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ZorbaTHut  1yr ago (text post)   44937 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of September 5, 2022

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As I'm sure many of you are already aware, it's been another insane 48 hours in Ukraine. The "side offensive" in the northeast that accompanied the "main offensive" in Kherson has made astonishing progress, with Ukrainian forces pushing all the way to the Oskil River, with Kupyansk under attack and Izyum and Lyman both threatened. None of this will mean much to most us, I realise, so here's a quick (already outdated) map of the progress.

It's important not to get carried away here; while this is the closest we've come to a true war of movement since April, and there are reports of desertions and surrenders by Russian forces, we're dealing with one front in a war with at least three more (roughly, in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk sectors). This will probably not trigger a general collapse of Russian forces. Moreover, it is still possible that Ukrainian forces will find themselves overextended and vulnerable to counterattacks. However, as matters stand, this looks like a decisive operational-level victory for Ukraine.

My main uncertainty in what follows is what Russia's response to this apparent defeat will be, given that the underlying tides seem to favour Ukraine. Mass mobilisation may have helped a few months back, but - in addition to its political difficulties - it's unclear whether this late into the war it will be sufficient to turn the tide. Obviously there's always the option of nuclear escalation, but this would be a colossal gamble for Russia, potentially leaving them diplomatically isolated while providing limited relief on the battlefield. Another possibility would be for Russia explicitly to use the Zaporizhzhia plant as a hostage, but again it's unclear how that would translate into gains on the battlefield. And all the while, Russia's gas blackmail strategy seems to be floundering; not only have European reserves filled at faster than expected rates, European gas futures continued to fall, suggesting optimism about long-term supply issues.

Clearly, the best solution for Russia is the removal of Putin. His successor might still be able to cut a deal with the West that allows them de facto control of Crimea (for example, via a Hong Kong-style lease agreement, accompanied by a clever financial 'reparations package' that involves minimal pain on all sides). That will not begin to ameliorate the damage this idiotic war has caused to Russia and Ukraine, but at this point it is the least bad option. The only question now is how Russia can best ensure a relatively fast recovery from the self-inflicted harm it has created.

Sending some troops under WBW flags into the Belgorod oblast would be a true power move for Ukraine right now. Right now the biggest obstacles for them are:

  • not outrunning their own supply lines, Russian style, and maintaining the momentum

  • the old LNR/DNR borders, which have eight years worth of fortifications on both sides

  • (I doubt they can invade Crimea overland, the isthmus is just too narrow for that)

If they overcome both, they end up in a stalemate of sorts: Russia can keep shelling Ukrainian lines and launching missiles at Ukrainian cities, Ukraine can keep HIMARSing Russian military HQs and ammo dumps, while both countries' economies continue to degrade: Russia's because it's sanctioned, Ukraine's because no one is going to invest into a country at war.

Striking now, before the frontline stabilizes at the border, and using technically Russian troops for that, will keep the frontline stretched and will give Ukraine something to negotiate away at the peace talks.

Context: Since we don't have old reddit Doglatine claimed six months ago that the Ukraine invasion would cure all western problems and end the culture war and also bring about world peace. So that is why he is desperate for any good news out of Ukraine

Without needing to dig up old posts, I am 99.9% certain this is an inaccurate, bullshit misrepresentation of anything @doglatine claimed.

TBH I thought this forum was a good idea at first, it felt good to get away from Reddit. I'm pretty sure it's a failure though, it has none of the dynamism that reddit had. It's a circle jerk of the most very online mottezins self fellating. Have fun with your toys guys. I'm out.

And nothing of value was lost.

Since we're going light in these early days, I'm just giving you a three-day ban, but if you intend use the timeout to come back and be this much of an ass again, just stay away.

TBH I thought this forum was a good idea at first, it felt good to get away from Reddit. I'm pretty sure it's a failure though, it has none of the dynamism that reddit had. It's a circle jerk of the most very online mottezins self fellating

it seems to be the exact same people doing the same discussions as before, idk what he's talking about here

Dude you can just link to the comment, no need for the outrageous paraphrasing. You weren't a bad poster on the subreddit. It's weird to see users coming over here and self-destructing because the url is different.

They deleted their post before I could see who it was. Who was this poster?

You can see the name of the poster being replied to the right of the user name, and it appears to last even beyond deletion.

Remzem apparently, not sure what he's famous for, but here he admonishes me, for instance.

So far, I've found it almost exactly the same as the Subreddit version. What's this "dynamism" you're talking about this site lacking?

You're not helping either. Communities are a communal effort.

But you do have a point, and I hope smarter mottizens than me have considered it: Where will new users come from in the future?

What is the appropriate age to bring your children to The Motte?

16, I think.

The topics are complex enough that I think it'd be difficult to participate productively until after university. However, one can develop skill in argumentation, and that's valuable as a late teen. The latter wins out against the former to me, so 16.

I assume Russia cuts a deal with the west. Call me racists but I think they would prefer to be a NATO colony than a Chinese colony.

Also offer Russia a way out. Europe doesn’t want to freeze. We don’t want Russia aligned with China. Offer peace. Maybe with a Putin in exile string and we can all just call this a disagreement amongst friends.

Offer Putin a mansion on Star Island and his yachts parked nearby.

Not likely. In the Russian memespace, Russia extended a hand of cooperation and the West shat in it because they think of Russians as a lower sort of people. In contrast, China might think of Russians the same but won't let that get in the way of business.

I assume Russia cuts a deal with the west.

No way. Not yet at least. Not while Putin's still in control.

I find further mobilization much more likely, either through more aggressive "shadow mobilization" as they've already done (if that can even be extended further), or limited conscription of the Russian population at large.

Russia tried to join NATO. They were rebuked. That's when it was cemented that Russia would never be welcomed into the west, and their policy shifted towards self-sufficiency. And that's why sanctions haven't destroyed Russia.

It's amazing how the west has become solely reactive, and worse, they spend all their time telegraphing their next move. They spend weeks talking about sanctions to hit Russia with, giving Russia weeks to plan for them. And when those sanctions hit, it turns out our leaders never thought about how it would affect us. Absolutely amazing.

