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Notes -
Nate Silver just accidentally posted a link to an AI slop article. A quick delve into the article text makes it obvious that the contents were blatantly copypastaed directly from the output of ChatGPT. Various GPT detectors also agree, giving it a solid 100% confidence of being slop. Unfortunately, it seems that nobody in the replies even seems to have noticed or cared.
I'm of course already used to my google searches being clogged up by black hat SEO slop, but I expected it to just live in the shadows quietly collecting clicks and boosting pagerank. So it was sobering to see an aislop article just get posted like that by someone I regard as at least somewhat intelligent.
What does this say about the world? Are normies, even somewhat intelligent ones, incapable of distinguishing the most obvious stinky smelly chatgpt output? Or did hundreds of people read the headline and drop a snarky comment, and not a single one bothered to read the article? It's either a depressing anecdote about human nature and social media, or a depressing anecdote about the lack of intelligence of the average human.
Of course aislop grifters should be fedposted just like indian call center scammers, but sometimes I can't help but feel like the victims deserved it. But when they bother me waste 5 seconds of my time again, I am right back in fedposting mode.
Edit:
Since you idiots are out here defending the slop, these quotes are hallucinations:
Here's the full recording of his talk and you can check the Youtube transcription: https://youtube.com/watch?v=MPt8V3MW1c4 And before you ask, the fake article specifically claims these fake quotes were said at his Harvard talk, not at some other time.
So again the AI put totally false words into somebody's mouth and you apologists are defending it.
Alternative phrasing: are normie journalists, even somewhat intelligent ones, incapable of putting out articles better than even the most stinky smelly chatgpt output?
I mean, why is this a surprise development? Oh, the article has a bunch of made-up garbage, you mean unlike all the rest of journalism where everything is true and the media never truly lies?
Why should I give a shit if a journo "hand authors" his latest piece of crap or just pushes a prompt at an LLM? Text generation is their speciality, and at this point I'd be stunned if most of them weren't 90th percentile in general writing quality in comparison to humans. How many journalists do you even know of for their writing quality? Hunter S Thompson and ?? Hell, just prompt the LLM in the right way and I bet you could get to 99th percentile no problem.
Do you even have an argument here beyond just the words "aislop"? Can you articulate a point that taboos the phrase slop and similar terms?
Journalists, even partisan hacks, almost never lie. They produce propaganda through omission, and when they need to spread falsehoods, they will always hedge it though "anonymous sources." It's actually quite nice that they will explicitly tell you when you're about to read something made up.
As much as I hate journalists, they are quite good at writing. Some no-name journalist at AP has gone to school for writing and honed his craft for years. His writing is almost certainly in the top 99th percentile of writing skills, and certainly far better than yours or mine.
To repeat my previous comment:
Your opinion of journalists is too low. Journalists are rabid partisans, but they're generally not very stupid. But they pretend to be stupid quite often in order to serve their side.
Absolutely fucking impossible. Just try and give me a single example of LLM output that's remotely comparable to quality human work.
Have you ever actually worked with journalists as a collective, not just a few people? I know someone in regular contact with the media. Many journalists are fools who can't even ask a clear question! They often don't understand what you're saying and introduce errors if you make any kind of complex point. Not to mention all the sloppy typos that go to press. What they're really good at is taking down talking points from corporations or media manipulators and regurgitating it as legitimate news.
First-rate LLMs are easily on par with the average journalist and that's extending every generosity to the humans.
Show me one.
They are pretending to be stupid in order to push their talking points, not yours. Your comment is only needed as a formality. When your quote is taken out of context, it's completely intentional, but at least they won't make one up.
Not even close. If you think so, then show me an LLM writing better than a generic whatever-tier human news article.
Here are some: https://www.rd.com/article/hilarious-newspaper-typos/
And here are a bunch of people seeing them, it's not just me: https://www.quora.com/Am-I-mistaken-or-are-there-more-typos-in-reputable-news-articles-each-year
I see them all the time in Australian national papers but none today.
Not everything is politics or worth lying about. Sometimes it's just a complex matter of fact and they're unable to grasp it. Or they don't understand a word like 'bifurcate', don't know what it means.
Now I'm going to copy out elements of an article in The Australian from not merely a journalist but a former Departmental Secretary, a high ranking government official. This guy should be very good! Here is the extract:
Enhance surveillance
First, we must enhance the continuous wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest. We must be able to pinpoint the precise locations and track the movement of Chinese (and Russian) ships, submarines and aircraft of interest as far from Australia as possible. This will require the more intensive use and meshing together of the sensor feeds from national intelligence systems, space-based sensors, the Jindalee radar network, P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, MQ-4C Triton surveillance drones, E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, undersea sensors and other assets.
