self_made_human
amaratvaṃ prāpnuhi, athavā yatamāno mṛtyum āpnuhi
I'm a transhumanist doctor. In a better world, I wouldn't need to add that as a qualifier to plain old "doctor". It would be taken as granted for someone in the profession of saving lives.
At any rate, I intend to live forever or die trying. See you at Heat Death!
Friends:
A friend to everyone is a friend to no one.
User ID: 454
You should really feel bad about nerd-sniping me at such a vulnerable time. Btw, essay's out.
The Youth in Asia Aren't Sliding: An Empirical Look at Slippery Slopes
In the thread fathered by Cjet, @EverythingIsFine raised the classic concern about assisted suicide: sure, it sounds compassionate in principle, but won't we inevitably slide from "dignified death for the terminally ill" to "economic pressure on grandma to stop being a burden"? This is the kind of argument that is very hard to adjudicate one way or the other without, in the end, appealing to observed reality.
After all, some slopes are slippery. Some slopes are sticky. Some are icy for five feet then turn into sand. The real question isn’t “is there a slope?” but “what kind of slope is this, and can we put friction on it?”
Fortunately, in 2025, which is well past its best-by, we can look at said reality in the many countries where a form of euthanasia is legal, and see how that's panned out. I think that settles the question far better than arguing over philosophy (I started the argument by arguing about philosophy). The best way to overcome Xeno’s paradox is to show that yet, things move.
The Welfare State Reality Check
Let's start with a basic empirical observation: the countries that have legalized assisted dying are not, generally speaking, ruthless capitalist hellscapes where human life is valued purely in economic terms.
The UK, where I currently work in healthcare, is hemorrhaging money on welfare policies that would make American progressives weep with joy. I can personally attest that a substantial number of people drawing unemployment or disability benefits aren't, if we're being honest, actually incapable of productive work. We have an influx of immigrants who aren't economically productive but receive extensive support anyway. As the public (or at least British Twitter) has realized, we spend gobs of money on Motability cars for people who look suspiciously able to jog for the bus (I can't make a strong claim on how widespread said fraud is, but several instances seemed highly questionable to me).
This is not a society poised to start pressuring vulnerable people into death chambers to save a few pounds. Our doctors are, if anything, a meek and bullied bunch who err on the side of aggressive treatment even when it's clearly futile. I regularly see resources poured into advanced dementia patients who have no quality of life and no prospect of improvement. The NHS is many things, but “relentlessly utilitarian” is not one of them.
If I had a dollar for every dementia patient who has straight up asked me to kill the, well, I wouldn't quite retire (and I'd ask why I'm being given dollars), but it would be enough for a decent meal. Enough for a fancy French dinner, were I to include family pleading on their behalf. And I think those people have a point. Most of these claims arise in the rare periods of lucidity that bless/curse the severely demented. You get a few good minutes or hours to realize how your brain is rotting, often before your body has, and you realize how awful things have become. Then you slide back into the vague half-life of semi-consciousness, and I hope your mind is choosing to devote its last dregs of cognition to happier memories, instead of the living hell you currently dwell in. Meanwhile, your loved ones have no such recourse. All the memories of good times are unavoidably tarnished by seeing the people you love shit themselves and not even care.
Even the supposedly heartless United States has far more social safety nets than people give it credit for. Reddit memes about medical bankruptcy notwithstanding, it still spends around 6-8% of GDP on public healthcare and another roughly 5% on Social Security. I'm not sure how to tease apart Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security Disability, food stamps, housing assistance. That doesn't exactly look like a Darwinian free-for-all.
In other words, both countries already have welfare states that leak money in every direction except the one we’re worried about. So the empirical track record is: we’re bad at saying no. If we legalised assisted suicide tomorrow, I expect the dominant failure mode would still be “keep Grandma alive at enormous cost,” not “shove Grandma off the cliff.”
The Empirical Record
But let's not rely on anecdotes or gut feelings. We have actual data from places that have implemented assisted dying:
The Netherlands legalized euthanasia in 2002. Belgium in 2002. Switzerland has allowed assisted suicide since 1941. Canada introduced Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) in 2016. If the slippery slope argument were correct, we should see clear evidence of these societies pressuring vulnerable populations into premature death.
Instead, what we see is:
- Rigorous oversight systems
- Multiple safeguards and waiting periods
- Low absolute numbers (typically 1.5% to 5% of total deaths, the Netherlands, after 23 years, finally broke through to 5.4% in 2024 and to 5.8% in 2025. That is less than the proportion of Americans who die as a consequence of smoking)
- Decent evidence of better outcomes for the family of the deceased (I've heard they tried to interview MAID participants post-procedure, but had truly abysmal response rates for reasons I can't quite fathom). For example, a statistically significant reduction in grief reactions or PTSD in the family of cancer patients who had opted for euthanasia as opposed to dying the old-fashioned way. In Canada: “The majority of family interview participants expressed high satisfaction with the quality of MAiD care their loved one received”. However, explicit single-item “approval rate” percentages among bereaved relatives are scarce.
