Transnational Thursday is a thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or international relations history. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.
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Can anyone explain what is going on in Gaza? Israel seems to be doing another ground operation, but their goal and why are murky.
Israel policy on it is a bit schizophrenic. Officially, there are two goals - destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages. Unfortunately, the IDF seems to be unable to find the hostages by itself, at least within the boundaries that are set now by the government. And Hamas does not want to make any agreement that does not involve, basically, restoring the situation to pre-October 7, with Hamas in power in Gaza, IDF fully outside Gaza, and basically resetting the board to the situation where Hamas can recover and resume what they were doing and prepare for the next round to come soon.
Obviously, this is not acceptable to Israel. On the other hand, Israel does not want to administer Gaza - day to day control over Gaza means persistent deployment of armed forces into densely populated hostile areas, which will inevitably lead to great increase of casualties on both sides, and is usually horrible for morale. On yet other hand, there's no viable alternative which is acceptable to Israel - all the ideas of "somebody" taking over from Hamas are crushed by the facts that a) nobody wants to do it and b) Hamas is still alive so "somebody" will have to fight them and really nobody wants to do it. I mean, the offer is to fight a guerilla war against motivated, well supplied and entrenched opponent, with broad support among local population, and the prize is a control of one of the shittiest places on earth with no noticeable resources, warlike population and no possibility of making any profit from it ever. Who'd buy that? And with Hamas in control, October 7 will inevitably repeat as soon as the IDF is out.
So, what Israel is doing is increasing its control over Gaza territory, while specifically not declaring the full takeover. The goal of it is twofold: a) more control over the territory means more chance to eliminate Hamas resources and somehow get lucky in the hostage area, though absent a miracle the chances of that are small, but we're talking about Jews here, miracles happen all the time; and b) more pressure on Hamas means more place for piecemeal agreements where at least some hostages could be released in exchange for temporary relieving the pressure. The pressure of course includes control over resources - the last ceasefire let enough resources to come in Gaza to physically last several months, maybe more, but who controls those resources and how is much more complicated. A lot of them are controlled by Hamas, but people of Gaza, even with their deep hatred for Israel, know that too and know Hamas has much more than it gives out. So that is another way to put pressure on Hamas and force them to both dole out some of their hoards and erode their stance with the local population. Of course, Hamas aren't stupid either, and the less hostages they have, the more reluctant they are to part with them. Currently, 23 hostages are believed to be alive, and Hamas does not want to give up more without some permanent gains.
Obviously, this situation is not sustainable, however Israel currently doesn't seem to have a solution that is both feasible and acceptable. So the strategy is to continue pressuring Hamas as much as the local and international politics allows, in hope either of softening them enough to amend their negotiation position (by either convincing some people or killing enough of them that somebody more reasonable comes to lead) or something external happening that improves the situation. Maybe US signing up to population evacuation plan, maybe some Arab sheiks going crazy and agreeing to take responsibility for Gaza, maybe Hamas making some spectacular blunder that would temporarily shut up the wokes in Europe and allow Israel to drastically increase the pressure, or there's a revolution in Iran and Hamas is left without a sponsor. Who knows. Or maybe Israeli government suddenly finds its cojones and declares that it's ready to take over Gaza now, at which point we're back to 2005. It could also be resolved the other way - the right-leaning government is toppled, the left comes to power in the next election, and agrees to Hamas deal described above, at which point we're back to October 6.
So the near term goal is to erode and weaken Hamas as an organization. Official long-term goals are described above, but they are more of an aspirational nature, as nobody knows how it's possible to actually achieve them in reality, at least in the near term.
Wasn't Oct 7 mostly IDF incompetence, and not hamas prowess?
