doglatine
1yr ago
100 days to victory; or, will the Ukrainian offensive ever culminate?
If the only tool you have is a hammer, then everything will look like a nail, as the old saying goes. As an amateur World War One historian, I've previously mused on this subreddit that the Russian offensive from April through to June was playing out in some ways like the German Spring Offensive of World War One: making some worrying gains on paper and inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, but also eroding some of the attackers' manpower and getting their best troops killed off.
Now that the Ukrainians are on the offensive, I'm starting to see parallels with the Allied 100 Days Offensive of the First World War - lots of offensives up and down the line, attacks behind enemy lines, heavy casualties on both sides, and no obvious culmination point where offensive operations have to cease. I think many of us were expecting the Kherson offensive, when it came, to be a short sharp shock and awe attack - throwing large amounts of resources into a small area of the line with the goal of capturing one specific city. But with the recent attacks at Kharkiv and in the Donbas, and the relatively steady pace of the offensive in Kherson, I'm wondering if the goal is to create a new unrelenting offensive up and down the line.
This would have many goals, most notably keeping the Russians continually on the backfoot. However, if Ukraine is confident in its logistics and supplies, then it might allow them to achieve a kind of "offensive escape velocity", a positive feedback loop where they maintain the initiative, pick their battles, and inflict steady casualties, gradually tipping the war more and more in their favour. This in turn could prevent Russia from regaining the initiative and concentrating new troops for an assault and allow the offensive to gradually sap their resolve and manpower.
Here are some of the indicators that we would expect to see if Ukraine had this strategy in mind and were pursuing it successfully -
Non-culmination. There won't come a distinct day or week where the offensive culminates. Instead, the offensive will be maintained continually, but with increasing emphasis given to one theatre after another.
Taking of prisoners. One distinctive feature of the 100 Days Offensive was that the Allies began to capture increasing numbers of German prisoners. This in turn reflected plunging morale among German troops. If we see the same thing here, it would provide evidence that the war might be coming to a close.
Undoing enemy progress. One painful feature of the 100 Days Offensive for the Germans was that almost all of the gains of the Spring Offensive were undone in fairly rapid order. This in turn further depressed their morale. If Ukraine were to launch successful attacks on Lysychansk and Sievierodonetsk, this could have a similar effect.
Striking seemingly impregnable strongpoints. Another key feature of the 100 Days Offensive was its successful breaching of the Hindenberg Line like the battle of St Quentin Canal. It's not clear what the equivalent would be in this war - perhaps some successful attacks on the northern tip of Crimea proper.
I'm not saying this is likely per se, and it may be mere hopium, but it's a new hypothesis about Ukraine's broader strategy that's come to mind, one that I'll be updating as news comes in.
Academic philosopher here. Philosophy has been losing its coherence for quite a long time with the “naturalistic turn” from the late 70s on (think Dennett and Fodor) A small but growing number of philosophers of mind were reading David Marr and Zenon Pylyshyn while the philosophers of language were reading Chomsky. Philosophy of biology and took off in a big way in the 90s, and philosophy of computer science in the 00s. Ethicists began to increasingly get into debates in moral psychology (eg John Doris’s work) and epistemologists started to get more and more into formal epistemology, heuristics and biases, and decision theory. Even aesthetics began to blur in some places into aesthetic psychology and neuroaesthetics. Of course you still had (and have) a large core of people doing traditional ethics, metaphysics, epistemology history of philosophy, and political science, so philosophy still had a recognisable centre, with the more empirically minded approaches on the periphery.
But then about 12 years ago, philosophy of race and gender started to expand hugely, frequently blurring into stuff like media studies, STS, and sociology. And this stuff was cool and trendy and attracted big grants. If you were on the job market looking for positions in traditional metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, or history of philosophy you were screwed. So a lot of good grad students and early career people left the field, leading to an evaporative cooling, while the really good empirical people shifted to working in cogsci departments and dedicated cross disciplinary centres with names like “Institute for Human Cognition” or “Centre for Science and Humanity.” So you had an evaporative cooling process that left the new trendy race and gender people in control of the old professional architecture — journals, associations, conferences, etc., though at the cost of losing a huge part of the talent pool and a lot of the connections to other disciplines. The main losers have been the old school philosophers.
Could say more and will do when I’m not writing on a tiny blood screen.