- Very low rates of non-compliance with oversight or protocol. An example is this Dutch report, which found only six cases that the physician had not fulfilled the due care criteria in performing euthanasia.
- No significant evidence of systematic coercion. Every system has its failures, with anecdotes and horror stories to match, and the question is how often it fails.
In the Netherlands, for example, support for euthanasia remains at ~90% in both 1997 and 2017 in the general populace. I lifted said figure from this study
I would consider it rather suspicious if it was 95% in a country where 5% of people get offed annually by MAID. Fortunately, that's not the case.
(Yes, I know that it's 5% of all deaths, not 5% of the total population. I couldn't resist the joke, sue me)
The most common criticisms of these systems aren't "too many people are being pressured to die" but rather "the bureaucratic requirements are too onerous" and "some people who clearly qualify are being denied."
Designing Better Incentives
That said, EverythingIsFine's concerns aren't completely unfounded. Any system can be corrupted by perverse incentives. The question is whether we can design safeguards that are robust enough to prevent abuse while still allowing genuinely autonomous choice. I spend an ungodly amount of time juggling hypotheticals, so I have Opinions™.
Here are some mechanisms that could work:
Competing Advocates System
Structure the tribunals with explicitly competing incentive structures. Pay psychiatrists or social workers bonuses for every person they successfully talk out of euthanasia after demonstrating that their suffering can be meaningfully ameliorated. Simultaneously, have patient advocates who are rewarded for ensuring that people with genuinely hopeless situations aren't forced to endure unnecessary suffering.
This creates a natural tension where both sides have skin in the game, but in opposite directions. The "life preservation" team has incentives to find creative solutions, provide better pain management, connect people with resources they didn't know existed. The "autonomy" team ensures that paternalistic gatekeeping doesn't trap people in unbearable situations.
Red Team Testing
Implement systematic "penetration testing" for the oversight system. Create fictional cases of people who clearly should not qualify for assisted dying - someone with treatable depression, a person under subtle family pressure, an elderly individual who just needs better social support. Have trained actors present these cases to euthanasia panels. (E.g., 25-year-old grieving a break-up, fully treatable depression, no physical illness)
A modest proposal for the composition of such a panel:
7 people, randomly selected for each case):
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2 psychiatrists, paid only if the panel declines the request.
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2 social-workers/advocates, paid only if the group approves the request.
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1 “neutral” physician (salary fixed).
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2 lay jurors, paid a flat fee.
The psychiatrists and advocates must publish a short written justification (≤500 words). The neutral physician and lay jurors read both sides and vote. Majority rules. The adversarial structure means the psychiatrists have skin in the game if they rubber-stamp a case that later looks fishy, and the advocates have skin in the game if they brow-beat a clearly salvageable patient. The lay jurors are there to keep the professionals honest.
(Alternative models might be splitting the psychiatrists and advocates across both teams)
Any panel that approves inappropriate cases faces serious consequences. This creates strong incentives for rigorous evaluation while identifying systemic weaknesses before they cause real harm.
We already use similar approaches in other domains. Government agencies test whether stores are properly checking ID for alcohol sales. Tax authorities use mystery shoppers to verify compliance. Financial regulators use stress tests to identify institutional weaknesses.
Temporal Safeguards
Build in meaningful waiting periods with multiple check-ins. Not the perfunctory "wait two weeks" that can be gamed, but structured reassessment over months. Require people to demonstrate that their decision remains stable across different contexts - good days and bad days, when surrounded by family and when alone, after various treatment interventions have been attempted. At any time the patient can unilaterally revoke the request (one phone call suffices), at which point the whole timeline resets. Finally, lethal medication is dispensed only on the day of the procedure, and only if the patient re-asserts consent on camera, without the advocate or psychiatrist in the room.
This serves multiple purposes: it prevents impulsive decisions, allows time for circumstances to change, and creates multiple opportunities to identify and address external pressures.
More Watching of the Watchers
All decisions (with names redacted) are published in a searchable database. Independent academics can run regressions on approval rates vs. patient age, diagnosis, postcode, etc. Outlier panels get flagged automatically. (If Panel #7 approves 90% of 25-year-olds with psoriasis, maybe look into that). The tribunal system becomes a public good: researchers learn what actually predicts irrevocable suffering, and policy can adjust.
