PyotrVerkhovensky
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User ID: 2154
As I mentioned in converting to Catholicism, I'm in the process of reading more theological works with an attempt to better understand my own beliefs and the beliefs of my wife. I've lately been on a soteriology kick.
I am bemused by the many attempts to identify the "one" Christian soteriological method. Very few of these theories are mutually exclusive. There is infinite richness to Christ’s life, death, resurrection, and everlasting reign; and there is facets of meaning in every (orthodox) soteriology. For instance, I believe in:
- Imputed righteousness, with substitutional aspects. Relevant hymns: "How deep the Father’s love for us" (it was my sin that held him there, until it was accomplished), "Yet not I but Christ Through Christ in Me" (The future sure, the price it has been paid. For Jesus bled and suffered for my pardon), "In Christ Alone" (The wrath of God was satisfied)
- Christ as ransom. Relevant hymns: "In Christ Alone" (1) (Light of the world by darkness slain), "O Come, O Come Emmanuel" (Ransom captive Israel)
- Christ as the perfect Israel, recapitulating Israel but perfectly, in whom all the nations of the world may be blessed (representative rather than substitutionary). Relevant hymn: "O Come, O Come Emmanuel" (2) (O come, O Branch of Jesse’s stem, unto your own and rescue them. From depths of hell your people save, and give them victory o’er the grave. O come, O Key of David, come and open wide our heavenly home. Make safe for us the heavenward road and bar the way to death's abode).
- Christ as the Passover Lamb, providing himself as the feast that lets us commune with the Triune God and yet live. Relevant hymn: "Let All Mortal Flesh Keep Silent" (Lord of Lords, In human vesture, In the body and the blood; He will give to all the faithful, His own self for heavenly food.)
Andrew Rillera's "Lamb of the Free" is one such recent example of a "new" perspective that intends to dispense with the "common" ("popular" as well as "low") soteriology of Penal Substitutionary Atonement (PSA). Rillera seeks to correct the belief that Levitical sacrifices were substitutes for the peoples’ sins. This "incorrect" belief is what has (allegedly) lead to the proliferation of belief in PSA. Yet while Rillera brings plausible scholarship to the Levitical sacrificial system (I, a layman, am not an expert on the nuances there), I think his resulting conclusion on the soteriological import of Christ’s death is not adequately supported and ultimately incorrect (indeed, I think it heterodox). Rillera, unfortunately, also writes with some condescension, using epitaphs like "wrong-headed" and "debunked". Having recently finished Khaled Anatolios's excellent "Deification through the Cross", who also posits an alternative soteriology (and one that I believe is orthodox) but is much more charitable in his contrasting with alternative soteriological theories, this meanness is jarring.
And yet there is good work in this book. Rillera, I believe, is an Old Testament (OT) scholar, and feels more comfortable in the Pentateuch than in the New Testament (NT). The first half of the book provides his perspective on the Levitical sacrifices, and I don’t see any real issue with his description or the rationale behind them, outside of some circular logic (eg, page 91 where he assumes the conclusion). His major points are:
- Very few, if any, Levitical sacrifices were made to atone for moral sin
- Blood mattered more than death.
- Sacrifice is limited, and cannot atone for moral impurity
- Only exile or death can purge “the land” of moral impurity.
- PSA is not a natural extension or consummation of the Levitical sacrificial system.