A fused situational picture of key Chinese and Russian movements in our area of direct military interest should be developed and shared in real time with US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii in exchange for its fused picture of the same. This will require more resources to support 24/7 operations in the Australian Defence Force and the relevant intelligence agencies. Wide-area surveillance of our area of direct military interest cannot be a “business hours” activity.
Operational readiness
Second, we must enhance ADF operational readiness, which means having more forces standing ready to undertake quick alert missions, such as air interceptions and maritime surveillance flights.
This will cost money and drain crews as they will fatigue more rapidly when kept at higher states of readiness. More assertive rules of engagement should be authorised by the Defence Minister to allow for the close shadowing of Chinese and Russian units in our area of direct military interest. This would be done in a safe and professional manner, as it is being done nearly every other day by our allies and partners who are being probed regularly at sea and in the air.
The ADF’s Joint Operations Command should be reconfigured along the lines of the original vision of defence force chief General John Baker, who in 1996 established the Australian Theatre Command, or COMAUST. Baker’s logic was that the ADF should be postured, and commanded, principally to conduct operations in Australia’s area of direct military interest. While operations farther afield would be undertaken from time to time, they should not be the main focus of the ADF. After 9/11, the ADF adopted a globalist orientation. Mastery of the area of direct military interest started to fall away.
It is time for the ADF to focus zealously once again on the defence of Australia’s area of direct military interest, and our national military command arrangements and systems should reflect this.
Longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities
Third, we must urgently acquire longer-range anti-surface warfare capabilities. A radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly six to 10 US Air Force B-1B Lancer bombers, which have been configured in recent years for anti-ship strike missions. These bombers are now able to carry 36 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (24 internally in bomb bays and 12 externally), which is a fearsome anti-surface capability. While the RAAF already is acquiring the LRASM weapon for use by its F/A-18F Super Hornets, having a platform in the order of battle with the range and payload capacity of the B-1B Lancer would severely impair PLA options for mounting surface action missions against Australia.
Longer-range air superiority capability
Fourth, we must urgently acquire a longer-range air superiority capability to deal with the threat of stand-off attacks by PLA Air Force H-6 bombers operating north of Indonesia. Again, a radical suggestion would be to acquire rapidly the air-to-air version of the SM-6 missile, to equip the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters. Facing such fighters, especially if they were operating forward of the barrier, would make PLA planners think twice about mounting long-range bomber missions against Australia.
Remediate naval warfare capability
Fifth, we urgently need to remediate our naval warfare capability, to ensure that our battle fleet of six Collins-class submarines and 10 major surface combatants (the Hobart and Anzac classes) are fully crewed and ready for action.
This will require crewing, training, inventory and maintenance issues to be addressed. The RAN’s replenishment tankers need to be fixed and returned to the fleet as soon as possible. Across time, the RAN battle fleet will need to grow in size, given the rapid growth in the PLA Navy’s battle fleet.
Ideally, we should be aiming across the longer term for a battle fleet of 12 submarines, 20 major surface combatants and 20 smaller offshore combatants, the last of which could be used as missile corvettes and naval mine warfare vessels. To further enhance the RAN’s battle fleet, large landing helicopter dock vessels should be re-purposed as sea control carriers, with embarked anti-submarine and airborne early warning helicopters, and long-range naval drones.
Ensure RAAF is battle ready
Sixth, we need to ensure that the RAAF is battle ready, with its squadrons fully crewed and its air bases well protected and fully functional. It is relatively easier to expand an air force, as compared with a navy, given the vagaries of naval shipbuilding. The RAAF is therefore the better bet in terms of a rapid expansion that could be achieved soonest.
More F-35 Lightning II fighters should be acquired, along with the B-1B Lancers mentioned already. The latter could serve as an interim bomber, pending reconsideration of the acquisition of the B-21 Raider strategic bomber. Crewing ratios should be increased quickly, such that the RAAF has more crews than platforms, which could then be flown more intensively. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of the RAAF’s aircrew training pipeline in World War II should be its guiding vision.
Maritime warfare readiness
Seventh, the army should continue to develop its increasingly impressive maritime warfare capabilities and readiness. Consideration should be given to the rapid acquisition of the ground-based Typhon missile system, which would give the army a long-range anti-ship and land strike capability. As we barricade the sea-air approaches to Australia, we will have to be vigilant in relation to stealthy commando raids and sabotage operations. The army will need to be postured to deal with such attacks.