Economic Firewalls
Perhaps most importantly, create strong institutional barriers between economic interests and euthanasia decisions. Healthcare systems, insurance companies, and family members should have no financial incentive for someone to choose death over continued treatment.
This might mean that euthanasia decisions are handled by completely separate institutions from those bearing the costs of care. Or it might mean generous death benefits that make someone more economically valuable alive than dead. Or mandatory cooling-off periods after any discussion of treatment costs.
EverythingIsFine’s deepest worry is emotional pressure: Grandma feels like a burden even if no one explicitly says so. The adversarial tribunal can’t eliminate that feeling, but it can reduce the plausibility of the belief. If Grandma knows that two professionals will lose money unless they are convinced she is beyond help, the thought “my family would be better off without me” loses some of its sting. The process itself becomes a costly signal that society is not eager to see her go.
The Comparative Harm Analysis
But here's what I think clinches the argument: we need to compare the risks of legalized assisted dying against the status quo.
Right now, people who want to end unbearable suffering have several options, all of them worse:
- Violent suicide methods that traumatize families and first responders. Even ODing on pills usually isn't easy, and some, like paracetamol overdoses are a terrible way to go. I saw a doctor do that once, and it worked (they died of liver failure in the ICU) but it wasn't any fun. Wouldn't recommend. As a physician, I can certainly think of better ways, but Google or most chatbots aren't nearly as obliging for lay users.
- Traveling to jurisdictions where assisted dying is legal (expensive, logistically complex, forcing people to die far from home)
- Gradually reducing food and water intake (slow, uncertain, medically problematic)
- Overdosing on accumulated medications (uncertain success rate, potential for brain damage if unsuccessful)
- Convincing doctors to provide unofficially lethal doses of pain medication (creates legal liability for physicians, inconsistent availability)
Each of these approaches involves more suffering, more uncertainty, and more potential for things to go wrong than a well-designed assisted dying system.
Meanwhile, the people we're supposedly protecting by prohibiting euthanasia - those who might be pressured into unwanted death - are already vulnerable to abuse in countless other ways. Family members can pressure elderly relatives to sign over property, refuse beneficial medical treatment, or accept substandard care. Healthcare systems already make implicit rationing decisions based on cost considerations (but this is a necessary tradeoff for any system that doesn't have literally infinite amounts of money. The Pope doesn't spend all of the Church’s budget on a single drowning orphan)
Creating a transparent, regulated system for end-of-life decisions doesn't create these pressures - it makes them visible and addressable.
The Autonomy Principle
Ultimately, this comes back to the fundamental question of autonomy that cjet79 raised in the original post. If we don't trust competent adults to make informed decisions about their own deaths, even with appropriate safeguards and cooling-off periods, then we don't really trust them to be autonomous agents at all.
We let people make all sorts of life-altering decisions with far less oversight: whom to marry, whether to have children, what career to pursue, whether to undergo risky medical procedures, whether to engage in dangerous recreational activities. Many of these decisions are statistically more likely to cause regret than a carefully considered choice to end unbearable suffering.
The paternalistic argument essentially says: "We know better than you do whether your life is worth living." That's a pretty extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary justification.
Conclusion
Legalising assisted suicide beyond the “imminent death” cases does open a channel for pressure and abuse. But the same could be said of every other high-stakes civil right: police shootings, child custody, involuntary commitment, even driving licences. The solution has never been “ban the activity”; it has been “create adversarial oversight with transparent metrics and random audits.”
If we can audit restaurants for rat droppings and banks for money-laundering, we can audit tribunals for premature death. The price of liberty is eternal paperwork (woe is me, I do more than my fair share already) but at least the paperwork can be designed by people who actually want the patient to live if there’s any reasonable chance of recovery.
I'm not arguing for euthanasia-on-demand or a system with minimal safeguards. I'm arguing for thoughtfully designed institutions that balance individual autonomy against the genuine risks of coercion and abuse.
(To put an unavoidable personal spin on it, I've been severely depressed, I've had suicidal ideation. I would have a very easy time indulging in that feeling, and I refrained not just from thanatophobia, but from a genuine understanding that my brain is/was broken. My advocacy for the right for people to make this choice is informed by a deeply personal understanding of what being there is like. Don't worry, I'm mostly better.)
The slippery slope argument assumes that any movement toward assisted dying will inevitably lead to systematic devaluation of vulnerable lives. But this treats policy design as if it's governed by some inexorable natural law rather than conscious human choices about how to structure institutions.
We can choose to create robust safeguards. We can choose to separate economic interests from end-of-life decisions. We can choose to err on the side of caution while still respecting individual autonomy.