I can buy most of these points (though Hebrews 5 implies that sin sacrifices had paramount importance in a priest's duties). However, Rillera makes a leap of logic when he then concludes that PSA isn’t supported in the Bible. Romans 3 states that God displayed Christ publicly as a propitiation in His blood through faith. Romans 5 says that Christ died for us (though it stops short of claiming he died in our place), and it is clear that we are justified through Christ’s blood which saves us from God’s wrath. Isaiah 53 says that the suffering Servant "was wounded for our transgressions, the chastisement for our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed...the LORD [YHWH] has laid on him the iniquity of us all"; with clear substitutionary implications (3). Colossians 2 states that Christ "canceled out the certificate of debt....having nailed it to the cross". I'd be willing to say that there is no substitutionary death implied in the Bible but that the blood is the means of substitution. Rillera myopically calls out substitutionary death as if that is the only possible substitutionary aspect. He also characterizes PSA as substitution for death, and in the book’s conclusion says that the greatest danger in believing PSA is that it implies we don't have to follow Christ to the cross. But that is not what substitution means: indeed, we will all die and we are all called to take up our crosses. What we are now freed from is the consequences and penalty of our sin. (4)
While Rillera's OT arguments point to sacrificial atonement for ritual (but not moral) impurity, the NT forces him to acknowledge the moral atoning nature of the sacrificial element in Christ's life, death, and resurrection. But he argues that this is not the core part of the Gospel (the "good news") but is a subtle symbol linking back to the OT sacrifices. In Rillera's view, the Last Supper is a sacrifice of thanksgiving and inauguration of the new covenant, not a sin/atoning sacrifice. (Again, 1st Corinthians 5 and Rillera's own Anglican Communion Liturgy have a different perspective). As Rillera walks through 1 John and Hebrews (210 - 240), Rillera is forced to admit that Jesus’ non-Passover activities were also a sacrifice. While he initially states that "on behalf of sins" does not mean that he was an atoning sacrifice (224), he does relent (page 225) and says that the Christ’s blood’s potency gives it an atoning aspect despite the Levitical sacrifices not being morally atoning (a key point of his argument during the first half of the book).
Rillera, despite being arm-twisted by the NT texts into acknowledging the atoning nature of the blood, does not appear to believe there is anything directly salvific in Jesus' death. The only reason for death is that it is required for the resurrection, which is the "proof" of Christ’s identify as the agent of moral and ritual purification (165-166). Rillera does say that Jesus' death is "soteriologically unique" (274), but solely due to its temporal precedence. Putting aside questions of substitution and sacrifice, the NT heavily leans on Christ’s death as the means of our salvation (5). Some example passages:
- Colossians 1:20 "Having made peace through the blood of His cross"
- Colossians 1:22 "Reconciled you through death"
- Romans 5:10 "Reconciled through the death of his Son"
- 1 Corinthians 11:26-27. "As often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, your proclaim the Lord’s death...whoever eats or drinks...in an unworthy manner shall be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord."
While not desiring to attribute atoning or salvific import to Christ's death, Rillera doesn’t offer an alternative for the means of salvation. Rillera points to Christ as the "agent" of both ritual and moral purification without describing the mechanism. There seem to be three options that are consistent with the rest of Rillera's thesis.
- Christus Victor. There are certainly hints at Christ as victorious over death (eg on page 180) but the ransom component Rillera explicitly denies (203, 205).
- Vicarious (6). Rillera does state that Jesus lives a perfect representative life and his death is a "murder" as the ultimate moral sin which requires the temple to be destroyed to "atone" or "purge" the sin on the land. There is a "double participation" (240) where Jesus participates in humanity, and humanity participates in Christ's death and sacrifice. There is a "solidarity" with humanity (255). This isn’t perfectly aligned with the Vicarious soteriology, but at least rhymes with it.
- No salvific mechanism at all in the cross and resurrection. Rillera does say that God can forgive out of his own desire, which would mean there is no necessity for the cross other than as a ritual and as a proof of Jesus’ agency as the "forgiving one". This would seem to open the door to universal salvation, which Rillera hints at in his discussion of 1 John (214), though he more explicitly goes after the "Limited Atonement" of TULIP.
Outside of my theological concerns, Rillera introduces his book with culture-war fodder: that believing in PSA leads to authoritarianism, hierarchy, and support of the death penalty. Granting that these things are, in fact, bad, this by itself isn’t an argument for or against PSA. This odd and off-putting opening salvo is trivially refuted on two fronts:
- Historical: the countries that were the first to promote liberty and freedom as "us moderns" understand those terms were exactly those countries that were the strongholds of Reformed and Puritan theology, the leading adherents of PSA.
- Levitical: it doesn’t take an academic to see that outside of the detailed descriptions of the various sacrifices, Leviticus spends its time on how to correctly construct hierarchies and enact the death penalty.