"IDF" is not a good term here. While some of the people responsible are top of the IDF command, it's by no means ends there. Pretty much all Israeli establishment has been captured in the worldview that allowed it to happen, and sole dissenting voices have been dismissed as kooks. Israel military intelligence has a special "contrarian" unit whose sole task had been to produce scenarios challenging the established way of thinking and poking holes in established paradigms. Sort of advocatus diaboli. They weren't able to make a dent in the wall of denial that something like Oct 7 is possible even in theory. And it's hard to call it "incompetence" per se - many of the people involved were highly knowledgeable, smart and competent professionals - but within the limits of their world model. Escaping those confines is hard for any person, and it turned out that this particular world model, while very attractive - in fact, so attractive that many people still cling to it right now, unable to part with it even with the benefit of the hindsight - this model is spectacularly wrong. How to prevent it from happening again is a very hard question, I am not sure Israel will find an answer, though I sincerely hope they do.
On the other hand, Hamas spent 18 years meticulously organizing and preparing for this kind of attack and followup confrontation with the IDF. It's not random that IDF can not locate the hostages, or eliminate Hamas in one sweep, and not because they are a bunch of bumbling fools - they aren't. Hamas made a lot of preparations for this exact scenario, including developing a system of underground communications, storages and munitions, and associated warfare paradigm that still has no adequate answer from the IDF side. It's not to say Hamas is now stronger than the IDF, they are not, by far, but they came prepared and successfully exploited - and continue to exploit - the weaknesses in IDF's military approach, be it sensitivity to casualties from both sides, or unwillingness to stay on the ground for a prolonged period of time, or vulnerability to propaganda efforts targeted at the wokes in Europe and the US.
So it was both. Hamas did their homework, for 18 years, and Israel didn't and completely ignored what Hamas has been doing, because it didn't fit their worldview. The result was the catastrophe of October 7.
What is that worldview?
I described it a number of times already, but basically the worldview that the war with and ultimate destruction of Israel is not the primary priority of Arab population and government in Gaza and PA, and skillfully combining mutually beneficial economic projects and very limited single-point military interventions, to suppress a small hard core of warmongers, it is possible to achieve security for Israel and long term peace, with Arab population living independently besides Israel as maybe not friends at first but not engaging in active hostilities. Moreover, most of the Israel elites were under impression that not only this strategy is possible in principle, it has been successfully implemented in Gaza and Hamas is largely pacified and contained, and its capabilities are confined to small-scale terror acts which can be easily kept at a minimum by routine intelligence/police work. This is why a lot of peace activists lived close to the borders of Gaza and why the music festival has been organized right there on the border - because, following this worldview, single one-off terror acts could strike anywhere and the danger is the same in Tel Aviv or Haifa (maybe even more, since terrorists tend to attack population centers) as on the Gaza border, and living close to the actual population helps bringing people together and strengthens the peace.
This is not a stupid concept per se - Israel has achieved similar position with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and even in PA you could argue it is moving in that direction. So in theory, without empirical adjustment, this was possible, and certainly very attractive, humanistic and optimistic. The problem is, that's not at all what Hamas and Gaza population were. Unfortunately, this things do not work by analogy or statistically - if most snakes aren't venomous, it doesn't mean that particular one about to bite you isn't. You can't rely on statistics in such cases, and you can't make hope your main strategy, ignoring empiric data that point otherwise. Unfortunately, that's what Israel had been doing for at least 18 years (in fact, even longer, pretty much since Oslo agreements). They wanted this nice peace picture so much, they ignored the reality that did not match it.
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So nobody comments on the recent Romanian presidential elections? I'd say it's a twist that's interesting from a culture war perspective.
What is there to say? The legally elected candidate was arrested and replaced because the people in power didn't like him. Just another example of European "democracy".
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I talked to a conservative Romanian who called one of the candidates a jumped-up, corrupt demagogue fascist...and then I stopped paying attention because that topic somehow came up mid-play with my daughter. That's about the full extent of my knowledge.