And our leaders have basically pretended that Russia can't hurt us. Make us pay in rubles or they'll cut us off? Surely Russia wouldn't shoot themselves in the foot like that. Oh, they did, and they are actually making more money now. Well they'd never cut off the Nord Stream. Oh they did that to? And they are making record profits again? Hmm..

Now we're seeing our leaders try and force a price cap on Russia. I think I know exactly how this works out. China and India get cheap gas, Russia cuts off the EU completely, gas prices skyrocket, and Russia somehow makes even more money.

Russia somehow makes even more money.

With "China and India get cheap gas" and inability to use Europe-focused pipelines, how it would happen?

Where is Shakesneer to tell us how this is good for Russia?

  • -11

Don't do snide call-outs like this.

Will Schryver, which has been praised as ‘consistently more accurate than western observers’ by some people here (Shakesneer) , said 12 hours ago “neither Kupyansk nor Izyum are threatened; AFU casualties are catastrophic. ”Well, ukrainian troops are in the center of Kupyansk, and if a bunch of russian sources are to be believed, Izyum and Lyman are being evacuated.

https://nitter.kavin.rocks/imetatronink/status/1568370298373967872#m

https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1568519813332406274

https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1568531278256799750

What twitter people are you all following? Any side welcome, I haven't been paying serious attention.

I guess @KofmanMichael (tends to hedge excessively) and @powerfultakes (rationalist-adjacent) have the least egg on their faces of their respective teams.

I'm convinced that there's a fair few people trusting (pro-)Russian sources that... well, probably have ideological reasons to do so, but also confuse the cynical and terse tone such sources often take as evidence of hidden wisdom and acumen, in comparison to the more enthusiastic and "Reddit" tone by Western pro-Ukrainian sources, even though both are just often shooting in the dark based on wishful thinking and bias.

Just saw a Substack post saying much the same.

In the coming months and years, we will likely see the one turn into the other: Red becoming Browns, Browns turning Red, Christian becoming atheists, atheists becoming Christian, “new systems” declaring the essential compatibility of Orthodoxy and communism, of international socialism and national chauvinism, politics shrugged off and then adopted as any other affectation, like health fads or sudden tastes for the exotic Orient, but having the added benefit of granting the appearance of serious conviction and purpose. Here we get an insight into the unifying principle of all these supposedly disparate tendencies: a type of base, moronic cynicism. More than anything else, it is this moronic cynicism that takes itself to be devilish cleverness that is the governing ideology of the Russian state and society, and it attracts all its global admirers.

The cynical pose, which flatters itself on being always undeceived, is in practice highly gullible and distinguishable from naivety only in the sour churlishness of its affect. These attitudes should be expected in the nether regions of the press and intelligentsia, where people make their livings writing semi-pornographic conspiracy literature and closely identify with the mob. But these stances have infected the broader intellectual climate as well. The whole pamphlet literature of the demi-monde provides a new language that sounds provocative and fresh compared to the stale banalities of bien-pensant humanitarian liberalism. It is tempting material for those who treat both life and politics as an irresponsible flight from one pose to another.

Ganz is an obnoxious guy. Zero charity, zero intellectual honesty, pure attack dog trained to never back down, and an instinctive, zoological elitist to boot (but cowardly when it comes to offending even the least of his fellow travelers: «uh I won't discuss Strauss, let's focus on Schmitt»... «eh, Dugina was probably killed by Putin, whatevs»). He tries to present his «bien-pensant humanitarian liberalism» or, rather, uncritical hegemonic cheerleading with an attempt to smuggle in some less discredited Marxist ideas through the cracks as mature wisdom born out of true morality; all dissenters are mercilessly deconstructed as poseurs and in the end, just fascists (he really, really likes the word). It's the first trick in any aspiring leftie essayist's book, he's just a bit more well-read in unorthodox (for them) lit than most.

That said: he's largely right about Russia Stans who consume shadows and figments of internal Russian propaganda. I've gotten in many arguments with them, and probably lost like 40% of my fake internet points inflow on themotte for disavowing the war that's ruining my country (or so it feels). They're ridiculous. But it's still easy to see where they're coming from.

This vicarious proxy war has highlighted just how much some people, just like in the 20th century but for other reasons, feel alienated by the Western liberal order in the West itself, unrepresented by its insitutions, and bitter about its poisonous nuances that exploited their good faith (like «anti-racism»...) Classical liberals of yesteryear; many reactionary outcasts like ethnic nationalists disaffected with erosion of their polities and happy indifference of the ruling class with regards to disintegrating families and collapsing birth rates; religious folks who take their faith to be something more than voluntary psychotherapy; and people like me, who want there to be an escape hatch. So there's a demand for some alternative – one backed with teeth and self-interest of players who have a more reliable stake than ideological commitment. Thus, China and Russia and Iran and Third Worldism, geopolitics and realpolitik, and cheerful shallow cynicism of being Against The Current Thing, chugging imported Eurasian sneer by the barrel like so much sour crude oil.

But of course this is the same reason for his own comrades to naysay Capitalism for centuries, and for him to casually fling shit at Elon Musk's endeavors. Like a much smarter socialist Cosma Shalizi has said:

That planning is not a viable alternative to capitalism (as opposed to a tool within it) should disturb even capitalism’s most ardent partisans. It means that their system faces no competition, nor even any plausible threat of competition. Those partisans themselves should be able to say what will happen then: the masters of the system, will be tempted, and more than tempted, to claim more and more of what it produces as monopoly rents. This does not end happily.

As in economy, so in ideology, so in everything: in the absence of challenge, monopolists optimize for their own convenience and rent extraction, and signs of decay are swept under the rug – until your science becomes a cargo cult, your enlightened humanism amounts to a fight for spoils and your dissenters begin rooting for foreign imperialistic empires because they want more democracy and can't get it at home.

Can a dog comprehend this terror of staring at hegemony in the general case, as a bad end? Or just whine when he's getting kicked by an unpleasant master, and cuddle to one who smells nice?

Ironically I can't see what he has written on literal Gramscian hegemony because he's hidden it behind a paywall. But it's probably nothing surprising.

I would like to know more.