Address capability gaps
Eighth, we need to remediate a number of other capability gaps where we have no or virtually no capability. Of particular concern is integrated air and missile defence. We will need to acquire some combination of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence and Patriot interceptors on land, and SM-3 interceptors at sea. Naval mine warfare capability also needs to be addressed.
There are likely to be other gaps that would impair our ability to execute the strategy. Given the urgency of the situation, rapidly acquired interim solutions will have to suffice to fill many of these gaps. Such interim solutions can be refined and built on. That is the lesson of the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Negotiate PNG alliance
Ninth, a military alliance should be negotiated with Papua New Guinea to provide for the establishment of ADF bases in locations such as Manus, Rabaul and Lae to support the conduct of maritime surveillance, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and air superiority missions. For instance, a forward-deployed composite RAAF wing, consisting of F-35A Lightning II fighters, B-1B Lancers armed with LRASM, F/A-18F Super Hornets armed with SM-6 missiles, and P-8 Poseidon aircraft could operate from the Bismarck to the Celebes seas and beyond with the aim of denying access into our northern sea-air approaches. A similar alliance should be negotiated with The Philippines. This would extend our coverage north of the barrier into the South China Sea.
We need to better appreciate the significance of PNG and The Philippines as Pacific watchtowers of the sea-air approaches to Australia. Our Indian Ocean territories are our western watchtowers.
Develop war book
Tenth, we should urgently reinstate the practice of developing a war book that would deal with civil defence, national cyber defence, the protection of critical infrastructure and the general protection, and sustainment of the population during times of war.
While the likelihood of war in the foreseeable future is low, perhaps 10 to 20 per cent, it is enough to warrant action. This will cost money and divert resources from more agreeable activities. That is the nature of war, which drains societies even when it does not occur. Against this must be weighed the costs of being unprepared.
While this worsening strategic environment is very confronting, there is an even darker scenario. Imagine if we had to face a coercive, belligerent, and unchecked China on our own. That would require a very different military strategy and a significantly larger ADF.
That is a grim story for another day – and one that may require us to pursue our own Manhattan Project. In that world, we would look fondly on this relatively benign age.
Now here's the AI response I got with regard to the same essay, I asked it for criticism and its own proposal, with my own commentary in bold:
A Critical Analysis of Australia's Proposed Defense Strategy
The proposed alterations to Australian defense planning outline a comprehensive vision for military restructuring in response to regional threats, particularly from China. However, closer examination reveals significant practical challenges and conceptual gaps that could undermine implementation. Cringe, it doesn't need a topic statement like a university essay
Strategic Coherence vs. Practical Constraints
The recommendations build on the sensible premise of enhancing surveillance and operational readiness in Australia's immediate region. Developing a fused situational picture shared with US Indo-Pacific Command represents sound alliance management. However, this proposal glosses over the substantial personnel requirements for 24/7 operations across defense and intelligence agencies. Australia already faces defense recruitment and retention challenges, with the ADF consistently struggling to meet personnel targets. Increasing operational tempo would exacerbate crew fatigue without addressing the underlying personnel shortages. Quite right, where is the manpower coming from for this?
The proposed focus on Australia's area of direct military interest through reconfiguring Joint Operations Command reflects strategic clarity, yet organizational transformation during heightened tensions carries significant risks. Historical reorganizations, like Baker's Australian Theatre Command, often face bureaucratic resistance and implementation delays that could leave capability gaps during a critical transition period.
Capability Acquisition: Ambition vs. Reality
The article's more radical proposals expose a disconnect between strategic ambition and practical constraints. Acquiring 6-10 B-1B Lancer bombers appears compelling on paper, providing impressive anti-ship strike capability. Yet this recommendation fails to acknowledge that B-1Bs are aging platforms with declining availability in US inventories. The maintenance requirements would be substantial, and Australia lacks existing infrastructure to support heavy bombers. Pilot training pipelines would take years to develop, meaning these assets would not be operational in the short-term timeframe suggested. Nailed the key point I was hoping it'd find, buying ancient B-1 bombers is absolutely retarded, this is the drone age not the 1980s. IMO this alone puts it ahead of our self-styled military commentator in intellectual sophistication
Similarly, the naval expansion goals—growing to 12 submarines, 20 major surface combatants, and 20 smaller vessels—represent extraordinary growth beyond Australia's current shipbuilding and maintenance capacity. Australian shipyards are already struggling with existing programs like the Hunter-class frigates. This expansion would require massive industrial investment not addressed in the proposal. Moreover, the suggestion to repurpose Landing Helicopter Docks as sea control carriers overlooks their primary value as amphibious assets in a region where amphibious capability remains strategically vital. Quite right, our shipbuilding capacity is awful
Economic and Fiscal Realities
The proposals conspicuously avoid discussing costs. Implementing even half these recommendations would require defense spending well beyond Australia's current 2% of GDP. Rapid acquisition of advanced missile systems, THAAD, Patriot batteries, and SM-3 interceptors represents tens of billions in unbudgeted expenditure. The article acknowledges these measures "will cost money and divert resources from more agreeable activities" but fails to provide any framework for prioritization or cost-benefit analysis.