A jumped-up, corrupt demagogue fascist indeed, who pretty much only had a real chance of winning only because activist judges aligned with the EU/GAE Deep State barred another jumped-up, corrupt demagogue fascist from running.
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Bloomberg has posted the list of Russian demands from the Istanbul talks:
An anonymous X user clashreport has posted a similar list, but with "adoption of EU standards for minority rights and ending nationalist propaganda" inserted as item 3.
The ordering of the items shows what Russia is willing to negotiate on:
I think Bloomberg's source consciously omitted it from the list to make Russia look like a straightforward warmonger in pursuit of moar clay. It's also the most dangerous to Ukraine in the long run, a poison pill.
Armed neutrality is easy: Ukraine can still buy whatever military hardware and training it needs from anyone, it just needs to do it in Przemyśl.
But "no persecution of the Russian language" is hard, because either Ukraine will have to crack down on its own most politically active citizens in a complete reversal of its current policy, or Russia will have a pretext for a resumption of hostilities at any moment.
Im still surprised by this. Our neutrality has always seemed to me like it gained the Soviets little. Anything to say about this from your end?
It's practically impossible to demand that Ukraine becomes officially Russian-aligned. This would require a complete takeover, and most countries would simply recognize the government in exile as the legitimate one.
Permanent neutrality leaves the door open for a future political realignment: Ukrainians are well known for throwing out the rulers they don't like.
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What is the purchasing maxim? Never offer to pay what someone is willing to do for free? This is the inverse of that- demanding for free what others know you are willing to pay for.
Even if all parts of the Russian position eventually end up being accepted as written, this demand alone would be reason enough to keep fighting on. The 'rapid' advances of Russia in the eastern front last year were still slow enough in absolute amount of territory gained that it would have taken years of fighting at the same rates to finish conquering the claimed territories at the same rate, if they could sustain the same intensity over that period of time. Indications so far this year don't really support that, with the territorial advances in Ukraine in the earlier part of this year falling behind the rate of the last months of last year.
The upcoming Russian summer offensive does not change that. In fact, the bloodier it is expected to be, the less reason to accept the Russian ceasefire terms to give up land it has not conquered, especially if you expect this advance to make major gains against the Ukrainian defensive lines.
After all, if the land and defensive lines would be lost regardless, the relevant variable isn't the land being lost, but the resources both sides lose to do so. Russian forces and equipment and time spent taking the easternmost regions by force are resources that can't be used in a later offensive should the conditional ceasefire break down. In turn, the defensive positions in the east, even if they are insufficient, are better than the defensive lines further west, while the investments in the east provide no benefit if turned over without a fight. But defenses in the west will have more time to be developed if it takes months, or even 'just' weeks, to be developed.
Even if the entirety of the four regions is conquered in the coming offensive- and that requires a level of belief that the Ukrainians are about to have a systemic collapse cascade that ignores the last few years of the war to date- it would still be better to accept the Russian demands then, rather than now.
And if the Russians wouldn't be interested in accepting them then, that is a pretty strong indicator they aren't likely to be satisfied even if the terms were accepted now. Which increases the value of making the Russians pay more manpower / material / time in the present, rather than leaving it open in the future.
From the Atlantic Council link:
Naturally he foresees that the Russian offensive will be bloody and that the war must continue. It's underrated just how much of the prestige information environment on foreign policy is Ukrainians, Poles and Baltics on govt payroll producing arguments for why Ukraine should get maximum support to fight on indefinitely.
Now it's "Russia hasn't taken any regional capitals!" or "their advance is too slow". The Ukrainian plan for victory seems to be "outlast Russia", even Bielieskov agrees on this. But since when was a conventional war of attrition with Russia a winning strategy for a much smaller country?
