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magic9mushroom

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magic9mushroom

If you're going to downvote me, and nobody's already voiced your objection, please reply and tell me

1 follower   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 10 11:26:14 UTC

					

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User ID: 1103

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For the most part, it's where the US is coming from, not necessarily where it's headed.

None of this matters if the Chinese roll the dice too early. There is a real problem with hypernationalism that saying "hold on, if you go for Taiwan now we wind up with our cities burning" tends to close doors and as such people avoid saying it even when it's true. I suspect they're actively planning a contingency for if the 2024 US election is enough of a shitshow, despite how terrible an idea this would be.

As the others said, moral foundations - care/harm, liberty/oppression, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation.

Everyone cares about the first three, but WEIRD (white/educated/industrialised/rich/democratic, and especially autistic) people care much less about the last three (while caring more about care/harm), which generates liberalism (and is why liberals frequently fail ideological Turing tests for conservatism, because it's harder to hypothetically add things to a moral compass than to remove them).

As @fishtwanger said, Haidt's book laying these out is dated because it predates SJ. My best working theory of SJ is that it's what happens if you try to cram 90s liberalism down the throats of people who are six-foundation-inclined; they will take superficial features of it, connect them to the missing foundations, and produce a bizarro-world morality that has all six foundations but lacks coherence and is divisive rather than unifying.

As I said above, this is a bulverism; it's an explanation for "why would people believe this crazy thing despite its craziness" rather than "what is the thesis of this thing and is it true". I don't like bulverism, and I don't like thinking of people as, well, morons susceptible to memetic effects. But it's the most sense I've managed to make of SJ.