The navy itched to demonstrate its parity/superiority to the white powers.
They were desperate. The oil embargo + the Dutch East Indies also embargoing them + the Americans planning to build ten fleet carriers in 1942 and a hell of a lot of escorts and battleships meant they had limited time left to act before they got crushed. Roosevelt was clearly moving towards war with Japan, as could be interpreted from his rhetoric, rebasing the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbour, the oil embargo, US volunteers in China, B-17s being deployed to the Philippines and the gargantuan military build-up. The US negotiating position was pretty heavy-handed too, demanding unilateral withdrawal from China, Manchuria and Indo-China.
Plus Japan fought well at Midway and lost the battle due to factors beyond their control - the US having broken their codes and the dive-bombers appearing out of a cloud at the absolute worst time.
The oil embargo + the Dutch East Indies also embargoing them + the Americans planning to build ten fleet carriers in 1942 and a hell of a lot of escorts and battleships meant they had limited time left to act before they got crushed.
History backs Nagano's view that Roosevelt would not have been able to justify way to the American public if it was only to protect the colonies of other nations. Had they avoided fighting America (leaving the Phillippines at their throat, yes), they might very well have avoided their disasters.
Plus Japan fought well at Midway and lost the battle due to factors beyond their control - the US having broken their codes and the dive-bombers appearing out of a cloud at the absolute worst time.
The skill of individuals on the Japanese side was high, but they absolutely failed to fight as well as they could have. Many of the decisions made during that battle make no sense even by the standards of what the Japanese should have known at the time.
The skill of individuals on the Japanese side was high, but they absolutely failed to fight as well as they could have. Many of the decisions made during that battle make no sense even by the standards of what the Japanese should have known at the time.
I only have a passing knowledge of this part of history (the Pacific war), but did Japan not get quite unlucky as well with scouting and with loading times of bombs/torpedoes?
Scouting is always a roll of luck in the age before satellite and radar. I plan to cover the Japanese scouting efforts in part 3.
It is not luck when we talk about loading bombs and torpedoes. That stems from design philosophy, since the carriers have to be built to a specific requirement before you train people on how to work aboard them.
Sure, it wasn‘t literally pure fortune, but is there not another definition of luck were decisions made have unforeseen effects?
If thievery is only caught 5% of the time, then a first-time thief getting caught would be quite unlucky. Much in the same way, the French were astonishingly incompetent in the Battle of Agincourt, but they were also unlucky with the weather.
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Notes -
They were desperate. The oil embargo + the Dutch East Indies also embargoing them + the Americans planning to build ten fleet carriers in 1942 and a hell of a lot of escorts and battleships meant they had limited time left to act before they got crushed. Roosevelt was clearly moving towards war with Japan, as could be interpreted from his rhetoric, rebasing the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbour, the oil embargo, US volunteers in China, B-17s being deployed to the Philippines and the gargantuan military build-up. The US negotiating position was pretty heavy-handed too, demanding unilateral withdrawal from China, Manchuria and Indo-China.
Plus Japan fought well at Midway and lost the battle due to factors beyond their control - the US having broken their codes and the dive-bombers appearing out of a cloud at the absolute worst time.
History backs Nagano's view that Roosevelt would not have been able to justify way to the American public if it was only to protect the colonies of other nations. Had they avoided fighting America (leaving the Phillippines at their throat, yes), they might very well have avoided their disasters.
The skill of individuals on the Japanese side was high, but they absolutely failed to fight as well as they could have. Many of the decisions made during that battle make no sense even by the standards of what the Japanese should have known at the time.
I only have a passing knowledge of this part of history (the Pacific war), but did Japan not get quite unlucky as well with scouting and with loading times of bombs/torpedoes?
Scouting is always a roll of luck in the age before satellite and radar. I plan to cover the Japanese scouting efforts in part 3.
It is not luck when we talk about loading bombs and torpedoes. That stems from design philosophy, since the carriers have to be built to a specific requirement before you train people on how to work aboard them.
Sure, it wasn‘t literally pure fortune, but is there not another definition of luck were decisions made have unforeseen effects?
If thievery is only caught 5% of the time, then a first-time thief getting caught would be quite unlucky. Much in the same way, the French were astonishingly incompetent in the Battle of Agincourt, but they were also unlucky with the weather.
To be clear, you are referring to the scouting efforts? As you'll see, the Japanese tempted fate.
Both.
But I would defer to any expertise on this, I don’t know much of Midway.
I think you'll find part 3 interesting, then, as I plan on addressing the scouting efforts and Japanese weapon arming.
Looking forward to it.
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