Do you have a link to that substack?

Isn't the link showing? It's in the post.

I think this is definitely one of those moments when the tide is going out quickly, and we're getting to see who's been skinnydipping.

There was a breakthrough in Balakliya, although Russian contigents continue fighting within the city.

https://youtube.com/watch?v=n7AlWYKc4Qs

To my understanding this represents an escalation of the war, wherein NATO forces commanded by Nato leadership are directly involved in a major offensive for the first time.

Will be interesting to see how Russia responds.

I do think we are in danger of overestimating the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Yes they have had initial success, but so did the Germans at the Bastogne. I think by the end of the week it will be more clear.

EDIT:

It appears Russian forces withdrew from Kupyansk late last night.

  • -19

wherein NATO forces commanded by Nato leadership are directly involved in a major offensive for the first time

There's 0 evidence of this, for the record.

I do think we are in danger of overestimating the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Yes they have had initial success, but so did the Germans at the Bastogne. I think by the end of the week it will be more clear.

Bastogne was a disaster for the Germans because not only did their offensive fail, but the western allies had mobile armies able to exploit the defeat to advance. The Ukrainian offensive in the north has succeeded as well as it has precisely because the Russians lacked reserves to contest with a counter-offensive, while in the South the issue is that the Russian ability to advance across the river was limited by bridges in Ukrainian artillery range. If the Ukrainians over-extend in the north, they stop advancing and keep considerable gains. If the Ukrainians overextend to the south, they... still have the bridgeheads in artillery range.

What, exactly, do you think the worst case of over-extension is supposed to be?

A loss in manpower, equipment, and morale.

Yes? And? What else? That's not exactly a worst-case scenario you're describing.

Manpower and equipment are already being lost even in a successful advance- either the categorical loss of something is bad enough to matter, or you need relevant context of what sort of losses are unacceptable. You could make an argument about moral, but you're not comparing it to anything else. Is this supposed to be lower than if there were no over-extended offensive in the first place? What difference is this supposed to make that warrants a comparison to the Germans at Bastogne?

If morale is the only categorical negative , we can just point at Ukrainian propaganda, say it raises morale, and call it net even.

To my understanding this represents an escalation of the war, wherein NATO forces commanded by Nato leadership are directly involved in a major offensive for the first time.

Which NATO forces? What country of origin, which unit?

Among soldiers in the offensive there certainly are some who served in NATO militaries before, but this does not make the offensive force NATO. It’s makes as much sense as saying that it’s the Soviets who invaded Ukraine, because some soldiers in Russian force served in Soviet Union.

I don't think the "NATO forces" (that is, Western ex-military volunteers) are particularly relevant, although people on multiple sides have a weird incentive to claim that they are (for instance, the veterans themselves to talk up the significance of their "experience" and therefore personal value). In fact, I'm unconvinced that for line soldiers many things matter as much as motivation/attitude and basic discipline/impulse control, which are aspects in which I don't see why Ukrainian soldiers now should be inferior to anyone.

On the other hand, Ukraine's equipment is increasingly NATO-provided especially at the low level (I keep hearing that Ukrainian units have a fillhorn of encrypted comms and Starlink terminals while the Russians are often stuck with CB radios donated by some Telegram bloggers if they have anything at all), and I'd wager that their command-and-control stack is advised and supplied with intel by the US at every level. Given the outcome, it seems to be pretty clear to me that the conclusion should be that these things just matter more, as long as neither side outright runs out of motivated soldiers, just as I would expect a professional RTS player with an early midgame starting position to trounce a noob who doesn't know how to scroll the map viewassign unit groups even if the latter starts with a popcap-sized endgame army.

(edit: Update: The speed at which that entire stretch of the Russian front is collapsing is astonishing. Between this and "unconfirmed" (of the type that seems to wind up confirmed a day or two later all the time lately) reports of breaches even all over the Donbass, I now get the sense that this is really the beginning of a potentially very rapid end for Russia. Hope that nobody overplays their hand past the nuclear threshold.)

No. What I said makes more sense. Nato has been funding this war from the beginning. The CIA worked with Nato to establish Ukraine's independence in the first place.

But there are British and American boots on the ground, likely using mercenaries as a thin veneer of plausible deniability.

  • -27

Let me know if this is better suited for the suggestions thread, but as it stands Skylab's comment is at 20 downvotes. Is Skylab not contributing to the conversation? Not enough evidence of claims? Is TheMotte.org userbase already eagerly using downvoting as a disagree button?

Not that this necessarily applies here, but I always thought of a solution where mods could booby-trap unpopular but constructive comments - high-signal rule-conforming comments, and automatically warn or even temporarily remove voting privileges from users who downvote the tripwired comment to 'train' them. I probably would've already tripped this trap a couple times by now, fwiw. This might lead to accusations of mod-favoritism.

I'm a downvoter in this case; not sure if my motivations are generalizable but here we go.

Why downvote this particular comment?

  • It contains a fairly outrageous claim with no evidence, not even bad evidence, presented.

Why downvote any comments?

  • Comments like this reduce the value of the thread for me; stopping to consider whether it made any sense broke the flow and ultimately I discarded the claims without learning anything. A downvote is a cheap way of giving feedback (to a well intentioned writer at least) that they should consider trying a bit harder.

  • Readers are going to have varying levels of knowledge on a given topic, and varying levels of patience for reading (and evaluating) rebuttals. A big negative score will at least signal that a claim is controversial.

I would bolt from this place if any traps were set. That's a level of official hostility that I don't want to contend with.

Downvotes don't matter in the slightest here. They don't even reduce visibility. Caring too much about score is more of a problem than people just arbitrarily downvoting stuff and not following "reddiquette" (which has been a joke since the very start).

It's ridiculous to expect users not to use it as a disagree button, and downvotes come from the ether anyway. It's bad form to complain about them in any circumstance.

That said, I've never seen any opinion, no matter how absurd, receive downvotes that was even-keeled, explained coherently, and delivered with some sort of assurance that rebuttals would be taken in good faith. And anything with 2+ good links will be net positive as well.