As I'm sure many of you are already aware, it's been another insane 48 hours in Ukraine. The "side offensive" in the northeast that accompanied the "main offensive" in Kherson has made astonishing progress, with Ukrainian forces pushing all the way to the Oskil River, with Kupyansk under attack and Izyum and Lyman both threatened. None of this will mean much to most us, I realise, so here's a quick (already outdated) map of the progress.
It's important not to get carried away here; while this is the closest we've come to a true war of movement since April, and there are reports of desertions and surrenders by Russian forces, we're dealing with one front in a war with at least three more (roughly, in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk sectors). This will probably not trigger a general collapse of Russian forces. Moreover, it is still possible that Ukrainian forces will find themselves overextended and vulnerable to counterattacks. However, as matters stand, this looks like a decisive operational-level victory for Ukraine.
My main uncertainty in what follows is what Russia's response to this apparent defeat will be, given that the underlying tides seem to favour Ukraine. Mass mobilisation may have helped a few months back, but - in addition to its political difficulties - it's unclear whether this late into the war it will be sufficient to turn the tide. Obviously there's always the option of nuclear escalation, but this would be a colossal gamble for Russia, potentially leaving them diplomatically isolated while providing limited relief on the battlefield. Another possibility would be for Russia explicitly to use the Zaporizhzhia plant as a hostage, but again it's unclear how that would translate into gains on the battlefield. And all the while, Russia's gas blackmail strategy seems to be floundering; not only have European reserves filled at faster than expected rates, European gas futures continued to fall, suggesting optimism about long-term supply issues.
Clearly, the best solution for Russia is the removal of Putin. His successor might still be able to cut a deal with the West that allows them de facto control of Crimea (for example, via a Hong Kong-style lease agreement, accompanied by a clever financial 'reparations package' that involves minimal pain on all sides). That will not begin to ameliorate the damage this idiotic war has caused to Russia and Ukraine, but at this point it is the least bad option. The only question now is how Russia can best ensure a relatively fast recovery from the self-inflicted harm it has created.
doglatine
1yr ago
Unclear. Tactical nuclear weapons aren't necessarily all that useful on the battlefield. People think of nukes as "destroy everything bombs", but if we're talking about an armoured division spread out across a few square miles, then a small nuke is hardly a game changer (and ironically, a lot of the ex-Soviet hardware Ukraine is packing is precisely designed to allow crew survivability in the wake of a nuclear strike). A nuclear missile on Kiev, Lviv, or Odessa might be effective, but would instantly mark Russia as a pariah state - the breaking of the nuclear taboo (and the consequent breakdown of non-proliferation) is in no way in the interests of their few remaining global friends like China or India.
The least bad nuclear escalation from Moscow, I think, would be a nuclear test (following appropriate legal measures to excuse Russia from its test-ban commitments). This would incur relatively few diplomatic costs, and would immediately raise the stakes for all concerned. That said, it wouldn't change the situation on the battlefield at all. At best, it might prompt a fresh round of negotiations with Erdogan et al. as intermediaries.
doglatine
1yr ago
It still could, but the likelihood of a long-term frozen conflict a la Korea looks a lot lower today than it did last week.
doglatine
1yr ago
I don't see the clarity of this
It wasn't immediately clear to me whether you were talking about the advisability for Russia of the removal of Putin or the suing for peace. Re: Putin, any deal that Russia could get with Putin still in place would be inferior to the kind of deal they could get with a successor in place. This is widely regarded in the West as "Putin's War", and while Russia will bear the bulk of perceived responsibility even if he goes, he will at least take some of it with him. As for the hunkering down option, that could be relatively palatable for Russia, but it's not clear it's going to be strategically sustainable if Ukraine continues to have operational victories and the West continues to pour weapons and money into the conflict.
Like what, say "we'll make it meltdown unless you do X"?
I was thinking instead that Russia would publicly signal something like "the war is endangering ZPP!" while privately signaling to Ukraine and Western governments "we'll shit on the carpet if you try to get us to leave". The advantage this would have over use of nukes is semi-plausible deniability; a major radiation incident at ZPP could simultaneously freeze all parties' military operations in the region and could be passed off as an unintended consequence of Ukrainian aggression. To be clear though, I don't think this is a very sensible option.
