site banner
PaperclipPerfector  2mo ago (text post)   35145 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of March 3, 2025

This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.

Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.

We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:

  • Shaming.

  • Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.

  • Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.

  • Recruiting for a cause.

  • Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.

In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:

  • Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.

  • Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.

  • Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.

  • Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.

On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.

7
Top Bottom Old Controversial Comments
Jump in the discussion.

No email address required.

If I'm advising a hypothetical DeSantis administration (i.e. accepting the basic premises of MAGA foreign policy thought, but ignoring Trump's personal beefs with Zelenskyy and apparent mancrush on Putin) then my strategic analysis is along the lines of:

  • Ukraine is in Europe.
  • The aims of US policy in Europe are (1) to encourage the Europeans to pay more of the cost of defending Europe [unspoken - from Russia] and (2) to prevent Europe (and the EU in particular) from developing the ability to act in a coordinated way contrary to US interests. This is hard because these aims are almost but not quite contradictory.
  • In particular, Taiwan (and containing China more broadly) is worth more to the US than Ukraine (and containing Russia more broadly), but this matters less than you think because a land war going on right now and a possible naval war in the future draw on different weapon stockpiles with different supply chains.
  • The so-called "rules based international order" is valuable to America, most importantly because it discourages nuclear proliferation. A world where Putin gets what he wants because he is a nuclear madman and DeSantis isn't is a world where a lot of countries are going to build nukes, and a few are going to act like nuclear madmen.
  • Russia's goal is to subjugate Ukraine (probably by installing a pro-Russian puppet government similar to Lukashenko in Belarus). Putin has been explicit about this. "Neutrality" is a furphy - a "neutral" Ukraine would not be able to avoid subjugation without some kind of western security guarantee which Russia would consider a violation of neutrality. In the failed Istanbul negotiations, Russia was far more concerned about "neutrality" than territory, and their idea of neutrality incorporated an explicit treaty commitment by the USA, the UK, and France not to intervene if Russia attacked Ukraine again. Note that from a European perspective, a "neutral" Ukraine is also one that wouldn't be able to prevent Russia crossing its territory in order to attack other European countries.
  • The key known unknown is Putin's intentions after subjugating Ukraine. The Mearsheimer view is that Russia wants to incorporate Ukraine into their sphere of influence, that this is reasonable because Ukraine is a natural part of the Russian sphere of influence, and that once Russia controls its natural sphere of influence Russia will not, for realist reasons, want to engage in continued aggression. The Putler view is that Russia is engaging in what lefties call "imperialism", Paradox players call "blobbing", and academics with sticks up their asses call something like "opportunistic expansionism". 200 years of Russian policy suggest that Russia sees its natural sphere of influence extending at least as far as the Vistula, and public statements by Putin administration officials are consistent with this, as is Russia's campaign of cyberattacks, election interference, WMD terrorism etc.
  • If the Putler view is correct, then failing to defend Ukraine is a mistake. It is a survivable mistake for the US, but a catastrophic one for Europe. (To paraphrase Churchill, if we appease Putler in Ukraine then the US will get dishonour, but the EU will get war).
  • Apart from Putin's intentions, there are no important secrets here. The Russians, Ukrainians, Europeans, Chinese etc. all know the same things we do. In particular, the Europeans know that Ukraine is near-existential if the Putler view is correct.
  • A strategic deal with Russia is not worth it if it means throwing Europe under the bus, because Europe is an order of magnitude more valuable as a trade partner and as an ally against China.

And the resulting policy recommendation is:

  • In the early days of the war, support for Ukraine is cheap and there is an outside chance of solving the Russia problem (if Russia either cuts and runs or offers a reasonable deal once it becomes clear that they can't win quickly). The Biden policy of providing cheap help like intel, and older weapons which were going to be replaced in the next 5-10 years anyway was a good one.
  • Once it becomes clear that this is a long war, and that support for Ukraine is going to start coming out of the budget rather than existing idle resources, the goal is to maintain a leading role while dumping the economic cost on Europe. So say, first quietly and then loudly, that the US is happy to continue helping Ukraine, but after some reasonable period of time (3-6 months) they are not going to do so for free. Then follow through - based on the above analysis the Europeans will grumble, but pay up. The US should chip in enough to retain a seat at the table - say 10-20% of the cost.
  • Engage in some performative show of strength in the Pacific to make clear that this is a pivot and not a bugout.
  • Support the European-funded response. Sell anything the US can produce that Ukraine wants on normal commercial terms. Encourage US arms manufacturers to prioritise orders bound for Ukraine (which is at war) over orders for the US (which is not). Share intel if you already have it or can acquire it cheaply. If Musk refuses to provide Starlink service to the AFU on normal commercial terms, then he doesn't get US government contracts.
  • Support the economic war against Russia, particularly in ways which directly promote US interests. (An energy-rich America is an economic competitor to Russia). Drill, baby, drill. Tank the oil price. Build out LNG export capacity. Name and shame the German businessmen who are trading with Russia via Kyrgyzstan.
  • Points about public diplomacy which shouldn't need saying but apparently do - don't lie for the benefit of a domestic audience, because everyone can see you lying. Don't take sadistic pleasure in selling out Ukraine, because it strongly suggests you would sell out Taiwan as well. Don't endorse Russophile right-populist parties in western Europe. Talk like you are leading a coalition, stamp US flags on US-made weapons the Germans are paying for, etc. etc. - the whole point is to gain the benefits of leading the free world while shirking the cost.
  • What is the win condition? We were seeing it in January/February this year. The combination of the cumulative impact of sanctions, the increasingly effective Ukrainian drone war, and the lame-duck Biden administration's decision to allow Ukraine to use western weapons to attack targets on Russian territory means that Russian logistics are falling apart. (The west, on the other hand, has near-infinite logistical capacity). If Russia doesn't come to terms while they can still supply the army in Ukraine, then the army is destroyed and they lose everything including Crimea - so they probably will.
  • If Putin does come to terms, offer face-saving concessions (Ukraine in the EU but not NATO, possibly international recognition of Russian rule in Crimea if they still control it) but not substantive ones.