The question isn't whether a poorly designed system could be abused - of course it could. The question is whether we're capable of designing better systems than the brutal status quo of forcing people to suffer without recourse or resort to violent, traumatic methods of ending their lives.
I think we are. And I think the evidence from jurisdictions that have tried suggests that the slippery slope, while worth watching for, isn't nearly as slippery as critics claim.
I've ended up writing such a long response that it's best submitted as it's own post. Standby, I wasn't going to get much sleep anyway haha.
Sometimes, when I regret making some good life decisions, I wonder if I should have taken up philosophy. Then I realize it would end in murder-suicide, and I'm glad I became a doctor instead.
I will grant that you are being consistent. It is a very unusual moral framework, but then again, so is mine and I'm happy with it.
I share your feelings here. I just couldn't be bothered to complain.
This claim is lacking in nuance.
My understanding of the scientific/medical consensus is that a well-planned vegan diet isn't harmful to kids. (I pray that even the most committed vegan mom doesn't refuse to breast feed her child on those grounds, but then again, people try to make their cats vegan).
This represents an additional challenge, you have to be very careful to ensure that your kids don't end up missing B12 etc. It is simply easier to feed them the same stuff everyone else eats and not worry about it too much. In other words, a quantitative instead of qualitative issue.
I looked up a bunch of citations, but I'm too drunk/busy to format them. I will dig them up later if you really want them.
You are correct. But the apparent contradiction doesn't exist. It might seem to: On one hand, I profess a functional indifference to the moral worth of non-human animals; on the other, I admit a deep and abiding love for my own dogs, to the point where I would have few qualms about visiting significant unpleasantness upon anyone who harmed them.
This isn't so much a contradiction as it is a clarification, best captured by amending my original statement: I don't care about the moral worth of most non-human animals. The ones in my circle of concern are a rounding error, statistically speaking - 99.99999...% of them fall outside it.
My moral framework isn't a flat, universalist plane where all entities of a certain class are assigned equal value. It’s better modeled as a series of intensely-felt concentric circles.
For example:
I love my mother. I would inflict what the law might term 'grievous bodily harm' upon anyone who purposefully hurt her. This is a non-negotiable axiom of my existence.
And yet, I do not, as a rule, love the mothers of other people. I might feel a general, abstract goodwill toward the concept of motherhood, especially in an era of demographic decline. I might even feel a pang of sympathy hearing a story about a stranger's ailing mother. But my level of emotional and practical investment is, let's be honest, functionally zero. My strong protective instinct is parochial; it does not generalize. I suspect for most people, it operates the same way. I suspect you love your mother more than you love mine.
This model extends to almost everything. I am willing to be taxed (in theory, if the system were effective) to prevent my phone from being snatched on the streets of London. I am not, however, moved to donate to an anti-thievery initiative in Nigeria. My concern is a function of proximity and personal stake. I disagree with Singer when it comes to the failures of a Newtonian model of ethical obligations, a child drowning in front of me compels me to act far stronger than one in Australia. The latter is, as far as I'm concerned, not my business.
This brings us to the dogs. My dogs are my dogs. The pleasant-looking labrador I met near St. Pancras station today received some affectionate scratches because he was a "good boy" and reminded me of my own, but my moral obligation began and ended there. If a restaurant in Sichuan province serves dog, my sole practical concern is ensuring my pups never wander off unattended if we visit.
As I've outlined elsewhere, my moral system is built not on a universalist foundation, but on a framework that approximates it through the mutual respect of property and sovereignty. It's a system designed for a world of bounded sympathies.
Calling a beloved pet "property" sounds cold, I know, and perhaps it’s an imprecise shorthand. They are a special class of entity within my sphere of sovereignty, one imbued with immense sentimental value, more akin to an irreplaceable family heirloom or a child than to a fungible commodity like a chair. But they exist within that sphere, and my duties toward them are products of that relationshipof ownership, stewardship, and affection. The cow destined for a steakhouse does not.
A committed utilitarian might call this a classic cognitive bias, a failure to apply the principle of impartiality, a failure of my moral software. I do not care, who gave them the right to dictate objective morality? But I find this model to be more descriptively accurate of how most humans actually operate, and perhaps more prescriptively stable than a universalism that demands a level of saintly, impartial concern that almost no one can consistently achieve.
So the paradox resolves cleanly. My dogs are loved not because they are dogs, but because they are mine. My concern for them is an exception that proves the rule*: my moral landscape is not flat, but mountainous, with peaks of intense personal obligation surrounded by vast plains of practical indifference. It's not a universalist's map, but I find it an honest and livable one.
*That phrase, for once, applied correctly.
Maybe? I think it's unlikely, Westerners tend to have rather flanderized views of what it's like in India. We aren't all vegetarian sadhus chanting om while shitting on the street outside Taj Mahal.