There isn't really a systematic difference. Both "ethics" and "morality" can refer to norms of human conduct, e.g., "John has no ethics" (=John is immoral). One clearcut difference is that "ethics" can refer to the philosophical study of norms of human conduct, including things like meta-ethics and descriptive ethics, whereas "morality" fills this role rather more awkwardly. For example, it's natural to say that "ethics is the study of morality" (even though this isn't the only use of the term "ethics"), whereas "morality is the study of ethics" doesn't make much sense at all. In this very specific reading of the terms, one might analogise "ethics" and "morality" to "linguistics" and "language", though I'd emphasise again that "ethics" is frequently (if inexactly) used synonymously with "morality" to refer directly to appropriate norms of human behaviour.
doglatine
1yr ago
It all depends on whether Russia has the logistics pipeline in place to train, arm, and deploy hundreds of thousands of new soldiers. It's entirely possible it doesn't, which would explain why Putin has been reluctant to take this option. As for economic mobilisation, it's critical to realise that the Russian government - despite its autocratic guise - has very limited state capacity. It's a long way from e.g. the US or Japan in 1941, where large-scale changes in industrial production could be accomplished quickly and efficiently via governmental fiat.
Of course, there are also the political factors. Quite apart from the direct political unpalatability of mobilisation, there's the risk that doing it now - so late in the day, and in response to military setbacks - signals weakness, which could cause any potential siloviki hyenas to pounce.
doglatine
1yr ago
I think this is definitely one of those moments when the tide is going out quickly, and we're getting to see who's been skinnydipping.
doglatine
1yr ago
The victories of pro-migrant parties are permanent insofar as they will have changed the ethnic composition of the population, but there are still things that anti-migrant parties can do to limit the speed of further demographic change and foster assimilation. One policy would be to explicitly target percentage of foreign born population as a measure for immigration policy, with automatic immigration restrictions kicking when it's passed. These restrictions could be selective, so as to specifically limit immigration from the developing world while leaving open immigration from e.g. the United States or Japan. One could combine these with pro-natal policies that won't disproportionately favour recent poorer immigrant groups (e.g., tax relief for parents earning above a certain threshold).
Given disparities in TFR between native and immigrant populations, this probably won't have a huge impact on the proportion of population from non-Swedish ethnic backgrounds, but it might successfully reduce the proportion of foreign-born citizens. Moreover, it may allow the percentage of successfully "assimilated" non-native citizens (for most values of "assimilated") to increase over time, and if we're interested in cultural assimilation (as per civic nationalism) rather than just ethnicity (as per ethnic nationalism) that might fix the problem in the long-run. This is true even if you think assimilation is hard; even among groups for whom it's more difficult (e.g., Somalian immigrants) it does happen to a subset of the population.
So unless we're concerned with ethnic change per se, then I think it's too early to sound a council of despair, especially since none of the big European migrant-destination countries have actually implemented heavy-duty policies to reduce percentage of foreign-born citizens. We have to be careful not to say "We've tried nothing and we're all out of options."
doglatine
1yr ago
immigrants have unprecedent ability to communicate with people back at home
I'd flag that this isn't necessarily at odds with assimilation. Look at first-generation Filipino-Americans as an example - this is a group that has assimilated very well by most standards, but maintains strong connections to their home country. I think we need to be clearer about what assimilation means. To my mind, it's something like convergence of broad values, linguistic competence, and convergence to national medians for things like income, education, and rates of offending. Of course perfect convergence is unlikely due to deep-seated differences between populations, but approximate convergence (or getting better results than the median) is all that's required.
doglatine
1yr ago
Ugh, this is one of the things that most alienates me from many transgender activist communities. It's pure BPD black-and-white thinking. Anyone who isn't a perfect ally is a sworn enemy. This also contributes to the movement eating its own (e.g. the truscum controversy).
doglatine
1yr ago
Agree with this take. A few quick additional reflections -
(1) I have no issue with diverse casts where it's actually thematically appropriate. In a show like The Expanse, for example, where people from all over the world have gone to space and made babies, it's entirely appropriate to have a cast of diverse (and often racially ambiguous) actors. My favourite show of all time is The Wire, which has a predominantly black cast because it's actually trying to reflect the makeup of Baltimore. Same with Hamilton - there was a specific artistic purpose there in using non-white actors to play revolutionaries (namely, to emphasise the fact that these people were in some ways outsiders). But in a show like Rings of Power or House of the Dragon, giving seemingly random roles to black actors without any attempt to address their race in the actual story just feels like bad world building motivated by petty politics.
