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Notes -
As I'm sure many of you are already aware, it's been another insane 48 hours in Ukraine. The "side offensive" in the northeast that accompanied the "main offensive" in Kherson has made astonishing progress, with Ukrainian forces pushing all the way to the Oskil River, with Kupyansk under attack and Izyum and Lyman both threatened. None of this will mean much to most us, I realise, so here's a quick (already outdated) map of the progress.
It's important not to get carried away here; while this is the closest we've come to a true war of movement since April, and there are reports of desertions and surrenders by Russian forces, we're dealing with one front in a war with at least three more (roughly, in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk sectors). This will probably not trigger a general collapse of Russian forces. Moreover, it is still possible that Ukrainian forces will find themselves overextended and vulnerable to counterattacks. However, as matters stand, this looks like a decisive operational-level victory for Ukraine.
My main uncertainty in what follows is what Russia's response to this apparent defeat will be, given that the underlying tides seem to favour Ukraine. Mass mobilisation may have helped a few months back, but - in addition to its political difficulties - it's unclear whether this late into the war it will be sufficient to turn the tide. Obviously there's always the option of nuclear escalation, but this would be a colossal gamble for Russia, potentially leaving them diplomatically isolated while providing limited relief on the battlefield. Another possibility would be for Russia explicitly to use the Zaporizhzhia plant as a hostage, but again it's unclear how that would translate into gains on the battlefield. And all the while, Russia's gas blackmail strategy seems to be floundering; not only have European reserves filled at faster than expected rates, European gas futures continued to fall, suggesting optimism about long-term supply issues.
Clearly, the best solution for Russia is the removal of Putin. His successor might still be able to cut a deal with the West that allows them de facto control of Crimea (for example, via a Hong Kong-style lease agreement, accompanied by a clever financial 'reparations package' that involves minimal pain on all sides). That will not begin to ameliorate the damage this idiotic war has caused to Russia and Ukraine, but at this point it is the least bad option. The only question now is how Russia can best ensure a relatively fast recovery from the self-inflicted harm it has created.
I don't follow the war news; they seem to unfold roughly as I've foreseen on 24th, and specific timing and extent of events is not that significant. Russia has an inept army and dysfunctional leadership; it was not in any position to pick this fight against the hegemonic power via attacking Ukraine. Mobilization might change the tide for a while (and I expected it to happen in early March, which it did not, presumably for the same reasons of ineptitude and dysfunctionality), but supplying Ukrainian capacity for resistance and eventual counterattacks is trivial for NATO, so it wouldn't amount to much, and there's an effectively unlimited supply of Ukrainian men, starting in 2023 women too... For me, what matters more these days is stuff like visa processing guidelines.
For the longest time, many in Russian intelligentsia spoke of the «collective Putin», assuming that this forgettable guy («Who is Mr. Putin?» – remember that, ages ago?) is merely a front, a consensus-approved talking head for interlocked elite interests. Oligarchs, siloviki, mafias, even the (downplayed) «little old me» – liberal NGOs and the like – and the see-through product of TV magic running around puffing his cheeks pandering to the plebs, asserting that everything's going according to plan.
Well there are no longer independent oligarchs, nor NGOs, and it's not clear that the dude isn't just running the whole show as an old style autocrat. But it may not matter: there is nobody to remove him anywhere close to him, so the entire upper echelon of Russian leadership could as well be a distributed Putin. They are all neck-deep in this, and apparently the top enforcers are either true believers, perhaps more driven than Vladimir himself, or fear the consequences of defection more than the outcome of the war. It doesn't help that they, bound by blood as they are, really have no reason to expect lenience from the victors. We don't know how deep in the echo chamber they remain after all the news, but they have the capacity to maintain the echo chamber for a big enough share of Russian population (including, crucially, Interior Troops) to not worry about their own necks before the disintegration of Russia.
As for how the war will go – I'm pretty sure neither Ukrainans nor their backers are intent on returning to the uneasy post-2014 status quo. So after the success of repealing these Special Operation forces, we will see the escalating siege of Crimea, supplies of even more capable tech, and continued nuclear bluff, and Russian refusal to recognize the outcome of the war upon exhaustion of offensive and even defensive capabilities. The best case scenario for everyone at this point is self-Jucheanization of Russia, which will win maybe 6-10 years for the regime, until its resource base is expended and it collapses with relatively little noise (which is to say, some nuclear accidents, minor wars and something like 5M dead from infrastructure collapses). However, if things go well for them, Ukrainians and co. can opt to force the issue and strike deep into Russian territory, on grounds of demilitarizing the unrepentant and consistent threat to European security; it's also probable that Galeev types will succeed to solicit funds and political momentum in the DC for the Operation Liberation of Oppressed Peoples. At least that's their plan.
But that's more far-fetched for now.
Do you think that even failing to respond with nukes to an undeniable invasion is not beyond the leadership?
I think there's very little will to use the nuclear option, and a great capacity for coping (in fact, in autocracies cope/cop capacity matters more than state capacity). If Ukrainians and their Western partners allow for a tolerable framing for this – e.g. «isolated terrorist incidents perpetrated by unknown Banderovtsi elements, leading to local insubordination and emergence of self-proclaimed unrecognized republics» instead of, like you say, an undeniable invasion – we may not even see the appropriate conventional response. Sans nukes, this is not so different from what happened in 2014 to the other side.
Of course this all depends on the continued degradation of Kremlins. Cutting your losses, evacuating loyalists from occupied territories, hunkering down and making a demonstrative nuclear show (say, in Russian Arctic) as a warning would be very reasonable of the regime. But they're not being reasonable.
Strelkov is clowning around:
I cannot tell if that quote is trolling/pessimistic sarcasm or if it is genuine cope.
The former. When being serious, Strelkov pleads for general mobilization and total war.
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The former
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