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Culture War Roundup for the week of November 2, 2026

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Legitimacy & Israel

What is it that makes a state legitimate? It's amazing to me how many people simply take any existing state as legitimate, without asking whether it ought to be seen as legitimate or not. States commit horrific acts of violence and coercion daily, so this is an important question. How can we know whether such a state is actually justified in committing such blatantly awful acts?

There are, I think, at first appearance two popular theories of this: might makes right, and democratic moralism. The former theory is amoral, and the latter is moralistic. In practice, however, I think these are in fact merely two faces of the same coin.

On the one hand, the might-makes-right people say that the state is self-justifying. It exists, it has might, therefore obey it, end of discussion. This is unsatisfying in that it essentially dodges the topic of discussion. As such it is not really a valid answer to the question of legitimacy; rather it implicitly denies that there is any question to be had at all. Might makes right might be a good starting point for a science of state, which investigates how, in human history, states have emerged and become mighty, but it is inappropriate for the normative question that is the question of legitimacy (what type of state should there be?).

Now on the other hand the democratists say that the state is justified when it is popular. But why should that be? If you assume, empirically, that people have different levels of moral aptitude, then popularity immediately appears to be a formula to craft a wicked state. The only deeper justification is that popularity probably correlates with mightiness. But this is just a thin veneer over the first position.

So said Thrasymachus:

Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. […]

Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies? […] And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.

— Plato, Republic 338c–339a (trans. Jowett)

In the Gorgias, Socrates makes the link to democracy explicit, and Callicles agrees:

SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?

CALLICLES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

CALLICLES: Very true.

— Plato, Gorgias 488d (trans. Jowett)

But Callicles then points out the absurdity of democracy:

CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?

— Plato, Gorgias 489b–c (trans. Jowett)

I agree, rather, with Socrates (and Plato?) that the aristocratic rule by virtue is more just than the democracy. And likewise the most legitimate state is the state of Reason (or what was called philosophy). I believe in modern times, Francis Galton and Friedrich Nietzsche have shown us the way to establish a legitimate state.

I teach ye the Overmen! Man is something that should be overcome. What have ye done to overcome him?

All beings until now created something above themselves: but ye want to be the ebb of the great tide and prefer rather to go back to animals than to overcome man?

What is an ape to a man? A joke or a painful disgrace! And likewise should men for the Overmen be: a joke or a painful disgrace.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, Prologue §3

Galton:

If a twentieth part of the cost and pains were spent in measures for the improvement of the human race that is spent on the improvement of the breed of horses and cattle, what a galaxy of genius might we not create!

— Francis Galton, "Hereditary Talent and Character," Macmillan's Magazine 12 (1865)

Thirdly it must be introduced into the national conscience, like a new religion. It has, indeed, strong claims to become an orthodox religious tenet of the future, for Eugenics co-operates with the workings of Nature by securing that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races. What Nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly.

— Francis Galton, "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope and Aims" (1904), in Essays in Eugenics (1909)

I take Eugenics very seriously, feeling that its principles ought to become one of the dominant motives in a civilised nation, much as if they were one of its religious tenets.

— Francis Galton, Memories of My Life (1908)

Now this brings me to Israel. Israel is a recent example of state foundation, by which I mean the art of creating a new state. It was founded in 1948 by a population made up largely of recent immigrants; for well over a thousand years Jews had been but a small minority in the region; for nearly two thousand there was no Jewish state.

Now, what kind of state is Israel? Obviously, it is Jewish. But it is also democratic. And it seems to premise its existence on the dwelling of the Jewish immigrants in the region. What inferences can we make here regarding probable hypotheses in the science of state? For one, we can guess that Israel and states like it depend on the influx of people into its vicinity for its sustenance. In other words Israel is predicated on the mass immigration of aliyah; the Jewish population grew from about 25,000 in the 1880s to about 630,000 by 1948, mostly through immigration. It is merely, then, the armed and coercive organisation of that population.