This fiscal blindspot undermines the strategy's credibility. Defense planners must make hard choices, yet the article presents a wishlist without acknowledging tradeoffs. A more nuanced approach would identify which capabilities deliver the most deterrent effect per dollar invested, particularly given Australia's smaller economy relative to potential adversaries. Also true, given how anemic Australian military spending is there's no point in making a huge wishlist, it needs to be sorted by priority.
Regional Politics and Forward Positioning
The proposal for military alliances with Papua New Guinea and the Philippines demonstrates strategic imagination but underestimates complex regional politics. PNG maintains significant economic ties with China, with Chinese companies heavily invested in resource extraction and infrastructure projects. The proposal ignores how these economic relationships could complicate security arrangements.
Forward basing Australian forces in PNG would require substantial infrastructure investment in relatively underdeveloped regions. Environmental impacts and relations with local communities present additional challenges not addressed in the proposal. Forward deployment also creates vulnerabilities—assets based closer to potential adversaries become targets themselves, requiring additional defensive capabilities not accounted for in the proposal.
Unaddressed Domains: Cyber, Space, and Information
The most glaring omission is the limited attention to cyber capabilities, space assets, and information operations. Modern military effectiveness depends increasingly on these domains, yet they receive passing mention at best. The proposal focuses heavily on kinetic capabilities while undervaluing the critical enabling functions of secure communications, positioning systems, and intelligence networks.
Australia's dependence on space-based systems for the proposed surveillance network creates vulnerabilities that determined adversaries would target early in any conflict. A more robust strategy would incorporate redundancy, resilience, and active defenses for these critical systems. Absolutely right, even if we did get the B1s how are we going to get them into the action without good targeting data from satellites?
The Nuclear Question
Perhaps most provocatively, the article concludes by alluding to "our own Manhattan Project" for a scenario where Australia faces China alone. This veiled reference to developing nuclear weapons raises profound questions left entirely unaddressed. Australia's longstanding commitment to non-proliferation, uranium export controls, and alliance with nuclear-armed nations would all be compromised by such a path. The international repercussions would be immense, potentially undermining the very security such weapons supposedly provide. OK, this is blather, we get it, Claude is leftwing. Also I don't see how it would inherently harm our relations with the US if we acquired nuclear weapons, though Claude may well be drawing from the history where the US talked us into joining the NPT and scuppering our nuclear program
A More Balanced Approach
A more realistic strategy would prioritize capabilities that leverage Australia's geographical advantages and alliance relationships without overextending resources. Focusing on undersea warfare, advanced sensors, unmanned systems, and cyber capabilities would provide greater deterrent effect than trying to match adversaries across all domains.
Australia should invest more in sovereign capabilities that reduce dependency on extended supply chains vulnerable to disruption. Developing domestic missile production, enhanced fuel security, and critical technology sectors would strengthen resilience while supporting the defense industrial base.
The future Australian Defense Force needs to be not just larger but smarter—emphasizing quality over quantity, asymmetric advantages over symmetrical competition, and sustainability over surge capacity. Rather than attempting to bar the sea-air approaches to Australia completely, a more nuanced strategy would focus on making adversary operations prohibitively costly through layered defensive capabilities and strategic uncertainty. boilerplate but not wrong
A truly comprehensive approach would also incorporate non-military elements of national power. Economic relationships, diplomatic initiatives, international law, and regional institutions all contribute to Australia's security. Military capabilities remain essential, but they function most effectively as part of a broader national strategy that maximizes all instruments of influence. Lmao at 'regional institutions' and 'international law' beating China, though you can interpret this as code for out-bribing China in the tiny Pacific countries while keeping the holier than thou attitude.
The proposals offer valuable ideas worth consideration, but implementation would require careful phasing, priority-setting, and recognition of practical constraints that the current analysis largely overlooks.
On balance I think Claude makes better points and presents a boring but more reasonable plan for Australia. It's unrealistic to go 'spend infinity dollars and buy everything we need plus more we don't' and 'ramp up everything to maximum'.
I really don't want to argue on the merits, but let's just delve into the hallucinations and falsehoods:
Is it substantial in terms of manpower? Maybe only a tripwire force will be deployed 24/7
Crew? These aren't crew.