I was disappointed by this book. I was hoping for a thoughtful book I could wrestle with even as a disagreed with the conclusion. Instead, the tone is brash and severe, the NT support in particular is unsatisfying, and he doesn't offer a clear alternative. I sense that he is searching for evidence for his pet theory, rather that believing the plain language of the Bible. And the soteriological implications of his pet theory he leaves to the side, perhaps due to its heterodox nature.
(1) Yes, you could do a whole soteriological study from "In Christ Alone"
(2) Yes, you could also do a whole soteriological study from "O Come, O Come, Immanuel"
(3) Rillera does talk about Isaiah 53 but only to say that the NT doesn’t consider Isaiah 53 to be about sacrifices. He does not attempt to cover the substitutionary aspects of Isaiah 53.
(4) There are myriad other verses. Hebrews 5:1 on the OT Sacrifices for Sin, Hebrews 7:27 on Christ as an offering that atones for Sin, Hebrews 9 12-14 on how purification can atone for sins, 9:26 again having Christ as Sacrifice, Hebrews 10:10 on Christ as a sanctifying offering. Rillera intentionally does not engage with "all" the verses that can be marshaled against him, seeming to treat them all as falling under a broader set of categories that he can dismiss. Yet if a plain reading of essentially the entire NT needs to be explained away, it does suggest that the original argument may have some flaws. To his credit, Rillera does wrestle with the Hebrews passages, and does seem to agree that there is some atoning aspect to Christ as sacrifice (even if there is no salvific aspect).
(5) The resurrection is necessary (and in fact, not at all surprising) given Jesus' deity. If the incarnation is true (God as Man), then the shock is God dying, not his coming back to life.
(6) Vicarious is perhaps my least favorite soteriological theory, positing that the Incarnation was sufficient for our forgiveness due to God now "understanding" us. Where Christ’s death plays into this is left as an exercise for the reader.
Since @ThomasdelVasto has made a couple "main-Motte" religious posts I thought I'd join in the fun.
I'm a Protestant with strong Reformed leanings. My wife, on the other hand, has just converted to Catholicism. This has led me to explore aspects of Catholic teaching, though necessarily at a surface level given the rich history. Aquinas alone would take months if not years to digest. I expected to disagree on Mary (perpetual virginity, immaculate conception, assumption) and the Pope (infallibility); and I still do (though I was surprised how recently these have become "dogma": I would have found it much easier to be a Catholic in 1800 than today). I am pleasantly surprised at how much weight they place on Scripture, Christ, and Assurance: there are far more shared hymns than I had anticipated, as as an example.
What follows is some of the reflections I had to this surface exploration. I would be thrilled to be corrected or critiqued by any of the Motte's Catholics, if nothing else to better understand my wife's flavor of the Christian faith. Many of these are reactions to "Catholicism" by Bishop Robert Barron, which my wife kindly bought to introduce me to the titular topic. While I presume he is orthodox Catholic, his interpretations may not be universally accepted by Catholics. If I challenge particular arguments from Barron, it should not be interpreted as an argument against Catholicism unless Barron is arguing for Church Dogma. His "Catholicism" is also meant as an introduction and for popular consumption, and his actual beliefs may have more nuance.
As part of this journey (which is certainly not over yet!), I also read (the dense and repetitive) "Divine Will and Human Choice" by Richard Muller and "Christus Victor" by Gustaf Aulén. These, too, have varying degrees of rigor. Muller and Aulén were both Protestants.
God’s freedom
While Reformed theology would affirm that God predestines both those who are saved and those who are damned, Catholics balk at this concept; arguing that this implies a God who would cause sin. God cannot will that which is against his nature. Catholics would appeal to God’s provision and common grace that allows humans consciences to (partially and weakly) discern good and evil. Yet we cannot perfectly discern this apart from divine revelation (scripture). And scripture states multiple times in the Exodus narrative that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart. Aquinas (as if often the case) provides the most rigorous Catholic argument I’ve heard for this hardening. God through an act of his will withdrew what grace was granted to Pharaoh. Absent God’s grace Pharaoh drew more into his sin. While Aquinas argued this case for the individual case of Pharaoh, it seems consistent to assume that were God to withdraw his common grace more broadly that all would fall into a state where our consciences are no longer capable of even partial discernment of good and evil. This is also consistent with God giving humans over to their lusts in Romans 1.