Yes, that’s what I said: there are former NATO soldiers in the offensive. No, this does not make them NATO forces. Similarly, NATO has been funding Ukraine, sure, but it does not make NATO forces Ukrainian forces, any more than “moderate” Syrian rebels were actually US forces.

Let me be quite clear what I would accept as “NATO forces” participating in offensive: a unit of active duty soldiers from the same NATO army, which was put together by said NATO army and sent to join AFU. Volunteer veterans slapdashed together into a unit upon arrival by the AFU military leadership does not count as NATO force.

This is important distinction, and I hope you are not purposefully trying to confuse people.

Let me be quite clear what I would accept as “NATO forces” participating in offensive: a unit of active duty soldiers from the same NATO army, which was put together by said NATO army and sent to join AFU. Volunteer veterans slapdashed together into a unit upon arrival by the AFU military leadership does not count as NATO force.

There is a plausible middle ground on this definition: something like the Flying Tigers, who were recruited from US forces to fly against Japan for the Republic of China Air Force as effectively (well-paid) mercenaries under the command of retired Army officer Claire Chennault. I have never found any evidence they were acknowledged to exist prior to the US entry into WWII (although their first combat missions only occurred some days later), but they were discharged and their travel papers declared them as mechanics or instructors. After US entry into the war, they were absorbed into the USAAF under the same commander. It would be difficult for me to describe them as anything other than "American forces, if covert."

Of course, I've seen no evidence that such an arrangement is happening today, and it seems that like the Soviet "instructors" and "test pilots" in Korea and Vietnam, it would probably be difficult to hide today.

The more probably middle ground is somebody like Blackwater expanding to a force over thousands and deploying. It's accepted to train troops, it's accepted to offer material aid, and it's legal but frowned upon for third nation citizens to join the army, but when you combine all three at once I think we'd see difficulty not seeing that as escalating.

That will not begin to ameliorate the damage this idiotic war has caused to Russia and Ukraine, but at this point it is the least bad option. The only question now is how Russia can best ensure a relatively fast recovery from the self-inflicted harm it has created.

That more or less explains why it can't happen. If the goal of the West is to weaken or destroy Russia, then it benefits them to drag the war out as long as possible.

The West's economic measures appear to be harming mostly themselves so far. Unless they expect Russia's economy to be propped up artificially and crumble aaaaaaany day now, I can see how their best decision would be to finish it while they're ahead.

The West's only real strategic goals in Ukraine are to avoid looking impotent and to avoid committing enough forces that the PRC could take advantage to blitz Taiwan. Beyond that there's mostly just the ideological goal of self-determination.

There's definitely an element of zero-sum competition in regards to China, but not so much with Russia.

I don't follow the war news; they seem to unfold roughly as I've foreseen on 24th, and specific timing and extent of events is not that significant. Russia has an inept army and dysfunctional leadership; it was not in any position to pick this fight against the hegemonic power via attacking Ukraine. Mobilization might change the tide for a while (and I expected it to happen in early March, which it did not, presumably for the same reasons of ineptitude and dysfunctionality), but supplying Ukrainian capacity for resistance and eventual counterattacks is trivial for NATO, so it wouldn't amount to much, and there's an effectively unlimited supply of Ukrainian men, starting in 2023 women too... For me, what matters more these days is stuff like visa processing guidelines.

Clearly, the best solution for Russia is the removal of Putin

For the longest time, many in Russian intelligentsia spoke of the «collective Putin», assuming that this forgettable guy («Who is Mr. Putin?» – remember that, ages ago?) is merely a front, a consensus-approved talking head for interlocked elite interests. Oligarchs, siloviki, mafias, even the (downplayed) «little old me» – liberal NGOs and the like – and the see-through product of TV magic running around puffing his cheeks pandering to the plebs, asserting that everything's going according to plan.

Well there are no longer independent oligarchs, nor NGOs, and it's not clear that the dude isn't just running the whole show as an old style autocrat. But it may not matter: there is nobody to remove him anywhere close to him, so the entire upper echelon of Russian leadership could as well be a distributed Putin. They are all neck-deep in this, and apparently the top enforcers are either true believers, perhaps more driven than Vladimir himself, or fear the consequences of defection more than the outcome of the war. It doesn't help that they, bound by blood as they are, really have no reason to expect lenience from the victors. We don't know how deep in the echo chamber they remain after all the news, but they have the capacity to maintain the echo chamber for a big enough share of Russian population (including, crucially, Interior Troops) to not worry about their own necks before the disintegration of Russia.

As for how the war will go – I'm pretty sure neither Ukrainans nor their backers are intent on returning to the uneasy post-2014 status quo. So after the success of repealing these Special Operation forces, we will see the escalating siege of Crimea, supplies of even more capable tech, and continued nuclear bluff, and Russian refusal to recognize the outcome of the war upon exhaustion of offensive and even defensive capabilities. The best case scenario for everyone at this point is self-Jucheanization of Russia, which will win maybe 6-10 years for the regime, until its resource base is expended and it collapses with relatively little noise (which is to say, some nuclear accidents, minor wars and something like 5M dead from infrastructure collapses). However, if things go well for them, Ukrainians and co. can opt to force the issue and strike deep into Russian territory, on grounds of demilitarizing the unrepentant and consistent threat to European security; it's also probable that Galeev types will succeed to solicit funds and political momentum in the DC for the Operation Liberation of Oppressed Peoples. At least that's their plan.

But that's more far-fetched for now.

However, if things go well for them, Ukrainians and co. can opt to force the issue and strike deep into Russian territory, on grounds of demilitarizing the unrepentant and consistent threat to European security;

Do you think that even failing to respond with nukes to an undeniable invasion is not beyond the leadership?

I think there's very little will to use the nuclear option, and a great capacity for coping (in fact, in autocracies cope/cop capacity matters more than state capacity). If Ukrainians and their Western partners allow for a tolerable framing for this – e.g. «isolated terrorist incidents perpetrated by unknown Banderovtsi elements, leading to local insubordination and emergence of self-proclaimed unrecognized republics» instead of, like you say, an undeniable invasion – we may not even see the appropriate conventional response. Sans nukes, this is not so different from what happened in 2014 to the other side.

