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Culture War Roundup for the week of November 28, 2022

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I have a lot of sympathy (or maybe pity) for SBF. "Stole client funds" appears to have solidified as a meme much the same way "crossed state lines" had in the Rittenhouse case.

I think it's hard for people, including technologists who haven't worked as quants, to appreciate the level of technology risk that's present in quant trading. In most of tech your biggest risk is having all of your data destroyed, and you can address that with well worn improvements in backups. You also risk being hacked but those breaches tend to be embarrassing rather than company ending. Even Sony, which was pwned as hard as you could possibly be pwned, ultimately recovered. But an additional risk in quant trading is accidentally and irrecoverably giving all of your assets away in a few seconds.

Even companies that are following all of the rules and have the right number of members of the professional management class in their ranks can destroy themselves in a matter of minutes. Knight Capital Group destroyed itself in 30 minutes by (with some creative license) failing to follow heroic practices around retiring old flags in protobufs.

Alameda/FTX had a culture that resembled "move fast and break things". They grew extremely quickly. I'm highly skeptical they were able to stand up robust accounting and practices to mitigate technology risks in so short a time.

When SBF says he didn't realize they were leveraged due to accounting error, I believe him. It's not like you can just install the QuickBooks Enterprise Crypto Derivatives Exchange plugin. All of this stuff was bespoke, and in a hurry.

When you thought you had $30b in assets and minimal liabilities, you can spend a billion or two on indulgences, charitable giving and campaign contributions. Your can say confidently you're not investing client funds. If those assets are suddenly marked down 90% you look like a fraud and you're in deep shit.

That's the nature of the business and he knew the risks. But probably in hindsight I'm sure he wishes he had been even more careful.

This isn't to say that I believe he definitely didn't commit fraud. Rather this is me saying that as someone who has pushed code that I thought accidentally gave away $10 million of my employer's money (the gigantic exhale of relief came when we learned I failed to scale by 1000x in the reporting and not the ordering), I am defaulting to blaming it on stupidity before malice.

Alameda/FTX had a culture that resembled "move fast and break things". They grew extremely quickly. I'm highly skeptical they were able to stand up robust accounting and practices to mitigate technology risks in so short a time.

When SBF says he didn't realize they were leveraged due to accounting error, I believe him. It's not like you can just install the QuickBooks Enterprise Crypto Derivatives Exchange plugin. All of this stuff was bespoke, and in a hurry.

The problem is that they didn't even try to have anything in place to handle what is basic practices in running any kind of a business. The bankruptcy filing is apoplectic about this, and sure, you can write that off as "old, out-of-touch guy doesn't understand modern new Internet" but even the adulatory pieces (like the Sequoia article which I keep coming back to again and again because you can pull so many plums out of it) describes how it was being run like a college dorm. And, uh, it keeps giving EA a black eye in the process, since it was via EA that Bankman-Fried met the likes of MacAskill and got involved with EA people and used them for labour and sources of funding to start him off. Bankman-Fried was making fast and (relatively) easy money off the "kimchi premium" but like all good things, that came to an end. So what next? Well, spinning up Alameda Research and FTX into a crypto exchange!:

The first 15 people SBF hired, all from the EA pool, were packed together in a shabby, 600-square-foot walk-up, working around the clock. The kitchen was given over to stand-up desks, the closet was reserved for sleeping, and the entire space overrun with half-eaten take-out containers. It was a royal mess. But it was also the good old days, when Alameda was just kids on a high-stakes, big-money, earn-to-give commando operation. Fifty percent of Alameda’s profits were going to EA-approved charities.

“This thing couldn’t have taken off without EA,” reminisces Singh, running his hand through a shock of thick black hair. He removes his glasses to think. They’re broken: A chopstick has been Scotch taped to one of the frame’s sides, serving as a makeshift temple. “All the employees, all the funding—everything was EA to start with.”

The HQ building is distinguished by a reception desk in the microscopic lobby. The door is unlocked. There is no receptionist. I peek around the corner and into the FTX command center—29 desks in a room designed to hold 8, at most. Every desk touches two or three others. There are no aisles. To get across the room, you have to wade through (and, at times, climb over) a sea of office chairs. Walls of wide-screen monitors—two, four, even six per desk—stand in place of cubicle walls. The screens erupt like palm leaves from aluminum uprights and are oriented willy-nilly: up, down, sideways. Some screens are mounted so high they seem to hang down from the ceiling. It’s office environment as jungle, and the oddest thing about it is that no one seems to be home.

