naraburns nihil supernum
7mo ago
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Israel-Gaza Megathread #1
This is a megathread for any posts on the conflict between (so far, and so far as I know) Hamas and the Israeli government, as well as related geopolitics. Culture War thread rules apply.
I've been thinking: what's the Palestinian path to victory? Ie. what's the course of action that would lead to an establishment of a from-the-river-to-the-sea Palestine? (Not focusing here on the desirability of that path etc.)
Any way one looks at it, the only way to get at this would be a war with Israel's neighbors joining in. Of course this hasn't happened since Yom Kippur War, and much of Israel's foreign and security policy has been successfully trying to make sure this doesn't happen. Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel and reasonably non-hostile governments (with their own reasons to hope that the situation stays stable), Lebanon and Syria are destabilized, Saudis are too dependent on US and too focused elsewhere to be a threat.
However, as far as I've understood, Egyptian and Jordanian populations continue to be strongly pro-Palestine, Jordan has a huge amount of Palestinian refugees, and Egypt continues to have many problems that make it a potential flash point. Would a sufficiently atrocious response by Israel have a possibility of leading to revolutions and strongly anti-Israel regimes taking power? Might Lebanon and Syria be stabilized, with Lebanon falling under Hezbollah rule? If all of Israel's neighbors started another big war, can Israel repeat the same as in 1947, 1968 and 1973? The traditional answer would be "probably", but the state of IDF currently looks like there's a lot of mythology and hot air underpinning that proposition.
I genuinely have no idea about these things, which is why I'm asking here.
A couple points around this that I don't think have been covered well enough yet:
The surrounding Arab countries never did really support Palestine or hate Israel that much, or trust each other that much. A big part of the reason Israel won their large-scale wars is that the Arab countries never did really unite. They were always scheming against each other, trying to ensure that one of the others did most of the fighting and took most of the losses. Yeah they don't like Israel, but they have not proved willing to put their own regimes at risk by committing sufficiently large forces to combat that they could be vulnerable to coups or counter-invasions if they suffered large losses.
Also, for anyone who looks at a map of the area, the surrounding Arab countries have hundreds of times more land area than Israel does. If any of them really cared about the Palestinians, they could easily offer to let them move into their countries. But none of them has ever offered that, even on a small scale. It seems they like the Palestinians more as a thorn in Israel's side and maybe as martyrs than they do as possible neighbors. (Jordan hasn't accepted any since 1967).
Given those realities, I don't think there's any way any action by Israel could lead to a united Arab world deciding to work together to raise large militaries and commit them to joint action against Israel, even leaving the nuclear angle out of the picture. If that was anywhere near being in the cards, why wouldn't they do the much cheaper and simpler option of offering the Palestinian people refuge in their countries first?
Of course, that also means I have no clue what Hamas is actually going for here besides a quick and briefly satisfying spasm of horrific violence mostly against civilians followed rapidly by an inevitable crushing by the IDF.
The surrounding Arab countries never did really support Palestine or hate Israel that much, or trust each other that much.
That depends on the country. Jordan was always a reluctant aggressor and did things like kick out the PLO and warn Israel of pending Arab attacks, but Assad blamed Israel for everything and was pissed when Jordan and Egypt signed peace treaties that foreclosed the opportunity of having another go of wiping them off the map.
The crux of the matter is that, in the Arab world, being anti-Israel is a popular sentiment, but the governments are smart enough to know that it's bad geopolitics. Egypt realized back in the 70s that a perpetual state of war was not to its advantage, but Sadat paid for that realization with his life. Jordan needed peace even sooner which makes the length of their holdout a testament to how pervasive popular sentiment can be; Hussein never came across as particularly anti-Israeli in interviews, and he was the king. The other Arab countries (aside from Syria and Lebanon) weren't directly involved in the conflict and probably never will be, so it's easy for them to withhold recognition. UAE is trying to fashion itself as an Arab state that's appealing to Westerners, so they can't afford to hold antiquated views about a country that isn't going anywhere lest people think they're just another Mideastern basket case. Morocco wanted to add some heft to its claims over Western Sahara, and they're far enough away that it doesn't cost them much. Sudan had sanctions they needed to be rid of, and they're a minor player in the whole Arab scene anyway. Bahrain is an interesting case, but it's small, dominated by US military interests, and is an absolute monarchy. But the point is generally that no Arab country will recognize Israel and normalize relations unless there's some carrot involved, and these carrots are usually the kind of thing that appeals more to the higher levels of government than to the average citizen; I doubt that the average Moroccan cares that much about the Sarahwi Arab Democratic Republic. Palestinians know this.
But the point is generally that no Arab country will recognize Israel and normalize relations unless there's some carrot involved, and these carrots are usually the kind of thing that appeals more to the higher levels of government than to the average citizen; I doubt that the average Moroccan cares that much about the Sarahwi Arab Democratic Republic.
There are plenty of countries where the local common man (at least the ones posting in the Internet) regularly works themselves up into an absolute lather over secessionist groups trying to split their country, so I'd imagine that the Moroccans would be quite similar.