Of course this all depends on the continued degradation of Kremlins. Cutting your losses, evacuating loyalists from occupied territories, hunkering down and making a demonstrative nuclear show (say, in Russian Arctic) as a warning would be very reasonable of the regime. But they're not being reasonable.

Strelkov is clowning around:

On the account of the brilliant operation (clearly according to plan and even ahead of schedule) of transfering of the towns of Izyum, Balakleya and Kupyansk to our respected Ukrainian partners, the territory controlled by the military and civil administration of the Kharkov oblast of Ukraine has significantly decreased. Within the framework of strengthening MCA and fruitful utilization of the freed personnel of state authorities, FSB and police, I suggest transferring a part (not less than three border districts) of Belgorod oblast to Kharkov oblast of Ukraine. Our partners there now can fire almost as freely as on the other side of the border, and there is no fundamental difference for the inhabitants... but then we will be able to say with good reason that there are no hostilities on the territory of the Russian Federation. Please consider my proposal as a patriotic initiative and my sincere contribution to the intra-Ukrainian reconcilement.

I cannot tell if that quote is trolling/pessimistic sarcasm or if it is genuine cope.

The former. When being serious, Strelkov pleads for general mobilization and total war.

The former

Mass mobilisation may have helped a few months back, but - in addition to its political difficulties - it's unclear whether this late into the war it will be sufficient to turn the tide

It still would, if Russia would do it. Everything points to this war becoming a grinding battle of attrition, so a few weeks or months of time horizon isn't super long. It's my opinion that Russia deciding to mobilize would be a game-changer; not enough to win instantly by any means, but more than enough to tip the strategic initiative back towards Russia in the medium term. Hopefully Russia just refuses to do that and sticks to its inadequate "shadow mobilization" that they've been using so far, but the Kharkov offensive has been really good evidence of why Russia should mobilize more broadly.

It all depends on whether Russia has the logistics pipeline in place to train, arm, and deploy hundreds of thousands of new soldiers. It's entirely possible it doesn't, which would explain why Putin has been reluctant to take this option. As for economic mobilisation, it's critical to realise that the Russian government - despite its autocratic guise - has very limited state capacity. It's a long way from e.g. the US or Japan in 1941, where large-scale changes in industrial production could be accomplished quickly and efficiently via governmental fiat.

Of course, there are also the political factors. Quite apart from the direct political unpalatability of mobilisation, there's the risk that doing it now - so late in the day, and in response to military setbacks - signals weakness, which could cause any potential siloviki hyenas to pounce.

It all depends on whether Russia has the logistics pipeline in place to train, arm, and deploy hundreds of thousands of new soldiers.

Soldiers are not the biggest problem, armor, weaponry and comms are. Training 10 or 20 new divisions armed with AKs is totally possible, producing enough tanks, IFVs, SPA, ATGMs, radios, counterbattery radars, UAVs is. Even the relatively slow trickle of arms Ukraine's getting is hard to match when your arms industry is 25% sinecure, 25% grift and 25% vanity projects.

Russian logistics were strained when they tried to rush Kiev at the beginning of the war, and they're presumably strained west of the Dnieper due to bridges having holes in them, but other than that the Russian logistics system seems to hold up reasonably well. It did well enough to transport thousands of artillery shells per day to pound the Ukrainians before HIMARS showed up and blunted their effectiveness. Furthermore, most of the analysis I've seen has said that Russia still has an equipment advantage while Ukraine has a manpower advantage. Russia needs bodies to plug holes like what happened at Kharkov, and to fill out their mechanized divisions (which was how it was supposed to work in the first place).

The fact that the Russians had to transport thousands of artillery shells a day for rolling artillery bombardment offenses is kind of the point of why a mobilization wouldn't really help much: the precondition for the already poor effectiveness in the Donbas was the artillery saturation in a salient where the Ukrainians couldn't risk their high-value artillery or air defense assets due to the nature of the salient, not local numbers of forces, which already favored the Russians. A general mobilization wouldn't have helped the Donbas offensive, even as forces unsupported by artillery/airpower wouldn't have been able to continue offenses elsewhere. Being unable to support too many invasion corridors is the entire reason the Russians withdrew from the Kiev axis, rather than dig in and play attrition there.

While having having more forces along the line might have allowed a stronger static defense against, say, the Kharkiv offensive, which appears to have been more opportunistic, the Russian mobilization of bodies wouldn't correspond with a mobilization of more artillery systems, as the artillery is already mobilized, and was already committed/concentrated. The same goes for the armor and airpower as well- the material advantages have already been mobilized, and in many respect squandered, as Western aid has in several respects flipped the quality advantage. Mobilizing armor divisions with no armor is just light infantry, and light infantry is what is best countered by the sort of systems that are bessed countered by the precision munition capabilities Russia no longer has.

A lot of this is because equipment is a force multiplier, but only when it enables and is enabled by other assets, and the Russian quality equipment that might have made a big difference with a mobilized manpower base earlier in the war is already gone, either expended early or attrited in the half-year since. It's not like there are warehouses of uncommitted precision munitions waiting for a general mobilization- the ones not reserved for NATO contingencies were largely used in the first month, most of what was left was again used in the second wave in the failed encirclement plans, and what's left is no longer obviously superior or more prevalent than Ukrainian material. It's not like a general mobilization is going to bring back the nearly 14 Armored Brigades worth of equipment already lost either. The Russians have already been trying to mobilize/refit/resurrect their machine stockpiles as well, just to plug the current gaps. More bodies wouldn't be helping the offense, just the defense.

To which you might go 'that's the point,' to prevent the success of a Ukrainian counteroffensive, to which the Russian national-level strategist would be justified in asking 'what's the point of that point?' The results of the war doesn't depend on the Ukrainian counter-offensive, it depends on cutting off the European supply routes to Ukraine, and it has since about March of this year.

The Russian strategic gamble has been that they can break Western support for Ukraine, turning the conflict into one where Russian economic advantages vis-a-vis Ukraine matter. If this gamble succeeds, the Ukrainian offensive is irrelevant- it can just be rolled back later when Ukraine faces economic collapse without western aid, and western abandonment allows Russia it's free hand. If this gamble fails, the Ukraine counter-offensive is also irrelevant in that the Russian position was fundamentally doomed, as a 'victory' still relies on a conclusive end to the war, which the Ukrainians won't provide if they're still getting support.