At first blush, the scene is classic startup—the kitchen full of snacks and soda; the free catered breakfasts, lunches, and dinners; the company bathroom stocked with everything you’d need to actually live at the office: Q-tips, disposable razors, Kotex. In keeping with the fashion aesthetic of senior management, the dress code is marketing-swag-meets-utilitarian-merch: gift-bag T-shirts featuring the FTX logo, nylon athletic shorts, white-cotton gym socks.

So it was chaotic and disorganised, but that doesn't mean anything more sinister than incompetence and biting off more than they could chew, right? Except again, and this is going off bits and pieces I've read online but don't have bookmarked to quote as sources, there was something going on below the surface. One of the 'co-founders' quit in 2018 because of unspecified concerns about how it was being run, as in 'not 100% honest'. Another claim is that early on, when a bunch of people who thought they were co-founders or equal partners or however they had taken it on trust that FTX 'belonged' to them all, wanted to leave and cash out what they thought they were due, turns out that Bankman-Fried had registered everything in his name and was the sole legal owner of the entire kit and kaboodle. So there are indications that he wasn't simply over-eager and not able to handle this, but had basically good intentions.

There's an entire web of entities associated with the entire FTX/Alameda operation, and Bankman-Fried holds majority ownership of most of them (again, God bless the bankruptcy filing, Mr. John J. Ray III may be old-school but he knows how to track down what he needs to know):

For purposes of managing the Debtors’ affairs, I have identified four groups of businesses, which I refer to as “Silos.” These Silos include: (a) a group composed of Debtor West Realm Shires Inc. and its Debtor and non-Debtor subsidiaries (the “WRS Silo”), which includes the businesses known as “FTX US,” “LedgerX,” “FTX US Derivatives,” “FTX US Capital Markets,” and “Embed Clearing,” among other businesses; (b) a group composed of Debtor Alameda Research LLC and its Debtor subsidiaries (the “Alameda Silo”); (c) a group composed of Debtor Clifton Bay Investments LLC, Debtor Clifton Bay Investments Ltd., Debtor Island Bay Ventures Inc. and Debtor FTX Ventures Ltd. (the “Ventures Silo”); and (d) a group composed of Debtor FTX Trading Ltd. and its Debtor and non-Debtor subsidiaries (the “Dotcom Silo”), including the exchanges doing business as “FTX.com” and similar exchanges in non-U.S. jurisdictions. These Silos together are referred to by me as the “FTX Group.”

Each of the Silos was controlled by Mr. Bankman-Fried. Minority equity interests in the Silos were held by Zixiao “Gary” Wang and Nishad Singh, the co-founders of the business along with Mr. Bankman-Fried. The WRS Silo and Dotcom Silo also have third party equity investors, including investment funds, endowments, sovereign wealth funds and families. To my knowledge, no single investor other than the co-founders owns more than 2% of the equity of any Silo.

To my knowledge, Mr. Bankman-Fried owns (a) directly, approximately 53% of the equity in Debtor West Realm Shires Inc.; (b) indirectly, approximately 75% of the equity in Debtor FTX Trading Ltd.; (c) directly, approximately 90% of the equity in Debtor Alameda Research LLC; and (d) directly, approximately 67% of the equity in Clifton Bay Investments LLC.

Also, Alameda was making loans to several of the founders/executives of FTX, and whatever about Bankman-Fried's alleged austere lifestyle, what did he do with a personal loan of $1 billion?

Related Party Loans Receivable of $4.1 billion at Alameda Research (consolidated) consisted primarily of a loan by Euclid Way Ltd. to Paper Bird Inc. (a Debtor) of $2.3 billion and three loans by Alameda Research Ltd.: one to Mr. Bankman-Fried, of $1 billion; one to Mr. Singh, of $543 million; and one to Ryan Salame, of $55 million.

He definitely got in over his head, but it's looking like he was spoofing all along and was aware that he couldn't keep the promises he was making. He figured out a way to make a quick buck (the kimchi premium) but that was never going to last, and once it ran dry, it seems like he couldn't go back to being just another quant trader looking for his old job at Jane Street back, he liked the fame and praise, as well as the money, from being the bitcoin arbitrage genius and so he looked for more ways to make fast, big bucks off crypto.

EDIT: Whoops, how could I forget the "software backdoor"? That moves things from the "well-meaning but dumb" column to the "oh yeah shady as frick" column:

There was no daily reconciliation of crypto positions. A software backdoor “conceal[ed] the misuse of customer funds”. User keys and critically sensitive data were sent around the group by an “unsecured group email account”. Group payment requests went “through an online chat platform where a disparate group of supervisors approved disbursements by responding with personalised emojis.” A paper trail is largely non-existent.