choices made for us by society and the structure of language). Science, by its own admission, makes use of idealized theoretical models that are one step removed from actual "reality" (spherical cows in a vacuum and such). We can imagine an alternative isomorphic description of the same physical model that keeps all the math exactly intact, but uses different linguistic imagery. Why a "spherical" cow "rolling" down an incline? Why not a "viscous" cow "flowing" down an incline?
Because the metaphorical imagery employed by science is fundamentally arbitrary, Irigaray's contention is that the fundamental choice of which parts of physics to label as "solid" mechanics and "fluid" mechanics in the first place reveals something sociologically and psychologically about the people doing the labeling (obviously, she would say that it reveals a fundamental aversion to or discomfort with fluid imagery and feminine imagery in general).
But science or mathematics, at least if they are carried out in any kind of reasonable good faith, are hard to skew like that.
The maths work out or don't work out regardless
Mathematicians are pretty honest about the fact that problem selection, and ultimately basic choices of definitions, are driven at least partially by cultural and aesthetic concerns. But the actual content of mathematics is extremely difficult to politicize, given how abstract it is.
It doesn't matter whether such-and-such the physicist is a rootless cosmopolitan because the results of theories of physics do not depend on the character or values of the theoretician.
It is much harder to introduce bias into fundamental physics than it is to introduce bias into psychology or even biology. I kinda gotta hand it to Irigaray for having the chutzpah to suggest that we haven't fully characterized the solutions of the Navier-Stokes equations because of men's fear of menstruation and "feminine" fluids, but... yeah that's actually not a reasonable thing to believe...
Most people here, including me, are not.
Yes, I'm quite conscious of this distinction! And this appears to be something of an inborn preference (or at least, it's a preference that's sedimented relatively early in life). So I didn't presume that I would be able to "persuade" anyone.
Porque no los dos?
At the species level, at the level of the collective, we can allocate resources to everything. My post was more about asking why, at the individual level, space colonization becomes such a powerfully attractive symbol for some people and not others.
Since space optimism is rather common in the Ratsphere, I suppose it falls to me to articulate the opposing view, and to elaborate a little bit on why I find space (or at least, the prospect of space colonization) to be rather boring.
The human mind is currently the most interesting object in the known universe. All of the human minds are already here, on earth. We don't need to go out into space to find them.
Space of course has a lot of, well, space, in which humans can propagate and live their lives. But space colonization won't fundamentally change human nature. Humans on Mars will still love, laugh, cry, and die. They'll just be doing those things... in space. Thinking that that changes the fundamental calculus would be like saying that a painting becomes more interesting when you magnify it 100x and put it on a billboard. It's still the exact same painting. Just bigger.
There is certainly something to be said for the drama of scientific discovery, and the challenges of surviving in a harsh environment. But this is still just one potential drama among many, only one potential object of study among many.
I of course recognize the utilitarian value of space colonization in terms of hedging against extinction risks on earth. But this strikes me as essentially an administrative detail. Not unlike paying your taxes, or moving into a new apartment because your landlord is kicking you out of your current one. More like something to be managed, rather than an object of fascination in its own right. There seems to be something importantly different going on in the psychology of the dedicated space optimists: they are attracted to expansion as such, effervescence, projection, power for power's sake, and most importantly, size.
Literally EVERYTHING ELSE in the universe is out there in space. Whatever you really care about or want, there's more of it out there.
Well, no, there's not much out there right now. Admittedly phenomena like neutron stars are extremely interesting, exotic planet compositions can make planets interesting in their own right even in the absence of life, etc. I am extremely grateful that we have scientists who are dedicated to expanding our knowledge of these phenomena. But in the last analysis, I still don't find these phenomena to be as interesting as other people.
Of course, if we were to discover that there are other conscious intelligent beings in the universe, then everything would change. Suddenly, we may not be the most interesting things in the universe anymore. We would have to make every possible effort to study them, with great haste. But you already said that you think we're probably alone. So it's unclear what you expect to find out there; besides, as already stated, the satisfaction of the utilitarian aim of preserving and multiplying what we already have.