I agree, children shouldn't own firearms. As the meme goes, they should instead be trained to operate crew-served weapons. It suits their frame, and teaches cooperation and other valuable life skills.
Consider the three categories of people nearly everyone agrees should not own firearms: children, people with mental deficiencies, and people with demonstrably violent impulses they cannot control. Notice anything? We generally don't trust these categories with much of anything. The first two get guardians or become wards of the state. The third we imprison. This suggests something interesting about the nature of trust in civilization. We've already made these fundamental judgments about competence and dangerousness. The gun question isn't really creating new categories, I'd say it's revealing categories that already exist.
I like guns. They're cool. I want to own guns. I am also libertarian adjacent, and I believe that I am willing to pay the tax on my beliefs that come from the downsides of widespread firearm ownership.
The first major anti-gun argument runs: guns are dangerous and unnecessary, and this combination justifies banning them.
Dangerous? Absolutely. Their purpose is literally to be weapons. But we don't ban everything dangerous. Cars kill more Americans annually than guns, and cars can achieve horrific mass casualties (see: Nice, France, 2016). We could make bombs from commonly available materials that I won't list here because I'm not a psychopath, but the point stands.
The "unnecessary" part does more work in this argument. We don't typically ban dangerous-but-necessary things. Chainsaws are dangerous but necessary for forestry. Commercial aviation is dangerous but necessary for modern logistics. Even cars, despite their body count, serve essential transportation functions. Even prostitutes, despite their body counts, serve essential transportation functions as the town pony.
It's the dangerous-and-unnecessary combination that supposedly justifies prohibition. But this opens a philosophical can of worms that I suspect most gun control advocates haven't fully considered.
Who decides what's "necessary"? Jet skis kill people and serve no essential function beyond recreation. Theme parks occasionally kill people and exist purely for entertainment. Large houses consume resources and increase inequality while providing no survival advantage beyond a certain point of diminishing returns.
Most hardcore authoritarians - sorry, "public health experts" would indeed ban all the fun toys if they could. The UK has been steadily moving in this direction for decades, restricting everything from kitchen knives to mean tweets, apparently operating under the theory that a sufficiently bubble-wrapped society approaches optimal safety.
This reveals what I think is the true philosophical divide: either you let adults decide for themselves what risks are worth taking for what benefits, or you have a central authority make these decisions for everyone. There's no stable middle ground here, every "reasonable restriction" contains within it the seeds of total control.
And keep in mind: you might not be the one making these decisions. Bureaucracies have a nasty habit of optimizing for metrics that strip every joy out of life while genuinely believing they're making things better. Eventually you'll be sad enough that you'll find the second argument more compelling.
Of the specific alternative forms of suicide you've mentioned, I think jumping off a tall building or bridge is almost as easy as using a gun. Guns are slightly more convenient, but it isn't very hard to find a bridge and overcome your fear of heights.
Wikipedia tells me that the US has the 24th highest suicide rate per capita. It's beaten by Japan, and South Korea takes the number 2 spot. The tiny little Saint Vincent and the Grenadines takes bottom place, and its suicide rate is as low as its water content (Wikipedia says both are negligible, or perhaps the country is too poor to afford water bodies and statisticians). Firearms really aren't that big of a deal in that regard.
(Do they contribute? Of course. I just don't think it matters particularly much.)
Here's where I probably lose some readers: I think competent adults should have access to reliable methods of suicide.
Not because I want people to kill themselves. Quite the opposite. On an individual level, I think suicide is usually a terrible mistake, and anyone contemplating it should get help. In many cases, I am the help. Sometimes that isn't enough, and all the King's horses and psychiatrists combined can't put your will to live back together again.
But there are cases where continued existence involves unbearable suffering: terminal illnesses, degenerative neurological conditions, lives of such persistent misery that death genuinely seems preferable.
More controversially, I think this extends beyond medical cases. Some people draw genuinely shit hands in life: too many cognitive limitations to achieve their goals, chronic health problems, inability to form meaningful relationships, economic circumstances they can't escape. A life of quiet desperation and misery, year after year.
Civilization is fundamentally a voluntary association. We agree to follow certain rules and norms in exchange for the benefits of cooperative society. But if the implicit terms of this agreement are "you must participate forever regardless of how miserable it makes you, and if you try to leave we'll ensure the exit is as torturous as possible," then civilization starts looking less like a beneficial arrangement and more like a prison. Some places manage to be both beneficial and prison adjacent, such as the dementia care homes that I'm frankly sick of visiting, but I hope the average person can be extended more autonomy than an 82 year old with Alzheimer's.