What sort of just foundation is that? Consider this: when one man declares himself sovereign, he is a laughing stock, like an ape. When a few men do it, they are criminals; yet when many men do it, I am supposed to profess that they are just?

I would prefer to keep my reason and see all such founders, not only Israel's, as laughing-stocks and criminals. Thus, I see Israel as the farce of state foundation. For before Israel we knew the way to the just state; yet it was the Torah and its aliyah which led to the foundation of Israel, a state not unlike all previous states, and all of its rivals in the region. There is nothing new or elevated about Israel. What is the higher purpose?

And if Israel is farce, who then is the tragedy? One does not have to look far; it is Israel's greatest ally, or should I say its uncle, old Samuel. For the United States was founded on philosophy, it was founded on higher ideals. But its ideals were flawed, because its philosophers were flawed, and so were its people. It started as an oligarchy, that saw itself as an aristocracy, and it never knew true justice. As Plato would predict, it degenerated to a democracy, and lost most of what apprehension of virtue it had, and now many say it is on the road to tyranny.

Imagine what could be done with North America if it were not already settled! That is the tragedy. And the farce is all the effort put in to crowding out the Muslims in Palestine, for nothing higher at all. The situation is so dire that people dream of settling Mars, a desert with no water and no breathable air, because at least it is not yet scourged by a state. Galton had the same dream:

On the forty-second page of the notebook, Galton lays out the skeleton of a story involving Mars, sun signals flashed from Earth, and eugenics among intelligent Martians, who are said to be descended from Ants by natural and artificial selection.

— Gavan Tredoux, galton.org

Some will say all of this is silly because it is impossible. But we know true aliyah is not impossible; Galton showed us that much. If Israel were impossible, it would not be because of the Jews. It would be because of the gentiles. So too, if true Israel is impossible, it is because the true gentiles block the true aliyah of the true Jews. (Sozusagen). Ask yourself, are you a Jew or a Gentile? Is it just for the gentiles to stop the Jews? And how should Jews feel, if they are stopped?

To be plain, since the above is metaphor (which I think has value in itself): I am not talking about actual Jews or gentiles. Zionism showed that a scattered people can migrate and found a state within a few decades; Galton showed what kind of state would be worth founding. By «true Israel» I mean a state founded on reason and on Galton's eugenics rather than on scripture. By «true aliyah» I mean the migration of the people who want such a state to a place where they can found it. By «true Jews» I mean those founders, and by «true gentiles» the existing states and peoples who would stop them. So the question I am asking is: would it be just for existing states to block the founding of a better one, and would its founders be wronged if they were blocked?

A state is what happens when a nation holds and administers sovereign land. A nation is a group of people who feel themselves bound by kinship. The nation of Judaism has long existed without a state and then founded one in Israel. It's not really much more complicated than that.

So do you think the Holocaust was wrong, or that it was just an action but a legitimate nation, which had a group of people who feel themselves bound by kinship, and which held and administered sovereign land, according to its own whim? Because by your own standard (might makes right), it would seem you have to profess that the Holocaust was just a legitimate state being legitimate (whatever happens happens, man. states are states, don't ask further).

I think it was an evil action taken by a legitimate nation(or at least whether nazi Germany was a legitimate state turns on questions other than just the holocaust). I think the question of whether a state is legitimate is different to whether a state is good which is in turn different to whether the actions taken by a state are good, although these different questions interact. Might may not make right but it does often make states, I would actually add that there be some kind of internal coherency that is required. In a game of chess on turn one:

  1. moving my rook immediately over both my own pawn and my opponents pawn to take his rook is an illegitimate yet good move.
  2. moving my rook over my own pawn and placing it in front of my opponents pawn line would be an illegitimate bad move.
  3. if somehow both our pawns were already taken taking his rook with mine would be a legitimate good move.
  4. if somehow both our pawns were already taken moving my rook right in front of his to be taken for no material gain would be a legitimate bad move

And all of this would then interact with the question of whether I had gambled $1 vs the orphan's life I Was playing the game of chess against, in which case it would be evil for me to make good moves.