(2) Also, why is diversity casting so overwhelmingly focused on black actors rather than e.g., South Asians, East Asians, or indigenous peoples? This is true even for a lot of British productions, and our South Asian population is a lot bigger than our black population. The obvious answer it seems to me is that white American elites have a weird quasi-fetishistic relation with blackness, and as cultural imperialists, they end up importing their own psychodramas to the rest of the Western world. And that's something I strongly resent.
(3) As OP notes, the issue is definitely not that productions with racially diverse casts are now more common, it's that it's becoming increasingly difficult to justify shows that don't exemplify racial diversity. This forces a dilemma on anyone looking to tell historical stories situated in Europe's past. Do they risk the wrath of the media-activist complex ("yet another show about white people"), or do they find ways to include non-white actors even at the cost of verisimilitude (as in, e.g., Vikings or Bridgerton)? Verisimilitude isn't the be-all and end-all, but it's not nothing either.
(4) Finally - and this is a much broader rant - it frustrates me yet again how narrow the lens of contemporary "diversity" actually is, and how focused it is on the most visible forms of difference. Linguistic diversity, for example, remains the exception rather than the norm in most shows, with everyone talking in English. What about class diversity, or neurodiversity, or regional diversity, or faith diversity? My academic workplace is 'diverse' in terms of gender and race, but everyone is from a fairly elite background and there's not a single openly Christian person among the thirty or so academics I interact with on a monthly basis. That seems like a striking failure of diversity, at least if one were naive enough to think that the concept was genuinely about encouraging heterogeneous representation rather than political point-scoring.
doglatine
1yr ago
For some reason you can get away with having originally East Asian and SE Asian characters played white actors; you couldn't possibly do it with black characters. This is blatant double-standards, and I feel it especially acutely as the father of two half-pinoy kids.
doglatine
1yr ago
For my part, I don't identify as right-wing, but a 'muscular liberal'. I genuinely believe in free speech as a good in its own right. Part of that might be self-interest, since I'm incorrigibly contrarian and enjoy playing around with outrageous ideas, but I would be happy to defend it as being in the broader interests of the polis on broadly the same grounds that Mill laid out in On Liberty. I find myself here temporarily allied with rightists, both enjoying talking with them and selectively agreeing with them on topics as my conscience demands. I suspect a lot of the most ardent defenders of free speech are broadly on the same team.
doglatine
1yr ago
I can feel the emotional appeal of this kind of "men in trouble" narrative, but I don't think it matches empirical reality all that well. Consider one of Fight Club's most famous quotes:
We’re the middle children of history, man. No purpose or place. We have no Great War. No Great Depression. Our Great War’s a spiritual war… our Great Depression is our lives. We’ve all been raised on television to believe that one day we’d all be millionaires, and movie gods, and rock stars. But we won’t. And we’re slowly learning that fact. And we’re very, very pissed off.
Sounds like a real crisis of masculinity. But where's the data? Male suicides per capita have been largely static or declining in almost all Western countries including the US. Reported mental health issues have increased, but this increase is driven more or less exclusively by worsening mental health in women; male mental health as measured by referrals has been relatively stable over the last twenty years - link to some UK data here.
I feel like this pattern is borne out among my friends and acquaintances too. I'm in my 30s, and I know quite a few women who have had serious mental health crises (usually associated with high stress jobs, especially in combination with parenting), whereas my male friends have mostly thrived, and now are happily ensconced in their careers and having kids. Quite a few of them had rocky spells in their 20s, but that's a normal part of growing up, especially for men where risk-taking is more common.
I don't know why so many right-wing Zoomers are obsessed with the evils of porn. I don't think porn is necessarily a great thing, in the same way that watching loads of TV isn't ideal for you, but I've yet to see anyone blow up their life with (legal) porn, whereas I've known people blow up their lives with alcohol, opiates, cocaine, gambling, and reckless driving, none of which are exactly new (though the opiates are getting worse). And when I look at subreddits like /r/loveafterporn, I'm much more inclined to see the person with the mental illness as being the controlling/BPD or psychodrama-seeking wife who is treating her husband's porn use as an existential threat to the relationship, rather than the poor guy who's jacking off to legal teens behind his wife's back.