At which point, at the national level, what is a general mobilization supposed to do that helps more than it hurts? It's not free manpower.

Economically, a general mobilization will further economic damages and pains, both taking current taxpayers out of the economy where they're doing necessary economic work to support the government's efforts to endure sanctions, and accelerating the ongoing demographic exodus as people currently apathetic about the war start looking for ways to avoid the draft. Politically, mass mobilization means that casualties go far beyond the current portion of the population that at least, in some sense, 'volunteered for it' and 'accepted the risks.' A core part of Putin's political power base is that people don't blame the Russian government for costs of the war- this often changes when the government forces family members to fight and die. Diplomatically, mass-mobilization also caries costs and risks: yes, the West can further escalate support, not just in equipment that is currently not being provided, including systems and capabilities that can range into Russia, but also in manpower. Russia is not the only country that can hire mercenaries, and if the issue of Ukrainian weakness actually becomes a manpower issue, there are sources available. There's literally millions of people trying to get into Europe, and the French Foreign Legion is more than a precedent, it has a Ukrainian counterpart.

If Russia is going to win, it's not going to hinge on the ability to defend and beat Ukrainian counter-offensives until they give up and stop fighting. The Ukrainians will just continue to accept western drones and precision munitions and keep blowing up Russian forces and material at range, and a Russian mobilization just raises the costs associated with it. Russian victory requires a political settlement, and breaking the will of the Western supporters as a prerequisite, and a general Russian mobilization is not going to make NATO's eastern front reduce supply lines through Poland to Ukrainian.

Russian mobilization wouldn't do much in the short term and it'd do more damage economically and politically in the long term, but in the medium term it's still Russia's best option. The Russian army isn't a spent force by any means. Just look at their defense of Kherson, which has made the Ukrainians bleed severely without much to show for it.. Diplomatically, mobilization would up the ante and force the West to send even more money and weapons if they want to keep Ukraine in the fight. That's the best chance for Russia to break Western unity especially as gas shortages come to the fore in the winter.

I'm not saying any of this is guaranteed to happen nor would a mobilization guarantee Russia to "win" in any sense, but it's really their only option to stabilize things without using nukes. The Kharkov push has been a sizeable morale + propaganda win for Ukraine and has signaled to the West that the war can be won beyond a Korea-style stalemate, so there's no reason to stop supporting Ukraine. Russia needs to prevent things like this from happening again if it wants to achieve any of its objectives including breaking Western unity, otherwise it's going to just lose conventionally sometime in 2023 unless Ukraine makes a massive blunder somewhere.

Russian mobilization wouldn't do much in the short term and it'd do more damage economically and politically in the long term, but in the medium term it's still Russia's best option. The Russian army isn't a spent force by any means. Just look at their defense of Kherson, which has made the Ukrainians bleed severely without much to show for it.

What the Ukrainians have to show for it is not only Kharkiv, where the Russians have lost in days what took them months to conquer when they had their best gear rather than losing it in retreat, but the fact that the Russians in Kherson are in an untenable position of being supplied across a river whose bridges are in artillery range. They can't build up for a breakout, they can't retreat, they're stuck and in an awful position prone to attrition. The Ukrainians don't need to 'show anything' to be winning the Kherson exchange, even setting aside a lack of reliable data to indicate they are 'bleeding severely.'

Diplomatically, mobilization would up the ante and force the West to send even more money and weapons if they want to keep Ukraine in the fight. That's the best chance for Russia to break Western unity especially as gas shortages come to the fore in the winter.

The West is already sending the Ukrainians money and weapons surpassing the annual Russian budget, and unlike the Russian budget it's been far more tailored to the war in Ukraine. Western aid isn't required to keep Ukraine in the fight anymore- they'll keep fighting regardless. Western aid is required to keep Ukraine on the offensive, but a stalemate doesn't imply a Ukrainian surrender.

If Western unity breaks, it doesn't mean that the West stops supplying Ukraine for that, because the West hasn't been united in degrees of support to Ukraine in the first place. 'Western unity' is, and has been, a mirage of different western countries doing different sorts of support. The decisive sorts of support for military resiliance haven't been coming from the countries who will be most affected, and thanks to Russian gas strategy a change of government doesn't re-open the gas network because the gas has to go through... Ukraine.

I'm not saying any of this is guaranteed to happen nor would a mobilization guarantee Russia to "win" in any sense, but it's really their only option to stabilize things without using nukes. The Kharkov push has been a sizeable morale + propaganda win for Ukraine and has signaled to the West that the war can be won beyond a Korea-style stalemate, so there's no reason to stop supporting Ukraine. Russia needs to prevent things like this from happening again if it wants to achieve any of its objectives including breaking Western unity, otherwise it's going to just lose conventionally sometime in 2023 unless Ukraine makes a massive blunder somewhere.

It'll still lose conventionally if it does a general mobilization, just sometime in later 2024, because they don't have the hardware superiority anymore to support infantry maneuver. Advance in areas of extremely favorable numbers and allocation of forces already required a concentration of artillery, armor, and airpower that won't be available to support the mobilized forces, because the hardware isn't going to be generated by mobilizing. The Russians need to win conventionally for a military mobilization to matter.

Nor would nukes stabilize the situation, because the situation is not constrained to Ukraine. A nuclear ultimatum for capitulation to surrender and national subjugation on nuclear grounds is incredibly destabilizing for regional nuclear proliferation, and that is far more dangerous to Russia than actually losing the war in Ukraine.

surpassing the annual Russian budget

Source?

(1) says Ru govt spending was $313.96bn in 2021. Not sure about that data, so here’s bloomberg on monthly revenues from 2021: taking 1.8t rubles as a median ~ $24bn (with $1=75rubles). $24bn x 12 = $288bn per year.

Taken together, the two strands of the programme would bring the total MFA support to Ukraine since the beginning of the war to €7.2 billion, and could reach up to €10 billion once the full package of exceptional MFA to Ukraine becomes operational this year. (src)

Also EU paid $90bn to Russia for fossil fuels since the beginning of war.