So far, this interpretation is consistent with scripture, though I am discomfited by the constraints this threatens to place on God: constraints that come perilously close to being primarily informed by our own interpretation or perspective of scripture and sin. God works and wills, including in sin.
Barron, if I read him correctly, goes a step further. He puts the "problem of sin" as one of the best arguments against God. I’ve never understood this as a problem for Christians. It is a deep problem for atheists, who have to explain or excuse their visceral (though often mis-aligned) desire for justice despite no objective basis for these judgments. Christians have no such need to explain or excuse: of course we are all deeply desirous for justice since we have (again, weakly and with great room for error) a sense of what transcendent goodness could be. A consistent perspective on the problem of evil would be that God defines good, and if we don’t understand his actions to be "good" that is a fault (a mis-calibration) of our fallen nature. The fact that Barron does not take this tack hints that he believes humanity’s desire for a "good" God is compatible with humanity’s definition of "good". This runs the grave risk of putting ourselves as a "judge" or external arbiter of God’s behavior.
Barron continues to put a soft face on hard truths. Later in the book, Barron says "God sends no one to hell, people freely choose to go there". This sharply contradicts scripture. Jesus talks about casting sinners into the outer darkness. Peter says the present heavens and earth are being reserved for fire, kept for the day of judgment and destruction of ungodly men. John’s Revelation describes those who receive a mark on their forehead drinking the wrath of God, mixed in the cup of his anger, and tormented with fire and brimstone. If anyone’s name was not found written in the book of life, he was thrown into the lake of fire. Again, God is not passive: he works and wills.
How does God work and will (1)? Does God have a an array of potential actions, any of which he can actualize? Yet this runs the risk of these potential actions being "outside" God. Does God create the potentials as he actualizes them? Thus no "possibles" exist for God, simply "actuals"? This also could be seen as a constraint on God and limit his radical freedom. Both these potential concepts of God’s will and freedom (of which I’m sure there are hundreds of alternative concepts) seem to be operating at a level above how Barron conceptualizes God’s freedom. Put crassly, Barron seems to be hinting that God could not "make a triangle a square", that is, that God is constrained by logical impossibilities. But this is such a small view of God. God creates our minds and universe. Our minds invent or discover things like logic, or define things like squares or circles. Whether spawned by our intellect or embedded in the structure of the cosmos, these concepts (including logic!) are part of Creation itself. God created the conditions under which we can model physical reality with math, structure, and logic. Logic is a model. Logos is Truth. Logic is created. Logos is the Creator.
God’s atoning work
The freedom God enjoys in his omnipotence has implications for a theological understanding of Atonement. The "big two" theories of Atonement, Satisfaction and Substitution, emphasize the sacrificial nature of the cross. This sacrificial interpretation retains God’s complete sovereignty with Christ’s death being an act of perichoretic propitiation. The incarnation and death was necessary because of God. It was not necessary because of anything external to God.
Catholics consider Substitution theory, which is the most common concept of Atonement in Reformed circles, to be heresy. Belief in the other concepts of Atonement are allowed. In the Satisfaction theory, which my understanding is that most if not all Catholics affirm, Jesus is our great high priest and a perfect offering, but does not receive the judgement of God. Christ died for our sins, but not in our place.
"Christus Victor" makes the historical case for Ransom theory. In principal, this theory could bring Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox together: the church Fathers at least strongly hinted at Ransom theory being the primary lens through which they interpret the cross, and the church universally recognizes the importance of the church Fathers. Aulén makes the case that Luther was also an adherent to Ransom theory. Yet this theory risks making God subservient to morality or law, proposing that Jesus was paid to Satan in exchange for humanity (2). Uncharitably, this theory makes God beholden to the "laws" of commerce, even transaction with a brigand.