More broadly, I think some of the male Zoomer doomerism (Zoomerism?) is just a matter of people looking for a romantic narrative around their gender generation. Which is fine, Palahniuk was doing it for GenX in Fight Club. But absent supporting data, I'm inclined to view it as a narrative rather than fact.
doglatine
1yr ago
Just a quick reflection, but something I wanted to run past the community. More and more as I've gotten older, I've found that critics and reviewers of games, movies, books, shows, etc. have been getting less and less useful as guides to what I'll enjoy or find interesting/beautiful/inspiring. There's no single pattern, but to give a couple of examples, in videogames, I often find high-rated AAA titles quite shallow, soulless, and needlessly time-consuming, whereas I have a real soft spot for AA games that may be a bit janky or have dated graphics but but have real creative vision and create an immersive world. In cinema, it's something similar; I find contemporary superhero movies and the recent crop of Star Wars films to be extremely uninteresting, mainly because I find it hard to take their narratives seriously and get immersed by them - they feel more like rides at an amusement park than a serious attempt at worldbuilding and storytelling. Similar patterns apply for me in TV and literature, and these days, I'm wary of entertainment products that score incredibly highly with reviewers, and am more interested by those that have a wide spread of love-or-hate-it reviews and/or a big gap between critic/user scores.
I don't think it was always this way. I've always been a big reader of gaming magazines, for example, even as a kid, and I also tried out a huge number of games by renting them from Blockbusters and similar. There, the review scores were remarkably predictive of my enjoyment. And to this day, I can't think of many cases of truly great games on the Megadrive/Genesis or N64 (my main consoles as a kid) that were panned by critics but adored by a good chunk of fans. And I remember from roughly 2002-2010 thinking that Rotten Tomatoes was basically godlike, pretty much always accurately predicting how impressive I'd find a movie.
I'm interested in what's causing this. Four quick hypotheses.
(1) It's just me. For whatever reason, my tastes have shifted so they're no longer aligned with the dominant standards of taste among reviewers. Maybe this is just because of idiosyncratic ways my tastes have evolved (hypothesis 1a), but a related possibility (hypothesis 1b) is that whereas I used to be more agreeable and subconsciously attempt to align myself with critical opinion, tricking myself into aligning my opinions with theirs, in recent years I've become more contrarian, so that the placebo-pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, and I now make a point of actively trying to dislike popular stuff.
(2) It's not just me, but it's a predicable generational effect. My positive experiences with reviewers started to change when I hit my late 20s and became a dad, thereby shifting marketing demographics significantly. Reviewers' standards of taste are very much aligned with 18-30 single consoomer demographic, but more weakly aligned with people who fall outside this group. If this were true, then I'd be curious to know, e.g., which 90s films resonating with my current demographic but panned by critics I might be able to retrospectively enjoy.
(3) Reviewers have gotten shitter because of corruption or politics. This is one I'm sure we've all been waiting for! It's a common opinion in many places that reviewers of movies, games, shows, etc. have either become very corrupt (1a) and/or have sold out to woke interests (1b) in a way that is not predictive of the experiences of mainstream audiences. If either of these were true, we'd expect a growing gap between critic and user opinion as measured by e.g. rotten tomates, metacritic, or Steam scores. I'd love to see data on this.
(4) Media markets have fragmented along taste lines, so reviewers - through no fault of their own - have a tougher job making recommendations. This is a tempting one for me, not least because it paints an optimistic picture of an era of cultural plenty, and it certainly seems we're awash in more varieties of content than ever before. If this were true, then we'd expect to see a growing standard deviation in review scores for art, games, and entertainment, as reviewers found themselves in a period of cultural continental drift and began drifting away from each other. I'd love to know if this is true.
What do others think? Does my experience resonate? Is it an age effect? What hypotheses am I missing?
doglatine
1yr ago
This really rings true to me. I had a broadly similar taste profile as a teen, enjoying weird and esoteric but critically acclaimed stuff regardless of recency (example: I took my ever proper date to watch Atanarjuat: The Fast Runner, a 2.5 hour film spoken entirely in Inuktitut, just because I heard it had good reviews from critics. I don't even live in Canada). Similarly with music.
doglatine
1yr ago
My parents have had one for approximately 10 years and they absolutely love it, and say that it's saved them thousands of pounds. Three caveats -
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they live in rural UK, so not crazy cold, though since it never gets that hot there they start relying on it fairly early in the year (October-April at least).
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they also have an Aga for heating the kitchen, and two log fireplaces for when it gets really cold.