It's possible, but those are usually in places where a local minority wants to separate territory that's already a well-established part of the larger country. Western Sahara was annexed in the late-1970s, which led to a war lasting over a decade, and the dispute has never been resolved. It's closer to a colonial issue than it is to, say, Basque separatists in Spain or Kurdish nationalists in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
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Notes -
I've been thinking: what's the Palestinian path to victory? Ie. what's the course of action that would lead to an establishment of a from-the-river-to-the-sea Palestine? (Not focusing here on the desirability of that path etc.)
Any way one looks at it, the only way to get at this would be a war with Israel's neighbors joining in. Of course this hasn't happened since Yom Kippur War, and much of Israel's foreign and security policy has been successfully trying to make sure this doesn't happen. Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel and reasonably non-hostile governments (with their own reasons to hope that the situation stays stable), Lebanon and Syria are destabilized, Saudis are too dependent on US and too focused elsewhere to be a threat.
However, as far as I've understood, Egyptian and Jordanian populations continue to be strongly pro-Palestine, Jordan has a huge amount of Palestinian refugees, and Egypt continues to have many problems that make it a potential flash point. Would a sufficiently atrocious response by Israel have a possibility of leading to revolutions and strongly anti-Israel regimes taking power? Might Lebanon and Syria be stabilized, with Lebanon falling under Hezbollah rule? If all of Israel's neighbors started another big war, can Israel repeat the same as in 1947, 1968 and 1973? The traditional answer would be "probably", but the state of IDF currently looks like there's a lot of mythology and hot air underpinning that proposition.
I genuinely have no idea about these things, which is why I'm asking here.
A couple points around this that I don't think have been covered well enough yet:
The surrounding Arab countries never did really support Palestine or hate Israel that much, or trust each other that much. A big part of the reason Israel won their large-scale wars is that the Arab countries never did really unite. They were always scheming against each other, trying to ensure that one of the others did most of the fighting and took most of the losses. Yeah they don't like Israel, but they have not proved willing to put their own regimes at risk by committing sufficiently large forces to combat that they could be vulnerable to coups or counter-invasions if they suffered large losses.
Also, for anyone who looks at a map of the area, the surrounding Arab countries have hundreds of times more land area than Israel does. If any of them really cared about the Palestinians, they could easily offer to let them move into their countries. But none of them has ever offered that, even on a small scale. It seems they like the Palestinians more as a thorn in Israel's side and maybe as martyrs than they do as possible neighbors. (Jordan hasn't accepted any since 1967).
Given those realities, I don't think there's any way any action by Israel could lead to a united Arab world deciding to work together to raise large militaries and commit them to joint action against Israel, even leaving the nuclear angle out of the picture. If that was anywhere near being in the cards, why wouldn't they do the much cheaper and simpler option of offering the Palestinian people refuge in their countries first?
Of course, that also means I have no clue what Hamas is actually going for here besides a quick and briefly satisfying spasm of horrific violence mostly against civilians followed rapidly by an inevitable crushing by the IDF.
That depends on the country. Jordan was always a reluctant aggressor and did things like kick out the PLO and warn Israel of pending Arab attacks, but Assad blamed Israel for everything and was pissed when Jordan and Egypt signed peace treaties that foreclosed the opportunity of having another go of wiping them off the map.
The crux of the matter is that, in the Arab world, being anti-Israel is a popular sentiment, but the governments are smart enough to know that it's bad geopolitics. Egypt realized back in the 70s that a perpetual state of war was not to its advantage, but Sadat paid for that realization with his life. Jordan needed peace even sooner which makes the length of their holdout a testament to how pervasive popular sentiment can be; Hussein never came across as particularly anti-Israeli in interviews, and he was the king. The other Arab countries (aside from Syria and Lebanon) weren't directly involved in the conflict and probably never will be, so it's easy for them to withhold recognition. UAE is trying to fashion itself as an Arab state that's appealing to Westerners, so they can't afford to hold antiquated views about a country that isn't going anywhere lest people think they're just another Mideastern basket case. Morocco wanted to add some heft to its claims over Western Sahara, and they're far enough away that it doesn't cost them much. Sudan had sanctions they needed to be rid of, and they're a minor player in the whole Arab scene anyway. Bahrain is an interesting case, but it's small, dominated by US military interests, and is an absolute monarchy. But the point is generally that no Arab country will recognize Israel and normalize relations unless there's some carrot involved, and these carrots are usually the kind of thing that appeals more to the higher levels of government than to the average citizen; I doubt that the average Moroccan cares that much about the Sarahwi Arab Democratic Republic. Palestinians know this.
There are plenty of countries where the local common man (at least the ones posting in the Internet) regularly works themselves up into an absolute lather over secessionist groups trying to split their country, so I'd imagine that the Moroccans would be quite similar.
It's possible, but those are usually in places where a local minority wants to separate territory that's already a well-established part of the larger country. Western Sahara was annexed in the late-1970s, which led to a war lasting over a decade, and the dispute has never been resolved. It's closer to a colonial issue than it is to, say, Basque separatists in Spain or Kurdish nationalists in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
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