In 2022 Russia wanted Crimea and Donbass, now it's four mainland regions, maybe five. In 2026 will the new talking point be 'now they want 8 regions, we must fight on lest Ukraine be dismembered and left even more of a ruined, broken state, plus the Russians can't be trusted and will attack anyway?' Or maybe just 'Trump needed to send more aid, it's all his fault'. Sunk cost fallacy on an epic, tragic scale, being relentlessly justified with increasingly flimsy rhetoric. First it was the counteroffensive to cut off Crimea and win the war. Then Kursk to provide a valuable bargaining chip in peace talks. And now fighting to delay defeat as long as possible.
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That's what the reported Russian threat was aimed against: "it will be five regions the next time we meet".
I agree that a major Ukrainian collapse is improbable, but it is not impossible. Russian operational competence is low, but most Ukrainian units are half-strength right now at best. If there's a lucky breakthrough, the 93rd might not be there to plug the gap in time. I am not talking about a total collapse, but a major realignment like the 2022 Harjkov counteroffensive.
And it was a poor threat for the same reason. Good threats should never incentivize people to not comply.
The issue is not how many regions Russia wants to claim. The issue is that it no matter how many kms of regions Russia wants to demand the ukrainians turn over without fighting, it will still be in the Ukrainian interest to make Russia pay the resources they are willing to spend fighting km by km, rather than let Russia have both kms and the resources to conquer more.
A Russian offer that a concession of KMs will stop further aggression runs into the Russian credibility problem.
Better a kharkiv further east within the regions that Russia insists it wants all of, than a kharkiv further west to be basis of claim a fifth region.
Oooh, this makes sense, thanks
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Some headlines below for your consideration, focused on risks. The high level overview is that Trump's Middle East trip is going well, India/Pakistan situation not that worrying. I was also surprised that the PKK announced its disbandment. Generally things seem less tense than a couple weeks ago.
Satellite images show Russian military buildup near Finnish border
Cotton Introduces Bill to Prevent Diversion of Advanced Chips to America’s Adversaries and Protect U.S. Product Integrity
Kurdish militant group, PKK decides to disband and end armed struggle with Turkiye
On May 14, a formation of Chinese Coast Guard vessels patrolled the territorial waters around my Diaoyu Islands.
PM Modi outlines harder stance against terrorists. Says that any terrorist attack on India will be met with a strong and decisive response; that India will not tolerate "nuclear blackmail" and will respond with precise strikes; that there will be no distinction between terrorist groups and their sponsors
Türkiye Says It Is Closely Monitoring PKK Disbandment to Secure Peace
Did Pakistan agree to ceasefire after IAF bombed nuclear assets in Kairana Hills? Did it cause leak of radiation?
Iran 'ready to make nuclear concessions'
Amazon will work with AI company recently launched by Saudi Arabia’s ruler to invest upwards of $5 billion-plus in building an AI Zone in Saudi Arabia
Genocide in Syria: Jihadists Massacre Druze, Christians, 'Infidels'
Nvidia sending 18,000 of its top AI chips to Saudi Arabia
Trump, Saudis secure $600B investment deal to include billions in US defense weapons
Similar to a 600B number earlier this year
Taiwan military conducts its first live-fire test of American-made HIMARS, military expert says: its survivability is very fragile.
Nigerian state, Borno, with 6M people, bans the sale of petrol in order to reduce the mobility of jihadist militants
EU finalizes 17th sanctions package targeting Russia's shadow fleet and defense sector
German police arrest three men over alleged Russian parcel bomb plot
Inside Putin's New Kill Squad: Russian Dictator Launches 'KGB 2.0'
Amid beating from India, Baloch rebels also claim 71 attacks on Pakistani forces
No radiation leak from any nuclear facility in Pakistan, says IAEA amid buzz after Indian claims
Macron open to deploying French nuclear weapons in Europe
Estonia tried to detain vessel from Russia's shadow fleeet, did not succeed
Here is the more polished "global risks brief" my team creates from the items above (and others). The executive summary is:
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Why is it that these very small and weak countries in the Baltic are so eager to go all in on 'we hate Russia' and make incidents? Estonia does not have any combat aircraft whatsoever. Their military is roughly equivalent to the Oklahomah national guard, who do actually have some aircraft. This is not really a good position to be trying to seize Russian ships. Seizing other people's ships is cringeworthy behaviour whether it's the Houthis, Estonia or America but Estonia's by far the weakest player.