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they have quite a lot of clear land by UK standards (a large garden plus a small field), which made it easy to install and apparently more efficient.
Also, maybe I'm missing something obvious, but I'm surprised more people don't use plug-in electric heaters. Obviously it's different if you live in Nunavit, but my wife and I are UK-based and only turn on our central heating during the very coldest winter spells, otherwise getting by with a small electric heater in the living room or bedroom. Admittedly it's very mild where we are, but I spent some time living in a very cold part of Japan where central heating was rare, and I really liked having the temperature differential and walking in from the cold bathroom to go tuck myself under the kotatsu.
tend to accept those outlandish victim stories at face value
An untrue sideswipe, especially in light of the example you chose. I am very much a 'Russophobe' in the sense of viscerally disliking the Russian state, and maybe even the Russian nation, but there's a lot more nuance to it than you paint here. For one, I learned my Russophobia years ago mostly from Russian expat grad students, as we'd sit in my college's MCR digesting dinner over a glass of Tokay. They were the one who taught me the names of Berezvosky, Khordokovsy, Lebedev, etc., who informed me that the chavviest Brit is a positive gentleman and intellect compared to the basest of their countrymen, that Putin's administration was Weekend-at-Bernie's for the Soviet Union, a cargo cult nation held together by inertia and oil and gas revenue. No-one is so good at hating Russia and Russians as Russians themselves, so I learned from the best, but the circumstances meant that of course, a special pardon was given to Russian expats, and a lesser but still significant one given to embittered children of the old intelligentsiya class who were still stuck in Russia (every expat starts has to start as a pat, after all). That's carried over to my attitudes in daily life; for example, I've been cautious about fulminating about the war with my son because there are several young Russian kids at his school, and he might not realise that they're almost certainly not aligned with the problem.
Moreover, a lot of my loathing of the modern Russian state comes from its utterly degenerate form (in the true sense of that term, not the Fuentes/4chan misappropriation). I have some actual respect for the USSR, and when I hear Shostakovich's anthem, I get the stirrings of something. That's not to deny the USSR was an expensive and unforgivably bloody experiment in leftist delusions, of course - Stalin in particular was a disaster of a leader and a human being - but throughout much of its history, there was something at least aesthetically impressive there: a grandeur and ambition. Even beyond the aesthetics, it was, at least at certain times and places, a genuine attempt to built a society on fundamentally new lines from those of the West. Of course, it failed, and history can learn from that, but there was still a hint of something honourable and aspirational there, in some respects even akin to the American Revolution. By contrast, modern Russia is a dumb klepto-petro-state feasting on the bones of its predecessors.
In any case, I think events like the one you describe would prompt at least some skepticism on my part, largely because it pattern-matches to other hoaxes, and partly because it seems unlikely in its own terms. Russians are rare in Europe, and comparatively many of them are wealthy or at least well connected. Far more likely to be ethnic Russian from the Balts than actual Russians (no visa required) or generic anti-Ukraine skinheads from Hungary or Poland or Serbia or even France. The actual explanation would probably have occurred to me too, though perhaps far down the list. I don't always apply such high standards of discretion to news when it comes in from Ukraine - I do a fair amount of willful optimism about the battlefield situation. But in operational matters at least, my predictions seem fairly well calibrated thus far, even accounting for my optimism bias, and I have no ability to materially influence things, so I'm happy to stick with my Pollyannaish prognostications of the military situation.
As for Armenia and Azerbaijan - of course, my sympathies are entirely with Armenia. It's barely a third the size of Azerbaijan with fewer allies and no petro revenues. It's an ancient bastion of Christianity in a part of the world that's been hostile to it for the last thousand years. They've already endured one genocide. But there's very little the West can do here - Armenia is landlocked, has no land corridors to the EU, is a CSTO member, and the EU is in no position to start using energy sanctions on Azerbaijan (the US has more freedom to act, and I'm still holding out hope for Pelosi's visit). I have quite strong feelings about the conflict nonetheless, and if anything, Russia's abject failure to protect its own client state from a genuine case of unwarranted aggression and ethnic cleansing further diminishes my opinion. If there was ever a time Russia could deliver on its promise of upholding Christianity in Asia or of constituting an alternate source of global order, this is it: a small long-suffering Christian nation on Russia's doorstep is under attack from a larger richer Turkic Muslim aggressor, and they have every legal right to intervene, and could do so easily. At the current time, of course, they have the excuse (!) that any potential intervention might provide a distraction from their very important and sincere commitment to several more months of sustained militarised slaughter of Slavs up and down the Dnieper. But what of the 2020 war, when they could have quickly bitchslapped Azerbaijan into accepting the status quo, and proven themselves Armenia's saviour? But no, Putin was greedy and stupid and had no real ideological commitment to helping Armenia, so waited until most of Artsakh had been reconquered by Azerbaijan, then belatedly tried to insert himself as a 'diplomat' (except it turns out, people need to take you seriously for that to work, as we're seeing now). Yet more evidence that Russian civilisation would be a good idea.
