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Notes -
Bloomberg has posted the list of Russian demands from the Istanbul talks:
An anonymous X user clashreport has posted a similar list, but with "adoption of EU standards for minority rights and ending nationalist propaganda" inserted as item 3.
The ordering of the items shows what Russia is willing to negotiate on:
I think Bloomberg's source consciously omitted it from the list to make Russia look like a straightforward warmonger in pursuit of moar clay. It's also the most dangerous to Ukraine in the long run, a poison pill.
Armed neutrality is easy: Ukraine can still buy whatever military hardware and training it needs from anyone, it just needs to do it in Przemyśl.
But "no persecution of the Russian language" is hard, because either Ukraine will have to crack down on its own most politically active citizens in a complete reversal of its current policy, or Russia will have a pretext for a resumption of hostilities at any moment.
What is the purchasing maxim? Never offer to pay what someone is willing to do for free? This is the inverse of that- demanding for free what others know you are willing to pay for.
Even if all parts of the Russian position eventually end up being accepted as written, this demand alone would be reason enough to keep fighting on. The 'rapid' advances of Russia in the eastern front last year were still slow enough in absolute amount of territory gained that it would have taken years of fighting at the same rates to finish conquering the claimed territories at the same rate, if they could sustain the same intensity over that period of time. Indications so far this year don't really support that, with the territorial advances in Ukraine in the earlier part of this year falling behind the rate of the last months of last year.
The upcoming Russian summer offensive does not change that. In fact, the bloodier it is expected to be, the less reason to accept the Russian ceasefire terms to give up land it has not conquered, especially if you expect this advance to make major gains against the Ukrainian defensive lines.
After all, if the land and defensive lines would be lost regardless, the relevant variable isn't the land being lost, but the resources both sides lose to do so. Russian forces and equipment and time spent taking the easternmost regions by force are resources that can't be used in a later offensive should the conditional ceasefire break down. In turn, the defensive positions in the east, even if they are insufficient, are better than the defensive lines further west, while the investments in the east provide no benefit if turned over without a fight. But defenses in the west will have more time to be developed if it takes months, or even 'just' weeks, to be developed.
Even if the entirety of the four regions is conquered in the coming offensive- and that requires a level of belief that the Ukrainians are about to have a systemic collapse cascade that ignores the last few years of the war to date- it would still be better to accept the Russian demands then, rather than now.
And if the Russians wouldn't be interested in accepting them then, that is a pretty strong indicator they aren't likely to be satisfied even if the terms were accepted now. Which increases the value of making the Russians pay more manpower / material / time in the present, rather than leaving it open in the future.
That's what the reported Russian threat was aimed against: "it will be five regions the next time we meet".
I agree that a major Ukrainian collapse is improbable, but it is not impossible. Russian operational competence is low, but most Ukrainian units are half-strength right now at best. If there's a lucky breakthrough, the 93rd might not be there to plug the gap in time. I am not talking about a total collapse, but a major realignment like the 2022 Harjkov counteroffensive.
And it was a poor threat for the same reason. Good threats should never incentivize people to not comply.
The issue is not how many regions Russia wants to claim. The issue is that it no matter how many kms of regions Russia wants to demand the ukrainians turn over without fighting, it will still be in the Ukrainian interest to make Russia pay the resources they are willing to spend fighting km by km, rather than let Russia have both kms and the resources to conquer more.
A Russian offer that a concession of KMs will stop further aggression runs into the Russian credibility problem that drives the preference, and which the threat raises- that there will be more demanded in the future.
Even if one agrees with your assessment, better a kharkiv within the regions that Russia insists it wants all of, than a kharkiv further west to be basis of claim a fifth region.
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