These announcements will bring the total U.S. military assistance for Ukraine to approximately $15.2 billion since the beginning of this Administration. (src)

I don’t know how much weapons, training services, etc cost, but it doesn’t seem to add up.

Western aid isn't required to keep Ukraine in the fight anymore

How so? I mean, Ukr soldiers don't have many job options anyway, but delayed or devalued wages would degrade performance by increasing marauding and other "part time" activities. If Ukraine receives cheap supplies/loans, then prices would rise at least somewhere (Europe, Ukraine or both). Ukraine inflation is around 23%. EU has 9.1%. For how long is that pressure sustainable? Ru bathes in commodity surpluses, for now, and I guess it has higher capacity to print money, if needed (although industrial output doesn't scale with the speed of printing press, of course).

a Korea-style stalemate

Before the Korean War went stalemate, it first involved the Northerners almost pushing the Southerners into the sea, and then the Southern-American alliance almost pushing the Northerners into China, for China to finally basically push the allied forces back to the initial alliance. We're still on track for a replay in a way; now we just need the Russians to do some daring flanking operation and take most of the country, only to be ambushed by unexpected NATO alpine troops at night just as final victory seems within reach while lost in some godforsaken wintery mountain valley near the far border of Ukraine, like, say, in the Carpathians.

Clearly, the best solution for Russia is the removal of Putin. His successor might still be able to cut a deal with the West that allows them de facto control of Crimea (for example, via a Hong Kong-style lease agreement, accompanied by a clever financial 'reparations package' that involves minimal pain on all sides). That will not begin to ameliorate the damage this idiotic war has caused to Russia and Ukraine, but at this point it is the least bad option. The only question now is how Russia can best ensure a relatively fast recovery from the self-inflicted harm it has created.

I don't see the clarity of this. It is not clear if there is an alternative with broad-based support in waiting, and a transition without internal fragmentation or echoes of civil war would be possible, and it is not clear why the West would just stop and offer that deal in that situation, as opposed to moving in for the kill. Even if the scenario you describe were the overwhelmingly most likely one, it is not clear to me that a better outcome for them than that is not on the table by staying on the battlefield, such as at least one that entails keeping (much of) what they have of the Donbass. Presumably, a large part of the economic isolation that Russia is subjected to at the moment would continue anyway, because the West would be foolish to trust any leader that could unite Russia as it is behind him to not immediately start plotting for a rematch of one form or another - and a Russia that changed leaders may actually be a Russia that is capable from learning from its mistakes, which could give it a rather better shot at it.

explicitly to use the Zaporizhzhia plant as a hostage

Like what, say "we'll make it meltdown unless you do X"? Seems to have all the downsides of tactical nukes plus the downside that they only get one choice of location to irradiate, which is a location they currently control.

I don't see the clarity of this

It wasn't immediately clear to me whether you were talking about the advisability for Russia of the removal of Putin or the suing for peace. Re: Putin, any deal that Russia could get with Putin still in place would be inferior to the kind of deal they could get with a successor in place. This is widely regarded in the West as "Putin's War", and while Russia will bear the bulk of perceived responsibility even if he goes, he will at least take some of it with him. As for the hunkering down option, that could be relatively palatable for Russia, but it's not clear it's going to be strategically sustainable if Ukraine continues to have operational victories and the West continues to pour weapons and money into the conflict.

Like what, say "we'll make it meltdown unless you do X"?

I was thinking instead that Russia would publicly signal something like "the war is endangering ZPP!" while privately signaling to Ukraine and Western governments "we'll shit on the carpet if you try to get us to leave". The advantage this would have over use of nukes is semi-plausible deniability; a major radiation incident at ZPP could simultaneously freeze all parties' military operations in the region and could be passed off as an unintended consequence of Ukrainian aggression. To be clear though, I don't think this is a very sensible option.

It wasn't immediately clear to me whether you were talking about the advisability for Russia of the removal of Putin or the suing for peace. Re: Putin, any deal that Russia could get with Putin still in place would be inferior to the kind of deal they could get with a successor in place. This is widely regarded in the West as "Putin's War", and while Russia will bear the bulk of perceived responsibility even if he goes, he will at least take some of it with him. As for the hunkering down option, that could be relatively palatable for Russia, but it's not clear it's going to be strategically sustainable if Ukraine continues to have operational victories and the West continues to pour weapons and money into the conflict.

The issue is that Putin doesn't take responsibility for the war in the Russian political context if he's ousted- whoever ousts him does. And it's the Russian political context which matters to Russian court politics, because who is going to depose Putin for the sake of being the ritual sacrifice as the one who's going to assume the responsibility of bearing the bad news? A palace coup comes with most of the negatives of the 'stabbed in the back' narratives, with the issue of it actually being true, regardless of whether the war was already being lost or not.

Russia, in aggregate, would probably be better off, but Russia, in aggregate, doesn't make decisions. Individual people make decisions, and they do so in their individual contexts and interests. Whose interests, specifically, are buoyed by couping Putin and not simply setting themselves up for the blame/follow-on coup?

I meant the removal of Putin (in the current situation/short term). I think you are probably right in that all other things equal, in any given scenario with s/Putin/some other leader/, the expected value of a West/Russia peace treaty for Russia would be higher, but the "all other things equal" does a lot of work here. The current expected cost of suing for peace is surely not "unconditional surrender"; a sufficiently weak leader presiding over a sufficiently fractured Russia, though, might wind up having a negotiating position that gets arbitrarily close to that. (...and I think that sufficient weakening as a result of the power transition is more than likely, in no small part by Putin's own design.)