doglatine
1yr ago
Why do you have so much hatred for the Russian state...
This comes rather close to Bulverism, especially given your final question; it reminds me a lot of lines like "Why do care so much about other people's genitals?" that are frequently used to disarm dissenting views in debates around trans issues, implying that someone has scurrilous or questionable motives for their investment in an issue. I will say, though, that I identify strongly as a European, and Russia soldiers squatted on half the old capitals of Europe for a half-century, oppressing, impoverishing, and killing. After throwing off the Soviet yoke and joining the Western bloc, these nations became richer, stronger, and more politically inclusive. Russia, by contrast, has made little to no investment in itself since the fall of the Soviet Union; its economic growth has been almost entirely led by the petrochemical sector, and it has let its excellent scientific and technological gains rot while its physicists went off to work on Wall Street. I would say moreover that it is morally worse to pretend to hold elections and fake the results than to deny them all together; assuming the net result is the same, the former simply adds deceit to coercion.
In any case, that's a sample of my reasons for caring about this conflict. As for Yemen, I know and care very little about the country aside from the fact that it has been fighting civil wars since before I was born, it is extremely poor, and has a crazy high TFR (also that khat use is endemic among men). Whether or not Saudi Arabia wages its war (which in turn involves a complex mix of sectarian and political motives), Yemen is likely to remain an impoverished and dysfunctional place, much like every other Muslim country in the Middle East that doesn't have oil.
But perhaps all of this is indulging your question a bit too much. Rather than turn this into a therapy session, it is clearest and simplest for me to say that as a citizen of the West who identifies with the aims and values of the liberal international order, I see it very clearly as being in our interests to make this war as painful as possible for Russia: we rebut the clearest threat to the LIO this century, we disincentivise China from attacking Taiwan, we weaken a long-term strategic adversary and non-status quo power, we weaken Russia's ability to control its authoritarian and extractive vassal states, we humiliate Russian military might and weaken their ability to compete with the West on arms contract, we reinvigorate the Western alliance and increase NATO's total budget, etc., etc.. By contrast, we should stay as far removed from the war in Yemen as we can without causing permanent damage to our ties to Saudi Arabia, on whom we'll be moderately dependent for another decade or so. After that, I'd be happy to let that particular alliance wither on the vine.
doglatine
1yr ago
This is all fair, and I'm aware of the complex situation underlying the conflict including the first war in the 90s, and was gliding over complex nuances. Interestingly, back in the early 1920s, Artsakh was going to be been awarded to the Armenia SSR based on predominant ethnic makeup, but Stalin personally intervened to prevent it.
And you're right about Turkey. Armenia has been very unlucky with its neighbours.
doglatine
1yr ago
I remember that interaction! It's always nice to see a familiar face outside of context, and I had been meaning to reply to you (let no sin of omission go unpunished). To be clear, what you were taking umbrage at was a procedural point - I was upbraiding Glideer on his dropping a quote without context, rather than presupposing that the context was misleading or that no such context could be provided. He (and you) provided that context, and I think it definitely diminishes the moral weight of the passage that another redditor had earlier quoted from. As you probably know, Glideer is the resident Russo-apologist of CredibleDefense, and I like to think I give him a fair shout - I actively upvote him as long as he's saying something informative or sensible, contrary to most of the lurkers on the sub. And I remember the Odessa arson quite well - it was a good example of those awful acts that get swept away by the awfulness of other acts at the time. I certainly didn't intend to be an apologist for thoroughgoing Russophobia.