The gun control advocate might respond: "But we can address the underlying causes of despair! Better mental health care, economic support, social programs!"
Sure, we should do those things anyway. But two problems with making them prerequisites for respecting individual autonomy:
First, it assumes we can solve all sources of human misery through policy interventions. This seems... optimistic. Some people will always be dealt rough hands by genetics, circumstance, or pure random chance.
(I am an optimist, in that I put higher than 50% credence in the claim that a Singularity within a decade or two that will solve this issue. But this is far from inevitable, and I think it's cruel to dictate how long someone needs to stomach their misery)
Second, it places the burden of proof on the individual to justify their decision to the satisfaction of others. You have to convince the authorities that your life really is sufficiently miserable to warrant an exit visa. This turns suicide from a tragic personal choice into a bureaucratic process, which seems to miss the point entirely.
This brings us back to the central thesis: forbidding gun ownership means you don't trust other adults to make fundamental decisions about their own lives.
But trust is the foundation of civilization. We trust strangers to drive two-ton vehicles at high speeds in our direction. We trust random people not to push us onto subway tracks. We trust that the person preparing our food hasn't poisoned it. We trust that pilots, surgeons, engineers, and countless others will perform their jobs competently rather than causing mass casualties through malice or incompetence.
Every functioning society is built on millions of these trust relationships. When trust breaks down, civilization breaks down. You get high-crime neighborhoods where people don't go outside after dark. You get societies where every transaction requires extensive verification and monitoring. You get authoritarian systems where the state assumes everyone is a potential threat.
(Hmm.. I write this while still in London)
The gun control position, taken to its logical conclusion, suggests that ordinary adults cannot be trusted with the power of life and death over themselves and others. But this power already exists everywhere around us. The main difference is that guns make it more obvious and immediate.
If you genuinely believe that most adults are so irresponsible, impulsive, and dangerous that they can't be trusted with firearms, then you should probably also believe they can't be trusted to drive, practice medicine, operate heavy machinery, raise children, vote, or participate in countless other activities that require judgment and self-control.
This is a logically consistent approach, but then one must contend with the fact that there's no consistency or rigor in how we approach this. Any Tom can still his dick in a Harry hairy pussy and pop out a kid without needing to get a fucking loiscence. Cars, forklifts and doctors need licenses just about everywhere. People automagically age into the right to vote, unless they commit a crime and become felons who are stripped of it.
I also doubt that even US-levels of firearm ownership are particularly strong mitigating factors against the risk of coup or government oppression. The government has drones, tanks, nigh panopticon surveillance if they cared to really use it. I am happy to acknowledge that it increases the difficulty of the government acting up, but I claim it's not that big of a difference.
That being said, I like guns, and wish I lived in a jurisdiction where I could shoot beer cans with the boys over a barbecue. And not the anemic shotguns or hunting rifles can get in the UK, those bore me to tears. Give me a minigun in Vegas, and give me the salary to fire it for more than a few milliseconds.
Red-tailed hawk painted like a Bald Eagle screeches in the background.
I think the biggest logical fallacy (or questionable ethical framework) in her stance is damnation-by-association. If a chimpanzee has never molested another chimp, nor eaten it, does it make it an individually honorable chimp? What proportion of individuals must not have committed grave sin for the whole to be condemned?
This suggests an end-state which is a surveillance state for both farmyard and wild animals. I chuckle to think of a world where "cruelty free" chicken is certified on the basis of their moral behavior before slaughter.
I do not think the majority of chimpanzees have eaten another chimp, though orangutans and bonobos seem much nicer chaps.
If a chicken is raised alone in a coop, and hasn't pecked other hens to death, am I not allowed to eat it? Or should we only eat the alpha chickens, the matriarchs who dominate the rest? Once they're eaten, the next chicken down becomes the dishonorable alpha, and is thus fair game.
I don't know dawg, and I don't care. I just had half of one in a Nandos, and it's not done digesting. I will meditate on this when I have blood supply to spare.
Yes. The more Aryan ancestry, the lower the rates, as you'd expect from descendants of pastoralist nomads.
The further south you go, the more pure the Dravidian ancestry. Mumbai is halfway in-between, and Maharashtra is an unusually strict vegetarian state.
Axioms:
- A1: Some humans commit murder against other humans
- A2: Murder is categorically dishonorable
Postulates:
- P1: If any member of a group commits a dishonorable act, then all members of that group are dishonorable
- P2: It is honorable to murder those who are dishonorable
Lemma 1: Humans are dishonorable Proof: By A1, some humans murder. By A2, murder is dishonorable. By P1, since some humans commit dishonorable acts, all humans are dishonorable.
