A final point about fair-reading textualism. Although some judges diverge from it through purposivism or consequentialism, others (less commonly, to be sure) can diverge from it by “strict constructionism”—a hyperliteral brand of textualism that we equally reject.
A. Scalia and B. Garner, Reading Law (2012)
In the textualist tradition/method of interpretation, words are given their original public meaning, which refers to the meaning a reasonable, intelligent, but not necessarily legally proficient,reader would get from the statute at the time of its enactment. This obviously flows from the text, but equally obviously, it is strongly influenced by the history, structure, and context of the provisions being referenced. This is because the meaning of words, in common parlance, is strongly dependent upon the context in which they are written or spoken.
Turning to the particular case in front of the Court, the majority essentially held that the words "modify" and "waive", when most naturally read, only allow for modest adjustments, additions, or changes, not completely transformative ones akin to what the Department of Education was claiming the HEROES Act allowed it to do with respect to the student loan debt cancellation. With regard to this, I am in near-complete agreement with Roberts's opinion. There was, of course, a certain back-and-forth between the majority and the dissent with regard to the relevance, validity, and importance of the Major Questions Doctrine to this case (and Justice Barrett framed her entire concurrence around responding to Justice Kagan's dissent on these points); nevertheless, the MQD categorically did not supply the fundamental basis for the decision. Rather, for those Justices who agree with it, it merely represented another (secondary) point in its favor.
Now, the discussion about the standing of the states suing the Department (particularly Missouri) does seem significantly more suspect, and, at least from my perspective, the dissent has the better of that argument (which, of course, would mean that the lawsuit would be dismissed entirely). Nevertheless, it's clear that this doesn't have much of anything to do with "textualism" versus "strict constructionism"; rather, it is a decision regarding a jurisprudential doctrine (standing) that flows from the (textually vague and unhelpful) words "the judicial Power of the United States" in Article 3 of the Constitution. The Court has traditionally interpreted that by looking at precedent and at the common law that influenced the thinking and decision-making of the Framers of the Constitution.
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In the textualist tradition/method of interpretation, words are given their original public meaning, which refers to the meaning a reasonable, intelligent, but not necessarily legally proficient,reader would get from the statute at the time of its enactment. This obviously flows from the text, but equally obviously, it is strongly influenced by the history, structure, and context of the provisions being referenced. This is because the meaning of words, in common parlance, is strongly dependent upon the context in which they are written or spoken.
Turning to the particular case in front of the Court, the majority essentially held that the words "modify" and "waive", when most naturally read, only allow for modest adjustments, additions, or changes, not completely transformative ones akin to what the Department of Education was claiming the HEROES Act allowed it to do with respect to the student loan debt cancellation. With regard to this, I am in near-complete agreement with Roberts's opinion. There was, of course, a certain back-and-forth between the majority and the dissent with regard to the relevance, validity, and importance of the Major Questions Doctrine to this case (and Justice Barrett framed her entire concurrence around responding to Justice Kagan's dissent on these points); nevertheless, the MQD categorically did not supply the fundamental basis for the decision. Rather, for those Justices who agree with it, it merely represented another (secondary) point in its favor.
Now, the discussion about the standing of the states suing the Department (particularly Missouri) does seem significantly more suspect, and, at least from my perspective, the dissent has the better of that argument (which, of course, would mean that the lawsuit would be dismissed entirely). Nevertheless, it's clear that this doesn't have much of anything to do with "textualism" versus "strict constructionism"; rather, it is a decision regarding a jurisprudential doctrine (standing) that flows from the (textually vague and unhelpful) words "the judicial Power of the United States" in Article 3 of the Constitution. The Court has traditionally interpreted that by looking at precedent and at the common law that influenced the thinking and decision-making of the Framers of the Constitution.
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