So what's your expectation of this new UAP hearing?
Nothing.
Anything different from the previous nothingburgers?
No.
All memes aside, I would very much like for the crash retrieval program to be real, although I recognize that the probability of it actually being real is meager.
The truth always comes out in the end.
Mainstream science dismisses the concerns and sees the object as ordinary red colored D-type asteroid.
Mainstream science told you to mask up and get the covid vaccine too.
Empirical psychology has little interest in characterizing phenomenological states in general, especially phenomenological states that have no relevance to any identifiable and treatable medical condition, so it's unsurprising that the vocabulary for describing these states remains underdeveloped. This is a task that has traditionally been left to philosophy.
Heidegger's Being and Time explores these themes in depth (both the experience of "everydayness" and the ways in which this experience is modified by anxiety), if you found the topic so interesting that you were inspired to approach such a mammoth tome.
I've recently been reflecting on this very topic for my own independent reasons. Although I've certainly never had anything as dramatic as a "disassociative episode", I can relate to a general feeling of being... never entirely present for things. Almost entirely present, at times. But rarely entirely so. And I'm curious about the extent to which this represents a real distinction between the experiences of different individuals, or if people might just be talking past each other (since we cannot directly become another person to verify the nature of their experience).
Just out of curiosity faceh, how vivid and comprehensive would you say that your memory (of personal events) is in general?
I’m generally not interested in “fluffy” romance, where the romance is literally the only thing going on. But as long as there’s something else going on in the plot then I enjoy those types of stories quite a bit.
Quite a few anime and VNs fall into this category, but you already said you don’t like things that are “too Japanese”, so, yeah, unfortunate.
To a first approximation, no one actually wants values diversity, whether in their fiction or anywhere else.
Challenge accepted. ("No one could ever want X". Well then, it is the philosopher's duty to want X. No generalization can be allowed to stand without an exception.)
I agree that value diversity within a given concrete mode of life is hard to consciously wish for in a direct sense (unless you're a certain unique type of individual at any rate). But certainly if we zoom out and consider a patchwork of distinct modes of life, there is no issue. I don't agree with how Islamic societies treat their women, but in an abstract sense, I'm happy that Muslims are able to continue on with their cherished values all the same. (Selfishly, it provides a further object of contemplation for me.) And fiction is an ideal medium for exploring such alternative modes of life.
But who even tosses their hair over their shoulder and hits Send at the exact same time? Most people don't have the coordination for that. You ever tried to pat your head and rub your tummy at the same time? It's that sort of thing.
She's obviously going to toss her hair first, and then hit Send a moment later.
"He hefted his mace and swung at her"
Yeah but that just sounds worse to me. No accounting for taste I suppose.
"Hefting his mace, he swung at her as hard as he could."
This sounds perfectly natural to me.
Agreed on all the political points though.
Yes exactly! “Autonomy” for Kant just means… the ability to autonomously come to the exact same ethical conclusions that Kant did. Which is pretty hilarious.

"Effectiveness of policy" is the last thing that political disagreements are about. If you listed all the causes of political conflict in order of importance and relevance, "effectiveness of policy" would rank around... 67th place? Maybe?
Political conflicts arise because of clashes between incommensurate value systems, misalignment of tribal interests, the competing demands of heterogeneous subjectivities, emotional biases both conscious and unconscious... if political conflicts could be settled through rational argumentation then people would have done so already.
Of course people will still try to convince themselves that politics is really about "policy", for various reasons. It could be because they're classical liberals who recognize that liberalism needs to postulate a universal, expansive, and malleable blank slate core as part of human nature in order for liberalism to function at large scales over long periods of time. Or it could be because they find the idea of human subjectivity to be intrinsically uncomfortable, and a world of rational information-processing agents is more amenable to their tastes. Whatever the reason.
The sooner you adjust your frame of reference, the sooner things will start making sense.
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