Theorem: It is honorable to murder humans Proof: By Lemma 1, humans are dishonorable. By P2, it is honorable to murder the dishonorable. Therefore, it is honorable to murder humans.
Or, to progress further:
Axioms:
- A1: Some humans commit murder against other humans
- A2: Murder is categorically dishonorable
Postulates:
- P1: If any member of a group commits a dishonorable act, then all members of that group are dishonorable
- P2: It is honorable to murder those who are dishonorable
- P3: Performing an honorable act makes one honorable
Lemma 1: Humans are dishonorable Proof: By A1, some humans murder. By A2, murder is dishonorable. By P1, since some humans commit dishonorable acts, all humans are dishonorable.
Lemma 2: It is honorable to murder humans Proof: By Lemma 1, humans are dishonorable. By P3, it is honorable to murder the dishonorable. Therefore, it is honorable to murder humans.
Lemma 3: Humans who murder other humans become honorable Proof: By Lemma 2, murdering humans is an honorable act. By P3, performing an honorable act makes one honorable. Therefore, humans who murder other humans become honorable.
Theorem: Humans oscillate between dishonorable and honorable states Proof: By Lemma 1, humans begin as dishonorable. By Lemma 3, they become honorable through murder. But having become honorable, they are no longer valid targets for honorable murder (by P2). However, their past dishonor persists by P1, creating a paradoxical state.
I hope this illustrates how ridiculous this whole line of reasoning is. You may substitute murder for cannibalism here.
Vegetarians still aren't a majority.
(And the majority of Indians are actually lactose intolerant, even if we love milk. Around 60% of the population, if a quick Google suffices)
He never asked it to not use them. If you do, most models are happy to comply, even if they slip up (ChatGPT is unusually bad about it).
I've heard of people doing it for that reason too. The placenta ought to come out mostly sterile, or no more dirty than getting busy with a beaver. If cunnilingus won't kill you, this wouldn't either. I don't think it's actually good, at least compared to other sources of protein. When animals do it, it's to hide the traces of birth from predators, and to prevent perfectly good calories from going to waste. While archeological evidence is lacking, it's highly unlikely to be a "natural" practice. Hunter gatherers usually bury or burn the afterbirth.
As an aside, how was London?
I ended up extending my stay for a week! I'm due to fly out this Saturday morning, but only so I can make it to the Edinburgh ACX meetup.
I've had a good time. I haven't written up everything that happened, but highlights include a trip to Cambridge, Dover, catching up with @Corvos at a Wetherspoons and getting happily drunk in his company.
Overall, I've warmed to the city quite a bit. And it certainly makes where I currently live seem like a village. If only it didn't cost an arm and both of my legs. Maybe when I finish my current stage of training, and have a CV competitive with the strivers, I might try my luck.
As it is currently illegal to consume human flesh in the UK, the scientists behind the experiment used samples of Foot's leg to recreate the taste.
Boo. Doesn't count! Especially with the name "Foot", how did they screw up so badly?
The second example does. I know of a senior doctor who, in his wilder days, swallowed an entire placenta raw on a dare. He won about the equivalent of $10, which is far less than I'd charge in all honesty.
A common misconception, I'm afraid. I think it's somewhere around 20-40%. Vegans are as rare as teeth on a hen, Jains have their own weird dietary restrictions, they don't eat any vegetables that grow beneath the soil, so even potatoes and onions are verboten.
Most Indians eat meat, though the majority wouldn't have beef. Of course, when that large a proportion of the populace won't touch meat, the rest of us are forced to accommodate them.
And do you want to know another animal with a clearly non human form of cognition? A parrot.
Touché. I walked into that one.
We are looking at this from two different angles. My angle helps people. Your angle, which seems to prioritize protecting the LLM from the 'insult' of a simple metaphor, actively harms user adoption.
Look, come on. We are literally in a thread dedicated to avoiding Bulverism. Do you honestly think I'm out here defending the honor of a piece of software? My concern is not for the LLM's public image. Sam Altman is not sending me checks. I pay for ChatGPT Plus.
I think the charitable, and correct, framing is that we are both trying to help people use these things better. We just disagree on the best way to do that. My entire point is that the "stochastic parrot" model, while it might solve the one specific problem of a user getting frustrated, ultimately creates more confusion than it solves. It's a bad mental model, and I care about users having good mental models.
You're right that a metaphor is a subway map, not a satellite image. Its value is in its simplification. But for a subway map to be useful, it has to get the basic topology right. It has to show you which stations connect. The parrot map gets the topology fundamentally wrong.
It tells you the machine mimics, and that's it. It offers zero explanation for the weird, spiky capability profile. Why can this "parrot" debug Python but not write a good joke? Why can it synthesize three different academic papers into a novel summary but fail to count the letters in a word? The parrot model just leaves you with "I guess it's a magic parrot". It doesn't give the user any levers to pull. What's the advice? "Just keep feeding the parrot crackers and hope it says something different?"
