Transnational Thursday is a thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or international relations history. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.
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Notes -
From the Atlantic Council link:
Naturally he foresees that the Russian offensive will be bloody and that the war must continue. It's underrated just how much of the prestige information environment on foreign policy is Ukrainians, Poles and Baltics on govt payroll producing arguments for why Ukraine should get maximum support to fight on indefinitely.
Now it's "Russia hasn't taken any regional capitals!" or "their advance is too slow". The Ukrainian plan for victory seems to be "outlast Russia", even Bielieskov agrees on this. But since when was a conventional war of attrition with Russia a winning strategy for a much smaller country?
In 2022 Russia wanted Crimea and Donbass, now it's four mainland regions, maybe five. In 2026 will the new talking point be 'now they want 8 regions, we must fight on lest Ukraine be dismembered and left even more of a ruined, broken state, plus the Russians can't be trusted and will attack anyway?' Or maybe just 'Trump needed to send more aid, it's all his fault'. Sunk cost fallacy on an epic, tragic scale, being relentlessly justified with increasingly flimsy rhetoric. First it was the counteroffensive to cut off Crimea and win the war. Then Kursk to provide a valuable bargaining chip in peace talks. And now fighting to delay defeat as long as possible.
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