Look, I am not sure where this insistence on redefining (wrt my post) legitimacy to become functionality comes from. Even if everyone who ever used the word before me meant it this way, if you actually read what I wrote in its entirety, and think about it sufficiently, and maybe even ask AI if a reference is unknown to you, you will easily understand that I meant moral legitimacy. So it is pointless to respond as if I am wrong semantically.

But, that's granting you too much. The reality is a boatload of writers use legitimacy exactly how I used it! From Claude:

First split: descriptive vs normative

  • Descriptive (Max Weber): A state is legitimate if its people believe it is. Weber names three grounds for that belief:

    • tradition: it has always been there
    • charisma: faith in the ruler
    • legal-rational authority: trust in the rule of law

    He offers no moral test at all.

  • Normative: A state is legitimate only if its power or authority is actually justified. Philosophers disagree about what justifies it, which is where the schools below come in.

  • In between (political realists, Bernard Williams): A state must first provide security and order. That's necessary but not enough: it also has to be able to justify how it provides them. Williams calls this the "basic legitimation demand".

Normative sources of legitimacy

The SEP groups them by what grounds legitimacy:

Family Legitimate if… Key names
Consent the governed actually agree to it, explicitly or by staying (tacit consent) Locke, Nozick, Simmons
Hypothetical consent people would agree under ideal conditions Kant, Rawls
Public reason it rests on reasons all reasonable people can accept. Rawls's "liberal principle of legitimacy" Rawls, Quong, Gaus
Participation / deliberation everyone has an equal say in making decisions Rousseau, Habermas, Pettit
Consequences it produces good outcomes, such as happiness or justice Hume, Bentham, Mill
Service / perfectionist its directives help people act on reasons that already apply to them Raz
Fair play / Samaritan you benefit from it, or everyone has a duty to rescue each other from the anarchic "state of nature" Hart, Klosko, Wellman
Epistocracy ("rule by the knowledgeable") those who know best rule. Brennan: incompetence "justifies not permitting them to exercise political authority over others" Plato, Brennan
Philosophical anarchism no actual state meets the bar Wolff, Simmons

The SEP calls the first four will-based theories, which are dominant in modern philosophy. Consequences, service and fair play are fact-based, and epistocracy is belief-based.

Related questions that often get mixed up with legitimacy

  • Statehood (international law): The Montevideo Convention (1933) sets four criteria: "a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states." That tells you whether something is a state, not whether it's legitimate. Scholars also disagree on whether recognition by other states is needed (the "constitutive" view) or not (the "declarative" view).

  • Territorial rights: Who has a right to which land is a separate question from whether a state's authority is justified. The SEP's Territorial Rights entry lists the main theories:

    • natural law (Grotius)
    • Lockean property
    • Kantian justice
    • nationalist
    • self-determination
    • place-based

    Most of your Motte commenters are actually arguing about this question: who was there, how many and when.


Some people use it descriptively, or try to bake in democratism to it, but a lot of people just mean it fulfills a normative obligation! Which is what I want to talk about! I write legitimacy, you read statehood. There's pre-existing writing on this. Why are you doing that?

And, FWIW, I am not playing a trick here. I genuinely understand legitimacy to mean something like an emotive result determining the moral rightness of an authority or a thing. For example: « Is this copyright media usage legitimate? ». It is close to asking if it's legal, but more abstract. It could be legitimate and illegal if it is justified and the law is morally flawed. « Is this bag legitimate? » means is it authentic, meaning is it lying about its provenance or not? This meaning is a little different, but close to a moral evaluation and not a question as to whether the bag exists or if you did in fact pay a lot of money for it. Applied to a state, it's not asking if the state is a functional bag, it's asking for its moral provenance. I think this is a completely reasonable embodied understanding of the term for a heavy reader to have. The discussion is massively weighed down by people who can't get past my usage of the term who insist that legitimacy must mean and can only mean whether a state is functional, aka mighty.