All in all, I still don't see a good way out for Russia - and especially not for Russian-Ukrainians except for those that had the clairvoyance to conspicuously commit to the Western horse early on - that does not depend on contingencies ranging from the very optimistic to major miracles. It seems to me that modulo high-variance paths like political transition, tactical nukes or Kesslering low earth orbit, and generic changes the feasibility of which we outsiders can not begin to estimate ("reform the military to use drones more effectively"), their best strategy really is hoping for a low-probability event, and perhaps maneuvering into a position where more distinct redeeming low-probability events become possible. To that end, what they are doing in terms of grand strategy seems basically correct: hold out for the European economy to crash and/or antiglobalist parties to come to power, reach out to China presumably urging it to accelerate its Taiwan schedule, hunker down and defend rather than engaging in any large-scale advances, ...

shit on the carpet option

I guess that one is in fact somewhat plausible. I would think that in Western media, the blame for any incident at the plant would be laid squarely at Russia's feet no matter what anyway (even in the land of Putinverstehers itself, I could only find one major newspaper that would not routinely give >=equal weight to the Ukrainian shitposts claiming that the Russians are shelling themselves at the plant!), but considering everything they've gotten up to so far I would also not put it beyond them to actually delude themselves into thinking it will be not so. (Perhaps, on the other hand, all that actually matters is that the rest of the New Second World can keep its population believing that it is not so clear-cut.)

What does a Russian nuclear escalation look like?

Russia conducts a nuclear test in its own territory. Foreign policy types freak out, Ukraine shrugs, Russia continues losing.

Russia conducts a nuclear attack on Urkainian forces in Ukraine with an ultimatum for a cease fire. Foreign policy and serious military types freak out. Ukraine howls, Europeans increase sanctions, but also schism. A nominal cease fire might be started, but Russian demands for recognition of their demands schisms Europe as people who actually care about stable nuclear game theory recognize this is precisely the sort of demand you can't accede to for a stable nash equilibrium.

Nuclear-derived case fires will probably not hold, as 'I get to conquer you since I have nuclear weapons' is an extremely nuclear proliferation incentive beyond just Poland and other European powers. Conflict possibly transitions to an asymmetric conflict, but probably transitions into a conventional military artillery/UAV duel with drone exchanges as low-altitude drones become the 'plausible deniable' weapon of choice while SOF work.

Russia conducts a nuclear attack on Urkainian forces in Ukraine with an ultimatum for a cease fire. Foreign policy and serious military types freak out. Ukraine howls, Europeans increase sanctions, but also schism. A nominal cease fire might be started, but Russian demands for recognition of their demands schisms Europe as people who actually care about stable nuclear game theory recognize this is precisely the sort of demand you can't accede to for a stable nash equilibrium.

I do not anticipate the world backing down at all if Russia conducts a nuclear attack against Ukraine. I imagine they would alienate both China and India at the minimum and see sanctions from that camp.

It's not like Russia would be threatening them, so 'not like' has nothing to do with 'backing down.'

This is one of those cases where Europe is not 'the world,' and conflation will make the general conflict apathy seem surprising when 'the world's' preference is not getting caught in a nuclear exchange more than the security structure of Europe.

This is plausible but I hope we never find out.

Unclear. Tactical nuclear weapons aren't necessarily all that useful on the battlefield. People think of nukes as "destroy everything bombs", but if we're talking about an armoured division spread out across a few square miles, then a small nuke is hardly a game changer (and ironically, a lot of the ex-Soviet hardware Ukraine is packing is precisely designed to allow crew survivability in the wake of a nuclear strike). A nuclear missile on Kiev, Lviv, or Odessa might be effective, but would instantly mark Russia as a pariah state - the breaking of the nuclear taboo (and the consequent breakdown of non-proliferation) is in no way in the interests of their few remaining global friends like China or India.

The least bad nuclear escalation from Moscow, I think, would be a nuclear test (following appropriate legal measures to excuse Russia from its test-ban commitments). This would incur relatively few diplomatic costs, and would immediately raise the stakes for all concerned. That said, it wouldn't change the situation on the battlefield at all. At best, it might prompt a fresh round of negotiations with Erdogan et al. as intermediaries.

if russia starts reaching for its nuclear gun, it probably ought to shoot. Gesturing in that direction is gonna solidify opinion against russia in a way i don't think i've ever seen in my life, aid$$$ will flow like coors light at a nascar tailgate from around the globe. Fucking joint action committees with every swinging johnson except for russia would be happening. The nuclear card is the end of russia, and russia likely knows not to use it unless the end is nigh.

it's unclear whether this late into the war it will be sufficient to turn the tide.

Are you implying that this thing isn't going to go on for years?

It still could, but the likelihood of a long-term frozen conflict a la Korea looks a lot lower today than it did last week.

If that were how it worked, the Taliban would not now rule Afghanistan. Let the contrast of Afghanistan and Ukraine show how much the locals' agency really does matter.

We wouldn't have continually detonated any negotiations otherwise.

I haven't seen any evidence of that happening, unless you count "refusing ridiculous terms from Russia (like "Russia gets to keep all its captured territory, also Ukraine apologizes and disarms")" as detonating negotiations. And that's not "we", that's Ukraine refusing those terms. Which, well, of course they would. Maybe they wouldn't refuse the terms if they had zero Western military/financial support and felt that their back was against the wall.

Foreign Affairs reported this week that the UK/US did in fact pressure Ukraine to walk away from a peace deal back in April. The peace deal would have basically been Russia retreats to pre-February 23rd status quo and Ukraine commits to not join NATO. Of course, the deal might have broken down anyways, but there is some evidence out there that the UK/US do not want peace and want Russia to bleed until Putin is ousted or the country is severely weakened. Source

We wouldn't have continually detonated any negotiations otherwise.

This is nonsense, the only people who seriously favoured actual negotiation were in the west, with Macron making an absolute ass of himself by trying to play the peacemaker for two sides with incompatable demands.

Russias idea of negotiating is to merely demand the castration of Ukraine through large transfers of land and assurances that nobody will be allowed to help Ukraine when they return to finish the job.

The Ukrainians recognise that Russia will not be deflected from their goal of annexing Ukraine by negotiations, and that their best chance is through battlefield victory.

They’ve certainly fallen for our trap, haven’t they. To think how hard it must be for them to shoot at their ukrainian brothers in a war everybody else caused. And now their true enemies won’t even help them extricate themselves from a little war of aggression. Fuck them.

A little too much heat and sarcasm. Dial it down.

If that was the case, Russia would have quit while she was ahead months ago.

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