'Scream hysterically and wave a tiny stick' doesn't seem like a great strategy, I suppose that it's popular domestically.
Yes, how dare Estonia... attempt to inspect a tanker, possibly one traveling in its territorial waters? And not even one sailing under the Russian flag. Which, yes, we all know that maritime registries are fig leafs and tax evasion, but it still counts.
If anything, the overreaction here was by Russia:
I don't see anything wrong with Estonia attempting to enforce the sanctions the West has imposed on Russia, and trusting in its alliance with the West to then back it up when it attempts to enforce them. Any policing effort is backed by the state's authority and not just the physical capabilities of the arresting officer (although it certainly helps to be a bruiser), so if you expand it up a bit to geopolitics, this is no different.
If you're an arthritic, 50 kg woman without a gun, you shouldn't try to enforce rules you and your friends invented the other day on a 200 kg heavyweight boxer with a 20 mm autocannon in his back pocket just because your friends also have big muscles, autocannons, bazookas and miniguns. It puts stress on your relationship and raises tensions.
It's obnoxious behaviour to go 'oh you need insurance to sail in these waters' and 'oh only we provide acceptable insurance, we'll sanction whoever provides insurance'. Sanctions are one thing, trying to mess with freedom of the seas is another, it's like a passive-aggressive blockade albeit 90% passive. This kind of behaviour is how you get your car keyed or your airspace violated.
I thought this thread was illuminating; thanks all
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Well, was it in its territorial waters or not? This seems like it's the deciding question, since ostensibly all actors involved more or less agree on the underlying conventions. There is a corridor of international waters along the centreline of the Finnish Gulf. The version I've read suggests that the tanker was following it (indeed, why would it not?), though some insinuate that it might have veered narrowly into Estonian waters at some point during the incident? It's pretty hard to discern the facts in a conflict where so many consider it their patriotic duty to lie if it makes their side look better.
Well, it all depends on what in fact happened, and what the sanctions really say. Are they in fact an explicit guarantee to participating state that amounts to "we will give you military cover to seize Russian ships in international waters"? Are they ambiguous, or in fact explicitly not saying that much? It's known that the Estonian state has a white-glowing hatred for Russia, and if they could press a button that made the US and Western Europe fight a hot war against it, they probably would (regardless of how the would-be belligerents feel about it). I could easily imagine a situation where whoever formulated the sanctions did not anticipate such a situation, but left enough ambiguity and lack of clear public information that Estonia saw something that to them looked like the aforementioned button and decided to press it.
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Because their domestic audience hates Russia so badly they wish the Nazis had won WWII and it’s not like Russia can do much to them- the wrath of big daddy America is too fearsome.
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India explicitly denied hitting nuclear facilities. The buzz was manufactured by media/social-media accounts.
If I recall correctly, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine involves using a lot more tactical warheads to offset Indian conventional superiority in the event of an invasion, so their warheads are a lot more widespread and forward deployed. Which would make the possibility of accidentally striking warheads a lot more likely. 4Chan found evidence of US Department of Energy personnel getting flown into Pakistan shortly after the strike. The DoE builds American nuclear weapons so they would be the type of people you would ask to get cleanup advice.
The DoE has US authority and expertise for all nuclear matters, to the point that the US Navy nuclear propulsion program is part DoD, part DoE. It makes sense that if there's even rumours of a radiation leak, the US would want/be invited to send some experts to check it out/verify for the propaganda/masses that there's nothing going on. Or hell, it may even have been an unfortunately scheduled unrelated visit.
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Technically, the pantex plant in Texas builds nuclear weapons.
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