I mean your OP turned almost entirely on the definition of "legitimate" so yeah, people are going to argue the semantics of it. You seem to want to essentially merge legitimate with good in order to justify denying the legitimacy of states you don't like or all states for that matter. I, and many, find that to be kind of a silly word game. You can say Israel delenda est if you want. That's fine, a totally legitimate thing to believe. But playing some word game about what it really means to be legitimate is unimpressive. Legitimate usually refers to whether something is authentic and Israel seems pretty authentic from most lenses, at least as authenticate as almost any other state. Its origin and composition is relatively normal as far as states go. I don't see any reason to overload the concept of legitimacy with all this other baggage when you could just use another term, like is Israel a moral state? And cut out all the confusion. If you're just an anarchist and don't believe that any states are legitimate then we needn't confuse things by focusing on israel.

I mean your OP turned almost entirely on the definition of "legitimate" so yeah, people are going to argue the semantics of it.

Maybe the first paragraph, but I think that's a mischaracterization of the entire post. I think most the replies make a boatload more sense if people stop after 1 to 3 paragraphs and write something up. Like I can see how they make sense if that's happening. I'm not sure what else is going on. I wrote:

(what type of state should there be?).

Now on the other hand the democratists say that the state is justified when it is popular.

I agree, rather, with Socrates (and Plato?) that the aristocratic rule by virtue is more just than the democracy.

And likewise the most legitimate state is the state of Reason (or what was called philosophy). I believe in modern times, Francis Galton and Friedrich Nietzsche have shown us the way to establish a legitimate state.

What sort of just foundation is that? Consider this: when one man declares himself sovereign, he is a laughing stock, like an ape. When a few men do it, they are criminals; yet when many men do it, I am supposed to profess that they are just?

I would prefer to keep my reason and see all such founders, not only Israel's, as laughing-stocks and criminals.

Imagine what could be done with North America if it were not already settled! That is the tragedy.

Some will say all of this is silly because it is impossible. But we know true aliyah is not impossible; Galton showed us that much.

I am not talking about actual Jews or gentiles. Zionism showed that a scattered people can migrate and found a state within a few decades; Galton showed what kind of state would be worth founding.

So the question I am asking is: would it be just for existing states to block the founding of a better one, and would its founders be wronged if they were blocked?

Yeah, I read your post and answered the narrow question of legitimacy. I think this would all be much clearer and maybe lead to better discussion if you didn't pose legitimacy as the question you are asking. People are consistently telling you that legitimacy and morality are separate questions and you keep scolding them for not answering the question of morality. As if legitimate but bad weren't a valid combination of descriptors. If you were asking "is Israel an immoral state" then there's some meat there. I'd argue that it's immoral by western standards but above par by mid east standards. Can you explain why you're insisting on the word legitimate?

Can you explain why you're insisting on the word legitimate?

American Heritage Dictionary, first thing I see when DuckDuckGoing the word:

legitimate /lə-jĭt′ə-mĭt/

adjective

   

Being in compliance with the law; lawful. "a legitimate business."

    

Being in accordance with established or accepted rules and standards. "legitimate advertising practices."

    

Valid or justifiable. "a legitimate complaint."

    

Based on logical reasoning. "a legitimate deduction."

What law do states submit to but natural law? Justifiable (morally) is the sense I am using, that is definition 3. Based on logical reasoning may seem different but I also hold to the reason theory of justice/legitimacy. So again, the question is more why people are insisting that I can't use the word. It's not weird at all that I'm using it, it's weird that there is difficulty understanding what I mean.

As for whether the state is immoral, maybe. I think I mean something deeper though, that is, whether there is any moral authority, while whether a state is immoral might be seen as less fundamental; a state might have moral authority but be temporarily immoral. Like their King, Solomon. He was immoral but they think he had moral authority / legitimacy. I would like to argue whether he had any moral authority (legitimacy) at all.

Another example, over 200 years ago: legitimists. Somehow everyone understood what they meant when they said Napoleon was not legitimate. They had a specific theory of legitimacy, birth right based on another aristocratic law, which I disagree with but not on the basis that I literally cannot understand their that concept differs from might.

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