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Notes -
An Iranian news service has published a clear photograph (Twitter link, possibly slower Iranian link) of a US gravity bomb hitting the B1 bridge in Karaj.
Twitter ID's the bomb as a GBU-31. It's definitely looks to be some sort of JDAM, and it does not appear to have a wing kit (such as in a JDAM-ER) which means it was dropped at a very short range, likely inside of 15 miles, and in broad daylight. Karaj is just outside Tehran, which means that either US forces flew several hundred miles over Iranian territory to drop gravity bombs, or, intriguingly, the US approached over the Caspian Sea, indicating an overflight route over, probably, Azerbaijan.
Either way, I am going to take a lil victory lap after my assessment a couple days ago that the US was, in fact, using gravity bombs inside of Iranian territory. This was very close to Tehran, suggesting that the US has a high degree of access even to areas one would expect to be highly defended.
Still here? Good, because I actually wanted to talk about China. Well, China and Iran. Or Iran, China, and the US.
Earlier this year, I read Strategy of Denial by Elbridge Colby. Colby makes a very concise argument for why the US should focus on countering China. Basically, Colby argues that Asia is the most significant part of the world, with the largest chunk of the global economy, and that it was essentially the area where the United States could be critically harmed by having someone else hegemonize the region. Colby dismisses the idea that the US' paramount security concerns are in Europe or the Middle East, and argues that it is important to prevent China from dominating Asia to avoid damaging US interests and the quality of life of American citizens. I highly recommend it, just as a read, specifically because Colby's writing style is extremely straightforward - I expected a much denser book.
Colby is now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Needless to say, some things have changed since Strategy of Denial was written in 2021. The security situation in Europe has arguably deteriorated significantly, and the war to defend those American interests in the Middle East that Colby said were not all that important is going strong. But the reason I want to revisit the book isn't to dunk on the fact that we're very clearly expending a lot of munitions that would be very relevant to a fight with China fighting Iran. It's because of the specific threat that Colby identifies from China. Colby's argument, hearkening back to the domino theory from the Cold War, is that Taiwan is specifically where the US and its regional Pacific partners should draw the line. If China starts taking territory it will be better positioned to add subsequent countries into its regional hegemony, either by force or coercive diplomacy. Colby identifies China starting from where it has the best relative strength (against Taiwan) and moving from there against other nations in the region, a tactic 4X players everywhere understand intuitively.
Is it just me, or does that seem familiar?
How about snatching Maduro (possibly the weakest American adversary), toppling the government of Cuba, and then moving to take out Iran? (a much stronger and more capable foe). Wait, that's not quite what happened - Cuba is still alive and kicking (for now). But if you squint, it almost looks like the Trump administration read Strategy of Denial and then...decided to ignore all of its recommendations for the US in lieu of pursuing its recommendations for China.
I don't know - I just thought it was an intriguing thought, but it's not clear to me that is what is going on. What is clear to me is that the US is probably now at the nadir of its strength relative to China in the Pacific. Over the next five years, US munitions production levels are slated to ramp up to extremely high numbers, but this will take time. If China wants to invade Taiwan (and I think that they would prefer not to, to be fair) the best time is probably while the US is stuck in the Middle East bombing stuff, the second-best time is as soon as you can afterwards.
How about it, China? How's it going?
Well...maybe not so great. The PLA has been gutted pretty badly by purges, which are also hitting high-level weapons engineers. I'm pretty skeptical of the theory that this is because recent US successes demonstrated that Chinese weapons were vaporware - it seems too neat, too America-centric.
But I do wonder if the US had some reason to believe that China was not going to move in 2027. Some reason to think they could mop up a few holdouts before beginning the real pivot to the Pacific?
Or maybe Hesgeth really was taken aback by Iran chimping out in retaliation for the decapitation strike, and maybe Xi is keeping all of his "purged" generals in a backroom somewhere waiting to spring them out as soon as he pushes the big button.
That is provided Chinese already decided to take Taiwan by force as soon as possible, and are only waiting for the right moment. However, if they did not decide that, and are considering what would it cost them and whether it's worth it, then showing US Army is no longer Milley's army - which had more concerned with looking pleasant towards China than with being lethal - may very well tilt their decisions towards "maybe not right now". I mean, nobody really wants a hot war with China. That'd be a complete disaster - not for US military as such, but for the world economy. Maybe convincing China they'd lose more than they'd gain is a good alternative? Unlike Iranians - whose ideology is pretty much a religious death cult - China can be very pragmatic.
I think that the Chinese would prefer not to fight over Taiwan at all. They would prefer to inevitably assimilate it.
But to your point, I think we're getting into the "deterrence through strength" versus "deterrence through resolve." Perhaps it's just my bean-counter personality - I think that it's better to have the munitions and forego other entanglements to show China that we mean business (if we're going to go down that road.)
But perhaps I am too calculating, and the US throwing its weight around and possibly even getting in a bit further than intended is exactly what would make China reconsider.
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