That said... I'm not too disinclined to own the label of Russophobe. I should tell you about my ten days in St Petersburg, and this seems as good a time as any. In short, to get over a girl (and get over some new ones), back in 2008 I decided to fly to Estonia and get the bus from Tallinn to St P. I had a wonderful 10 days in the city, but it was also an extreme experience. On the one hand, the abundance of architecture and beauty was breathtaking - the Spas na Kravi alone is a marvel. But the Hermitage was my favourite: a wonder, full of wonders (many of them plundered, admittedly). But in my time there I was also (lightly) assaulted a couple of times on the street; apparently the English fop look is an invitation to being shoved, punched in the back, and otherwise disrespected. Many clubs I tried to get into thought I was from the Caucasus, amusingly enough, and I had to feign being Italian to get in (apparently I'm too olive-skinned for the English story to be believable). I had my bag ripped off while I was in the subway (another marvel, although perhaps at that point I would have benefitted from doing less marveling). And best of all, I got arrested! I'd met a friend of one of my Russian expat pals at a punk bar, and one thing had led to another and I was drunkenly heading home with her for a night of cross-cultural communication. We were stopped by police, who found my identity documents insufficient (I had a photocopy of my passport, as per Lonely Planet advice, but this was insufficient). The situation probably wasn't helped by the fact that my new friend was outspoken, and from what I latterly gleaned, had told the police they were acting shamefully. Anyway, I was taken into the station, my possessions were taken from me, and I was put in a cell. My possessions were returned to me a few hours later and I was released, though not without all my English and US currency being swiped from my wallet (with enough of the night remaining for some cross-cultural activities, thankfully).
In any case, it left a significant imprint on me, and when I crossed back over the Estonian border back into Tallinn, I breathed a huge sigh of relief. But it was the little things that most annoyed me. The fact that everyone in St Petersburg seemed to dress the same way - furs for women, leather jackets for men - and the way that nobody smiled. By contrast, Tallinn was a riot of colour and gaiety. The obsession with the latest gadgets and brands, with very little intellectual substance, despite the incredible weight of history on every street corner. The urban decrepitude alongside gaudy conspicuous consumption. All of this was in stark contrast to my experience in Tallinn, and made me incredibly grateful that the rest of Europe was now being spared the turpitude of contemporary mainstream Russian culture.
All that being said, I think the Russian intelligentsiya are some of the best (and smartest) people I've ever met. As much as you might despise the people I mentioned, I should stress that these were children of relatively modest privilege. My closest Russian friend is the child of a physics professor and a geologist, who managed to snag a British guy and get into an Oxbridge PhD on the back of her monstrously high IQ, rather than connections or money. I have zero patience for the corrupt gangsters of Russia's true monetary elite, but my impression is that - for a time - the USSR genuinely cherished and rewarded at least some scientific minds, and my expats contacts are drawn almost entirely from their sons and daughters.
A quick post for the new subreddit. Are we headed for a new era of polygyny? Looking at contemporary metropolitan dating markets, both anecdote and data arguably suggests that what I’d call casual open polygyny is becoming a lot more common. By this I mean sexual dynamics in which men and women enjoy casual open sexual relationships, but where the male parties in such relationships have more simultaneous female partners than the female parties have male partners. I think the data supports this kind of polygyny specifically rather than general polyamory as the dominant new model, insofar as it seems that a large subset of young men have few or zero sexual partners and a small subset of men have large numbers of sexual partners, with the SD in number of sexual partners being much higher for men than women. (But of course there are plenty of women who have multiple partners too.)
If I had to guess, I’d say this trend is being facilitated by things like hookup apps, societal atomisation, better contraception, and the decline of religion. But we also perhaps shouldn’t be too surprised — monogamy and polygyny are the two most common stable mating norms both cross culturally and historically (polyandry is exceptionally rare; general polygamy fairly rare).
Still, this trend obviously creates a problem in the longer run, because our society is still largely built around social monogamy: Men and women who form long term partnerships overwhelmingly do so on a one-to-one basis. As sexually actively young people transition from polygyny to monogamy in their late 20s, this leaves a lot of jilted women and bitter romantically inexperienced men, hardly a recipe for a happy long term marriage.
In the long run there will probably be some kind of correction, possibly via polygynous marriages becoming more commonplace.
There will also need to be a correction in terms of norms and expectations. Looking to the future, a significant proportion of young men may simply fail to find a romantic life partner unless they can distinguish themselves in some way. This is already how it works in many stable polygynous societies, but a lot of the resentment of Incels comes about because we’re at a liminal period, where monogamous norms dominate public discourse but de facto open casual polygyny is an increasingly common in the sex lives of young people.
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