Compare that to the "fallible but brilliant intern" model. It's also a simplification, but it's a much better map. It correctly predicts the spikiness. An intern can be a world-class expert on one topic and completely sloppy with basic arithmetic. That feels right. More importantly, it gives the user an immediate, actionable strategy. What do you do with a brilliant but fallible intern? You give them very clear instructions, you provide them with all the necessary background documents, and you always, always double-check their work for anything mission-critical. That maps perfectly onto prompt engineering, RAG, and verification. It empowers the user. The parrot model just leaves them shrugging.
Shaming users for not having the correct mental model is precisely how we end up with people who are afraid of their tools
I'm pretty sure I haven't done that. My frustration isn't with your average user. It's with people who really should know better using the term as a thought-terminating cliche to dismiss the whole enterprise.
If my own grandmother told me she was getting frustrated because "Mr. GPT" kept forgetting what she told it yesterday, I wouldn't lecture her on stateless architecture. I'd say something like, "Think of it as having the world's worst long-term memory. It's a total genius, but you have to re-introduce yourself and explain the whole situation from scratch every single time you talk to it."
That's also a simple, not-quite-accurate metaphor. But it's a better one. It's a better map. It addresses her actual problem and gives her a practical way to think that will get her better results next time. It helps her use the tool, which is the goal I think we both agree on.
Uh, I hope posthumans wouldn't be aging or dying, for one. I think that's a pretty big deal, every hour I play of a video game becomes a painful tradeoff as my life expectancy becomes ever shorter. Leaving aside everything else, it would be very nice not have thanatochrony be an issue.
We could be much smarter, and thus able to enjoy far more complex and strategic games. I don't think someone with mental retardation would enjoy Crusader Kings of Civ, even at the baby difficulties.
We could be faster, be it mentally or when it comes to physical reflexes. That would make games that rely on that more enjoyable.
We could have immense amounts of computing power, such that the lines between virtual and real become blurry, and you could live a billion years doing whatever your heart desires, without being able to tell your experience apart from reality.
We could be more physically durable, so that Airsoft with real guns might be on the cards. We could back ourselves up to external storage, such that we could play recreational nuclear warfare with H-bombs. (Someone will make nuclear tennis from Infinite Jest into a real thing)
Is it a good life if you dedicate your life to video games? On what terms could such a life be considered good?
The answer to that is mu. If someone enjoys video games, then a good life for them involves video games. If they don't, it doesn't.
What is "good" about gardening? Or painting? Or getting into debates with strangers on the internet?
What is laudable about being a doctor when the AI can do your job better? What is so great about travel when you can catch a flight to anywhere in the world and get there in less than 24 hours? What if it takes no time at all, subjectively, and we send a scan of your brain to Enceladus at the speed of light?
I do not rely on the approval of others to define my interests. I hope others have the courage to do the same.
Are dogs aliens? I must admit I've never seen a wolf piloting a flying saucer, but my lab has sent many a normal saucer flying. Unfortunately, they were only domesticated between 20-40k years ago, not 200k.
Cannibals from Papua New Guinea tell us that human flesh tastes just like pork. "Long pork", if you will. I like bacon, and I'm not averse to alternative sources. Maybe lab-grown meat will let me have a me-burger, kinda removed the ethical downsides.

Consider the counterfactual, or inverse case:
If you were offered the opportunity to remove 40 IQ points and half your lifespan, would that help in any way? Is there a particular reason the status-quo is privileged?
To the extent that you ask me to involve ethics in the question, my thrust is that most ethical theories tend towards eudaimonia, and some people really enjoy games. The same principle applies to enjoyment of just about anything really, though I suspect Marvel movies are best enjoyed while severely concussed.
In other words, most moral theories kinda like it when people have fun, all else being equal.
There are no universally compelling arguments. If it doesn't compel you, I genuinely can't do better than sigh/shrug. In this case, I have interrogated a rather related question, namely the concept of universal morality. My genuine takeaway from doing that is to come to the conclusion that there's no reason to believe such a thing exists, and even if it did, no plausible way to know that we've found it. The same applies to questions of objective/universal criteria for leading a fulfilling life.
Eventually, most of the "real" challenges that humanity faces will be, at least in my opinion, rendered obsolete. That leaves just about only games to pass the time. They can be complicated games, they might be of relevance to the real world (status games, proof of work or competence), but they're still games we play because we've run out of options. I think this isn't a thing to complain about, once we get there. Our ancestors struggled to survive so that we wouldn't have to.
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