If the Putler view is correct, then failing to defend Ukraine is a mistake. It is a survivable mistake for the US, but a catastrophic one for Europe. (To paraphrase Churchill, if we appease Putler in Ukraine then the US will get dishonour, but the EU will get war).

You lost me here. The idea that Russia is even capable of threatening more conquest is just silly. Ukraine was the softest target in Europe, and Putin has spent years beating his head against it. Both Ukraine and Russia have been bled dry by the war, so even if Putin won a total victory today he still wouldn't get back the manpower and materiel he spent conquering it. There is no way that he's going to come off a victory in Ukraine and move on to Poland, especially not after Poland has had so much time to prepare. And Poland wouldn't even have to fight Russia alone, since it's a NATO member. Given that Putin couldn't even get a clean win against Ukraine, it's safe to say that if he ever goes toe-to-toe with the core members of NATO his ass is grass.

Russia is poor and weak, and it just spent a whole bunch of its dwindling manpower to laboriously pry a few provinces out of Ukraine's cold, dead hands. This was its last gasp.

The Baltics exist. They are a lot weaker than Ukraine. By helping Ukraine, we do two things:

  • Demonstrate our credibility in defending countries against Russian aggression
  • Degrade Russia's war fighting capacity

Both of which deters Russia from messing with the Baltics later on. Yes, the Baltic states are in NATO, which precisely makes it worse, because fighting over them has a good chance of leading to WW3 or nuclear Armageddon, with a far higher likelihood than a war in Ukraine. So in this case, "we fight them over there so we don't have to fight them over here" makes sense. It's also not even "we fight them over there", it's "we give the Ukrainians weapons so they can fight them over there" which makes the calculus even better.

I believe the current NATO assessment is that Russia's warfighting capacity has increased and that it will be stronger and better-prepared to fight NATO after the hostilities end.

I'm not aware of that assessment but it's not unbelievable the Russian military at this point in time is more capable than it was in 2022, simply because of the necessity to fight a high intensity conflict in Ukraine. However, long term Russian war fighting capacity is still being degraded due to the accumulating effects of battlefield losses, economic sanctions and their inefficient war economy. The more we can deplete their strategic reserves, cause more casualties, and inflict economic damage, the less of a threat Russia is in the long term, and the more time they'll need to re-organize and re-arm before their next military adventure.

So if Ukraine capitulates today and Russia decides to immediately shift to attacking NATO, then, yes, that would indeed be a poor outcome. If we keep supporting Ukraine and Russia gives up because of war exhaustion, that's the best outcome. If we keep supporting Ukraine and it becomes a frozen conflict, it's still a good outcome because Russia is still occupied with Ukraine. If we keep supporting Ukraine and it eventually loses in a year or two, that would be suboptimal but still better than forcing Ukraine to capitulate now since it will keep Russia occupied for longer, depleting more of their resources, and they'll need a longer recovery period to reconstitute their strength before they can think about attacking the countries we really care about.

However, long term Russian war fighting capacity is still being degraded due to the accumulating effects of battlefield losses, economic sanctions and their inefficient war economy. The more we can deplete their strategic reserves, cause more casualties, and inflict economic damage, the less of a threat Russia is in the long term, and the more time they'll need to re-organize and re-arm before their next military adventure.

Yes, the Russians have blown through their Soviet-era artillery munitions stockpile. But pull back for a second. When was the American military more capable, 1941 or 1945 after taking a million casualties? Was the US more of a threat over the long term after 1945 or less of one?

Or heck, let's say you think the US isn't a good comparison because we destroyed all of Europe's industry. Fine, let's take Russia - more of a threat in 1941 or 1945 after losing 27 million people? I'm sure that theoretically caused them long term problems but we still had a couple of decades where "nuking Germany repeatedly" was basically our best bet at stopping them.

If we keep supporting Ukraine and it eventually loses in a year or two, that would be suboptimal but still better than forcing Ukraine to capitulate now since it will keep Russia occupied for longer, depleting more of their resources, and they'll need a longer recovery period to reconstitute their strength before they can think about attacking the countries we really care about.