However, I do find Ransom theory to have its merits. In heavily Reformed theology Satan is almost considered an afterthought. Satan plays no necessary role in the arc of human redemption and salvation. Ransom theory, on the other hand, puts Satan in a prominent place: he is either the kidnapper of human souls or is the (legitimate, in some sense) owner of human souls. The exchange of Christ for humanity and the subsequent torture and murder of Christ was simultaneously Satan’s crowning achievement and his destruction. This interpretation echos Jesus’ parable of the landowner who sent servants to collect from the tenants only to have them beaten or killed. The frustrated landowner finally sent his own son, but the tenants murdered him hoping to take his inheritance. At the conclusion of the parable, the chief priests react that the landowner will bring the tenants to a “wretched end”. Christ’s death and resurrection was the ultimate victory over Sin, Death, and the Devil, bringing this triumvirate to a “wretched end”. Indeed, this victory can be interpreted as more complete than Satisfaction or Substitution theories: it not only removes the penalty of sin, but defeats the sin itself.
Conclusion?
I plan to read and think more on this topic. Next on my list is "Deification through the Cross" by Khaled Anatolios. Any other book recommendations are welcome. I'm particularly interested in Catholic perspectives Atonement that go deeper than Barron's book.
(1) As I read "The Divine Will and Human Choice" I had to continuously bite my tongue. My mathematical training was screaming "But Kolmogorov!". Yet Kolmogorov is but a model, and Muller was trying to describe reality. Muller, though, had merely words to try to describe reality and I kept mentally begging for a more rigorous algebraic representation to more clearly and concisely communicate. Of course, the algebraic representation is itself a model, but so are words: anyone who uses ChatGPT or Claude is implicitly recognizing that words are not reality but just a map or model of reality.
(2) In CS Lewis' The Lion the Witch and the Wardrobe, Aslan (representing Christ) is beholden to the "deep magic".
Under what circumstances can preferences under uncertainty be modeled by expected utility? The classic von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem constructs a utility function that, when multiplied by corresponding probabilities, yields an ordering that is consistent with the ordering of the preferences of the agent.
Being able to represent choice under uncertainty via expectations is a powerful tool. As just one example, utility functions tend to be convex to capture diminishing marginal utility. Hence, by Jenson's inequality, the notion of risk aversion (the utility of a certain outcome of 1 dollar is higher than the utility of a 50% chance of 2 dollars and 50% chance of zero dollar) pops out of such models "for free". More generally, the rich mathematical and optimization frameworks that accompany expectations is made available for economic modeling.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem itself relies on two core axioms of economics, a third axiom that is required to prove the existence of a utility function, and finally a fourth that is required to prove the existence of a utility function such that the expectation of the utility in each possible state corresponds to the actual preference ordering of the agent. It is this fourth axiom that is the lynchpin for the von Neumann-Morgenstern proof.
The late Daniel Kahneman, Nobel prize winner and critic of "mainstream" economics, took issue with this fourth axiom. (As an aside, his pop-science book "Thinking Fast and Slow" took (unjustified) issue with far more in economics than just this fourth axiom. He repeatedly conflates the concept of rationality and of the representation of preferences via expectations, leading the casual reader to believe that he had essentially undermined all of economics). As a simple example, the "Allais Paradox" posits two gambles that would appear to contradict the fourth axiom. In response to this shortcoming, he created an entirely new framework he termed prospect theory.
So does Kahneman's work prove the death-knell for expected utility? I don't believe so. There is a trick for resolving Allais' Paradox while retaining the expected utility framework: switching the "real-world" probabilities into an equivalent measure. A simple re-weighting of the probabilities generates expected utility that is consistent with the actual preference ordering, and it is not difficult to construct a general re-weighting that accomplishes this for any "gamble" in which at least one state has a higher utility than the alternative. Put in such a way, the fourth axiom is actually not necessary for expectations to be an appropriate representation of preferences. By adding the single line "under some probability measure" to the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem, the entire analytical toolkit of expected utility is back at our disposal.
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