Wrong use of the wrong term
They are ageing but there are plenty sitting around. The bigger issue which claude failed to catch is that the US won't sell them.
Australia already operates heavy airlift, so I see no infrastructure lacking that would be needed to support strategic heavy bombers. The maintenance requirements would of course be as substantial as any other plane.
This is used as a gotcha for the b-1 but it applies equally to all new planes. And it wouldn't take years to develop a training program. The human author even hints at that.
Even if you're right, claude's reasoning is wrong.
Bullshit
Why does Australia need amphibious assault ships? The human author is proposing a strongly anti-ship defensive posture, and claude spends no time rebutting that.
Claude proceeds to never mention the Philippines again.
The human author mentioned space a single time, as a single component in a fused surveillance system across all domains. So this sentence is just retarded.
Retarded when claude just argued against forward positioning bases in png.
Who do you think mans a P-8 or a frigate spying for Chinese ships? Crew!
No, that's perfectly correct. You're not aware of the proper terminology here. If you spend more time at sea or in the air, operational tempo increases. This is basic stuff.
It's not a tripwire force it's talking about here. Again, you do not understand what it's talking about. This is surveillance, not tripwire.
Production of the B1 finished DECADES ago. They're supposed to be replaced in 2025 by the B-21. Why would we want to be flying an obsolete, incredibly expensive to maintain aircraft with a logistics chain that barely even exists in America? No more can be made, so if we crash one, it's gone forever!
Heavy bombers are different to fighters or heavy airlift for that matter. Australia already fields fighters but not heavy bombers. These are super complicated and hard to train, it's a highest of the high-end capability that can't just be rushed in a few years. And he wants to base them in Papua New Guinea, a shithole country with no infrastructure.
That's just flatly true, Australian shipbuilding is a joke. Read up on the Hunter class if you like, Claude knows more about it than you.
There are islands in the Pacific ocean and it can be helpful if you can land things there - troops, equipment, missiles, supplies. They're not really amphibious assault ships in that any opposition will sink them quickly, they're glorified and overpriced transports. Expecting these things to function like light carriers is very silly. Australia has minimal experience with carrier operations and no carrier-borne aircraft. It's another one of Pezzulo's 'lets just develop yet another high end capability how hard can it be' moments.
Fair enough, though it's not like the original article explains how we're supposed to get in bed with the Philippines either. 'Just make an alliance' doesn't cut it either.
Claude criticizes it for not talking about space enough. Space is very important as a killchain enabler and for surveillance. That was the whole point which you seem to have missed. See here:
Claude is not perfect. Sometimes it just produces blather. But it's still considerably better than your own criticisms of it. I rest my case!
Absolutely absurd. A plane is a plane. Or give me a single real reason why not.
You seem to think that real life is like an RTS, where you need to unlock all the tech tree before you can get to heavy bombers as an endgame unit. Well that's not how it works. In fact supporting a fifth generation stealth fighter will require much more specialized infrastructure than an old ass bomber would.
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For typos:
No dates or links to the articles. I'm sure typos happen but these could be decades old for all I know. One of the examples is even a classified ad, and in case you don't know, those are not written by journalists.
Vibes with literally not a single concrete example.
Pezzulo has written dozens of long-form analytical articles for major newspapers. He is BETTER than a regular journalist, he actually achieved an office of mild significance. He does not write about lost dogs in regional papers or the fake tits of celebrity no. 10023 like most of them.
The quality of factual proposals is inseparable from their prudence.
Claude's response surpasses Pezzulo because it's a more realistic strategic plan and because it doesn't make any major blunders.
You clearly have not read many government reports if you think that's drivel. I assure you that people are being well paid to produce this kind of stuff without the ameliorating factors of any good points whatsoever.
I can't give you a concrete example, only my friend's anecdotal experiences working with journalists and my anecdotal experiences spotting missing words in newspapers. They really aren't that clever and have been getting worse.
A real journalist writes over a dozen articles every month.
At some things not others. Writing is not one of those things.
False. You can actually write a well written and well researched work arguing for both the right side and the wrong side of an argument. Haven't you ever taken English class and not gotten to choose the side of the argument you have to write for? Getting the bad side doesn't mean you throw up your arms and just say that your essay is gonna be bad.
Nope. That's just, like, your opinion, man.
I am, in fact, autistic enough to read EIRs for fun. And the rote boilerplate in them is more valuable than your claude drivel because it's not pretentious and actually serves a purpose in this world, however stupid that may be.
This thing happens so often that I can't provide a single example of it happening.
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