I think this is context-dependent on what we're supporting Ukraine with. If we're supporting them with our own munitions stockpiles and we're sending weapons to Ukraine faster than we can reconstitute them, then we'll be the ones needing a long recovery period. This knife also cuts both ways when it comes to advanced weapons systems, the more of which we supply Ukraine with the less capable they will be if we ever use them against Russia.

Russia has blown through its stockpiles and it is not doing well economically, which impacts its military production and force generation. Sure, their military capability might have increased through adaptations and experience, especially with drones, but it's not a significant departure from their army in 2022. In fact, in terms of equipment, their formations are probably less mechanized today than three years ago. I don't see a parallel between the Russia today and the US or USSR from 1945.

Yes, if we (NATO) are depleting our materiel faster than we are depleting that of Russia, then that's a problem. So far, I don't see good evidence that's the case. Further, Ukraine itself is also producing a significant amount of war materiel like ammo, armored vehicles and drones, so having Ukraine by our side is still better than forcing it to surrender.

it is not doing well economically

Hmm. A quick Google tells me they made 3.6% growth last year. That seems...fine. Better than the US, even.

So far, I don't see good evidence that's the case.

How large was the collective NATO artillery park in 2022 versus now? How about tanks? Mines-clearing vehicles?

Why is Germany's military now less ready than it was in 2022, falling to 50% readiness rates? Probably has nothing to do with shipping gear to Ukraine (spoiler: it has something to do with shipping gear to Ukraine).

I feel like you are just trying for gotchas without addressing the core of my argument here.

EDIT: but let me just respond quickly - The 3.6% growth number is self-reported by Russia, no longer independently verifiable because they stopped reporting a lot of their economic stats after the war started. Even if taken as true at face value, we know that they are experiencing high inflations even with record high interest rates, 21% to be exact, this indicates any economic growth is propped up by an aggressive fiscal policy that's unsustainable. But what are you actually arguing for with the 3.6% number, which is apparently better than the US? Are you claiming that Russians are simply immune to the effects of economic sanctions (then why do they want those lifted?), and having a sizable portion of their work-force and industrial output being blown up in Ukraine is actually good for their economy?

The NATO equipment parks questions, I don't know. I have not seen people do analysis on NATO equipment numbers from satellite imagery, unlike the Russian equipment parks. But if you have a link, I'd be interested. My premise is that we (NATO) are not depleting our materiel faster than Russia is. Germany's readiness going down from 65% to 50% is evidence that one of the NATO countries is being affected, it does not demonstrate NATO as a whole is seeing lower readiness numbers. For example, at least Poland is seeing an increase of its own military capabilities. And even if NATO is seeing a net depletion of its own reserves, it does not demonstrate that it is depleting it at a rate higher than Russia. We have a visual database of equipment losses that tracks individual equipment types for us to estimate the relative loss rates between Russian and NATO equipment (The page actually links to Ukrainian losses as a whole, of which only a fraction is NATO supplied equipment). Also, even if this is a problem, the correct solution is to increase NATO's military production, kind of like what EU is doing right now, rather than ceding Ukraine to Russia. Again, I remind you that Ukraine is producing a significant amount of its own weapons and under no circumstances that NATO + Ukraine vs Russia is worse than NATO vs Russia + Ukraine.

More comments

What is this place?

This website is a place for people who want to move past shady thinking and test their ideas in a court of people who don't all share the same biases. Our goal is to optimize for light, not heat; this is a group effort, and all commentators are asked to do their part.

The weekly Culture War threads host the most controversial topics and are the most visible aspect of The Motte. However, many other topics are appropriate here. We encourage people to post anything related to science, politics, or philosophy; if in doubt, post!

Check out The Vault for an archive of old quality posts. You are encouraged to crosspost these elsewhere.


Why are you called The Motte?

A motte is a stone keep on a raised earthwork common in early medieval fortifications. More pertinently, it's an element in a rhetorical move called a "Motte-and-Bailey", originally identified by philosopher Nicholas Shackel. It describes the tendency in discourse for people to move from a controversial but high value claim to a defensible but less exciting one upon any resistance to the former. He likens this to the medieval fortification, where a desirable land (the bailey) is abandoned when in danger for the more easily defended motte. In Shackel's words, "The Motte represents the defensible but undesired propositions to which one retreats when hard pressed."

On The Motte, always attempt to remain inside your defensible territory, even if you are not being pressed.


New post guidelines

If you're posting something that isn't related to the culture war, we encourage you to post a thread for it. A submission statement is highly appreciated, but isn't necessary for text posts or links to largely-text posts such as blogs or news articles; if we're unsure of the value of your post, we might remove it until you add a submission statement. A submission statement is required for non-text sources (videos, podcasts, images).

Culture war posts go in the culture war thread; all links must either include a submission statement or significant commentary. Bare links without those will be removed.

If in doubt, please post it!


Rules


Recommended Posts And Communities

Recommended Realtime Chats